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1. INTRODUCTION 
Copyright protection ought to serve the public interest by incentivising artistic 
labour and facilitating dissemination of creative works. Inevitably, granting 
exclusive rights, as one of the means of achieving the objectives of copyright pro-
tection, comes at the cost of reduced public access to protected works and distorted 
competition. Therefore, control conferred by exclusive rights is not absolute but 
must be confined to what is necessary to serve the rationales of copyright pro-
tection. 
Development of technology has challenged the established approaches to 
defining the appropriate scope of exclusive rights. Not least, the emergence of the 
digital environment as a new dissemination channel has contested the traditional 
distinction between the rights of material and immaterial dissemination enshrined 
under secondary EU law in the field of copyright. Whereas the secondary law 
seemingly denies any general limit to the right holder’s control over any primary 
or secondary acts of immaterial dissemination, the recent developments under 
CJEU jurisprudence suggest that variable circumstances of exploitation of a work 
call for a more flexible approach. 
This thesis explores the development of the key economic rights under the EU 
copyright acquis against technological advancements and the distinction drawn 
between material and immaterial dissemination rights under secondary EU law. 
The thesis advances the idea that the assumption enshrined under the EU copy-
right framework at the very outset of copyright harmonisation is outdated and 
suggests reconciling the approaches to regulating dissemination-related rights in 
the light of the developments under the acquis, the changing circumstances of a 
work’s exploitation, and the background outlined below. 
 
 
1.1. Copyright, technology, and online dissemination 
A significant share of works protected by copyright is disseminated online.1 
Whether one searches for a movie on a DVD on Amazon, purchases Kindle  
e-books, or streams music on Spotify, the Internet seems to accommodate any 
possible way of accessing and consuming the copyright-protected content. Like-
wise, performances and concerts, traditionally confined to concert halls and 
theatres, can now be enjoyed in real time and without leaving the comfort zone 
of one’s home. 
The diversity of ways of accessing works offered by a vast number of inter-
mediaries is accompanied by a variety of restrictions on their consumption. 
                                                                                             
1  Distribution through digital channels accounts for more than fifty percent of the global 
music recording industry income and a substantial part of film and publishing industry 
revenue. International Federation of the Phonographic Industry. Key Statistics of 2018. 
Available at http://www.ifpi.org/global-statistics.php (July 14, 2019). 
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Whereas a person might keep a DVD forever, opt to lend it to a friend, or even 
sell it, their control over an e-book purchased from Amazon Kindle or a Netflix 
subscription generally ends at the time of purchase. The individual will learn that 
e-books downloaded are licensed and, hence, cannot be transferred, resold, or 
even retrieved from the particular application enabling them to actually read it. 
Equally, a user will discover that the Spotify subscription cannot be passed on 
and, even though they paid an annual fee equivalent to approximately ten music 
albums, they will be left with nothing more than the free version of the service 
once they discontinue the paid subscription.2 
While a person might choose to open a second-hand store to resell books and 
tangible copies of multimedia, they are also likely to be charged with the infringe-
ment of copyright for launching a webpage for resale of legitimately acquired  
e-books.3 Besides, they might want to refrain from setting up a publicly accessible 
webpage for the exchange of digital files, as users may happen to share infringing 
copies of works.4 Similarly, posting a link to content of unknown origin on a 
personal webpage can get them in trouble, in particular, if the webpage in some 
way generates income.5 
An individual may understand that downloading a cat drawing and uploading 
it on their webpage might not be acceptable, even if the drawing is already freely 
accessible to the Internet community.6 However, other restrictions on the disposal 
of the legitimately acquired digital content may raise questions. Why cannot 
someone lend an e-book to a friend, donate it to a library, or even resell it, if they 
are not making it publicly accessible to anybody with an Internet connection? 
Someone may have used to exchange physical books with their fellow Nordic 
noir fans, but a similar exchange is not possible with e-books. Providers usually 
do not allow any transfer and, even if they did, the different digital formats used 
by readers would not necessarily be compatible.  
Nonetheless, a person will also learn, to their big surprise, that Bandcamp 
allows them to download purchased music albums as many times as they need. 
                                                                                             
2  The free version allows users to stream music but not to cache songs for offline access or 
to decide in which order to play the recordings. 
3  Tom Kabinet is a platform for the resale of DRM-free e-books and a party in an ongoing 
dispute in the Netherlands. The Court of The Hague has referred several questions on the 
interpretation of EU secondary law to the CJEU, Request for a preliminary ruling in Neder-
lands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet and others (2018) 
Case C-263/18. 
4  Essentially, the circumstances of the Ziggo case examined by the CJEU, where the Court 
held that providing a platform for an exchange of infringing copies of a work infringed the 
exclusive right of communication to the public. See CJEU, Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and 
XS4All Internet BV. (2017) Case C-610/15, Judgment of 26 April 2017 and section 5.2.3.2.2.3.  
5  Pursuant to the criteria developed by the CJEU in the GSMedia case. See CJEU, GS Media 
BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case C-160/15, Judgment of 8 Sep-
tember 2016 and section 5.2.3.2.2.3.  
6  Consider the circumstances of the Renckhoff case, CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v 
Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 7 August 2018. See also section 5.2.3.1.2. 
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The files are also DRM (digital rights management)-free, which allows backup 
copies and transferring them between any device. Readers may be surprised to 
discover that some retailers offer e-books without DRM. Not all the items in the 
Amazon Kindle store are actually supplied with DRM, but there is no way to 
know in advance. These other platforms do not seem to be scared of a user copying 
the files hundreds of times and sharing it with their friends. Even if they do, they 
do not show it, and they let users pay the artist a little extra on top of what is asked 
and pass along a personal note to them.7 
This brief discourse into the dos and don’ts of online behaviour in relation to 
copyright-protected content illustrates the shift that has taken place in the past 
two decades. Whilst no permission is required to dispose of an acquired tangible 
copy of a work, users are now forced to accept the limits on what is permissible 
in the online environment. Whereas the practices of platforms offering access to 
works differ, the greater the variety of the supply or the higher the demand for it, 
the more restrictions on its disposal seem to be in place. There is no simple 
explanation for the current practices. Business models rely on a complicated 
mixture of licensing arrangements, contracts, and rights under copyright, the 
scope of which is examined here. 
The digital environment has enabled a variety of services and made on-demand 
access to works, de facto, the new standard.8 Besides a new dissemination channel, 
technology has also enabled unprecedented control over the works, be it in the 
context of online access or transfer of digital copies.9 Whereas copyright protects 
the exploitation of a work, the individual copies traditionally remained largely 
out of reach for copyright holders once distributed.10 However, the situation has 
changed in the online setting, where control over digital copies reaches beyond 
authorising initial access and encompasses the circumstances of consuming a 
work.11 Mere consumption of a work as such is outside of the copyright regu-
lation.12 However, the demarcation between uses which are relevant for copyright 
and those which are not becomes increasingly less evident.13 
                                                                                             
7  The feature of Bandcamp’s service, where artists list minimum prices, and the platform 
allows fans to pay a higher price and to send a personal note. 
8  On benefits for the right holders and consumers, see Waldfogel (2017), pp. 208–210; 
Longhini (2016), p. 106. 
9  For instance, technological protection measures do not only enforce provisions of license 
agreements but also de facto expand control over a work and copies thereof. See Poort (2018), 
p. 291.  
10  Exploitation of a work is enabled by the fact that transfer of a copy does not entail transfer 
of the rights in a work. See Koktvedgaard (1970), p. 229; Rognstad (2018), p. 138. 
11  On the role of technological protection measures in securing control over consumption, 
see Hilty (2018), p. 877. 
12  Dusollier (2018), p. 166. 
13  On consumption being outside the scope of copyright protection, see Hugenholtz (2000a), 
p. 486; Wiebe (2019), UrhG § 15 Allgemeines Rn. 6–8. In the contemporary setting, see Hilty 
(2018), p. 874. 
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The opportunities offered by the emergence of new distribution channels 
prompted the expansion of the scope of exclusive rights under copyright.14 Major 
additions to the international copyright framework were negotiated in the 1990s 
at the outset of the online environment as a channel of a work’s exploitation.15 
Besides subjecting any online communication of a work to the authorisation of 
the right holder, the negotiated provisions also secured the non-interference with 
the right holder’s implementation of technological protection measures (TPMs) 
applied in connection with the exercise of exclusive rights. 
The influence of such a legislative development has been two-fold. On the one 
hand, such a legal regime combined with the technological possibilities facilitated 
the development of a variety of business models offering access to legitimate 
copyright-protected content. On the other hand, it has essentially either restricted 
or discouraged secondary use of a work, whether by a third party or by an end 
user. As has been illustrated at the beginning of this section, the latter often 
clashes with the expectations of users which were formed by the circumstances 
of the analogue world.16 
The tendency of expanding control accorded by exclusive rights is also evi-
dent at the European Union (EU) level, where copyright harmonisation under the 
acquis is guided by the goal of a high level of protection.17 The development of 
the scope of exclusive rights and the permissible limitations under the acquis has 
been influenced by this objective, which has attracted extensive critique from 
scholars.18 The combination of broad, all-encompassing rights and an exhaustive 
list of narrowly defined limitations results in an asymmetry implicating the task 
of balancing the divergent objectives of copyright protection and interferes with 
the freedom of MS to devise their own solutions.19 
One of the reasons why online usages which appear functionally equivalent to 
traditional tangible distribution are treated differently is because the EU copy-
right framework does not explicitly draw a boundary of the right holder’s 
                                                                                             
14  See Synodinou on copyright resisting new technologies and gradually expanding the scope 
of the rights, Synodinou (2014), p. 81. Also, Ohly on the history of copyright as expanding 
exclusive rights, Ohly (2009), p. 238. 
15  First and foremost, the adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted in Geneva on 20 
December 1996 (WIPO Copyrigth Treaty) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights signed on 15 April 1994 (TRIPS Agreement). 
16  See Guibault (2008). 
17  EU copyright acquis refers to the body of common obligations for EU Member States in 
the field of copyright. Secondary EU law refers to the part of the acquis comprising the 
Directives and Regulations in the field of copyright. Jurisprudence refers to the body of the 
case law of the Court of Justice of the EU interpreting the acquis. 
18  See Ohly on the need to adopt a level-playing field approach rather than an author-centric 
one, Ohly (2009), pp. 239–240. Also, see van Gompel arguing against the high level of 
protection as a goal in itself, since it does not necessarily contribute to enhanced creativity and 
innovation, van Gompel (2017), p. 307.  
19  See Ohly (2009), p. 236; van Eechoud et al. (2009), pp. 94–118; Hugenholtz (2019), 
Rosenmeier et al. (2019), pp. 17–24. 
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exclusive control over dissemination unless it concerns distribution of tangible 
copies. Whereas the exhaustion principle recognised under the right of distri-
bution implies that control of the tangible copies by virtue of the exclusive right 
expires once the right holder has marketed the copy, no such limit exists in regard 
to digital copies or other forms of online dissemination. Such a differential treat-
ment has been explained, inter alia, on the basis of the distinction between mate-
rial and immaterial dissemination of a work, where only the former type justifies 
placing a general limit on the reach of the exclusive right. 
This distinction has influenced legislative choices made in the 1990s. Material 
dissemination is associated with the distribution of tangible copies, which enables 
the right holder to obtain compensation through the initial act of dissemination. 
Immaterial dissemination, on the other hand, encompasses communication of a 
work without providing any tangible copies, hence, through a performance, broad-
cast, and the like. The rationale behind the distinction lies essentially in the eco-
nomic underpinning of exclusive rights. Through sale of copies the right holder 
would be able to obtain remuneration for each copy. On the other hand, value of 
a work might not be realised through first exploitation in the form of performance. 
The distinction has been used to differentiate between the exclusive rights 
under copyright and justify their respective boundaries. In the EU, the main dis-
semination-related rights, the right of distribution and the right of communication 
to the public, have been harmonised accordingly. Whereas the scope of the right 
of distribution, as corresponding to material dissemination, has been limited by 
means of the exhaustion principle to the acts of first distribution, the right of 
communication to the public, associated with immaterial dissemination, covers 
both the initial and any subsequent act of communication of a work. 
Hence, although the online environment has enabled a variety of ways to com-
municate a work, resembling both distribution and performance, online dis-
semination under the EU acquis is treated as essentially immaterial in nature. The 
latter has resulted, inter alia, in denying any general limits to the right of commu-
nication to the public comparable to the exhaustion principle for the right of dis-
tribution. The broadly defined right of communication to the public accompanied 
by narrowly construed permissible exceptions under the EU acquis has led to a 
drastic expansion of control accorded to the right holder.20 
However, the recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) interpreting secondary EU law in the field of copyright has chal-
lenged this enshrined perception of the homogeneous nature of online dissemina-
tion. Among other things, the Court has sanctioned the resale of software which 
was distributed online by extending the exhaustion principle to online dissemina-
tion resembling the sale of tangible copies.21 Furthermore, the Court has on a few 
                                                                                             
20  See Hilty on the short list of limitations applicable to digital uses, Hilty (2004), p. 766. 
21  In the famous UsedSoft case. See CJEU, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. 
(2012) Case C-128/11, Judgment of 3 July 2012 and section 4.2.3.3. The impact of the ruling, 
however, is so far confined only to software, as other subject matters of copyright are regulated 
under a different instrument. 
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occasions restricted the reach of the right of communication to the public beyond 
the authorisation of primary communication, employing arguments resembling 
exhaustion.22 
The importance of the overall development is three-fold. First and foremost, 
it undermined the legal certainty as to the extent of protection conferred by 
exclusive rights under the acquis. Functionally similar acts are potentially subject 
to different treatment, depending on whether dissemination is taking place online 
and what type of a work it concerns. The technology-specific approach to defining 
the rights under secondary EU law and the constantly evolving jurisprudence of 
the CJEU make it difficult to apprehend the peculiarities of assessing the possibility 
to limit the rights. Second, the broad wording of the right of communication to 
the public has a chilling effect on possible secondary uses of a work, as it appears 
to preclude generating any additional value for a user even though the right holder 
has obtained remuneration through first dissemination. Finally, the absence of 
legal certainty complicates the clearance of the rights as well as their management 
by collective management organisations (CMO). The latter, for instance, have 
been seeking additional compensation on the basis of the broad scope of the right 
of communication to the public.23 
The recent developments resulted in numerous calls for reconsidering the 
approach to regulating the exclusive rights under the EU copyright acquis, in 
particular with respect to delineating their scope in the online environment.24 The 
main concern is that the EU copyright framework provides very little flexibility 
in apprehending the variety of ways in which a work could be disseminated 
online, which is particularly problematic considering the high degree of harmo-
nisation of the economic rights under secondary EU law.25 Furthermore, the 
CJEU, entrusted with interpretation of the secondary law, must navigate issues 
arising in an online setting on the basis of the concepts enshrined into the Direc-
tives even before such kinds of exploitation could be anticipated. 
Evolving circumstances of exploiting a work might call for new approaches 
to regulating the scope of protection.26 Holding on to the traditional paradigms 
may not be warranted in the age of new technological possibilities.27 The extent 
                                                                                             
22  Sganga (2018b), pp. 213, 227–228. 
23  For instance, for the public receipt of a broadcast. See section 5.2.3.2.1.3.4. 
24  For a summary of the main arguments see Rendas (2018), pp. 155–160. In the context of 
online dissemination see Hugenholtz et al. (2018), Ginsburg (2002), Rognstad (2015), Geiger 
(2017), Westkamp (2017), Depreeuw (2014). 
25  Rognstad (2009), pp. 532, 536. See also Hilty holding that, by limiting the elbowroom for 
the MS, EU legislation also interferes with their ability to respond to newly emerging needs 
to balance the interests. Hilty (2004), p. 766. 
26  Jenner calls the discussion whether it is a download or a stream, under what section of the 
act does it fall and where and who owns it “an arcane Medieval teleological discussion”, 
Jenner (2011), p. 59. 
27  See Heide on copyright as an invention of legislature, whose contours can be shaped towards 
what we need it to be. Heide (2004), p. 102. 
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to which consumption of a work and any secondary use can be controlled in the 
online environment stretches well beyond what would be possible or permissible 
in the analogue world and is not necessarily justified by the underlying rationales 
of copyright protection.28 In the light of the developments under the EU acquis, 
this thesis undertakes to illustrate the role of the assumptions made at the outset 
of the EU harmonisation, demonstrate how they have been challenged by the need 
to sustain a flexible approach to the boundaries of exclusive rights, and provide 
an outlook on how the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights 
could be reconciled to better serve the rationales of copyright protection. 
 
 
1.2. Scope of this thesis 
Against the background outlined in the previous section, this thesis explores the 
role of the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination in shaping 
the scope of the dissemination-related rights under the EU copyright acquis. The 
analysis focuses on the scope of the exclusive control conferred by the rights 
reaching beyond authorising every initial act of dissemination. For this purpose, 
the development of the two main rights covering dissemination of a work under 
the EU acquis is studied: the right of distribution and the right of communication 
to the public. 
The scope of conferred control and the limits thereof depend essentially on 
the rationales and the objectives of copyright protection.29 Hence, the analysis in 
this thesis is based on the assumption that none of the theories underlying the 
rationales of copyright protection calls for a single blanket right entailing com-
plete control over a work. When it comes to the results of the development of the 
EU acquis in the light of the distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination, they are evaluated towards the incentive rationale of copyright pro-
tection with the emphasis on the economic underpinning of the rights and their 
limits. 
Two primary objectives are pursued in this thesis. The first objective is to 
demonstrate how the changing circumstances of exploitation of a work have 
driven the convergence of approaches to defining the scope of material and 
immaterial dissemination rights under the EU acquis. The second objective is to 
offer a way to reconcile the approaches by outlining a normative framework for 
assessing the justifiability of subjecting secondary dissemination to the exclusive 
right holder’s control, pursuant to the developments under the EU copyright 
acquis. 
 
                                                                                             
28  For example, the economic rationale of copyright protection on the basis of mitigating a 
market failure does not support extension of exclusive rights to acts that lack market failure, 
such as control of individual copies on a downstream market. See Poort (2018), p. 331. 
29  See Rognstad on the delineation of the exclusive rights as depending on the policy choices. 
Rognstad (2018), p. 123. 
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1.2.1. Research design 
Historically, the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
triggered the application of different rights with a diverse scope, enabling 
exploitation of a work while maintaining appropriate limits of control. However, 
the emergence of new exploitation opportunities, in particular in an online 
environment, has challenged that distinction. The absence of a material medium 
as a primary indication of material dissemination, where exclusive control could 
be restricted to primary dissemination, has prompted legislators to approach the 
new ways of exploitation from the perspective of immaterial dissemination. 
Under the EU acquis, the distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination has been used early on in the process of harmonisation. First, the 
CJEU relied on it to justify a divergent treatment of the exclusive rights when their 
exercise conflicted with the objectives of the Treaties. Second, the distinction 
became a basis for harmonising the exclusive rights under EU secondary law. 
Nevertheless, the recent developments under the CJEU jurisprudence have ques-
tioned the assumptions enshrined under secondary EU law at the very outset of 
copyright harmonisation.  
The Court has shown flexibility when interpreting the right of communication 
to the public, which had been harmonised based on its seemingly immaterial 
nature and, hence, lacking any general limits under secondary law. Although 
there could be other grounds justifying placing no general boundaries on the par-
ticular right, the criterion of tangibility is too simplistic and has rarely been 
explicitly employed by the CJEU.30 Instead, the Court has resorted, inter alia, to 
the functional equivalent approach when assessing online dissemination resem-
bling the conventional distribution of tangible copies.31 Also, the CJEU has 
developed a number of criteria which, in certain circumstances, exempt the 
secondary acts of communication from the exclusive control of the right holder.32 
These developments resulted in a substantial impairment to legal certainty. 
The limits of protection are decided on a case-by-case basis. Any new ruling from 
the CJEU is rigorously studied in an attempt to systematise the Court’s approach 
and to predict the boundaries of the rights under the acquis.33 This thesis con-
tributes to the body of research on the EU copyright acquis by focusing on a 
single yet significant distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
rights. Employed at the very outset of harmonisation, it has influenced the 
                                                                                             
30  The tangible nature of copies was discussed explicitly in the VOB case concerning the 
lending right under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive, CJEU, Vereniging Openbare 
Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht. (2016) Case C-174/15, Judgment of 10 November 2016. 
Also, see sections 3.2.4.3. and 3.3.1.3. 
31  In particular, in the UsedSoft case. See section 3.3.3. 
32  Such as a new public criterion, different technical means, etc. 
33  Few empirical studies of the CJEU jurisprudence have been recently conducted: Favale et 
al. (2016), Favale et al. (2018), Rendas (2018), Rosati (2019). 
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development of the rights but might no longer adequately reflect the relevant 
considerations. 
 
 
1.2.1.1. Research questions 
This thesis questions the assumption enshrined under secondary EU law in the 
light of developments under the acquis and the changing circumstances of a 
work’s exploitation. Besides examining the background to the harmonisation of 
the rights and their scope under secondary law, it explores whether the distinction 
between material and immaterial rights has been maintained under the subsequent 
CJEU jurisprudence. Next, the thesis investigates how the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination rights could be reconciled for the assessment of 
justifiability of submitting secondary dissemination to the exclusive control of 
right holder under the acquis. 
 
This thesis asks two overall research questions: 
1. How does the development of the rights of distribution and communication to 
the public under the EU acquis reflect the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination rights? 
2. How could the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination be 
reconciled to define the scope of exclusive rights beyond authorising every 
communication of a work? 
 
Answering the two overall questions is supported by asking supporting sub-ques-
tions. Namely, answering the first overall question relies on addressing the fol-
lowing questions:  
• How and for what purpose is the distinction between material and immaterial 
dissemination drawn in the context of copyright? How does the distinction 
relate to copyright rationales and how has it been challenged by technology 
development? 
• What has enshrining the distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination rights under the EU framework meant for national laws and the 
freedom of MS to legislate? 
• How was the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
enshrined under secondary EU law and what were the driving forces? 
• What circumstances have influenced the need and the form of harmonisation 
of the right of distribution, the right of communication to the public, and the 
exhaustion principle under the EU acquis? 
• What role has the exhaustion principle played in limiting the scope of the 
exclusive distribution right pursuant to material dissemination under secondary 
EU law? 
• Does the development of the right of distribution under the EU copyright frame-
work reflect material dissemination and, if so, how? Does the development of 
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the right of communication to the public reflect immaterial dissemination and, 
if so, how? 
• How does the exhaustion principle perform its function of limiting the right 
of material dissemination given the subsequent development of technology 
and the acquis? 
Answering the second overall research question, in turn, is supported by the con-
clusions of the analysis addressing the first overall question and answering the 
following supporting sub-questions:  
• What are the indications of the convergence of the approaches to material and 
immaterial dissemination rights under the EU acquis? 
• What common criteria can be used to systematise the extent of control over 
secondary communication, relying on initially authorised communication, 
under the EU acquis? How do these criteria relate to the incentive rationale 
and the objectives of protection under the acquis? 
• What are the main shortcomings of the current EU copyright framework in 
accommodating the developed criteria? 
 
The thesis refers to dissemination of a work broadly as to any way to communi-
cate its content to the public, e.g. through distribution of copies, performance, 
recitation, broadcast, streaming. Communication of a work might be a somewhat 
better term from the linguistic perspective and will be used interchangeably with 
dissemination, in particular in the last chapter of the thesis (Chapter 6). However, 
to avoid confusion between communication in the broad meaning of dissemi-
nating a work and communication falling within the scope of the rights of 
communication to the public, the term dissemination is preferred for the analysis 
of the scope of the exclusive rights. 
 
 
1.2.1.2. Methods and sources 
The first overall research question aims to ascertain what role the distinction 
between material and immaterial dissemination rights has played in EU copyright 
harmonisation. Given the structure of the EU legal framework, it is necessary to 
examine two aspects to answer this question. The first relevant aspect is how the 
distinction between material and immaterial dissemination influenced harmoni-
sation under secondary EU law. The second related aspect is whether the subse-
quent development under the CJEU jurisprudence supports the distinction drawn 
under EU secondary law. 
The second overall research question aims to offer a way to reconcile the 
approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights on the basis of the 
developments under the EU acquis. In order to answer the second question, two 
aspects must be examined. The first aspect is what common criteria for approach-
ing the scope of the rights beyond authorising every initial communication can 
be derived from the development of the rights under the acquis. The second 
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aspect is how these criteria could be reconciled under a common framework for 
assessment and in accordance with the rationales of the EU copyright acquis.  
The analysis combines both descriptive and normative methods in order to 
answer the research questions. The first question, although being normative in 
nature, also requires a descriptive analysis of the legal framework in force. In 
order to set a stage for the analysis of the development of the rights under the 
acquis, first, the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination is 
explored towards the rationales of copyright protection. Second, the significance 
of employing the distinction under the EU copyright for the national laws of the 
MS is examined using the Scandinavian countries as an example.34 In addition to 
the analytical method, the comparative method is applied to assess the divergent 
approaches to implementing the obligations under the acquis under national laws. 
Next, the analysis turns to the exclusive rights under the EU copyright acquis 
as reflecting the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
rights. The inquiry starts with a historical analysis of the background to the har-
monisation of the exclusive rights of communication and distribution at the inter-
national and EU levels. Against this background, the scope of the rights under 
secondary EU law is addressed using the literal, contextual, and teleological 
interpretation methods. Next, the subsequent development of the exclusive rights 
under CJEU jurisprudence is analysed through the prism of the distinction 
between material and immaterial dissemination rights as entailing limiting or 
extending the reach of the right beyond initial authorisation of each dis-
semination. 
The analysis and conclusions to the first overall research question form a basis 
for deriving the common criteria for a normative framework for assessing the 
justifiability of submitting acts of secondary dissemination to the exclusive right 
holder’s control. These criteria are evaluated towards the incentive rationale of 
copyright and the economic underpinning of the rights under the EU acquis and 
divided into primary and ancillary elements of the framework accordingly. The 
primary elements shall form a basis for the assessment, whereas the ancillary ones 
can complement the primary elements provided that the objectives of the exclu-
sive rights under the acquis are clarified. Last, the main shortcomings of the cur-
rent copyright framework under secondary EU law in accommodating the offered 
criteria are emphasised. 
The analysis is supported by a variety of sources, including legislation, pre-
paratory works, jurisprudence, and legal scholarship. When it comes to the EU 
copyright acquis, which is the main focus of this thesis, primary and secondary 
                                                                                             
34  As will be elaborated in Chapter 2, Scandinavian copyright is characterised by the weight 
of public interests in copyright law-making and the broad right of making a work available, 
which is meant to withstand the challenges of law-making following the technology develop-
ment. Harmonisation under the EU acquis has limited the ability to serve the public interest 
and adapt the copyright framework to technological advancements. See section 2.3. 
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EU legal sources as well as CJEU jurisprudence are analysed.35 Whereas the his-
torical analysis of the development of the rights of distribution and communica-
tion to the public examines a variety of the Directives in the field of copyright, 
the primary focus of the analysis is the InfoSoc Directive, which is the main 
instrument of harmonisation of the economic rights.36 The CJEU jurisprudence 
also takes an essential place in the assessment of the development of the rights 
under the acquis, as the Court plays an increasingly important role in EU copy-
right harmonisation despite the absent system of binding precedents.37 Besides 
the legal sources and jurisprudence, preparatory works to the legislative instru-
ments are analysed. 
Whereas the purpose of the analysis of the international instruments is not to 
provide an all-encompassing picture of the obligations under international law 
but to place the developments in the broader context of copyright evolution, the 
variety of sources are taken into consideration. Of primary interest are the provi-
sions of the Berne Convention (BC), the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WIPO CT), 
and the TRIPS Agreement.38 Besides these instruments and their preparatory 
works, the analysis includes the provisions of the Universal Copyright Conven-
tion (UCC) and the negotiations on the Model provisions for legislation in the 
field of copyright and on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention (PPBC), 
ongoing in the 1990s. Although the negotiations on a Model Law and a possible 
Protocol did not result in the adoption of binding instruments, they laid the 
ground for the subsequent adoption of the WIPO CT and contribute to the under-
standing of the circumstances leading to the harmonisation of the rights. 
Last but not least, the discussion on the impact of the EU harmonisation on 
national laws relies on the analysis of Scandinavian copyright, with the focus on 
copyright legislation in Sweden and Norway. It explores the discussion preceding 
the adoption of the Swedish and Norwegian copyright acts in the 1960s, and the 
developments taking place since the adoption of the acts, including the new 
Norwegian Copyright Act (NCA) of 2018. Besides the copyright acts, the pre-
paratory works to the acts and to subsequent amendments are analysed, as they 
constitute an important source of interpretation under Scandinavian copyright. 
                                                                                             
35  Primary EU law comprises the Treaties, whereas secondary EU law in the context of this 
thesis consists of the Directives and Regulations in the field of copyright. EU copyright acquis 
is used in this thesis as referring to both primary and secondary EU law, complemented by the 
CJEU jurisprudence.  
36  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
22.6.2001. OJ L 167/10. 
37  See Rosati on no formal system of precedents but the crucial role of the CJEU preliminary 
rulings, Rosati (2019), pp. 73–85. Also, Hartley on the role of the jurisprudence in the EU 
law-making and van Eechoud on the role of preliminary procedures and scholarly engage-
ment: Hartley (2014), pp. 71–72.; van Eechoud (2012). 
38  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on 
September 28, 1979), WIPO Copyright Treaty, adopted in Geneva on 20 December 1996; 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights signed on 15 April 1994. 
26 
1.2.2. Theses set forth for the defence 
On the basis of the research conducted in this thesis, the following theses are set 
forth for the defence: 
1. The development of the rights of distribution and communication to the public 
under the CJEU jurisprudence conflicts with the envisaged scope of the rights 
under the InfoSoc Directive. 
2. Whereas the CJEU appears to exercise greater flexibility when interpreting 
the scope of exclusive rights than supported under the InfoSoc Directive, the 
development further limits the freedom of the MS to legislate and is to the 
detriment to legal certainty. 
3. Reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights 
under the acquis would be a logical step given the developments, advancing 
flexibility while improving legal certainty. 
4. Reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination could 
be achieved by defining common criteria for assessing the justifiability of sub-
jecting secondary communication to the exclusive control of the right holder 
rather than operating the all-or-nothing rule under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc. 
5. The main shortcomings of the current EU copyright framework in accommo-
dating a flexible approach to the appropriate scope of control accorded by 
exclusive rights is the ambiguity of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive and 
the all-or-nothing rule of the exhaustion principle enshrined under Article 
4(2). 
 
 
1.2.3. Limits of the study and future research 
Evaluating the development of the rights under the EU acquis based on the dis-
tinction between material and immaterial dissemination rights implies that the 
conclusions drawn here serve to inform copyright policy without necessarily 
taking a definite stance on the appropriate boundaries of protection or each specific 
right. The objectives of copyright policy go beyond providing the incentives to 
create and do not necessarily require the grant of the exclusive rights. Hence, this 
thesis assesses the adequacy of assuming a rigid stance on acceptable limits to 
the control accorded by the rights in the light of the dynamic nature of exploita-
tion of a work. 
Accordingly, the normative framework, drawn on the basis of the develop-
ments on the assumption of the predominantly incentive-based rationale of the 
EU copyright acquis, provides the indications on whether extending control 
beyond the first dissemination is desirable. The final position on the matter will 
have to be taken by national courts, taking into consideration the rationales 
beyond providing incentives and, likely, aspects outside of the copyright domain. 
In the light of technological development, it is only sound that the EU acquis 
provides a flexible framework rather than operating with all-or-nothing criteria. 
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Furthermore, the analysis focuses on the specific dissemination-related rights, 
and the findings are without prejudice to the application of other rights, in par-
ticular, the right of reproduction. This is not to suggest that the right of 
reproduction is, as such, irrelevant. It may well be the case that the scope of the 
right of reproduction will cover an aspect of secondary dissemination, which, 
according to the developed framework, ought to fall outside the reach of the 
exclusive right to control dissemination. Recommendation to reconsider the 
approach to regulating the right of reproduction towards the communicative 
function of the exclusive rights is supported.39 Further discussion of the right of 
reproduction is, however, outside of the scope of this thesis.  
Similarly, the right of rental, which is closely linked to the right of distribu-
tion, will be examined here insofar as it illustrates the fine line between material 
and immaterial dissemination rights or the impact that the recognition of a sepa-
rate right of rental has had on the scope and the wording of the right of distribu-
tion and the exhaustion principle. The right of rental will also serve as an example 
for where technological development prompted extending the right holder’s 
exclusive control over secondary dissemination through recognising a separate 
right. Introduction of a single broad right of communication to the public not 
subject to exhaustion, however, means that there is little need to recognise new 
rights for subjecting particular acts of dissemination to extensive control. On the 
contrary, some form of categorisation of the acts falling under the broad right of 
communication to the public would be necessary if any of these acts ought to be 
exempted from the reach of the exclusive right. 
Another important limitation of the thesis is the way to implement the sug-
gested normative framework in practice. The mechanisms of the EU harmonisa-
tion are rather complex and require a thorough assessment of the different 
options. The scope of the analysis under this thesis does not allow this task to be 
undertaken. As will be shown, a relatively simple restriction of the right, as in the 
case of the exhaustion principle in the analogue world, is far from achieving a 
comparable result in the online environment.40 Nevertheless, the concluding part 
of the thesis will briefly outline the main shortcomings of employing the criteria 
under the current system of secondary EU law. 
As to the more concrete restraints of the analysis, four major points are iden-
tified. First, for the purposes of the analysis, no differentiation is made between 
the potential holders of the exclusive rights under copyright. Although the focus 
is on the author’s rights as opposed to the neighbouring rights, the analysis does 
not distinguish whether the person exercising the right is an author, a publisher, 
                                                                                             
39  On the ambiguity of the right of reproduction since the extension of its scope to temporary 
copies, see Rognstad (2018), p. 113. Also, see van Eechoud et al. (2009), pp. 73–76, 84–89; 
Hugenholtz (1996), pp. 95, 100.; Rognstad and Poort (2018), p. 134. 
40  See Oprysk (2019a).  
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or an intermediary. Hence, right holder means any person or an entity who is 
entitled to exercise the exclusive rights granted under copyright legislation.41  
The second limitation is the focus on the boundaries of the exclusive right 
with respect to secondary acts of dissemination, which rely on the initial lawful 
act authorised by the right holder. This is to distinguish the relevant circum-
stances from the cases where the initial dissemination was not authorised and, 
thus, is infringing. In latter cases, the assessment of secondary dissemination will 
call for considering secondary or contributory liability, which is outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
Third, the exhaustion principle, despite its presence in various Intellectual 
Property (IP) fields, is addressed solely as employed under copyright law. The 
principle can be attributed a variety of functions. Nevertheless, addressing the 
scope of exclusive rights from the perspective of allowing or restricting control 
beyond the first authorisation calls for considering the principle of exhaustion as 
a boundary of the right of distribution inherent to material dissemination. 
Finally, the EU acquis is analysed outside the realm of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the EU 
(CFR), or the property theory of copyright.42 Whereas the CFR is likely to be 
more often considered by the CJEU in cases requiring balancing diverse interests, 
it does not allow inferring the justifications for copyright protection or the struc-
ture of the rights.43 Whereas historically, the rules under copyright were influ-
enced by regulations connected to tangible property, property analogies are more 
misleading than guiding and detached from their purpose in the context of the 
online environment.44 
All these delimitations call for future research. Here, two important aspects 
shall be highlighted. If it is accepted that the right holder’s exclusive control over 
any subsequent acts of dissemination is not justified by virtue of the incentive 
rationale, and, hence, could be restricted, alternative approaches should be con-
sidered. First, it is important to highlight the need for further research on the in-
                                                                                             
41  Unless indicated otherwise, the term “author” is used interchangeably with the term “right 
holder”, similarly to the InfoSoc Directive. The Directive has been contested on this unfortunate 
generalisation, see Westkamp (2017), pp. 24, 38. Whereas it is important to distinguish 
between the different groups of right holders in every particular case, it falls outside the scope 
of this thesis. 
42  The European Convention on Human Rights signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 18.12.2000. OJ C 364/1 recognise IP 
as a property right. 
43  See Rognstad on the CFR addressing IP as property in the meaning of an asset. Rognstad 
(2018), pp. 68–70. Also, he emphasises that the protection of IP as property under the human 
rights instruments only means that legitimate expectations of right holders created by existing 
law should be secured. Ibid., p. 197. 
44  On the analogies to property being misleading in the IP context, see Ross (1945), p. 349; 
Rognstad (2018), p. 66. More generally, see Sganga criticising the contamination of IP with 
property rhetoric for political arguments rather than using it as a systematic ground for dealing 
with IP under civil law. Sganga (2018a), p. 11. 
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fluence of the exclusive rights on competition, in particular in the context of 
secondary dissemination following an authorised act. Likewise, the influence of 
the extent of the rights beyond the initial authorisation shall be subject to an 
assessment in the context of consumer protection.45 Whereas, as will be demon-
strated, some concerns stemming from these two fields were mitigated with a 
rather simple but inflexible tool of the exhaustion principle, it is unlikely that any 
comparable solution fitting all the circumstances of exploiting a work can be 
easily construed. 
This thesis sets to contribute to the overall discussion on the need to reconsider 
the approach to regulating the exclusive rights and their scope under copyright in 
the light of the recent developments, in particular in the online environment.46 
More precisely, it advances the argument on the necessity to take a holistic 
approach to the scope of the exclusive rights instead of relying on the assumptions 
enshrined under the EU framework under different circumstances.47 Although 
examining the exhaustion principle primarily through the prism of its function of 
limiting the reach of the distribution right pursuant to the material dissemination 
approach, the thesis also contributes to the scholarship on the exhaustion prin-
ciple’s potential in the context of online dissemination.48 
The thesis also serves to inform copyright policy at the EU level as well as at 
the MS level. EU harmonisation has greatly restricted the freedom of the MS to 
devise their own solutions and has not always been favourable to the diverse 
objectives of copyright under national laws.49 The thesis provides an under-
standing of the background of the obligations arising under the EU law and the 
main driving forces behind the evolving scope of exclusive rights, as well as of 
the tendencies observed under the CJEU jurisprudence.50 In turn, the analysis also 
emphasises the impact the assumptions under secondary EU law have on national 
laws and the freedom of the MS to serve the rationales of copyright beyond 
incentivising creative labour, such as serving the broad public interest. 
On a more general level, the findings of the analysis serve to inform copyright 
policy faced with the challenges of law-making in the constantly changing 
                                                                                             
45  In particular with a view of the recent adoption of the Digital Content Directive that 
provides consumers with a claim for remedies when the use of digital content is prevented or 
limited as a result of restrictions imposed by a third party, including on the basis of IP rights. 
See Article 10 of the Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content and digital services. 22 May 2019. OJ L 136/1. 
46  Jütte (2017), Gervais (2017), Hugenholtz et al. (2018), Westkamp (2017). 
47  Rognstad and Poort (2018), Strowel (2018). 
48  Mezei (2018), Karapapa (2014), Sganga (2018b), Hilty (2016), Spedicato (2015), Benabou 
(2016). 
49  On the diminishing freedom of MS to devise their own solutions, see Hugenholtz (2019). 
For an example of the conflicting objectives, see Kelli et al. (2017). The exhaustive list of 
exceptions and limitations to the exclusive rights under the EU Directives comes into conflict 
with the preservation of Estonian language through the development of language technologies. 
50  See Rosati on the role of the CJEU in copyright law-making and an attempt to rationalise 
the Court’s rulings to identify standards, Rosati (2019). 
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circumstances of exploitation of a work that would safeguard competition while 
providing sufficient incentives to engage in creative work. Drawing conclusions 
on the basis of the analysed development, every attempt is made to leave behind 
the contemporary ways of dissemination and the existing business models. Just 
as it was detrimental to the legal certainty to legislate the exclusive rights on an 
assumption that made sense at the time, it would be disadvantageous to attempt 
to offer a rigid framework for drawing normative conclusions on the basis of a 
clear-cut categorisation pursuant to the contemporary circumstances. Instead, 
what this thesis seeks to achieve is to rationalise the importance of reconciling 
the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination on the basis of the 
notions which are well familiar in copyright law-making even if not always 
explicitly acknowledged. 
 
 
1.2.4. Outline 
The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part contextualises the 
analysis by outlining the framework towards which the development of the rights 
under the EU acquis is assessed in the later chapters. The second part of the thesis 
concentrates on the analysis of the development of dissemination-related rights 
under the acquis against the outlined framework. The third and final part of the 
thesis discusses the findings of the analysis and presents the answers to the two 
overall research questions. 
Chapter 2 provides a basis for the analysis by placing the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination into the wider context of copyright ration-
ales and, in particular, the economic rationale of protection. Given that the main 
focus of the thesis is on the EU copyright framework, the chapter also draws 
attention to the significance of enshrining the distinction under secondary EU law 
for national laws. Next, the distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination rights is also discussed towards technological development constantly 
changing the circumstances of a work’s exploitation and the appropriate scope of 
protection, emphasising the risk entailed by drawing normative conclusions on 
the assumptions of the past. 
Chapters 3 to 5 present the analysis of the development of the rights of distri-
bution and communication to the public towards the findings and the outlined 
framework under Chapter 2. The exhaustion principle as an inherent boundary of 
the right of distribution is separated from the analysis of the right and is dealt 
with at greater length in Chapter 4. Each of the chapters 3 to 5 starts with identi-
fying the background to harmonising the rights at the EU level, including the 
relevant obligations under international law. The analysis then proceeds to 
assessing the development of the rights in the light of the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination rights. The last part of each chapter com-
pares the findings of the analysis with the characteristics of material or immaterial 
dissemination to illustrate how the approaches converge.  
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Finally, Chapter 6 presents a discussion of the findings of the analysis and the 
answers to the two overall research questions. The first part of the chapter is 
dedicated to summarising the identified developments pointing towards the 
convergence of the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights 
under the acquis and forming a basis for reconciling the approaches through a 
common framework. In this part, the conclusions on the first overall research 
question are provided along with the outlook on the normative framework in the 
second part. 
The second part of Chapter 6 presents the normative framework offering 
criteria for the assessment of justifiability of subjecting secondary dissemination 
to the right holder’s control, based on reconciling the approaches to material and 
immaterial dissemination pursuant to the observed developments under the 
acquis. The part outlines primary and ancillary elements of the normative frame-
work and highlights the main shortcoming of employing the framework under the 
current system of secondary EU law. Chapter 6 concludes by summarising the 
answer to the second overall question. 
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2. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MATERIAL AND 
IMMATERIAL DISSEMINATION IN THE CONTEXT  
OF COPYRIGHT RATIONALES AND  
COPYRIGHT LAW-MAKING 
Whereas the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination has been 
used to systematise exclusive rights under national laws before EU harmoni-
sation, it has been given a distinct normative expression under the acquis. The 
scope of the two main dissemination-related rights was harmonised under EU 
secondary law relying, inter alia, on the distinction. Nearly three decades from 
the start of copyright harmonisation under secondary EU law and after numerous 
requests for its interpretation, the normative scope of the harmonised dissemi-
nation-related rights no longer fits into the originally intended boxes. At the same 
time, the CJEU must commence every assessment of the scope of the right 
departing from the normative constructs of the early 1990s. 
To assess the developments under the EU acquis in the light of the distinction 
drawn at the outset of harmonisation of the exclusive rights, it is essential to start 
from the rationales of copyright and how the justifications for protection impact 
the scope of control under exclusive rights. The distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination is based essentially on the economic rationale of copy-
right, which will be paid special attention. Next, the suggested rationales of the 
EU copyright harmonisation ought to be explored to emphasise the challenges of 
serving the diverse rationales of copyright under national laws of MS. 
The harmonisation of exclusive rights under the acquis has had a tremendous 
impact on national laws, both when it comes to the normative scope of the rights 
and, even more important, the MS freedom to legislate in the field of copyright.51 
The scope of this thesis does not encompass a detailed analysis of the impact of 
harmonisation. Nevertheless, this chapter will briefly address the influence of 
harmonising the rights under secondary EU law on the basis of the distinction 
between material and immaterial dissemination by taking a look at the juris-
dictions traditionally characterised by a less dogmatic stance on the scope of 
exclusive rights. 
Namely, the chapter will look into the Scandinavian copyright framework. 
Important for the overall focus of this thesis, Scandinavian copyright has long 
recognised a broad right of making available of a work encompassing any pro-
tected acts of dissemination to the public, exemplifying categories of the acts 
falling under the right. Although, depending on the category, the consequences 
of exercising the right of making available would be different, the tendency has 
been to refrain from strict fitting of the acts into the boxes and focusing on the 
circumstances of the work’s exploitation at large. The development ought to 
                                                                                             
51  On the CJEU jurisprudence indicating the preemption in the field of copyright, see Rosati 
(2019), pp. 73–85. Also, see Rosenmeir et al. (2019), pp. 24–26. 
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better match the ever-changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation, although 
EU harmonisation has substantially limited such leeway. 
Furthermore, initially, Sweden and Norway implemented the obligations 
arising from the InfoSoc Directive, which is the primary focus of this thesis, 
differently. However, subsequent developments under CJEU jurisprudence have 
recently prompted Norway to introduce a separate category of communication of 
a work to the public under the broad right of making available to the public under 
the national law. Although Norway is not an EU MS as is Sweden but an EFTA 
MS, its copyright framework is likewise affected by the EU copyright acquis. 
Lastly, Scandinavian copyright offers novel rationales for determining the scope 
of copyright protection which have not been explicitly acknowledged under the 
acquis but might be of help where the traditional underpinnings fail to provide 
mechanisms for striking an appropriate balance. 
This chapter serves to provide the background to the analysis of the develop-
ment of the rights under the EU copyright acquis and outline the framework 
towards which the development will be evaluated. Before attempting to answer 
the two overall research questions of this thesis, it is necessary to recall the 
rationales of copyright and their influence on the scope of the exclusive rights. 
Depending on the perspective taken, the analysis of the development will deliver 
different results. Furthermore, the background would not be complete without 
introducing the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination as 
understood at the time of harmonisation in the 1990s and without also addressing 
its relation to the rationales of copyright protection. This chapter contributes to 
the understanding of the background by addressing following sub-questions: 
 
How and for what purpose is the distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination drawn in the context of copyright? How does the distinction relate to 
copyright rationales and how has it been challenged by technology development? 
What has enshrining the distinction under the EU copyright framework meant for 
national laws and the freedom of MS to legislate? 
 
To address the first two questions, it is appropriate to start with the rationales of 
copyright. First, the leading theories for state intervention are recalled with an 
emphasis on the economic justifications for copyright, which underpin the dis-
tinction between material and immaterial dissemination. The aim is to illustrate 
how the rationales of protection shape the scope of the exclusive rights by accom-
modating interests other than that of right holder’s and to introduce the objectives 
of the EU copyright acquis expressed under secondary EU law. 
Next, the chapter will turn to the challenges of determining the optimal scope 
of protection given the ever-increasing and diversified channels of a work’s dis-
semination. Here, the distinction between the material and immaterial dissemi-
nation shall also be introduced. Whereas the distinction has been useful to 
systematise the rights in the past, including at the very outset of rapid techno-
logical development, the distinction becomes rather confusing in a contemporary 
34 
setting. Hence, any rigid rules formulated on that basis could become misleading 
and counterproductive. 
To address the third question, the impact of the harmonisation of the exclusive 
rights on the basis of material and immaterial dissemination is explored using the 
example of Scandinavian copyright. First, the background for the unique 
rationales of Scandinavian copyright is provided through addressing the Scandi-
navian realism movement. Second, the premises of the broad right of making 
available with its categories is explored. Third, the impact of the EU harmoni-
sation on national laws is summarised by looking into further categorisation of 
the making available right under Scandinavian copyright. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. Part 2.1. provides the background by 
addressing the rationales of copyright and in particular the economic justifi-
cations behind the exclusive rights. It then proceeds to the rationales of copyright 
under the EU acquis with the emphasis on the InfoSoc Directive. Part 2.2. is 
dedicated to the impact of the development of dissemination channels on copy-
right law-making and the distinction between material and immaterial dissemi-
nation as a basis for differentiating between exclusive rights. 
Part 2.3. is set to explore how the harmonisation under the acquis has impacted 
the flexibility of the MS in addressing the proper boundaries of protection 
through determining the scope of exclusive rights. Focusing on Sweden and 
Norway, this part explores legal realism thinking as impacting the rationales of 
Scandinavian copyright, the structure of economic rights and the changes that 
followed the harmonisation under the EU copyright acquis. Finally, Part 2.4. 
summarises the findings of the chapter and outlines the prism through which the 
analysis in chapters 3–5 will be undertaken. 
 
 
2.1. Rationales of copyright 
Copyright legislation is essentially a result of state policy intervening in private 
relationships to facilitate certain behaviour that is considered to contribute to the 
common good. Hence, the copyright policy is formed according to the needs of 
society and is subject to change.52 Although many aspects of copyright protection 
are harmonised internationally, much of the regulation takes place on the national 
or, at most, regional levels. The extent of state intervention and the scope of the 
granted protection depend on the assumed rationales of the intervention. 
This part provides a stage for further analysis of the scope of the rights by 
recalling the diverse rationales of copyright protection and the premises of 
harmonisation under the EU copyright acquis. More precisely, it places the dis-
tinction between the material and immaterial dissemination in the context of the 
justifications for protection and, in particular, the economic underpinning of the 
rights. First, it briefly outlines the leading copyright theories underpinning the 
                                                                                             
52  Heide (2004), p. 102. 
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rationales of copyright protection.53 Depending on the theory and the respective 
justifications, the desirable extent of protection and the scope of the exclusive 
rights will differ. In this part, particular focus will be paid to the economic con-
siderations, which also will form a basis for further analysis of the development 
of the rights.  
In-depth analysis of copyright theories is outside of the scope of this thesis. 
Even though the theories present justifications for the grant of protection, the 
extent of protection is not absolute and must be aligned with the interests of 
society at large.54 Furthermore, neither of the theories endorse an absolute con-
ception of copyright but allow boundaries to be maintained to account for com-
peting interests.55 Besides granting control over intellectual creation, copyright 
establishes the limits of such control in order to meet the goals of the system.56 
 
 
2.1.1. Theories of copyright and rationales of protection 
Multiple theories attempt to explain and justify copyright protection. Although 
some theories are primarily associated with particular legal systems, the argu-
ments from multiple theories often blend and do so inconsistently.57 The mix of 
theories can be traced in legislation, legal scholarship, and jurisprudence.58 Europe 
is no exception. Whereas the multiple aspects of copyright protection are har-
monised, the underlying rationales differ between jurisdictions, which poses chal-
lenges to EU harmonisation.59 Guidance on how the different rationales should 
be reconciled under the EU acquis is missing.60 
While, traditionally, European copyright is predominantly based on the authors’ 
rights and thus, natural rights theories, more “rational” rationales are also recog-
nised.61 Natural rights philosophy provided grounds for developing the person-
ality and labour theories, which emphasise the connection of an author with the 
product of their work.62 While the personality theory considers an intellectual 
creation to be an extension of the author’s personality, the labour theory accen-
tuates one’s entitlement to the outcome of their efforts or labour.  
                                                                                             
53  On discussing ideas rather than theories, as the latter must be contextualised, see Rognstad 
(2018), p. 114. 
54  Ramahlo (2016), p. 72. 
55  Ibid., p. 217. 
56  Ramahlo (2009), p. 11. 
57  Quintais (2017), p. 329. Also, Rognstad (2018), p. 88. 
58  Fisher (2001), p. 173. 
59  Ramahlo (2016), p. 7. 
60  Rognstad (2018), p. 92. 
61  Hugenholtz (2000a), p. 483. 
62  Philosophical foundations of the theories can be found in the works of Locke and Hegel. 
See Locke (2008), Hegel (1991). 
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Both personality and labour theories entitle authors to inherent exclusive 
rights of a moral and economic nature. They are often associated with the conti-
nental European legal systems, where the moral rights of an author are of the 
utmost importance.63 The basis of these theories lies in the vision of IP as con-
ferring property right, which emphasises a person's entitlement to the results of 
their labour.64 Personality and labour theories have traditionally been seen as 
advocating for more extensive protection than the utilitarian considerations.65 
Nonetheless, these theories also accept the societal function of recognising natu-
ral rights under the positive law. Hence, they also recognise the possible necessity 
to restrict these rights.66 
Utilitarian theory, which has mostly been associated with US copyright, has 
also influenced development in Europe.67 It has constantly been gaining import-
ance at the EU level.68 The theory builds on the idea that, towards a diversity of 
individual interests, a collective good should be promoted.69 In the context of 
copyright, the theory seeks to promote the creation of works and their dis-
semination to the public through the grant of protection.70  
Ultimately, what amounts to a collective good is no easy question to answer. 
This led to the development of multiple derivatives offering a framework for 
establishing one. As utilitarian philosophy also became one of the grounds of 
modern economics, the most prominent derivatives are to be found in the eco-
nomics domain.71 In the search for a definable collective good, two major lines 
of economic thinking have been extensively applied to copyright: the welfare 
economics and the theories of social justice.  
The welfare economic theory has been widely used to justify contemporary 
copyright rules.72 Welfare is a broad term on its own, which can include both 
monetary norms and non-monetary ones, such as privacy and freedom of 
speech.73 In the context of copyright, the welfare economic theory became a basis 
for the incentive theory. The incentive theory justifies protection against acts that, 
as a consequence of market failure, negatively and significantly influence exploi-
tation opportunities and, thus, the incentives to create.74 
                                                                                             
63  Guibault (2002), pp. 8–9. 
64  On philosophical foundations see van Gompel (2011), pp. 197–200.  
65  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 62. 
66  van Gompel (2011), pp. 255–256. 
67  Waelde and MacQueen (2006), p. 6. 
68  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 66. 
69  Ibid., p. 63. 
70  Guibault (2002), p. 10. 
71  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 63. 
72  Rognstad and Poort (2018), p. 124. 
73  Poort (2018), p. 288. 
74  Ibid., p. 293. 
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Another approach to maximising utility relies on individual choices and 
society functions rather than on welfare.75 One example is scholarship building 
on the relatively recent theory of distributive justice, which provides alternative 
grounds for considering copyright outside the welfare economics.76 Besides 
recognising the need to provide incentives in general, such theories also differen-
tiate between the authors, actual right holders, and the intermediaries.77 
These theories by no means form an exhaustive list of possible justifications 
for copyright protection.78 Besides the theories outlined above, there are other 
less studied rationales such as free expression, culture and industry.79 This chap-
ter will proceed with a closer look at the economic underpinnings of exclusive 
rights. The economic considerations have gained importance following the 
development of digital technologies and the changing circumstances of a work’s 
exploitation. Furthermore, the distinction drawn between material and immaterial 
dissemination rights to determine the extent of appropriate control relies on the 
economic underpinnings of the rights. 
 
 
2.1.2. Economic approaches to copyright 
The prevailing approach to analyse IP through the prism of law and economics is 
the incentive theory.80 The theory relies on the conception that the production of 
cultural goods ought to be incentivised in the name of the collective good. Incen-
tives typically translate into the grant of exclusive rights, although not neces-
sarily.81 What is then transacted on the basis of the rights is the access to a work 
                                                                                             
75  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 64. Examples of such scholarship are works on 
social justice in the context of copyright. See, for instance, Shaver on promoting access to 
works despite the existing disadvantages, and on advancing the interests of individual creators 
within disadvantageous communities. Shaver (2014), pp. 117–168. 
76  The distributive justice theory builds upon more recent philosophical work, the theory of 
justice by John Rawls, where a person has an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal 
basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. See Rawls (1999), 
p. 53. Interpretation of Rawls’ theory in the context of IP holds that welfare should be 
maximised for all groups as long as the worst off are not made even worse off, see Hughes 
and Merges (2017), p. 520. According to Poort, some aspects of copyright explicitly have a 
distributive justice character, such as the droit de suite or measures advancing position of 
authors. See Poort (2018), p. 284.  
77  The utilitarian approach has been criticised, inter alia, for focusing too much on regulating 
reward for creators, while it is essentially intermediaries who benefit the most, see Hughes 
and Merges (2017), pp. 514–516. On the distributive justice theory initially being at the core 
of IP harmonisation, see Yanisky-Ravid (2017), p. 6. 
78  On the impact of the distinction on the differences between the legal systems, see Goldstein 
and Hugenholtz (2012), pp. 6–8. 
79  Hugenholtz (2000a), pp. 483–484. 
80  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 72. 
81  Guibault (2002), p. 11. 
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or its temporary possession without acquiring ownership.82 Whilst the incentives 
are not a necessary a precondition to the creation of a work, it is generally 
accepted that granting the exclusive right to exploit a work increases production 
at least of the works that are to be exploited commercially.83 
Copyright is thus often explained through a trade-off. The granted protection 
“trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the benefits of providing 
incentives to create the work in the first place”.84 According to the incentive 
theory, copyright protection is justified as long as it does not reach beyond “the 
minimum necessary to provide authors with an incentive to create and make their 
works available to the public”.85  
Seen from the perspective of the trade-off, granting rights in order to secure 
incentives to create a work comes at the cost of access to a work. From an eco-
nomic standpoint, the objective is to find an optimal point of protection at which 
a maximum amount of social welfare is created.86 However, the focus of the eco-
nomic approach has predominantly been on the role of exclusive rights, without 
considering the role of the exceptions to these rights.87 The following sections 
outline the main considerations under the incentive theory, both traditional and 
alternative ones. 
 
 
2.1.2.1. Justifications based on market failure 
Public good is one of the most evoked concepts to justify the exclusive rights 
under copyright and a leading foundation of the incentive theory. Under this 
approach, intellectual creations are considered public goods, the production of 
which will be undermined due to market failure. Therefore, under the incentive 
paradigm, state intervention is justified to safeguard incentives to create such 
public good and, hence, eliminate market failure.88  
The two underlying attributes of public goods are non-excludability and non-
rivalry. The non-excludability of a good lies in the absence of mechanisms to 
exclude other persons from using it or the high costs of such exclusion. The non-
rivalry nature of a good means that consumption of good by one person does not 
hinder consumption by other persons.89 These attributes lead to a market failure, 
where the good is likely to be underproduced due to the lack of incentives. 
                                                                                             
82  Watt (2004), p. 154. 
83  Blomqvist (2003), p. 64. Also, on copyright as a costly measure to inhibit unauthorised 
copying and use, see Handke (2011), p. 4. 
84  Landes and Posner (1989), p. 326.  
85  Netanel (2007), p. 18.  
86  Picard and Toivonen (2004), p. 29. 
87  Heide (2004), p. 89. 
88  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), pp. 72–77. 
89  Ibid., pp. 75–76. 
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For instance, if the good is non-excludable and there are no mechanisms to 
exclude others, there is a potential for free riding. Where the investment for 
creating a good is significantly higher than the actual cost of producing subse-
quent units, others could free-ride on the investment and act in competition with-
out bearing these initial costs of creation.90 Further, if a good is non-rivalrous, it 
can be consumed by multiple persons without being exhausted. This means that 
providing it to a marginal individual comes at zero cost. On the other hand, it is 
also in the general interest of society that non-rivalrous good is used by as many 
as possible, as it creates positive externalities, which contribute to maximising 
welfare.91 
In essence, both attributes of public good result in externalities, which arise 
when an economic activity influences an unrelated third party, whether positively 
or negatively. Market failure arises where a public good is underproduced 
because of the first investor not recouping the investment due to another party 
entering the market.92 From this perspective, copyright-protected works are 
treated as public goods, for which an intervention is justified to incentivise their 
production. However, the non-rivalrous nature of such goods justifies limiting 
the scope of control over the goods to facilitate the broadest of possible usage for 
the greatest collective welfare.93 
Correcting market failure through granting exclusive rights comes at the cost 
of the monopoly it facilitates.94 First, exclusive control in combination with 
profit-maximising behaviour results in deadweight losses that reduce social wel-
fare.95 Second, it also increases the overall cost of the production of such goods, 
ultimately decreasing social welfare.96 Third, it increases transaction costs asso-
ciated with obtaining authorisation from the right holder, which slows down the 
production of new works.97  
In economic terms, regulation is justified on the basis of correcting one or 
more market failures. Nonetheless, regulatory failures are likely to be worse than 
market failures themselves.98 Thus, the incentive theory on the basis of the public 
good concept justifies providing the incentives to produce a work, followed by 
maximising collective usage and welfare once the work is created.99 Economic 
                                                                                             
90  On the example of book publishing, see Ibid., pp. 74–75. 
91  Ibid., p. 76. 
92  Rognstad (2018), p. 18. 
93  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 76; Brennan (2002), p. 350. 
94  See Boyle for the discussion on the monopoly concerns Boyle (2000), pp. 2025–2026. 
95  Maximising profits can lead to pricing out certain consumers that are willing to acquire a 
good at the marginal cost of production, which results in a deadweight loss. See Elkin-Koren 
and Salzberger (2012), p. 76. Also, Boyle (2000), p. 2029. 
96  van der Noll, R. et al. (2012), p. 1.  
97  Hugenholtz (2000a), p. 483; Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), pp. 76–77.  
98  Regulatory failures should not be mitigated by more regulation but instead by repealing 
the failed regulation. See Pacces and Van den Bergh (2011), pp. 4–6.  
99  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 65. 
40 
theory only provides arguments for copyright protection which is justified, for 
example, on the basis of market failure of public good. However, it does not pro-
vide guidance on the extent of appropriate protection.100 What is too broad or too 
narrow for granted rights can be difficult to determine only with the help of eco-
nomic theory and must take into account the circumstances.101 
 
 
2.1.2.2. Challenges to justifications based on market failure and 
alternative approaches 
The traditional approach to copyright under the incentive theory has been 
contested.102 The reliance on the concept of market failure of public goods 
appears to emphasise only a part of the involved externalities and promote 
extending the scope of the exclusive rights. For instance, the traditional approach 
was criticised for considering the exceptions to the rights solely through the prism 
of market failure and without considering their market effects.103 More funda-
mentally, it has been doubted whether the public good characteristic of works is 
a problem or actually an opportunity.104 
A major line of critique is directed to the inability of the traditional approach 
to point towards achieving a necessary balance between the incentives to create 
and ensuring access to a work. For instance, absolute protection is unlikely to be 
socially optimal, as it is costly to exclude the non-payers from access, considering 
that they do not impose direct costs.105 Moreover, it is relatively costless to pro-
vide exclusive rights. Where the potential positive effect for users is great, it 
could be tempting to broaden the rights.106 Boyle, for instance, questions copy-
right protection going beyond the grant of exclusive rights that would provide 
enough incentives to create. The exhaustive control over a work in all aspects 
would clearly be excessive. 107 
Furthermore, some argue that if a substitute market of pirated or second-hand 
copies exists, it does not necessarily mean that the whole society is worse off. 
Right holders might well be able to appropriate the profits from these markets, 
which is not only socially beneficial but also increases the welfare of right holders 
                                                                                             
100  Poort (2018), p. 2089. 
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themselves.108 Besides, most of the estimates on the costs of piracy are considered 
inadequate as they are based on incorrect assumptions of consumer behaviour.109 
Consequently, the efficacy of copyright as a tool to create a system promoting 
creation and access to a work has been questioned.110 Copyright protection has 
been regarded as not capable of achieving a balance between interests, which are 
anything but static.111 Some contend that, unlike other property rights, copyright 
is easy to expropriate and most of the time society as a whole is better off without 
it.112 To this end, a variety of alternatives to copyright protection have been pre-
sented, essentially corresponding to various market strategies.113 
One of the proposed alternatives to the approach based on market failure is 
the wider perspective of externalities. Externalities arise when an economic 
activity influences the unrelated third party, whether positively or negatively. 
Heide argues that externalities can better explain the current structure of copy-
right as a system granting rights of different scope to different stakeholders in 
essentially the same underlying intangible.114 If viewed from the perspective of 
externalities, the system of copyright protection can be explained as attempting 
to internalise the externalities in two major ways; first, by allocating the rights 
that facilitate the existence of a market for works, accompanied by the exceptions 
to these rights which enable a secondary market; and, second, by permitting 
others to borrow ideas and elements of a work, facilitating existence of alternative 
suppliers.115 
Externality is potentially maximised when a work is widely disseminated and 
available to the public. Hence, if a right holder can charge for every use or for 
identical repetitive uses, or ask for a different amount depending on the type of 
use, externalities are affected negatively. On the other hand, if the right holder 
can only charge a certain amount for the use, the extent of the externalities is 
affected positively.116 Through this lens, the exceptions and the limits of the rights 
are equally important, as they influence the externalities and have effect on a 
market. 
Another issue which is overlooked by the preoccupation with market failure 
in economic research on copyright is competition, which should be of great 
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115  Ibid., p. 92. 
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importance in the information society.117 Rather than addressing it through com-
petition law regulating copyright from the outside, Heide suggests employing a 
competition perspective to understanding how the market works. He argues that 
rigorous competition could be a desirable and sound basis for understanding 
copyright law.118 
This alternative approach emphasises the importance of maintaining the 
mechanisms of placing constraints on a right holder’s ability to impose the price 
and the conditions of use through exclusive rights.119 Hence, it stresses the 
importance of exceptions and their effect on the market. For instance, if examined 
towards internalising externalities, the effect of the exhaustion principle on the 
market is rather minimal, as it accords only the copies produced by right holder 
or with their authorisation to be in circulation.120 
Recently, economic analysis of the borderlines of copyright protection in the 
context of digitisation has been conducted by Poort.121 Taking the normative wel-
fare economics approach, the scope of copyright protection was assessed in a 
couple of concrete examples of a work’s exploitation. It has been argued that 
digitisation has significantly influenced the envisioned market failure, and in 
some cases, may have even eliminated it.122 Extensive copyright protection could 
go beyond resolving a market failure and generate a new one if protection is wider 
than the one the right holder would have enjoyed in the absence of the original 
market failure. As the analysis showed, the current state of copyright is indeed 
going beyond the market failure justifications, extending to the acts lacking the 
underlining market failure, resulting in what Poort calls jealousy tax.123 
 
 
2.1.3. Rationales of copyright under the EU acquis 
The harmonisation of copyright in the EU is based, first and foremost, on the 
competence of the Union to approximate national laws for establishing or 
furthering the internal market.124 The approximation of national laws is achieved 
in two main ways. The first is negative harmonisation, which means the measures 
precluding the provisions of national law conflicting with the objectives of the 
internal market.125 The second is positive harmonisation, which encompasses 
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122  For instance, TPMs potentially eliminate market failure. See Poort (2018), pp. 290–292. 
123  Poort (2018), pp. 298–232. 
124  Ramahlo (2016), pp. 11–12. 
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mainly the legislative measures to harmonise certain matters throughout the 
EU.126 
The EU copyright acquis as a regulatory framework for copyright and neigh-
bouring rights consists of measures of both negative and positive harmonisation. 
Historically, the negative harmonisation preceded the positive harmonisation 
under the EU Directives in the field of copyright. However, the recent develop-
ments under the CJEU jurisprudence interpreting the provisions of secondary EU 
law underlies the continuously important role of the negative harmonisation.127 
The copyright traditions of the EU Member States (MS) are quite diverse even 
though many represent the droit d’auteur system relying on the natural rights 
theory, or evolved towards it.128 While the cultural aspect of copyright harmoni-
sation has been acknowledged on the EU level, the internal market approach to 
regulation took the lead.129 Whereas the Directives and Regulations in the field 
of copyright are accompanied by lengthy recitals setting the stage for the inter-
vention, the rationales of copyright protection under the EU acquis are far from 
clear and generally ambiguous.130 
Here, attention shall be drawn to the four important notions enshrined into the 
main instrument of positive copyright harmonisation under the EU acquis, the 
InfoSoc Directive.131 First is the objective to incentivise the creation of creative 
works through providing copyright protection. Second is the high level of protec-
tion as a necessary basis for providing the incentives to create. Third is the 
appropriate reward for the use of the works to the creators and producers, which 
is necessary to enable satisfactory returns on investment. Fourth is the intent to 
boost competitiveness and secure the freedoms of the internal market. 
When it comes to the underlying rationale of harmonisation, recitals 2 and 4 
of the InfoSoc Directive suggest that the legislation aims to provide the incentives 
for the creation of works.132 Copyright and related rights shall stimulate the 
development of products and creation and exploitation of creative content. 
Protection will foster substantial investment in creativity and innovation. Further, 
according to recital 9 of the Directive, harmonisation proceeds from an 
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assumption that it must take as a basis a high level of protection, as rights are 
crucial to intellectual creation. Recital 11 further specifies that a rigorous, effective 
system of protection is one of the main ways to ensure that cultural production 
receives necessary resources.  
Next, recital 10 emphasises that authors and performers have to obtain an 
appropriate reward for the use of their work. Hence, it is necessary to guarantee 
the availability of such reward and opportunity for satisfactory returns on the 
investment.133 Last but not least, pursuant to recital 1, harmonisation of the copy-
right laws across the MS contributes to the establishment of the internal market 
and ensuring competition. Under recital 4, the harmonised legal framework will 
foster investment and competitiveness of European industry. 
As evident, the objectives of the harmonisation include a variety of economic 
components such as incentives, competitiveness, and reward. They point to eco-
nomic rationale as one of the main driving forces of the EU harmonisation. 
Recital 19 of the InfoSoc Directive excludes the author’s moral rights from the 
harmonisation and leaves them outside of the scope of the Directive. The focus 
of the EU legislator appears to be to further the internal market by providing a 
regulatory framework that would encourage the creation of works while ensuring 
competition. 
From this perspective, we could conclude that the extent of protection should 
ensure that the incentives to create do not go beyond what is necessary and do 
not unduly impede competition on the market.134 In a sense, this resembles the 
argument under the incentive theory, which addresses market failure of a public 
good through the grant of the rights to make the good excludable. On top of that, 
the Directive aims to strike a balance between the exclusive rights and the 
competition. 
 On the other hand, the Directive also stipulates the high level of protection as 
the starting point of harmonisation, without explaining its role in the above equa-
tion.135 Whereas the high level of protection appears to stem from considerations, 
inter alia, under the incentive theory, the scope of such protection and the limita-
tions are not further explained.136 This assumption may impede achieving the 
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above-mentioned goal of striking a balance. A high level of protection as the 
starting point for harmonisation has indeed been widely criticised. Peukert argues 
that the statement of a high level of protection is teleological and only focuses on 
the positive effects of IP.137 Van Gompel, in turn, submits that such premise 
inevitably shifts the starting point of legislative intention. A high level of protec-
tion must not be a goal in itself. Rather, the goal should be striving for an equi-
librium between the different interests.138  
Turning to the appropriate reward aspect, at first sight it seems to belong to the 
incentive rationale and a high level of protection. The concept of remuneration 
(whether reward or compensation) is at the very heart of copyright regardless of 
the underlying theory. While under the natural rights theory and especially labour 
theory, reward is justified by the very fact of invested labour, the utilitarian 
approach often looks at incentives in the form of compensation or remuneration 
on the investment.139 Under the incentive theory, reward is considered from a 
broader perspective of rights being granted to secure continuity of cultural pro-
duction. Accordingly, the extent of monetary incentives can be limited once the 
incentives are provided.140 
Reward appears to become a central consideration under the EU copyright 
acquis.141 On the one hand, it can be categorised towards a high level of protec-
tion and the adequate incentives, justifying the extensive scope of the rights in 
order to secure a reward. However, it has also been employed to achieve the 
opposite. For instance, the CJEU relied on an appropriate reward under recital 10 
to hold that the reach of the exclusive right could be restricted following its exer-
cise as the possibility to obtain appropriate remuneration has been provided.142 
This is of particular interest as the case in question concerned the freedom to 
provide services. Hence, it suggests that an appropriate reward can be an instru-
ment of balancing the high level of protection as a starting point for providing the 
incentives to create and the objectives of maintaining competition. 
The recently adopted DSM Directive introduced the principle of appropriate 
and proportionate remuneration in cases where the authors and performers license 
or transfer their rights.143 Emphasising appropriate remuneration for the authors 
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and the performers ought to promote the interests of creators when the rights are 
transferred and exercised by other right holders. Whereas under the InfoSoc 
Directive the appropriate reward was used as justification for the grant of the 
rights, in this context it is the distribution of generated remuneration which is at 
stake. Appropriate remuneration is also mentioned in recital 61 explaining the 
rationale behind Article 17 of the DSM Directive placing obligations on the 
online content-sharing services.144 The recital refers to the right holder’s inability 
to determine appropriate renumeration for the use of a work, which should be 
guaranteed. 
Accordingly, the objectives of EU harmonisation under secondary EU law are 
rather blurry. Much emphasis is placed on the exploitation of creative content and 
the need to incentivise the creation and marketing of new products and 
services.145 Given the specific circumstances of the culture industry, these could 
be two distinctive goals requiring separate sets of measures.146 Furthermore, the 
CJEU appears to rely on the textual interpretation of the recitals to construct the 
objectives of protection.147 
On these grounds, proceeding from the high level of protection as a starting 
line of any assessment of the scope of protection can be questioned. It has been 
claimed that neither notion of a high level of protection nor appropriate reward 
claim requires courts to interpret the rights beyond what was envisaged by the 
legislature.148 Nevertheless, proceeding from the notion of the high level of pro-
tection and the lack of articulated rationales has influenced further development 
of the acquis, not least under CJEU jurisprudence.149 
On the other hand, the Court has also shown flexibility when assessing cases 
concerning the acts of secondary dissemination, as will be shown in the following 
chapters. Such notions as remuneration corresponding to the economic value of 
a copy, knowledge of the infringing nature of an act, or use contemplated by the 
first authorisation stand out from the traditional copyright rules enshrined under 
international law. They appear to indicate the tendency to resort to extrinsic prin-
ciples for balancing of the interests.150 
Given the ambiguity of the objectives of the acquis, there are numerous calls 
for reconsidering the approach to harmonisation. One suggestion is to clarify the 
rationale of copyright under the EU acquis, taking into account the developing 
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needs of society.151 Another suggestion is to remove the superfluous constel-
lations from the wording of the legislative tools, which unnecessarily complicate 
the weighing of the objectives.152 Clarification of the rationales ought to serve 
legal certainty by elaborating on the objectives of harmonisation and potentially 
leaving more freedom to the MS in attaining them. 
 
 
2.2. Challenges of technology and  
the distinction between material and  
immaterial dissemination 
As has been explored above, one of the main tasks of the copyright framework is 
to secure the creator’s (or right holder’s) control over exploitation of a work. The 
nature of copyright-protected works makes their exploitation highly dependent 
on technological advancements, which enable the content of a work to be con-
veyed to an ever-widening public. Technology development not only offers new 
dissemination channels but also has implications for the scope of copyright pro-
tection. A work that exists in a single tangible exemplar calls for one level of 
copyright protection, considering any other available protection, such as by virtue 
of property law. A possibility to produce an infinite number of copies or to com-
municate a work’s content to a (virtually) endless circle of persons will call for a 
different level of exclusivity.153 
This part will briefly introduce the distinctive feature of copyright as intri-
cately linked to both the development of technology and the rationales discussed 
in the previous section. Not only should the introduction of different exclusive 
rights necessarily be understood through the prism of copyright rationales and the 
need for protection at the specific time of their enactment, the development of the 
copyright framework as a whole should be assessed against its ability to con-
tinuously achieve the objectives it sought to serve. Hence, it will be discussed 
how the changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation influence the rationales 
for intervention and the desirable scope of exclusive control.  
Furthermore, against this background, this part will introduce the distinction 
between material and immaterial dissemination rights. The distinction has not 
been clearly articulated at the national or international levels, even though it 
served as an argument in harmonising the exclusive dissemination rights in the 
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1990s. The loose distinction between material and immaterial dissemination will 
be linked to the previous part and put in the context of the economic under-
pinnings of exclusive rights. Also, the challenges associated with holding onto 
the distinction for drawing any normative conclusions will be explored, raising 
the question of whether the rules justified on the basis of the distinction ought to 
be reconsidered. 
 
 
2.2.1. Diversification of dissemination channels and  
challenges of copyright law-making 
Copyright is closely linked to the development of technology, as protection is not 
awarded in the form of a blanket exclusive right but instead consists of the rights 
of a different scope. Therefore, every technological development potentially 
influencing the exploitation of works calls for considering the necessity to widen 
protection through subjecting new uses to the established rights or recognising 
new rights. In that sense, the rights are to a large extent not technology neutral, 
even if there is a tendency towards grouping the uses.154 Given the variety of 
highly technical rights, legal certainty comes at a high cost.155 
For a long time, rights developed largely on a national basis, subject to state 
policies and rationales behind vesting the exclusive rights in authors. However, 
with the rise of international harmonisation a few decades ago, the development 
of national copyright laws became increasingly dependent on the negotiations at 
the international level. Whereas at the outset of international harmonisation only 
very specific uses were harmonised, the tendency has been to opt for more 
generally worded rights and, hence, a higher degree of harmonisation.156 
Understandably, the order in which the rights were recognised internationally 
is by no means incidental. It reflects not only their importance during the specific 
periods but also the ability to reach a compromise that would satisfy majority of 
the parties. The right of reproduction, which is the only general right provided 
under the BC, was harmonised as late as during the Stockholm conference in 
1967.157 The broad right of distribution, on the other hand, was only recognised 
under the WIPO CT and in conjunction with the broad right of communication to 
the public.158 
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The rights to control dissemination gained importance with the diversification 
of the ways to communicate a work, first, when the potential reach of perfor-
mance was substantially extended by the ability to broadcast it and second, when 
reaching an even wider audience was enabled via subsequent communication of 
a performance or a broadcast thereof through wire or wireless means. The interest 
of the copyright holder shifted from the production of the copies and authorising 
a performance to control over the circumstances of dissemination.159  
Control over communication of a work became even more crucial with the 
rise of the Internet as a new channel of dissemination. It presented an unprece-
dented opportunity to reach a broad audience, a possibility and a danger at the 
very same time. Whilst right holders could rely on the technology to reach a 
broader public and, hence, increase remuneration, unauthorised communication 
could harm not only the opportunities to profit from Internet dissemination but 
also impact the demand for a work through conventional analogue channels, such 
as through distribution of tangible copies. These changes did not happen over-
night. Even when the Internet enabled access to the resources all over the world, 
it took years of technological development to enable file-compressing techniques 
and fast data transfers that could facilitate quick delivery of content or even a 
real-time broadcast over the Internet. Once these developments occurred, costs 
necessary to exploit a work online decreased.160 
Determining proper scope of protection online meeting right holders’ interests 
and those of the public at large was a far from straightforward task. In the 1990s 
the rights were expanded to cover the new uses, whilst the established boundaries 
did not always follow. As the technologies had only recently emerged, this legis-
lative development was based mainly on assumptions about how digitisation 
would affect copyright holders in the future.161 Drawing parallels between the 
emerging uses and the established concepts meant a danger of premature sub-
mission of new processes under the existing concepts.162  
From today’s perspective, harmonisation at the international and the EU levels 
prompted by the emergence of the Internet took place rather early. Since then 
online dissemination has become much easier and less costly.163 Control over dis-
semination is enforced by a legal framework and technological constraints well 
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beyond the capabilities of the analogue era.164 The online environment has not 
only enabled a new and effective dissemination channel but also made it easier 
to enforce the copyright rules.165  
The question that arises is what implications the development has for the 
copyright policy.166 Should the assumptions that were driving policymaking at 
the outset of harmonisation still be observed or must they be reconsidered? 
Whereas they are not necessarily strictly followed anymore, they often result in 
a premature standpoint on the matters even before the start of the discussion. One 
of the main assumptions made at the time of EU copyright harmonisation under 
secondary EU law and significant for all the subsequent development of the 
exclusive dissemination right is that the new environment enabled commu-
nication of an exclusively immaterial nature.167  
Being considered of immaterial nature essentially meant that the acts of online 
dissemination were submitted to the right of communication to the public rather 
than to other rights, such as the right of distribution. Hence, the application of the 
rights of material distribution and the boundaries associated with them did not 
take place online. The notion has been contested and challenged not least by 
CJEU jurisprudence. The next part of this chapter will take a close look at the 
distinction and introduce its place under the acquis. 
 
 
2.2.2. Material and immaterial dissemination rights and  
the challenges of the digital environment 
Whereas the distinction between material and immaterial (or tangible and intan-
gible) dissemination can be found in the policy debates justifying extending or 
limiting the right holder’s control over a work’s dissemination, the distinction 
itself has not been clearly defined. Stemming primarily from the two main 
exploitation rights, distribution and performance, it aims to distinguish between 
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the uses of a work for the purpose of defining the appropriate scope of control 
accorded by exclusive rights. 
Before the rise of the digital environment, rights covering dissemination of a 
work were grouped into two major groups, rights concerning material dissemi-
nation (distribution rights) and rights covering immaterial dissemination (com-
munication rights). The former would relate to distribution on a tangible medium 
where copies were sold to individual users. The latter related to dissemination 
where consumption by members of the public did not require possession of a 
tangible medium. Hence, material dissemination would primarily encompass the 
right to distribute tangible copies of a work, whereas immaterial would encom-
pass different ways of communicating a work, e.g. through a performance or a 
recitation. 
The distinction is not always clearly defined under national laws, but some 
kind of aggregation of the rights in these two major categories is often present.168 
One example of an explicit distinction is the German Copyright Act.169 Article 
15 divides exclusive rights into two groups: rights to exploit a work in material 
form and the right to communicate a work in immaterial form.170 The former 
relates to instances where a work is fixed on a tangible medium (also on a sound 
carrier or in electronic memory) which presents a work for its consumption.171 
The latter relates to making the content of a work accessible directly without the 
involvement of a material carrier.172 
In a similar manner, the distinction finds its manifestation in the systemati-
sation of the rights by their relation to a copy. For instance, sometimes economic 
rights are divided into reproduction and dissemination in non-material form.173 
Similarly, the distinction can be drawn between the copy-related and non-copy 
related rights.174 The former would encompass distribution and rental, whereas 
the latter would include broadcasting, performance, and communication to the 
public.175 Copyright legislation in Scandinavian countries also distinguishes 
between two major ways of making a work available that have economic signi-
ficance: performance of a work and a work’s fixation in a way that enables others 
to consume it.176 
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The distinction between material and immaterial dissemination is drawn pre-
dominately for systematising purposes to distinguish between types of exploi-
tation protected under copyright. Copyright is generally an incorporeal right over 
a work, hence regulating, inter alia, the creation of the copies but essentially their 
fate.177 Hence, it is construed according to how a work can be presented, i.e. 
through its materialisation or performance. The primary aim is to empower the 
copyright holder to decide over access and consumption of a work through allo-
cating them control over material circumstances that influence consumption.178 
Accordingly, the presence of a material object is only used to characterise a way 
to disseminate a work and convey its content.179 
Before the rise of the digital environment, the distinction between the two types 
of rights was more or less clear. The rights of distribution would relate to dis-
semination in a tangible (copy-related) form, hence classified as the rights of 
material dissemination. The rights of performance, broadcasting, and commu-
nication to the public would protect immaterial exploitation.180 To the extent that 
a copy could also be used for performance, the rights of immaterial and material 
dissemination would not overlap but protect different aspects.181 It also goes with-
out saying that the tangible medium must be distinguished from a work, which is 
essentially subject to copyright protection.182 
Whereas the systematisation of rights could be an aim in itself, the distinction 
served another important function. It was used for justifying the extent of the 
control accorded to the copyright holders by the different exclusive rights. Whereas 
control over the dissemination in a material form involving a tangible copy of a 
work would have to be limited to avoid the conflict with the marketing of copies 
and the resale of goods, control over immaterial dissemination would, in general, 
result in fewer conflicts with other fields of law. For this reason, limiting the 
control over material dissemination was more acceptable than limiting control 
over immaterial dissemination. 
The distinction goes hand in hand with the incentive rationale of copyright 
and the economic approach to defining the scope of protection. From the economic 
standpoint, the exclusive rights under copyright help to internalise the externalities 
                                                                                             
177  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 656. On the immaterial nature of copyright, Knoph 
(1936), pp. 8–9. Also under the new NCA, see Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til 
Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), p. 30. 
However, the intangible nature of a work should not be mistaken to mean that IP rights are 
associated with an immaterial object that is comparable to a physical thing, see Rognstad 
(2016), in particular, pp. 520–521. 
178  Ross (1945), pp. 346–347. 
179  Ross on reading a physical book being essentially a performance of a work to oneself. 
Ibid., p. 346. 
180  Depreeuw (2014), p. 245. 
181  Ibid., pp. 259–262. 
182  See Watt on IP good and delivery good, where consumption of a work is supported by a 
delivery good, such as a printed book. Watt (2004), p. 154. 
53 
in order to set up a market for a work, but these rights are accompanied by 
boundaries.183 What is traded on the market is essentially access to a work for its 
consumption, which may require involvement of a delivery good such as a CD to 
facilitate consumption.184 Hence, the economic underpinning of the distinction 
between material and immaterial dissemination does not concern itself with the 
presence of a tangible copy but rather exploitation of a work by putting it on the 
market.  
Material dissemination through the sale of copies would allow the right holder 
to estimate the size of a market and to price copies accordingly. Hence, remu-
neration could be obtained through the first putting of copies into circulation. 
Restriction of the right holder’s ability to further control the fate of such copies, 
including their resale, would be admissible as the function of the right (i.e. 
obtaining remuneration) has been fulfilled.185 Immaterial dissemination, on the 
other hand, would not necessarily enable the right holders to obtain remuneration 
corresponding to the size of the audience through the first communication of a 
work. Accordingly, it would not prompt the same conclusion and generally justify 
the right holder’s control over each and every act of immaterial dissemination.186 
If seen from the perspective of the right holder’s control over subsequent dis-
semination, the main difference between the rights would be that the one allows 
for a downstream market and the extraction of value from a work for third parties, 
whereas the other does not. To be clear, both types of rights provide full control 
over separate acts of dissemination, be it a performance of a film or distribution 
of physical copies of a book. The only difference lies in the extent to which the 
right holder can exercise further control over each specific act of dissemination. 
For material distribution, such an example would be resale of copies, whereas for 
immaterial dissemination a good example would be a retransmission of a broad-
cast.  
Notwithstanding any limits on control over such secondary communication, 
the right holder is always in the position to exercise their right to authorise or 
prohibit every primary act of dissemination. Hence, the only argument such dis-
tinction is capable of advancing is limiting the extent of subsequent control when 
the function of the right has been achieved. Seen from this perspective, the mate-
rial and immaterial distinction has nothing to do with the presence of a tangible 
medium per se. Instead, it relies on the right holder’s ability to obtain adequate 
remuneration that would indicate the proper boundary of protection. It just so 
happens that in the analogue era the most prominent example of such a situation 
would be the distribution of tangible copies.  
Fast forward to today’s realities; online dissemination comes in all shapes and 
sizes. Some ways of communicating a work closely resemble established chan-
nels, like the distribution of physical copies or broadcast. Others do not fit 
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184  Watt (2004), p. 154. 
185  On the remuneration theory of exhaustion, see Hugenholtz (1996), p. 96. 
186  Ghosh and Calboli (2018b), pp. 121–122. 
54 
squarely into the previous models. What they do have in common is that through 
them the right holder attempts to realise the value of their work. To hold at every 
outset that none of the models enables proper remuneration solely because no 
tangible mediums are involved would be rather naïve. 
Similarly, to accept that the cases resembling material dissemination should 
be subject to the same treatment as in the analogue world would be too hasty.187 
As the online environment facilitates all the different models operating in parallel 
with each other, it might raise the need for additional considerations, such as 
competition and consumer expectations. Also, it might be necessary to reconsider 
the copyright relation to the profit made in (in)direct connection to a work. Should 
any created value be assigned to the right holder? Or should exclusive control be 
limited to enabling right holders to obtain remuneration through each act of 
primary exploitation? Obviously, it depends. 
Not every conventional copy-related right calls for the same treatment as the 
right of distribution. The right of rental, for instance, could be categorised under 
material dissemination because of the presence of a tangible medium. On the 
other hand, it could also be categorised as the right of immaterial dissemination, 
which requires authorisation for each and every act of rental. Hence, it is a policy 
choice whether or not subsequent exploitation is subject to the right holder’s 
control. 
Different ways of categorising exploitation online were proposed. For 
instance, Hilty distinguishes between three stages of digital exploitation. The first 
is the move to tangible carriers carrying digital copies of a work, e.g. a CD with 
music on it. The second stage is the delivery of digital copies without the involve-
ment of tangible mediums through the creation of copies on the user’s end. The 
third stage is the one where there is no copy (whether tangible or not) at the user’s 
end, and where access to work is the key aspect.188 Similarly, Guibault distin-
guishes between three transactions taking place online: a physical purchase (e.g. 
a CD), digital download of a file, and streaming of a work, which does not entail 
a purchase per se but depends on authorisation from the platform.189 
What does this mean for the old distinction between material and immaterial 
dissemination? Inevitably, the nature of online transaction changes as technology 
evolves.190 What might be a sound generalisation at some point might be quickly 
obsolete soon after. However, the nature of a transaction or exploitation is of 
importance not only to copyright for establishing the appropriate legal regime but 
also for other fields of law, such as contract law or consumer protection law.191 
Consequently, the clearer the scope of the exclusive control under copyright is, 
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the easier it is to examine the right holder’s conduct towards the concerns of com-
petition and consumer protection law. 
Where does that leave us with the material and immaterial dissemination 
rights distinction? According to Ficsor, “digital transmissions scramble the 
beautifully arranged, dogmatically duly characterised and justified picture of 
these two families of rights.”192 In the absence of a material medium, the distinc-
tion between exploitation in material and non-material form is obviously 
blurred.193 Whereas the intangible nature of communication at the first sight 
would point towards immaterial dissemination, certain uses would be more com-
parable to traditional material exploitation.194 
Not only did the distinction become vague, it also became misleading in the 
online context.195 Drawing conclusions on the proper scope of protection online 
solely on the basis of the assumption that it falls under immaterial dissemination 
is questionable. Early on in the course of technological development and long 
before the emergence of the Internet, Reimer warned about subjecting any new 
way of communicating a work to the public to unlimited control, even if it falls 
under an immaterial form. Rather than automatically putting exploitation into one 
of the existing boxes, one must consider the involved interests before deciding 
which right to apply.196 
Furthermore, rejecting the application of any boundaries to the acts of 
seemingly immaterial dissemination solely on the basis of qualifying the use 
under one or another existing exploitation rights would amount to “conceptual 
jurisprudence”.197 To completely deny application of the exhaustion principle tra-
ditionally associated with material dissemination would be unfair if right holders 
had the option to obtain remuneration through first dissemination, comparable to 
analogue world.198 Blindly relying on the rules developed for different technical 
circumstances would not do any justice.199 
The absence of the tangible medium is not the only difficulty with recognising 
the relevance of material dissemination rights in the online setting. The on-
demand nature of work’s communication is another factor. Before the advent of 
digital technologies, material dissemination mainly gave rise to the supply of 
works in a form where it could be consumed by a user at a time and place chosen 
by them. Performance, on the one hand, enabled consumption which lacked 
individual choices.200 The online environment, on the other hand, enabled 
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communication of both types, thus resembling material and immaterial dis-
semination. 
Towards this background, it is noteworthy that the distinction between 
immaterial and material dissemination rights has motivated the differentiation 
between the right of distribution and the right of communication to the public 
under secondary EU law. Whereas the former right is subject to exhaustion, 
legislation explicitly excludes the application of the principle to the right of com-
munication to the public.201 The legislative choice has been explained, inter alia, 
by the case law of the CJEU preceding copyright harmonisation under the Direc-
tives. When exclusive rights under national laws were examined against the 
freedoms of the internal market, the exercise of the right of distribution was 
limited to the first distribution of copies of a work within the Community. On the 
other hand, the exercise of the right of performance under national laws was not 
impaired by virtue of the Treaty.202 
Nevertheless, the developments under the CJEU jurisprudence suggest that 
the strict division between material and immaterial dissemination rights is no 
longer maintained. First, the exhaustion principle, as inherent to the material dis-
semination under the acquis, has been interpreted as also covering the online dis-
tribution of digital copies of software.203 Second, acts of communication which 
formally fall under the broad right of communication to the public were exempted 
from the reach of the right on the basis of criteria alien to traditional copyright 
doctrine.204  
What is more, the absolute majority of the CJEU rulings interpreting the scope 
of the right of communication to the public under the Directives concern secondary 
acts relying on either authorised or unauthorised act of initial communication.205 
In most cases, the question is whether the right covers secondary acts of dis-
semination, where right holder has authorised initial communication. From that 
perspective, the situation at stake resembles the one regulated by the exhaustion 
principle under the right of distribution. The latter simply exempts any secondary 
act from the scope of the right if copyright holder has authorised the first 
distribution. No comparable mechanism exists under the right of communication 
to the public. 
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Pursuant to secondary EU law, the question of applying exhaustion to the right 
of communication to the public does not arise. Nonetheless, in practice, the juris-
prudence of the Court exempts certain secondary acts either by the extension of 
the exhaustion principle beyond the realm of distribution of tangible copies or by 
applying other criteria in the context of the right of communication to the public. 
Hence, the question is whether the division between material and immaterial dis-
semination rights is still observed under the acquis, and further, what the develop-
ment means for the scope of control accorded by copyright in general, regardless 
of the specific right in question. 
 
 
2.3. Implications of the distinction under  
the acquis on national laws on the example  
of Scandinavian copyright 
This section sets out to illustrate the consequences the EU harmonisation has had 
for national laws on the example of the Scandinavian countries. As will be 
explored, apart from being influenced by legal realism thinking and hence, less 
disposed to dogmatic assumptions, Scandinavian copyright is also characterised 
by the special place of public interest in copyright law-making. Copyright regu-
lation relying less on the dogmatic assumptions and more on the practical out-
come of the adopted rules has also influenced the structure of exclusive rights. 
Scandinavian copyright provides a broad right of making a work available to the 
public which covers all the protected acts of dissemination. Further, legislation 
provides a non-exhaustive list of categories of the right, which are then subjected 
to different exceptions and limitations.  
Faced with the broad harmonised right of communication to the public under 
the InfoSoc Directive, Sweden and Norway decided to implement the obligations 
differently under their national laws. Whereas in Sweden a new category of the 
making available right was introduced, in Norway the act only clarified that such 
acts already fell under the existing category of public performance. Nevertheless, 
last year, and nearly twenty years after the adoption of the Directive, Norway also 
introduced a new category of communication to the public under the making 
available right. The change was motivated by the extensive developments taking 
place under CJEU jurisprudence. 
Whereas harmonisation under the EU secondary law originally did not seem 
to subject any non-protected use to the exclusive control of right holder, the sub-
sequent developments under CJEU jurisprudence have had a considerable impact 
both in terms of the acts falling under the broad right of communication to the 
public and in terms of freedom to legislate on matters not explicitly harmonised 
under secondary EU law. Whilst a broad right of making a work available was 
introduced under Scandinavian copyright with an intention of making it adaptable 
to the developments of technology, a highly selective approach to harmonisation 
under the acquis interferes with its potential. 
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The following sections serve to address one of the sub-questions posed at the 
beginning of this chapter. Namely, what did enshrining the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination under the EU framework mean for 
national laws and the freedom of MS to legislate? Using Scandinavian copyright 
with its distinct rationales and approach to law-making as an example, it will be 
explored how a flexible approach under the national law has been restricted by 
the harmonisation under the EU acquis. Before turning to the structure of exclu-
sive rights themselves, this section will look into the peculiarities of copyright 
rationale in Scandinavia and how it translates into the scope of protection. 
 
 
2.3.1. Scandinavian realism and copyright rationale 
Scandinavian countries share periods of common history but also of a common 
law-making.206 Copyright is a prominent example due to the considerable level of 
harmonisation at the international and regional levels.207 The basis for cooperation 
lies in common legal tradition, culture, historical ties, and closeness of the lan-
guages.208 Although collaboration in the region has decreased in the light of EU 
harmonisation, the countries strive to implement the obligations under inter-
national and EU law in a similar fashion.209  
The flexible and less doctrinal approach of Scandinavian law can be attributed, 
among other things, to the philosophy of the Scandinavian legal realism.210 
Scandinavian legal thinking represents a realistic view of the purpose and the 
effect of legislation.211 Positive law under this view is a deliberate act of the 
appropriate authority to serve guidance for conduct. The very purpose of the act 
is to establish the reasons for belief and action, where legal rules are behavioural 
patterns maintained by force. Thus, legal science cannot provide the conceptual 
content of the law.212  
Legal realism thinking found its way to the copyright field, in particular to 
explain the aims and structure of copyright protection. Danish scholar Ross, a 
prominent representative of the movement, criticised justifying the copyright 
rules on the sole basis of the nature of the legal relationship instead of considering 
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the practical implications. The only durable method of evaluating a legal ques-
tion, he held, is by practical consideration of the pros and cons of the rules, which 
must be decided in relation to specific interests.213 Accordingly, it is not possible 
to deduce more from a construction than what was put into it in advance, as it is 
a description of the law in force and cannot be more than that. 
When it comes to the purpose of copyright legislation, there is a good tradition 
in Scandinavia to take into account society’s interest in access to cultural products 
besides the right holder’s interests.214 Copyright-protected works are not only 
products of culture but also its elements, copyright operates in between these 
considerations.215 The interests of right holders and society at large do not point 
in opposite directions. Broadening the exclusive rights could, to a certain extent, 
also be explained as furthering society’s interest in culture production by sup-
porting right holders’ demand for better legal protection.216 This also has impli-
cations for a view on the limitations. As copyright is expected to balance these 
two considerations, the idea of limitations being construed narrowly has been 
rejected.217 
The aim of protection is described as giving the author a right to decide over 
the circumstances of making a work public.218 In a slightly different light, the aim 
is defined as providing the right to decide how a work will be enjoyed or per-
ceived by others.219 Hence, essentially, the granted protection is described towards 
the goal of communicating a work. Besides the moral nature of the control over 
communication, it also serves to increase the potential for obtaining economic 
remuneration.220  
Apart from determining the circumstances of communication of a work, the 
right holder is also entitled to a reward for their work.221 Hence, one of the 
underlying grounds for copyright protection is based on the account that a work 
should be remunerated and the one having created it should also receive benefits 
from their creation.222 The extent of appropriate reward is not clear, especially as 
to whether copyright is expected to guarantee a living for the creators.223 Even 
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though the law and preparatory works rely on an unclear concept of remuneration, 
legislation can have the function of a general stimulus of culture creation.224 
Towards this background, the extent of the granted exclusive rights must be 
restricted. This is explicitly mentioned under the recently adopted NCA. The first 
paragraph provides that the purpose of the act is, inter alia, to delineate the rights 
in order to reach a reasonable balance between the interests of right holders and 
the interests of users and the public in general, in a way that ensures that a work 
can be used where it is reasonable in respect to societal considerations.225 
An important distinction which has been drawn in this regard is the control 
over a work and control over the copies. Knoph contended that copyright serves 
solely to provide control over a work as such and not the copies. If there is a need 
for some control over the copies, it should be regulated under a special provision. 
The possible need to restrict the property right of the owner of a copy at later 
stages, he argued, is nothing compared to what is missed in technical and practical 
considerations by abolishing the distinction between a work and the copies and 
placing the latter under copyright.226  
Similarly, Koktvedgaard reasoned that total control over copies would not 
serve the interests of copyright holders. Control had to be restricted to avoid pro-
tection being excessive and going beyond what is necessary.227 He argued that 
broadening the scope of protected works, the length of protection, and the content 
of the rights to cover any related act was ultimately extending copyright beyond 
its natural boundaries.228 Hence, the strong emphasis on the interests of society 
calls for confining protection to what is necessary. For instance, private use 
would usually be exempted, as it generally does not harm the interests of the right 
holder.229 The protection accorded under copyright does not mean an unlimited 
and unfounded control over a work.230 Also, the enjoyment of work would be 
seen as outside copyright.231 
Preparatory work for the current Swedish Copyright Act (SCA) stresses that 
the rights granted by the act are not based on an exact theory of copyright, but 
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rather are a result of historical development, both domestically and inter-
nationally.232 Similarly, the preparatory work for the recently repealed NCA of 
1961 puts the act into the context of international harmonisation and discussion 
on the copyright purpose.233 The purpose of copyright legislation, on the other 
hand, occupies more space in the discussion. The grant of exclusive rights serves 
the interests of the general public, and hence, their scope should be aligned 
accordingly.234 The right to a work’s exploitation of greater economic or practical 
importance should be granted to the copyright holder as long as there are no 
strong societal interests speaking against it.235 
The preparatory work to the recently adopted NCA acknowledges that there 
are many often opposing interests that must be balanced both in the context of 
separate provisions and the act as a whole. The NCA lists three central objec-
tives.236 The first is to grant the rights to authors, performers, or investors, 
providing incentives for cultural production. The second objective is to delineate 
the rights to ensure the reasonable balance between the interests. The third is to 
facilitate effortless negotiations on the use of a work.  
The nature of copyright protection has been subject to a debate in Scandinavia. 
The idea that gained the least support is that copyright as a part of IP is a special 
kind of property that is of the same nature as material property.237 According to 
this view, any restrictions on the rights from the perspective of society’s interests 
had to be excluded.238 The view was rejected and largely seen as a policy program 
supporting stronger protection.239 Furthermore, copyright comparability to 
property right could not form a basis to resolve any unsettled issues by analogy 
with property.240 Preparatory work for the NCA of 1961 rejected parallels 
                                                                                             
232  As stressed by the committee preparing the draft, see SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till 
litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 84. On the absence of underlying theory see also 
Nordell (1997), p. 203. The SCA should be understood in the light of international obligations, 
see Bernitz et al. (2007), p. 13. 
233  Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, pp. 4–7. 
234  For Sweden, see SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: 
lagförslag, pp. 85–86. For Norway, see Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett 
til åndsverk, p. 7. 
235  SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 248; 
Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 7. On the other hand, see 
the Swedish Arts Council stating that any professional or systematic exploitation of work 
should result in remuneration, Ljungman (1976), p. 102. 
236  Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om 
opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), pp. 25–26. 
237  Such property was called “spiritual property” or åndelig eiendommsrett in Norwegian and 
was supported by V. Kruse. See more Knoph (1936), p. 13. 
238  Ibid., p. 46. 
239  Rognstad (2016), p. 533; Ross (1945), p. 337; Knoph (1936), p. 46; Bergström (1954), 
pp. 25–26. 
240  It does not preclude an opposite solution, which should be decided based on the practical 
considerations See Ross (1945), pp. 352–353. 
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between rights under copyright and considered the rights in tangible property to 
be of no assistance in legislative work.241 
Another way to describe the structure of copyright stems from the view that 
the object of IP is an intangible work, which should be differentiated from copies 
of a work or other means of expression.242 The intangibility of the object of IP 
distinguishes it from property law dealing with material things.243 Under this 
immaterial rights theory, copyright protects the exploitation of a work as direct 
exploitation of an intangible creation. Exploitation, in turn, takes place in two 
main forms: creation of copies in tangible form and communication of a work in 
its intangible form through a performance.244 
The prominent critique of these two theories is found in the contribution of 
the Danish scholar Ross, a leading Scandinavian realist thinker. Criticising the 
immaterial rights theory, Ross focused on the close proximity between defining 
a work as an object of copyright and assimilating it with the property theory of 
copyright. In his view, a work was just an abstraction because it exists solely as 
an experience. Accordingly, what is disposed of through exclusive rights is an 
experience of a work. Likewise, he divided the presentation of a work into two 
categories: either through the copies of a work that enable the direct experience 
of a work (e.g. painting) or through the experience of a work as a process (e.g. 
performance of a work, reading a book).245 From this perspective, Ross described 
exclusive rights as related to creating the experience of a work and restricting 
other’s freedom to dispose of their property.246  
The article by Ross started a long debate on whether the rights under copyright 
are object or subject related. Eberstein, representing the camp of immaterial rights 
thinking, agreed with Ross in a later article that a work is just an abstraction, 
albeit necessary to describe the rights to a creation which can take many different 
forms.247 Hedfeldt also agreed with the view that a work as an internal experience 
is just an abstraction. The purpose of the rights is to enable the authorisation of 
the communication of a work through external experiences. Hence, a work as an 
internal experience is just an abstraction which you cannot exploit.248 However, 
                                                                                             
241  Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 7. 
242  Knoph (1936), p. 8. 
243  Eberstein (1949b), p. 1. 
244  Eberstein (1943), pp. 744–748. 
245  Ross (1945), pp. 343–354. 
246  This led to a statement that, because property rights are exclusive rights and copyright is 
a special restriction to others’ freedom, rights under copyright are negative rights. See Ross 
(1945), p. 349. The argument was criticised by Hedfeldt, holding that the rights’ exclusivity 
inevitably also results in the negative side. See Hedfeldt (1952), p. 157. Also, it was criticised 
by Lund, stating that it is the negative rights which matter the most and which are not specific 
to copyright but to general freedom of action. See Lund (1954), p. 144. 
247  Eberstein (1946), pp. 83–84. See also Lund on the purpose of copyright to provide control 
over the circumstances of a work’s communication, Lund (1954), p. 136. 
248  Hedfeldt (1952), pp. 155, 161. 
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he rejected classification of these experiences based on the type of a copy 
involved, as it would depend on the type of work in question.249  
Recently, Rognstad summarised the discussion in Scandinavia and high-
lighted the dangers of adopting one or another approach. For instance, one middle 
ground is the one expressed by Karnell: although a work is an abstraction, it is 
not an obstacle for describing a work as something rights are related to.250 
Accordingly, even discarding property theory and immaterial rights theory, which 
consider copyright as a right to an object, it is important to highlight the main 
common characteristic of IP and property law as affecting an unlimited circle of 
persons.251 In any case, no substantive conclusions should be drawn whether the 
rights are described as related to an object or not.252 
Hence, copyright legislation and scholarship in Scandinavia has been influ-
enced by a pragmatic approach to the legislation and the philosophy of Scandi-
navian legal realism. Copyright is considered to be a tool for achieving a variety 
of objectives with an emphasis on the interests of society. Accordingly, regulation 
relies less on the dogmatic assumptions and more on the practical outcome of the 
adopted rules. This has influenced the structure of exclusive rights, which will be 
explored later in this chapter. 
 
 
2.3.2. Broad exploitation right under Scandinavian copyright 
Scandinavian copyright acts have almost an identical structure, which is due to 
the close cooperation preceding the adoption of the acts in the 1960s.253 Whereas 
following harmonisation under the InfoSoc Directive the structure of the exclu-
sive exploitation right somehow differed, with the recent adoption of the new 
NCA close proximity has been brought back. According to the acts, the exploi-
tation rights conferred on the copyright holder consist of the right of making a 
work available to the public and the right of reproduction. The right of making a 
work available to the public further contains a non-exhaustive (following the 
courts’ practice) list of categories of acts falling under the right. Distribution, 
performance, and display traditionally were the main forms of making a work 
available. A new category of communicating a work to the public was introduced 
following the harmonisation under the EU acquis. 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
249  For example, reading a book with pictures would comprise two different types of copies: 
direct (picture) and indirect (text which you have to read). Ibid., p. 158.  
250  Rognstad (2016), p. 523. 
251  Ibid., p. 524. 
252  Ibid., p. 535. 
253  Bernitz calls the 1960s the golden age of Nordic legal cooperation, Bernitz (2018), p. 388. 
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The broad right of making available highlights the communicative function of 
exploitation rights and the economic significance of control over commu-
nication.254 Despite the flexibility such a right introduces, the categories specified 
under the right are also important. Not least, qualifying the act of exploitation 
under a particular category of making available can lead to a different outcome 
based on the exceptions foreseen for a particular way of making a work avail-
able.255 
The harmonisation under the EU acquis has, however, limited the flexibility 
envisaged by the broad right of making a work available. Importantly, the acquis 
has introduced a rigid distinction between the right of distribution and the right 
of communication to the public, which has been interpreted restrictively in the 
context of national proceedings. Moreover, the exhaustive list of exceptions to 
the right of communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive is another 
matter limiting courts’ ability to treat dissemination as they deem legitimate in 
the light of the objectives of national copyright laws.256 
Although it cannot be concluded that the harmonisation under the EU acquis 
substantially influenced the application of the distribution right outside the realm 
of tangible copies, it may have discouraged exploration of the desirability of such 
a scenario. Generally, the right of distribution under the Scandinavian copyright 
acts is reserved for acts involving tangible copies, with little further discussion 
on the matter of tangibility.257 Nonetheless, before the adoption of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the Norwegian government expressed a view that exhaustion would 
apply to copies to be produced locally from the information system.258 
 
 
2.3.2.1. Right of making available under Scandinavian copyright 
Due to historical reasons and close cooperation in various fields, the Nordic coun-
tries developed copyright legislation which is very similar in many areas. 
Cooperation between Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark started in the 
1930s in an attempt to create Nordic copyright law.259 Although due to the col-
laboration in the Nordics the texts of copyright acts in Norway and Sweden were 
almost identical at the time of their adoption, court practice and subsequent 
amendments resulted in certain differences.  
                                                                                             
254  Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 16.; Prop. 104 L 
(2016–2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk 
mv. (åndsverkloven), p. 29. Also, see Ross on the very purpose of exploitation rights to enable 
control over making a work or a copy public. Ross (1945), pp. 332–333.  
255  Wold (2004), p. 541. 
256  Rognstad (2005b), p. 369. 
257  Lindberg and Westman (2001), pp. 256–257; Olsson and Rosén (2016). Levin (2017), 
p. 141. On the contrary, see Wagle and Ødegaard (1997), p. 178. 
258  Ot. prp. nr. 15 (1994–1995) Om lov om endringer i åndsverkloven m m, p. 455. 
259  Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 1. 
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On a few occasions, countries took slightly different approaches to imple-
menting international obligations. They also became members of different inter-
national organisations. Sweden became a member of the EU in 1995 and, subse-
quently, a party to the WIPO CT in 2009 upon the EU's ratification of the Treaty. 
Norway is neither a member of the EU nor a party to the WIPO CT, but the Treaty 
was taken into account when amending copyright legislation in 2004 and 
adopting a new act in 2018.260 On the other hand, as a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), Norway harmonised certain aspects of copyright law, 
including under the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive.261 As the Directive 
implements the WIPO CT, it can be said that Norway has as well largely harmo-
nised its legislation with the WIPO CT. 
Both acts provide explicitly for exploitation (economic) rights and moral 
rights. Further, the exclusive right to exploit a work is divided into two main 
rights, the right to produce copies and the right of making a work available to the 
public. Only the latter will be addressed here. 
The right to exploit a work under the SCA is provided in Section 2§ and reads 
as follows: 
 
Subject to the limitations prescribed hereinafter, copyright shall include the exclu-
sive right to exploit the work by making copies of it and by making it available to 
the public, be it in the original or an altered manner, in translation or adaptation, 
in another literary or artistic form, or in another technical manner.262 
 
The new NCA from 2018 has slightly changed the wording, Section §3 of the 
NCA provides that: 
Copyright provides exclusive right to dispose of a work by  
a) producing permanent or temporary copies of a work, regardless of the 
way and form it takes 
b) making a work available to the public.263 
 
The right of making available to the public as a part of the exploitation right 
granted to the right holder is further divided into four categories. Before the 
InfoSoc harmonisation, the SCA and the NCA contained three categories: public 
display, public distribution, and public performance. They are now supplemented 
                                                                                             
260  Ot. prp. nr. 46 (2004–2005) Om lov om endringer I åndsverkloven m.m., p. 10. 
261  In 2004 the EEA committee included the InfoSoc Directive into the Agreement. EØS-
komiteens beslutning nr. 110/2004 av 9. juli 2004 om endring av EØS-avtalens vedlegg XVII 
(Opphavsrett). Available at http://www.efta.int/sites/default/files/documents/legal-texts/eea/ 
other-legal-documents/adopted-joint-committee-decisions/2004%20-%20Norwegian/110-
2004n.pdf. (Accessed on July 14, 2019). 
262  Translation into English by the Swedish Ministry of Justice. Available at  
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/se/se124en.pdf (Accessed on July 14, 2019). 
263  Translation into English is author’s own, no official translation of the new act is available 
on the WIPO webpage. 
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by a fourth category, communication to the public.264 Whereas SCA was amended 
in 2005 when it was harmonised with the InfoSoc Directive, NCA was amended 
with a new category in 2018 following, inter alia, the development of the right of 
communication to the public under the EU copyright acquis.265 
In the meaning of both acts, a work is made available to the public every time 
it is published, read out, performed, exhibited, broadcasted, or otherwise made 
available. Thus, it extends to each and every act.266 In the preparatory works in 
the 1960s the categories of the right of making available were considered to mark 
three main groups of acts falling under the right.267 Hence, it was disputed 
whether acts of making available comprise only acts falling under these cate-
gories or if the right is broader than the categories. However, the development 
suggests that the list is not exhaustive but merely indicative.268 
For instance, in Norway some case law was criticised for not making it clear 
whether the making available right comprised solely acts falling under one of 
three categories or whether the categories had to be seen in the light of the making 
available right. It is suggested that the Supreme Court’s judgment in Napster 
broadened the scope of the making available right and removed the need to actu-
ally put an act within one of the categories to find that it constitutes an act of 
making available.269 There is a similar tendency in Sweden, where the courts do 
not always clearly establish the category of making available right before holding 
that a particular act falls under the exclusive right.270 
The term “making available” in the definition of exploitation right was criti-
cised at the time of the adoption of the acts in the 1960s. First, it was suggested 
that the literal reading of the right would not make it clear that the scope of the 
right extends beyond the act of first making a work available to the public, i.e. 
publishing.271 The second major concern was that the right comprised exploitation 
                                                                                             
264  Since Norway has introduced a separate category of the right of making available in 2018, 
Denmark is the only Scandinavian country where the right still comprises the same three 
categories introduced in the 1960s. 
265  Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om 
opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), pp. 31–34. 
266  For Sweden, see SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: 
lagförslag, p. 402. For Norway, see Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget 
(forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), p. 30. Also, it 
was confirmed in the Napster case, Rt 2005 41, para. 21. 
267  SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 97; 
Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 16. 
268  The preparatory work for the new NCA provides that the list of categories under the right 
of making available is not exhaustive. Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget 
(forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), p. 30. 
269  Napster case Rt 2005 41. For a comment, see Rognstad (2005b), pp. 345–346.  
270  For instance, the Court’s of Appeal for Southern Norrland judgement in DoD, RH 
2006:80. 
271  The alternative term could have been to spread a work to the public. See Bergström (1954), 
p. 186. 
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through distribution, which blurred the relation between the general right 
concerning a work as such and a category of exploitation concerning separate 
copies.272 Third, by extending the control to single copies, protection was 
extended to such an extent that the right covered all the possible aspects and could 
have been a blanket right instead.273 
 
 
2.3.2.2. Distribution and performance as the original categories of  
the right of making available 
The original acts in the 1960s contained three categories of the right of making 
available: performance, distribution, and display. Distribution is one of the cate-
gories of the right, encompassing acts where the copies of a work are offered for 
sale, rented, lent, or otherwise distributed to the public. Hence, the scope of the 
acts falling under the concept of distribution is wider than the right of distribution 
under the EU acquis.274 The control over making copies available through distri-
bution had to be restricted. Hence, the right holder cannot object to further dis-
semination.275 
The prevailing view in the legal literature is that the right of distribution con-
cerns solely tangible copies with no further discussion on the matter of tangi-
bility.276 However, some are of the opinion that an upload of a copy on the Inter-
net constitutes distribution, even if it is not exactly the same copy which is being 
transferred, but rather new copies.277 Inapplicability of the distribution right to 
acts online is often motivated by the nature of the acts, namely creation of copies 
as part of the process. For instance, one of the arguments is that the distribution 
right for copies produced by transmission is not exhaustible because copies are 
not transferred but created on the recipient’s end instead.278  
When the acts were adopted in the 1960s, the right of distribution would be 
exhausted not upon the sale or transfer of ownership, as it is common today and 
harmonised under the EU acquis, but upon a work being published. Now the 19 § 
of the SCA has the following wording:  
 
Once a copy of a work has been handed over with the copyright holder’s consent 
within the European Economic Area, that copy may be disseminated further.  
The provisions of the first paragraph do not confer a right to offer the public: 
                                                                                             
272  Ibid., p. 81. It was also submitted that exclusive right cannot comprise rights which con-
cern property of others. See Ross (1951), pp. 85–93. 
273  Kruse (1952), pp. 405–423. 
274  Rognstad (1999), pp. 116–117. 
275  SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 246.  
276  Lindberg and Westman (2001), pp. 256–257; Olsson and Rosén (2016). Levin (2017), 
p. 141. 
277  Wagle and Ødegaard (1997), p. 178. 
278  Lindberg and Westman (2001), p. 258; Olsson (2015), p. 115. 
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1. copies of works, with the exception of buildings and works of applied art, 
through rental or equitable legal acts  
2. copies of computer programs in machine-readable format or cinematographic 
works, through lending.279  
 
§ 27 of the NCA, in turn, has a very similar wording:  
 
Once a copy of a work is sold or otherwise handed over with the copyright holder’s 
consent, that copy may be further disseminated to the public. The provisions apply 
only to the copies handed over within the European Economic Area. If a copy is 
handed over outside this area, the provisions are without prejudice of a copy being 
acquired for private use or disseminated further through rental or lending.  
The provisions of the first paragraph, with the exception of buildings and 
works of applied art, do not permit rental. Neither do they permit lending of com-
puter programs in machine-readable format. Organised exchange equals rental.280 
 
The prevailing view under the SCA is that it only applies to tangible copies, 
which is sometimes justified by the reference to the CJEU ruling in the Art & 
Allposters case.281 As to the NCA, there has been a shift in the opinion whether 
the exhaustion principle under the NCA applies to copies of a work lacking tan-
gible support. In the mid-1990s before the adoption of the WIPO CT and the 
InfoSoc Directive, it was expected that the provisions would also apply to the 
copies produced locally from the information system.282 In the preparatory work 
for the amendments in 2005, on the other hand, it was argued that the question 
did not arise in the context of online services, even though they might enable 
acquiring a copy.283 The latter view is also supported in the Preparatory work for 
the act adopted in 2018.284 
Another category of the making available right is communication of a work 
to the public, which has been separated from the public performance right. Public 
performance related mostly to works that could be performed.285 The emergence 
of the new category of communication to the public under the right of making a 
work available was motivated by the international and the EU harmonisation. 
                                                                                             
279  Translation is author’s own, adapted from the one by the Swedish Ministry of Justice. 
Available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/se/se124en.pdf (Accessed July 14, 
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280  Translation is author’s own. 
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285  SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 97. 
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The line between making a work available through performance or commu-
nication to the public and through the dissemination of copies in the Swedish 
court practice is rather blurred. Analysis of the judgments of the Courts of Appeal 
and the Supreme Court reveals that qualifying acts under specific category of the 
making available right is a secondary task. The focus is on determining whether 
acts generally constitute an act of making available.286 This could also be viewed 
as expanding the scope of the making available right, as opposed to the idea 
expressed at the time of the SCA adoption.  
The right of distribution was considered by the Swedish courts in the circum-
stances involving online distribution on a few occasions. For instance, in the DoD 
case, the Sundsvall District Court and the Court of Appeal for Southern Norrland 
had to examine the upload of copies of software on a leech server and its subse-
quent download by users of the server.287 The question was whether by uploading 
and sharing a copy of software a person infringed the right of making a work 
available to the public by distributing it to the public or contributing to distri-
bution of it to the public.  
The District Court ruled that no act of making available to the public in a form 
of distribution took place, because the public element was absent. The Court 
based its assessment on the public criteria rather than interpreting the meaning of 
distribution. The District Court held that users having access to the leech server 
did not form a public. The Court of Appeal ruled differently though when it 
comes to the public. It found that users of the leech server formed a public and, 
thus, a person committed infringement by making software available to the public. 
The scope of the right of distribution or its applicability to online transmis-
sions was not discussed by either of the Courts in the grounds of the judgment. 
In the absence of a separate category of communication to the public at that time, 
the acts of making available to the public could be qualified under either the dis-
tribution, display, or performance categories. What seems to be uncontested is 
that enabling a download of copies would be an infringement of the right of 
making a work available if it was directed at the public. Qualifying an act under 
one of the forms of making a work available was of secondary importance. How-
ever, the reference to distribution category of the making available right high-
lights the parallels that have been drawn between unauthorised distribution of 
tangible copies and upload of a digital copy for its subsequent transmission.  
It was not the only time where the acts of online dissemination through upload 
and download of copies was considered under the category of distribution as a 
part of the wider right of making a work available to the public. In the earlier BBS 
case, a person running an online bulletin board for uploading and downloading 
                                                                                             
286  As can be seen from an example provided below, where the Appeal Court in RH 2006:80 
held that an act amounted to making a work available to the public without examining in detail 
whether an act fell under the specific category of the right. 
287  DoD-målet, Hovrätten för Nedre Norrland dom 2006-11-22 mål nr B121-05. Although the 
judgment was rendered in 2006, the case was decided according to the law in place before the 
harmonisation with the provisions of the InfoSoc Directive. 
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software was accused of copyright infringement or, alternatively, contributory 
copyright infringement. The case built, inter alia, on the infringement of the right 
of making a work available to the public through acts resembling rental or 
lending.288  
The District Court of Helsingborg found that defendant infringed copyright 
by renting software without the copyright holder’s authorisation, whereas the 
Scania and Blekinge Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court disagreed, ruling 
that, in order to be held liable for infringement there had to be an active action. 
Whereas the case is not further commented on here, it is interesting to note that 
the prosecutor incriminated the operator of the online bulletin board with 
infringement of the right of rental, which under the SCA is part of the wider 
category of distribution, primarily associated with tangible copies.289 
 
 
2.3.3. Harmonising with the EU acquis 
Harmonisation on the international and EU levels influenced the dissemination-
related rights to a considerable extent. Although the right of making a work avail-
able to the public proved sustainable in the age of changing technological 
circumstances of a work’s exploitation, the wording of the legislation was amended 
on a few occasions, especially when it comes to the exhaustion principle. At 
times, the amendments were introduced in anticipation of the upcoming changes, 
drawing inspiration from the Directives and the EC’s Green Papers and Proposals.  
The first impact of harmonisation can be seen as early as in 1989 when the 
SCA was updated to cover computer programmes as literary works under copy-
right, and the exhaustion principle was modified. Copies of computer pro-
grammes in a machine-readable format would now be, like any other literal 
works, subject to exhaustion. However, their subsequent rental or lending would 
still be subject to the right holder’s authorisation. This followed the recommen-
dation published by the WIPO in 1982, the EC’s Green Paper and the on-going 
discussions, even though the draft Directive was not yet presented.290 
When the Software Directive was adopted in 1991, the discussion in Scandi-
navia concerned mainly the territoriality of exhaustion, although EEA-wide 
exhaustion was not implemented until few years after. Both Norwegian and 
Swedish governments considered the Software Directive unclear on the matter of 
territoriality of exhaustion.291 Also, the Swedish government did not perceive the 
                                                                                             
288  BBS-målet, NJA 1996 s. 79. Högsta domstolen dom 1996-02-22 i mål nr B363-95. 
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Directive as requiring full harmonisation, but as allowing to go further than 
requested.292 Nor did the Rental and Lending Rights Directive harmonising the 
neighbouring right of distribution and its exhaustion persuade the countries on 
the EC’s approach to the territoriality of exhaustion. EEA-wide exhaustion under 
SCA and NCA for all types of works was implemented in 2005 at the time of 
harmonisation with the InfoSoc Directive. Meanwhile, the provision on exhaus-
tion of the right of distribution in regard to computer programmes has been 
changed multiple times under the SCA, from providing for an EEA-wide one in 
1992, reverting to the international one in 1997 and, finally, merging with other 
types of works in 2005.293 
Nevertheless, the adoption of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive in 1992 
resulted in major changes to the copyright frameworks. Both jurisdictions modi-
fied the conditions for exhaustion to occur, and now it took place once a work 
was sold rather than published. Accordingly, the SCA would provide that copies 
which were transferred could be freely disseminated further, and the NCA 
provided that copies which were sold could be disseminated further.294 The dif-
ference in the wording was mitigated by the additional statement under the NCA 
which provided that the same applied to copies made public and otherwise trans-
ferred with the authorisation of right holder. Furthermore, the already existing 
provisions, according to which exhaustion did not sanction further rental of dis-
tributed copies of musical works, were extended to cover any type of a work, 
effectively recognising the non-exhaustion of the right of rental.295 
As can be seen, the EU harmonisation impacted the exhaustion provisions in 
Scandinavian countries rather profoundly. First of all, the exhaustion would apply 
upon a transfer of a copy and not a work being issued, which decreased the scope 
of the acts which trigger exhaustion from any putting into circulation to the acts 
amounting solely to a transfer of a copy (or sale, as reflected in the NCA). 
Secondly, the scope was further delimited to exclude subsequent acts of rental 
and lending, meaning that even after the initial distribution through sale, rental 
and lending of distributed copies would still require authorisation. Thirdly, the 
harmonisation also impacted the territoriality of exhaustion, changing it from an 
international to the regional (EEA) one.  
                                                                                             
292  Prop. 1992/93:48 Om ändringar i de immaterialrättsliga lagarna med anledning av EES-
avtalet, pp. 110, 122–123. 
293  For more on the motivation behind adopting the EEA-wide exhaustion for computer 
programmes, see Prop. 1994/95:58 Uthyrning och utlåning av upphovsrättsligt skyddade verk, 
p. 36. 
294  The SCA uses the term “överlåta” to refer to a transfer of a copy, while the NCA uses 
“solgt”, literally meaning a sold copy.  
295  Also, in line with the later CJEU’s interpretation of the Directive in the Laserdisken case, 
see CJEU, Foreningen af danske Videogramdistributører, acting for Egmont Film A/S, Buena 
Vista Home Entertainment A/S, Scanbox Danmark A/S, Metronome Video A/S, Polygram 
Records A/S, Nordisk Film Video A/S, Irish Video A/S and Warner Home Video Inc. v Laser-
disken. (1998) Case C-61/97, Judgment of 22 September 1998. 
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Adoption of the InfoSoc Directive also turned out to be an opportunity to 
revise the acts. When it comes to the right of distribution to the public under the 
Directive, it was established in both countries that the rights under national law 
were in conformity with the InfoSoc Directive as they covered all the acts of 
distribution of copies fixed on a tangible medium.296 Both preparatory works stated 
that the right of distribution under the copyright acts cover solely tangible copies. 
While the Norwegian preparatory act does not comment further, the Swedish one 
refers to the case law of the Swedish Supreme Court, including the MP3 case, 
covered later on in this section.297 
On the other hand, the right of communication to the public under the InfoSoc 
Directive was implemented in a different way. The Swedish government con-
sidered communication to the public right under the InfoSoc Directive to have a 
narrower scope than the respective category of public performance under SCA. 
The former comprised only acts of distance transmission, meaning when commu-
nication was taking place by technical means and not by live performance. In 
addition, the Swedish government concluded that the communication to the 
public right included certain acts of distance transmission, which under SCA 
were qualified under the public display right.298  
Two ways of implementing the communication to the public right into the 
SCA were identified. The first option was to clarify the scope of the public 
performance category to include all the forms of distance transmission irrespec-
tive of types of a work. It would mean that the public performance right would 
also cover pictures and text made available on the Internet or broadcasted on TV. 
An alternative was to introduce a separate category of communication to the 
public as the fourth category of the making available to the public right. This 
would also mean a change in the scope of the public performance and the public 
display categories to exclude acts falling under the communication to the public 
right under the Directive. 
The second option was preferred, and a new category was included under the 
making available to the public right. The main argument was a more straight-
forward implementation of the Directive and linguistic considerations. Also, 
distance transmission of works were considered significant from the copyright 
holder’s perspective as it could reach a broad audience. Hence, it deserved 
specific protection as a separate category. Moreover, if the right of public perfor-
mance would include distance transmission of different types of work, there 
would be a need to modify the existing exceptions. Finally, it was reasoned that 
                                                                                             
296  Prop. 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället – genomförande av direktiv 
2001/29/EG, m.m., p. 81; Ot. prp. nr. 46 (2004–2005) Om lov om endringer I åndsverkloven 
m.m., p. 27. 
297  Prop. 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället – genomförande av direktiv 
2001/29/EG, m.m., p. 27; Ot. prp. nr. 46 (2004–2005) Om lov om endringer I åndsverkloven 
m.m., p. 80. 
298  Prop. 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället – genomförande av direktiv 
2001/29/EG, m.m., p. 63. 
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adopting the chosen solution would approximate the scope of the public perfor-
mance category under SCA with the public performance right under the BC.299 
Similar to the discussion in Sweden, the Norwegian proposal established that 
communication to the public right under the InfoSoc Directive was narrower than 
the rights granted to the copyright holder by NCA under the category of perfor-
mance outside the private circle. Second, the proposal stressed the fact that com-
munication to the public right did not have a uniform meaning under different 
international instruments, namely the BC and the WIPO CT. Third, it underlined 
that the making available to the public right was technology-neutral and flexible 
enough to cover usage of new technologies in an effective manner. Because of 
these reasons, it was decided that including a new category under the right of 
making available to the public would not provide desired legal certainty and 
would be unnecessary, taking into account already existing court practice and 
agreements concluded based on the act in force.300  
Hence, following the harmonisation under the InfoSoc Directive, Sweden and 
Norway maintained different approaches to dealing with the acts of commu-
nication to the public under national law. However, this has recently changed as 
the NCA was amended to include a new category of communication to the public 
under the right of making available. The change has been motivated by making 
it easier to relate the developments under the EU acquis to Norwegian law as well 
as because performance from the language perspective did not seem suitable for 
dealing with such a variety of situations that have little to do with its original 
meaning.301 The scope of protection was not influenced by the change, but rather 
the qualification of acts under the categories of the making available right. 
Two cases ought to be mentioned here. Both cases concerned hyperlinking as 
an act of making a work available in the proceedings on contributory infringe-
ment. Following the harmonisation of the right of communication to the public 
under the InfoSoc Directive, the considerations would likely be different if the 
cases were to be decided now.302 The judgments illustrate the flexibility of a 
general making available to the public right in dealing with new ways of exploi-
tation. Also, the MP3 case from Sweden illustrates how the developments under 
the EU acquis have influenced the position of the courts during the pro-
ceedings.303 
It is important to note that at the time of the proceedings in the MP3 case, 
there was no communication to the public category under the making available 
to the public right, thus charges were brought on the basis of distribution or per-
formance categories. The appeal proceedings, as well as the proceedings before 
                                                                                             
299  Ibid., pp. 64–66. 
300  Ot. prp. nr. 84 (1991–1992) Om lov om endringer I lov 12 mai 1961 nr 2 om opphavsrett 
til åndsverk m.v. og i enkelte andre lover som følge av EØS-avtalen, p. 22. 
301  Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om opp-
havsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), p. 10. 
302  For the developments under the CJEU jurisprudence, see section 5.2.3.2.2. 
303  MP3-målet, NJA 2000 s. 292. Högsta domstolen dom 2000-06-15 i mål nr B413-00. 
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the Supreme Court, seem to have been influenced by the adoption of the WIPO 
CT and negotiations on the InfoSoc Directive. Skövde District Court, Göta Court 
of Appeal and the Supreme Court have ruled that there was no copyright infringe-
ment, but the qualifications of the act in question differed.  
The case concerned hyperlinking, namely whether posting direct (pointing to 
a downloadable copy of a file) hyperlinks to sound recordings constituted an act 
of making a work available through distributing it to the public in the meaning of 
SCA. The District Court held that providing links to the webpages where a copy 
could be downloaded could not be considered as an act of distribution. Links 
merely enabled a download of copies without a direct involvement of the person 
providing a link as files were hosted on the third-party web server.  
The Court of Appeal, dealing with the question of contributory infringement 
of the right of making available to the public, brought the adoption of the WIPO 
CT and the negotiations on the InfoSoc Directive into the picture. The Court of 
Appeal stated that the right of distribution concerned physical copies, which 
applied as soon as a sound recording was fixed on a hard drive.304 Therefore, no 
direct infringement could have taken place in this case. Merely providing a link 
did not itself make copies available. Contributory infringement could not be proven 
either because it was not possible to determine whether the third party which 
uploaded works did so unlawfully, as copying for private use was not an infringe-
ment.  
The case was appealed further to the Supreme Court, which had to rule whether 
linking could constitute a contribution to unauthorised making available of sound 
recordings. The Supreme Court’s secretary was asked for a proposal for a ruling, 
which differed from the final judgment and deserves special attention. The 
secretary dismissed the idea that that the right of distribution only concerned 
copies fixed on a tangible medium or that the absence of a transfer of a copy in 
an act of making a work available would preclude considering it a distribution. 
Both forms of making available, distribution and performance, could take place 
at the same time, enabled by technology but not anticipated by law. There were 
no supporting arguments for holding that one of the forms would exclude the 
application of the other. On these grounds, it was proposed to rule that providing 
direct links to copies made available online constituted unlawful distribution to 
the public and, thus, an act infringing the right of making available to the public. 
The Supreme Court ruled a bit differently. It stated that the distribution cate-
gory under the SCA concerned physical copies. Not placing digital transmissions 
under the category of distribution under the right of making available to the public 
was motivated, inter alia, by the provisions of the WIPO CT and the draft of the 
InfoSoc Directive. As the defendant did not himself produce or dispose of copies 
that could be made using his webpage, the making available that took place could 
                                                                                             
304  Note that here the original medium did not matter. It did not matter whether music was 
disseminated on a CD or via the Internet, downloading to a hard drive created a physical copy 
subject to the right of dissemination. Some are of opinion that “distribution” was not used in 
the meaning of the SCA, but as a synonym to making available. See Westman (1999), p. 6. 
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only be qualified as a public performance. However, no infringement of the right 
of making available to the public took place, as public performance of sound 
recordings was exempted from the exclusive neighbouring rights of performing 
artists and phonogram producers. 
A similar issue at stake was in the Norwegian Napster case, where the question 
was, inter alia, whether linking to unlawfully uploaded sound recordings consti-
tuted an infringement of the right of making available to the public under the 
category of public performance.305 Unlike in the Swedish MP3 case, the Sør-
Gudbrandsdal District Court found there to be an infringement of the right. The 
Eidsivating Court of Appeal reversed the judgment on the grounds that linking 
constituted only a reference to a work which had already been made available. 
Hence, the Court of Appeal ruled that linking did not constitute making a work 
available in the meaning of the NCA.306 The Supreme Court concentrated on 
examining contributory infringement, without focusing on qualifying the act of 
linking under one of the categories of the right of making a work available. The 
Court ruled that a person uploading the files infringed the right of making a work 
available. The defendant contributed to the infringement by providing hyper-
links.307 The reasoning of the Court in reaching the conclusion has been criti-
cised.308 
This brief discourse on the structure of copyright acts in Scandinavia illus-
trates the flexibility of a broadly formulated right of exploitation. Whereas the 
right of making a work available to the public is divided into categories, these do 
not form an exhaustive list. Such an approach captures new ways of exploiting a 
work without a need to recognise new rights. However, such flexibility also 
requires mechanisms of ensuring a proper balance between the interests of right 
holders and society. The harmonisation under the EU acquis has influenced the 
flexibility envisaged by the structure of the broad right in two major ways. First, 
an exhaustive list of permissible limitations under the acquis limits the freedom 
to introduce appropriate exceptions under national law. Second, a rigid distinc-
tion between the rights of communication to the public and distribution interferes 
with determining the scope of protection in accordance with the envisioned 
objectives rather than on the basis of the dogmatic assumptions. 
 
 
                                                                                             
305  Napster.no-saken, Høyesteretts dom den 27 januari 2005, HR-2005-00133-A, sak nr. 
2004/822. 
306  Ibid., para. 11. 
307  Ibid., para. 73. 
308  See Rognstad (2005b). For a comparison with the Swedish MP3 case, see Westman 
(2012). 
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2.4. Conclusions and framework for the analysis  
in the following chapters 
This chapter provided a background to the analysis of the rights under the EU 
copyright acquis, which will be undertaken in the following chapters. First, it 
placed the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination into the 
wider context of copyright rationales and their significance for determining the 
scope of exclusive control conferred by the rights. Second, it discussed how tech-
nological development influences the circumstances of a work’s exploitation and 
the appropriate scope of protection, emphasising the danger of drawing conclu-
sions on the assumptions of the past. Third, the chapter highlighted the impact of 
EU harmonisation on the national laws of the Scandinavian countries. Not only 
do the jurisdictions have distinct copyright rationales which are largely un-
acknowledged under secondary EU law, the broadly construed right of making 
available covering all the protected acts of dissemination falls short of its in-built 
flexibility due to harmonisation under the acquis. 
The brief discourse on the theories of copyright and the rationales of protec-
tion revealed that none of the theories call for an all-encompassing right over a 
work, as the interests of the creators and right holders cannot always be placed 
above all other interests. The variety of possible justifications calls for assuming 
a perspective on the function of protection for the subsequent analysis of devel-
opment. As has been explored, the distinction between material and immaterial 
dissemination, which is the main interest of this thesis, is closely related to the 
economic justifications of copyright and the incentive rationale. The latter justi-
fies protection, inter alia, on the basis of eliminating market failure or inter-
nalising externalities of cultural goods production. Hence, providing exclusive 
control is justified to the extent it is necessary to mitigate that particular concern. 
Once the goal is achieved, other involved interests can be focused on. 
An appropriate level of protection and justifications for it are nothing but 
static. As has been explored, given the intricate link between the scope of copy-
right protection and the developments of technology, it may not be desirable to 
rely on the normative constellations outlined at a specific time in the light of con-
stantly changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation. Given the increasing 
impact of the EU harmonisation, it is highly desirable that the MS are left with a 
framework flexible enough to adapt to the developments and to account for the 
public interest. 
This thesis is concerned with a particular rule enshrined under EU secondary 
law, which is the distinction between the right of distribution and the right of 
communication to the public based on the assumption that the former represents 
material dissemination and the latter covers immaterial dissemination. It is not 
the characteristic of the rights as such that is questioned but rather the normative 
conclusions drawn from attributing the rights to one type of dissemination or 
another. Through both types of dissemination, the right holder attempts to realise 
the value of a work. The difference lies in the acceptable extent of control con-
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ferred by the exclusive rights, given the rationale of protection and other interests 
involved. 
As has been explored, once useful distinction might turn counterproductive 
when the circumstances change. Whereas striking a balance between the need of 
protection and the need for drawing its boundaries is all but a straightforward 
task, constructing frameworks on the basis of contemporary circumstances also 
bears the danger of becoming quickly obsolete. Neither any online dissemination 
that does not involve digital copies shall be treated uniformly, nor shall online 
dissemination that involves copies necessarily be submitted to the rules designed 
for tangible copies. 
The following chapters will analyse the development of the rights of distri-
bution and communication to the public under the acquis from the perspective of 
material and immaterial dissemination as envisioned at the outset of harmo-
nisation. Taking the perspective of the distinction as signifying a normative scope 
of the rights, it is essential that the scope of enquiry is clearly defined. When 
addressing the background to the harmonisation of the rights, the analysis will 
focus on the justifications for aligning the rights with either material or immate-
rial dissemination and on other developments influencing the need and the form 
of harmonisation. 
Next, the subsequent developments under the acquis, particularly CJEU juris-
prudence, will be analysed proceeding from the premises that secondary EU law 
differentiated between the rights pursuant to the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination. This will allow to focus on the developments which 
counter the original presumption of the nature of the right under secondary EU 
law. Furthermore, the analysis will commence from the perspective of economic 
rationale, i.e. focusing on the reasoning of the CJEU concerning the right holder’s 
control over exploitation of a work, the market for a work, remuneration and 
competition. 
Importantly, the analysis will focus on the acts of secondary dissemination that 
rely on the initially authorised act; it is where the differentiation between material 
and immaterial dissemination rights plays out. This means that whereas the 
jurisprudence interpreting the particular rights is analysed, the emphasis is on the 
CJEU’s reasoning in the cases where the right holder has authorised initial dis-
semination (e.g. distribution of copies, sending a signal, posting a work on the 
Internet), and where the question is whether particular act relying on such initial 
act (e.g. resale of a copy, retransmission of a signal, linking to uploaded work, 
etc.) requires authorisation. 
Hence, particular attention will be paid to the reasoning of the CJEU for 
extending or denying control over subsequent acts of dissemination in relation to 
the initially authorised act. Rather than focusing on qualifying secondary acts in 
question under one or another right, it will be shown how the scope of the right 
of distribution evolved beyond the control over the first dissemination of a work, 
envisaged by the material dissemination approach. Furthermore, it will be 
demonstrated how the struggle around the scope of communication to the public 
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right is caused, inter alia, by the assumption that any primary or secondary act 
ought to be subject to authorisation. 
The assessment of the development of the rights towards the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination relies on two key assumptions. First, given 
the economic underpinning of the exclusive rights, it is presumed that control 
over every primary act of dissemination potentially offers sufficient incentives to 
create and exploit a work. Accordingly, it is accepted that the exclusive rights, 
given their incentive rationale, shall provide control over each and every new act 
of exploitation.309 However, the question whether each and every secondary act, 
relying on authorised communication, should be subjected to right holder’s 
exclusive control is not resolved by virtue of the incentive rationale alone. 
The second assumption is that the distinction between the primary and 
secondary acts of dissemination could be a benchmark for evaluating the scope 
of control accorded by exclusive rights. Hence, in order to derive the justi-
fications behind extending the reach of the rights beyond authorising each new 
act of dissemination under CJEU jurisprudence, the analysis relies on the 
differentiation between primary authorised acts and secondary acts relying on 
such acts. Appropriate control over secondary act could depend on its inter-
ference with the incentives to exploit a work, which ought to be safeguarded by 
the control over the primary act, or on the considerations outside the incentive 
rationale or even copyright. 
  
                                                                                             
309  Such as every upload of a work on a webpage or sale of every new copy of a work. 
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3. RIGHT OF DISTRIBUTION AS PROVIDING 
CONTROL OVER MATERIAL DISSEMINATION 
The right of distribution is one of the core economic rights granted under copy-
right, traditionally covering distribution of tangible copies of a work. As has been 
briefly addressed in Chapter 2, the right of distribution has been associated with 
the material dissemination of a work. Limiting the scope of the right upon the 
initial authorisation of the right holder has been justified on the basis of other 
competing interests, e.g. free circulation of distributed copies. The exhaustion 
principle, exempting secondary distribution of copies put into circulation from 
the scope of the exclusive right, is thus also the right’s essential characteristic. 
Whereas the exhaustion principle is dealt with at a greater length in Chapter 4, 
the aim of the present chapter is to analyse the development of the right and the 
justifications for limiting its scope beyond first distribution. In this respect, the 
exhaustion principle is considered merely a tool to delineate the exclusive control 
accorded by the right. The objective of the enquiry is hence to illustrate how the 
development of technology and copyright legislation has shaped the scope of the 
distribution right under the EU acquis, in particular in respect of the secondary 
(subsequent) distribution. Therefore, particular attention will be paid to the justi-
fications for extending or limiting the reach of the right beyond the first dis-
tribution. 
Distribution could be discussed in its broad and narrow meanings. The former 
would comprise different forms of dissemination of a work, typically associated 
with transfer of copies, e.g. sale, rental, lending. The latter would comprise the 
forms of more permanent transfers of copies and ownership, such as sale. 
Whether considered in broad or narrow form, distribution of a work or copies 
thereof essentially achieves the same result: it conveys the content of a work to 
the public. However, depending on the specific form, each distribution of a work 
or copies thereof will have different legal consequences under copyright, as, 
historically, the rules have been tailored to reflect the need of balancing com-
peting interests in particular type of cases. Whether or not this approach is bene-
ficial given changing circumstances will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Given the overall focus of the thesis on the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination rights as the ground for denying any general limit on 
the extent of control conferred by the right of communication to the public, this 
chapter focuses on the right of distribution in its narrow meaning. The right is 
harmonised in the narrow sense under the InfoSoc Directive, the main instrument 
under the EU copyright acquis. Rental and lending rights, which are so intricately 
linked to the distribution right will not be analysed separately in this chapter. 
Rather, the developments of technology, calling for submitting rental and lending 
to a treatment different from the distribution right are discussed, as well as the 
precedent of extending the reach of the lending right to digital copies of a work. 
As the title suggests, the focus will be on the relationship between the right of 
distribution and the concept of material dissemination. In this context, rental as 
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the form of a broader distribution, which de facto falls under the immaterial dis-
semination treatment, falls outside the scope. 
This chapter together with chapters 2, 4 and 5 serves to answer the first overall 
research question, which is how the development of the rights of distribution and 
communication to the public under the EU acquis reflects the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination. More specifically, the present chapter 
provides a better understanding of the rationale for harmonising the distribution 
right on the EU level and drawing the boundary of its scope by means of the 
exhaustion principle. This is achieved by addressing the following sub-questions: 
 
What circumstances have influenced the need and the form of harmonisation of 
the right of distribution under the EU acquis? 
How was the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination enshrined 
under secondary EU law and what were the driving forces? 
Does the development of the right of distribution under the EU copyright frame-
work reflect material dissemination and if so, how? 
 
In order to answer these questions, first, the background to harmonising the right 
of distribution at the international and EU levels is analysed in the light of the 
overall developments at the time. Second, the circumstances which played a 
crucial role in determining the form in which the right was harmonised under EU 
secondary law are explored, with a particular focus on the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU preceding the adoption of the Directives. Third, the development of the 
scope of the right of distribution after its harmonisation under the Software and 
InfoSoc Directives is analysed. Next, the results of the subsequent development 
of the right are contrasted with the notion of material dissemination in order to 
conclude whether they have challenged the notion of the distribution right being 
confined to material dissemination. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 3.1. provides the background to 
the harmonisation of the right of distribution under the EU acquis through the 
prism of copyright development in general and the international developments in 
particular. Obviously, the right of distribution did not develop in a vacuum and 
its relation to other rights and the circumstances at the time have impacted its 
harmonisation. Four important aspects are addressed in this part: significance of 
recognising a separate distribution right in the light of the reproduction right; 
acceptance of the broad right covering secondary distribution; distinction 
between ownership and possession in the context of separating the rental right; 
and harmonisation of the right at the international level. 
Part 3.2. is dedicated to the harmonisation and the development of the right 
under the EU acquis. It starts with the enquiries of the European Commission 
(EC) into the necessity to harmonise the right of distribution and the aspects 
harmonised under CJEU jurisprudence prior to the adoption of the Directives. 
Then this part proceeds to the legislative history of the Software Directive and 
the InfoSoc Directive, tracing the choices made at the time of enumerating the 
rights under the acquis. Finally, CJEU jurisprudence interpreting the Directives 
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and subsequently shaping the scope of the right according to the changing 
circumstances of work’s exploitation is explored. 
Part 3.3. is set to assess whether and how the right of distribution under the 
acquis reflects the premises of material dissemination envisioned at the time of 
harmonisation under the Directives. This part focuses on the three aspects of the 
right: circumstances supporting restricting exclusive control beyond the first 
distribution, circumstances pointing towards extending exclusive control beyond 
the first distribution, and the tangibility of object as an (in)dispensable attribute 
of material dissemination. 
 
 
3.1. Background to the harmonisation of the right  
of distribution under the EU acquis 
Harmonisation and further development of the right of distribution under the EU 
acquis should be examined through the prism of the respective developments and 
obligations under international law, even more so due to the fact that the develop-
ments on the EU level happened in close time proximity or even in parallel with 
the international negotiations. This section presents the background to harmonising 
the right of distribution on the EU level, in the light of its scope, wording, and 
reach beyond the acts of first distribution. 
Besides the brief look at the international obligations and the interpretation of 
them under the EU acquis, this section identifies key aspects that influenced the 
speed of negotiations, the accepted scope of obligations, and the need for har-
monisation per se. The first aspect is the significance of the recognition of the right 
of distribution, in particular in the light of the right of reproduction. The second 
aspect is the acceptance of right holders’ control over any subsequent distribution 
of copies. The third is the growing support for subjecting rental of copies to copy-
right holders’ control and the distinction between ownership and possession. The 
fourth and last aspect is the relation between the right of distribution and digital 
transmissions. 
 
 
3.1.1. Significance of explicitly recognising the right  
of distribution in the light of the right of reproduction 
The need for vesting in copyright holders an exclusive right to control any distri-
bution of a work has not always been self-evident. In many cases, at least at the 
time preceding the Internet, an ability to determine conditions for the distribution 
of a work was inherent to the creation of a work itself. For instance, when a work 
exists as a single piece (e.g. a painting), it is ultimately within the control of the 
author, even without the involvement of copyright law. The property right in the 
piece would secure the creator’s ability to control its fate and ask for compen-
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sation in the case of a transfer. The same would be true if there were multiple 
copies which were produced and distributed by the author. 
On the other hand, without the copyright protection, the author would not be 
able to oppose production of exact or similar copies and their distribution. This 
concern was mediated by the right of seizure covering counterfeit (i.e. infringing) 
copies, as recognised by the BC ever since its adoption in 1886. At the time of 
the Brussels revision in 1948 and the first discussions on the necessity to recog-
nise a right of distribution, Article 16 of the BC provided that competent authori-
ties of signatories may seize pirated works, which included copies imported from 
the countries where they were not or no longer protected.310 Since the Stockholm 
revision in 1967 the BC mandates even stronger protection by providing that 
infringing copies are liable to seizure.311 Copies are deemed infringing if their 
creation involves infringement of copyright in a work.312 Hence, Article 16 of the 
BC provides a limited control over infringing copies and, in the absence of a 
recognised right of distribution under the BC, an opportunity to prevent the dis-
tribution of copies produced abroad where distribution right may no longer be 
enforceable. 
Coming back to a work or lawfully produced copies thereof, the situation 
would be different in the case where the author entrusts creation and/or distri-
bution of additional copies to a third party. First, it might well be desirable that 
the reproduction and distribution are clearly distinguished between and that 
author’s control over the copies of a work is enforceable beyond the contractual 
obligations. Second, the author may wish to retain control over a work or copies 
of it beyond their first transfer. As will be shown, whereas the justifiability of 
vesting the exclusive control over distribution of a work has hardly been disputed, 
the extension of control to any subsequent disposal of a work or copies has been 
controversial. Given the overall focus of this thesis on the limits of control over 
authorised dissemination, this section will focus solely on control over distri-
bution of the copies produced by or with the authorisation of the author. 
Although the right of distribution was eventually recognised as a broad right 
under the WIPO CT, it occurred much later than in respect of other key economic 
rights, such as the rights of reproduction and performance.313 In particular, it was 
not before the Brussels revision of the BC in 1948 that the recognition of the right 
of distribution was discussed internationally. The inclusion of such a right was 
                                                                                             
310  International Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works Signed at Berne 
on the 9th September, 1886, Revised at Berlin on the 13th November, 1908, and Revised at 
Rome on the 2nd June, 1928. 
311  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on 
September 28, 1979), Art. 16. 
312  WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights. WIPO 
Publication No. 816 (EFS) 1980, p. 133. See also the comments by the German delegation at 
the Stockholm conference, Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm 
1967. Vol. 2. WIPO 1971, pp. 854, 907. 
313  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 13. 
83 
opposed on many grounds, including the collision of a broad distribution right 
with the property rights of a subsequent acquirer and a strong anti-competitive 
effect on the market.314 Moreover, in some countries, the right of reproduction 
provided the right holders with control over the conditions of distribution of 
reproduced copies.315 
A major argument for not providing a separate right of distribution was the 
view that the right would largely be redundant given the protection already 
secured by the right of reproduction.316 For example, if an author chooses to 
entrust the making of copies of a work (e.g. a manuscript) to a third party, they 
would assign to a publisher the right of reproduction, either accompanied or not 
by an authorisation to distribute these copies. In most cases, it would be very 
unlikely that a publisher would acquire a right to make copies but lack a right to 
distribute them.317 
Considering the right of distribution, a corollary to the right of reproduction 
was not in itself an obstacle to granting it explicitly under national law.318 For 
instance, the view that the right is a complement to the reproduction right and 
seldom has a separate meaning is found in Swedish literature and preparatory 
works for the copyright act, even though it has been recognised as a separate right 
since 1960.319 As it was noted, the right would only become distinctive when 
copies are disseminated in breach of an agreement, or if copies produced abroad 
were imported in the absence of it.320 Hence, a separate right was of a minor prac-
tical importance, except for the producers of mass-produced music and films.321 
                                                                                             
314  Ricketson (1987), pp. 402–403.  
315  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. First Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part II. (Draft). 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/I/3 1991, p. 20. 
316  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 656. 
317  See, for instance, the preparatory work to the SCA, SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till 
litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 95. 
318  At the time of harmonisation, many countries had already recognised a separate right of 
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subsequent distribution of such copies. The latter case highlights the overlap between the right 
of distribution and the right of seizure under the BC. See also SOU 1956:25 Upphovs-
mannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, pp. 95–97. 
321  Koktvedgaard and Levin (1992), p. 105. Also, see section 3.1.5.1. 
84 
Similarly, the draft of the Model Law on copyright drafted by the Committee 
of Experts with the support of the WIPO recognised the right of distribution 
explicitly despite uncertainty on whether or not the right of reproduction already 
provided sufficient control.322 Granting the distribution right was considered 
justified in certain circumstances, where the author might not have sufficient 
control over copies by a virtue of contract. This might have been influenced, inter 
alia, by the overall aim of the meetings of the experts to “inspire and influence 
governments and legislators to improve their intellectual property laws and opt 
for solutions that will increase the degree of similarity among legislations when-
ever the special interests of a country do not require different solutions”.323 
Although the draft of the Model Law was never officially published because 
another committee started working on PPBC, it serves as a source to under-
standing the discussions ongoing at that time. 
At the level of the international agreements, the right to control distribution 
has for a long time been considered corollary to the right of reproduction, and its 
recognition was of a minor practical importance.324 As noted in the Official 
Program for Stockholm’s revision of the BC in 1967, the right of distribution is 
a “natural complement to the right of reproduction”; including the right of distri-
bution into the BC would also require technically complex rules for the sake of 
exceptions.325 The right of reproduction at that time was considered fit to provide 
adequate protection against infringements in most cases.326 This view prevailed 
until the end of the 1980s, when the technological development called, if not for 
a revision, then for a clarification of the existing rights. 
As late as in beginning of 1990s, it was not considered worthwhile to separate 
the right of distribution from the reproduction right under the BC. As the Com-
mittee of Experts working on PPBC phrased it, “it would not seem worthwhile 
trying to use the PPBC to further clarify that age-old relationship between repro-
duction and (first) distribution of copies of works just for stating immediately (as 
it would have to be) that, after the first sale of a copy, the right of distribution is 
exhausted. It seems more appropriate to recognise those aspects of the right of 
distribution whose maintenance even after the first sale of copies – according to 
                                                                                             
322  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Memorandum 
prepared by the International Bureau. III Comments on the draft model provisions for 
legislation in the field of copyright. CE/MPC/I/2-III 1989, pp. 19–21. 
323  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. I Introduction. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau. CE/MPC/I/2-I 1989, p. 2. 
324  Ginsburg (2002), p. 121. Although the view was widely supported, the right of distribution 
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in the chapter. 
325  Hesser (1966), p. 281. 
326  Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm 1967. Vol. 2. WIPO 1971, 
p. 854. 
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growing agreement at the international level – seems justified; namely the right 
of rental and public lending in respect of particular categories of works.“327 
Following the rejection at the Stockholm conference in 1967, the right was 
also initially dropped from the agenda of the Committee of Experts working on 
PPBC in the 1990s as a corollary to the right of reproduction.328 Moreover, Article 
14(1) of the BC providing for a limited right of distribution for cinematographic 
works was called redundant.329 Recognition of the right of first distribution was 
not considered urgent as its absence had not created difficulties in the inter-
pretation of the BC. Nevertheless, a suggestion to sign a protocol stating that the 
right of first distribution is a corollary inseparable from the right of reproduction 
under the BC received support from only half of the delegations.330 The right of 
distribution was back on the agenda at the later stage of negotiations, which led 
to the adoption of the WIPO CT.331 
Subsequent developments in the field of copyright law changed the perception 
and the role of the right of distribution. The ample ways of reproducing a work 
and the broad protection granted under the right of reproduction have challenged 
the link between the two rights. Notwithstanding the creation of copies, which is 
subject to the right of reproduction, circumstances of any public distribution of a 
work are subject to the right of distribution. Furthermore, the subsequent develop-
ment of the scope of the right and, in particular, its extension to counterfeit or 
infringing copies under the EU acquis has confronted its function as a mere 
corollary to the reproduction right. 
 
 
3.1.2. Acceptance of extending control to subsequent 
distribution 
Whereas the right of distribution would increasingly be recognised under national 
laws and the idea of harmonising it on the international level became gradually 
accepted, the scope of such right remained a topic for further discussion. One of 
the most important aspects to address was how far such a right should stretch, i.e. 
whether it would cover solely the acts of initial distribution (i.e. putting copies 
into circulation) or any further distribution of copies as well. One of the biggest 
concerns was a strong anti-competitive effect on the market of any control 
                                                                                             
327  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. First Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part II. (Draft). Memor-
andum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/I/3 1991, p. 22. 
328  Ibid., p. 22. 
329  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Third Session. 
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330  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Third Session. 
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beyond the initial distribution.332 As will be shown, the concerns expressed during 
the various negotiations preceding the harmonisation of the right in the 1990s 
point towards a conclusion that subjecting all the subsequent acts of distribution 
to exclusive control was not widely supported at this stage. 
The right of distribution rarely existed in an absolute manner under national 
laws.333 Even if some countries introduced the right of distribution before the 
international harmonisation, most of them also had in place the mechanisms of 
restricting it to the acts of first putting copies into circulation. Although the dis-
tinction between the right of distribution and the right of first distribution has not 
always been clearly followed, it can be traced in the overall context of the various 
proposals. The draft of the Model Law, for instance, included the right of distri-
bution as a distinct right. The latter was accompanied by the provision on free 
resale, hence, pointing towards the right of first putting copies into circulation.334 
Turning to the BC, few delegations at the Stockholm conference advocated 
for recognising the right of distribution as an independent right under the BC and 
placing it under the right of reproduction in Article 9(1).335 Certain countries 
favoured the proposal in general but expressed the view that the exclusive right 
of reproduction was enough to secure an author’s interests in most cases.336 A 
possible need for a separate right was acknowledged; however, it was considered 
risky to provide copyright holders with the secondary prerogatives of a blanket 
circulation right beside the reproduction one.337  
In the absence of preparatory works on the subject, it was difficult to find a 
solution acceptable to all.338 For this reason, discussions at the Stockholm con-
ference were concluded with postponement of the question to the following 
meeting. The right of distribution (or circulation) was not completely rejected but 
considered overreaching and required further studies of the consequences of its 
introduction.339 Hence, the right was still not on the agenda and largely con-
sidered a corollary to the right of reproduction.340 
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Hence, the idea of providing copyright holders with a blanket right to control 
initial and any subsequent distribution of a work was not accepted even if it was 
not rejected. However, this does not mean that the BC lacks such right altogether. 
Limited to a specific type of works, the droit de suite right under the Article 14ter 
of the BC provides authors or successors with an inalienable right to an interest 
in any subsequent sale of original artwork or manuscript, provided that the 
country the author belongs to provides for such a right. 
Certainly, the droit de suite right is rather different from the right of distri-
bution. The latter implies control over the acts of distribution as these must be 
authorised, whereas the former solely enables receiving further benefit in the 
form of remuneration. Arguably, by receiving remuneration, the copyright holder 
is acquiring certain information about the circulation of work, which could be 
considered as a kind of control, albeit a passive one. On the other hand, one of 
the primary justifications for granting the right of distribution is to enable right 
holders to control conditions for distribution and maximise remuneration. 
The importance of the distinction between first and subsequent distribution is 
well illustrated under the negotiations on the PPBC. When the right of distri-
bution was discussed at length at the outset of the third session in 1993, two dis-
tinctive definitions were considered: the right of distribution and the right of first 
distribution. The former (synonymous with the right of circulation) meant the 
right to authorise acts where one or more copies changed hands. The latter (or the 
right of putting into circulation) covered acts of distribution of a copy for which 
right of distribution was not exhausted through the first sale.341  
In essence, the existence of the two possible definitions or models for recog-
nising the right was due to the ongoing discussions on the recognition of the right 
of rental, surviving the first distribution.342 It was fairly obvious that the right to 
resell a copy should not survive the first sale.343 As indicated in the report of the 
third session, the broad right received support subject to the condition that the 
exhaustion of the right through the first sale would apply.344 
Similarly, the distinction can also be traced under the negotiations on another 
important instrument, formally Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
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of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).345 The Chairman’s text, which served as 
a draft for the negotiations, contained the right of first distribution and the right 
of importation, neither of which made it into the final text. According to the draft, 
the economic rights of the copyright holder should include the right of importa-
tion of lawfully produced copies and the right of first distribution by sale, rental 
or otherwise of original or copies of a work.346 Hence, the distribution right under 
the TRIPS negotiations concerned solely the acts of initial distribution. 
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the extent of the right of distri-
bution, the broad wording of the right was also included into the draft of the 
WIPO CT. This was motivated by the fact that broad right of distribution gained 
wide international acceptance by that time.347 It is important to note though that 
the preference for the broad right of distribution extending to subsequent acts is 
also linked to the developments in terms of recognising the right of rental.348 
Following the recognition of rental right as a separate right through restricting 
the scope of exhaustion of the right of distribution, the scope of the right of dis-
tribution has been significantly extended.349 
Hence, there was no clear agreement on the question whether subsequent 
distribution should necessarily fall under the right of distribution in the context 
of international harmonisation in the light of different positions of the states. For 
instance, as pointed out in the preparatory work to the SCA, whilst it could be the 
case that subsequent distribution would come under the exclusive general right 
of making a work available, it was understandable that a copyright holder should 
not decide over such acts. Hence, there was a need to explicitly limit the control 
over such subsequent distribution by means of the exhaustion principle.350 
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89 
3.1.3. Distinction between ownership and possession 
as the basis for separation of the rental right 
Another discussion that is of a tremendous importance to understanding the 
development and wording of the right of distribution under the international 
instruments and the EU acquis is its relation to ownership and possession of 
copies. First, as the main rationale of the right is to provide means to control the 
dissemination of lawfully produced copies, it has been defined in the relation to 
work and copies thereof. Second, the primary way of distributing copies is 
through their sale; hence, reference is often made to the transfer of ownership. 
Whereas the usage of these terms in the context of international harmonisation 
might appear self-explanatory, it is important to keep in mind the circumstances 
in which the harmonisation took place, namely, the emergence of the markets for 
rental of copies. 
International negotiations and harmonisation took place during the time when 
new technologies created possibilities for new forms of exploitation. Durable 
mediums such as CDs or DVDs enabled the repeated use of a work through the 
rental of copies. In certain circumstances, rental undermined the market for dis-
tribution of copies, which raised the concerns of copyright holders.351 To address 
this, countries started introducing the right of rental, either as a new right separate 
from distribution or by exempting it from the reach of the exhaustion principle if 
national law already provided for the broad right of distribution covering 
rental.352 On the EU level, early on the CJEU secured the right holder’s control 
over rental of copies imported from a different MS by exempting it from the reach 
of the Community exhaustion principle of distribution right, which the EC has 
subsequently harmonised under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive.353 
Under these circumstances, a certain degree of international harmonisation 
became crucial to secure the right to authorise rental, in particular where the 
divergent national laws made it possible to import already distributed copies 
without a separate authorisation of the right holder.354 It was further supported by 
the fact that many national laws provided a broad right of distribution covering 
all the types of dissemination of copies, including rental.355 If under such national 
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laws the exhaustion principle was applied upon any act of initial distribution, the 
right of rental would also be exhausted upon first putting copies into circulation, 
unless it was explicitly exempted. Hence, even though it was not universally 
accepted that the right of distribution ought to be harmonised internationally, new 
forms of corporeal exploitation made it desirable to regulate at least certain 
aspects. 
The tendency to define distribution using the terms of ownership in conjunc-
tion with the recognition for the right of rental is best traced under the nego-
tiations on PPBC. At the very outset of the negotiations, right of rental and 
lending became a major topic of discussion along with the right of distribution. 
Even in the absence of an agreement on the latter, it was considered important to 
harmonise aspects of the distribution right that would justifiably extend beyond 
the first distribution, namely the right of rental and lending.356 
Under the negotiations on PPBC, the first memorandum included a definition 
of the right of distribution as “a right to authorise any acts where ownership or 
possession of copies of the work changes hands”.357 Hence, the right was con-
sidered in its broad form, including the rental, lending, etc., where only a transfer 
of possession takes place. Thereafter, rental and lending were defined respec-
tively as transfer of possession of a copy of a work for a limited period of time, 
for profit- or non-profit-making purposes. In the absence of an indication of a 
wider acceptance of recognising the broad right of distribution, recognising rental 
and lending as surviving exhaustion of the right of distribution was considered 
desirable.358 
In such circumstances, the distinction between transfer of ownership and 
transfer of possession became handy for exempting acts of rental from exhaustion 
under national law. By providing that exhaustion took place only following a 
transfer of ownership, one would secure that distribution through rental would 
not trigger exhaustion of the distribution right, in its broad sense (e.g. also 
encompassing rental). Ultimately, to make sure that the distribution of a copy 
through sale would exhaust solely the resale right and not the right to rent a copy, 
either a separate right of rental or an additional adjustment of the exhaustion prin-
ciple would be necessary. Scandinavian copyright acts provide a good example: 
under both SCA and NCA the right of distribution is defined broadly as encom-
passing rental and lending. To secure the right holder’s control over rental and 
lending after the exhaustion of the right of distribution, the respective sections of 
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the law were updated to clarify that exhaustion did not sanction further rental and 
lending of copies.359 
Understandably, recognising the right of rental as an entirely distinct right 
would make the adjustments of the exhaustion provisions largely unnecessary. 
The latter is exactly what took place under the WIPO CT. The right of distribution 
and the right of rental became separate rights with their distinctive scope.360 This 
way the Treaty ensured both that any exhaustion of distribution by sale or other 
transfer of ownership did not affect the right to rent a copy in question. Similarly, 
it also ensured that renting a copy would not exhaust the right to its further rent 
or sale.361 On the other hand, it still used the ownership-possession dichotomy in 
the definition of the right of distribution and the provision on the freedom to 
decide the territoriality of exhaustion. 
Whereas the use of ownership in the definition of the distribution right is 
understandable in the light of the intention to distinguish it from the right of 
rental, the use of ownership term in the provision on parties’ freedom to regulate 
exhaustion appears less so. Whereas the term ownership was of importance under 
previous negotiations, it no longer served the same purpose under the WIPO CT, 
as it would not impact the right of rental. The explicit reference of ownership 
would be necessary only if the rental right would remain under the broad right of 
distribution, as in the early definitions under the negotiations on the PPBC. 
Hence, there has been a departure from viewing the right of distribution as a 
broad right encompassing the acts of rental, lending, and even importation, to 
viewing it narrowly as comprising solely of acts of sale or other transfer of owner-
ship.362 Whereas the shift could be justified for the sake of legal clarity over the 
scope of the right holder’s control in the context of different ways of dissemi-
nating (tangible) copies, one should be careful drawing conclusions from the 
wording of the right under international law. For instance, relying on the absence 
of a transfer of ownership as a ground for denying the application of the distri-
bution right to digital transfers of a work could be short-sighted if reasoned based 
on the obligations under international law. Whereas limiting the scope of the right 
of distribution to tangible objects has its grounds, relying solely on the notion of 
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transfer of ownership under the international obligations might be of limited 
relevance. 
 
 
3.1.4. Right of distribution and digital transmissions 
Whereas the right of reproduction evolved to comprise so-called intangible 
copies or digital copies, the same did not happen with the right of distribution.363 
As the right of distribution (in the countries where it was recognised) was closely 
linked to the right of reproduction and, hence, dissemination of tangible copies, 
the question of its applicability to copies lacking tangible support did not arise 
before the mid-1990s. Qualification was important because of the exhaustion 
principle as the distribution right’s inherent limit. According to the preparatory 
work for the revision of the NCA in 1995, it was expected that the provision on 
the exhaustion of distribution right could also apply to the copies produced 
locally from the information system.364 
Development of technology which enabled transmission of digital copies 
became subject to discussions at the national and international levels at the time 
of the negotiations on PPBC and the WIPO CT. The fourth session of the 
Committee of Experts on PPBC was one of the first events where online trans-
missions as acts related to the dissemination of copyright-protected works were 
discussed on the international level. The initiative to include the topic into the 
agenda came from the EC. Notably, from today’s standpoint, the issue of digital 
transmissions was added to the part concerning the harmonisation of the right of 
distribution.365 The ultimate goal was to ensure the author’s control over eco-
nomically meaningful use of a work necessary to provide the incentives for creative 
work as well as to promote “distribution and use of works in the “digital age”.366 
Digital transmissions soon became one of the key priorities for the PPBC, and 
reaching an agreement was seen as indispensable for the success of ongoing 
negotiations.367 Including digital transmissions into the discussion on the right of 
distribution was not a mere coincident. As summarised by the chairman, “… the 
questions concerning digital transmission of works could be discussed in the con-
text of distribution right, since there were some views according to which, as a 
result of such transmission, at least in certain cases, distribution of copies might 
take place.”368 
                                                                                             
363  On the right of reproduction and digitisation, see Depreeuw (2014), pp. 97–120.  
364  Ot. prp. nr. 15 (1994–1995) Om lov om endringer i åndsverkloven m m, p. 123; Prop. 
1994/95:58 Uthyrning och utlåning av upphovsrättsligt skyddade verk, p. 123. 
365  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fourth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/IV/3 1994, pp. 3–6. 
366  Dixon and Hansen (1996), p. 604. 
367  Ficsor (1995), p. 122. 
368  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fourth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/IV/3 1994, p. 7. 
93 
During the discussions, a majority of the delegations were of the opinion that 
the right of distribution should be reserved to the distribution of tangible copies. 
However, others expressed the view that making a copy available through digital 
transmission may substitute distribution in the future. Such acts should then fall 
within the scope of distribution if the primary purpose is to deliver a copy at the 
receiving end.369 Hence, there was some support for extending the distribution 
right to transmission of electronic copies. Such copies were perceived as identical 
to the ones distributed on a tangible medium, and language of the text was con-
sidered to be wide enough to allow for such extension.370 As one of the delega-
tions noted, “… the rules concerning protection as far as possible should be the 
same regardless of whether that result was obtained through distribution of physi-
cal copies or through digital transmission”.371 Nevertheless, following the dis-
cussion, it was established that the right of distribution applied primarily to the 
tangible copies. Two options were identified for the digital transmissions: either 
to apply the right of distribution if copies are established at the recipient end or 
to place them under the right of communication to the public. Creating a new, 
separate right for digital transmissions received limited support.372  
Starting from the fifth round of negotiations in 1995, the question of digital 
transmission was separated from that of the introducing the distribution right into 
the "digital agenda".373 Despite extensive negotiations, no agreement was 
reached, and questions were postponed to the next session.374 As the result of the 
sixth round in 1996, there was an agreement on including a general right of dis-
tribution, but no agreement on the type of exhaustion.375 For the digital trans-
missions an “umbrella solution” was developed. This meant that acts of digital 
transmission would be covered by an exclusive right in a technology-neutral way, 
and regardless of the right which applies, such acts would also constitute an act 
of reproduction.376 Given the advancement of the negotiations, it was decided to 
prepare for the Diplomatic Conference in December 1996, which resulted in the 
adoption of the WIPO CT.377 
 
                                                                                             
369  Ibid., pp. 3–6. 
370  Dixon and Hansen (1996), p. 609. 
371  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fourth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/IV/3 1994, p. 13. 
372  Ibid., p. 14. 
373  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fifth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/V/9-INR/CE/IV/8 1995, p. 59. 
374  Ibid., p. 68. 
375  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Sixth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VI/16-INR/CE/V/14 1996, p. 23. 
376  Ibid., p. 35. See also Geller (1996), pp. 42–43. 
377  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Sixth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VI/16-INR/CE/V/14 1996, p. 69.  
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While the US favoured classifying acts of making works available through 
digital transmission as acts under the right of distribution, the European Commu-
nities supported placing it under the right of communication to the public.378 The 
umbrella solution, developed under the negotiations for PPBC, was adopted as a 
compromise.379 It covers all the acts of digital transmissions when a work is made 
available to the public in such a way that individuals can choose when and where 
to access the work.380 
Upon the proposal of the chairman, a statement was made in relation to the 
articles corresponding to the right of distribution and the right of communication 
to the public: “As used in these Articles, the expression ‘copies and originals’ 
being subject to the right of distribution and the right of rental, refer exclusively 
to fixed copies that can be put into circulation as tangible objects."381  
Similarly to the previous section, I would not find it convincing to rely on the 
Agreed Statement to hold that the obligations under international law prevent the 
application of the right of distribution and its exhaustion to digital transmissions 
of copies. First, the statement is clearly of an explanatory nature, i.e. clarifying 
that the provisions of the articles provide obligations only insofar as distribution 
of physical copies is concerned.382 Second, while the text of the WIPO CT places 
acts of making available under the right of communication to the public, states 
are free to choose the right under which such acts will fall under the national 
legislation.383 
 
 
3.1.5. Harmonisation of the right of distribution under 
international law 
Against the background to the harmonisation of the right of distribution inter-
nationally, this section briefly summarises the obligations under the international 
instruments. It is important because the harmonisation on the EU level has often 
                                                                                             
378  Guide to the Copyright and related right Treaties administered by WIPO. Publication 
No. 891(E) 2004, p. 38. 
379  On the origins of the term and the idea, see Ficsor (2002), pp. 204–206; Ficsor (1996), 
pp. 136–137. 
380  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 697; Dreier and Hugenholtz (2016), p. 64; Guide to the 
Copyright and related right Treaties administered by WIPO. Publication No. 891(E) 2004, 
p. 203. 
381 Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain copyright and neighboring rights 
questions.1996 Volume II. WIPO Publication No. 348(E) 1999, p. 777. 
382  See also sections 3.1.5.4  and 4.1.5. .
383  Guide to the Copyright and related right Treaties administered by WIPO. Publication 
No. 891(E) 2004, pp. 208–209; Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain copyright 
and neighboring rights questions.1996 Volume II. WIPO Publication No. 348(E) 1999, p. 675. 
For example, the obligations under the right of making available in the US is implemented 
under the right of distribution. See The Making Available Right in the United States. A Report 
of the Register of Copyrights, United States Copyright Office, 2016, pp. 15–56. 
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been motivated by the developments on international level and served as a basis 
for establishing the appropriate minimum or maximum level of harmonisation 
under the EU acquis. Last but not least, the provisions of the Directives are often 
interpreted with a reference to international obligations. 
As has been argued in the previous sections, harmonisation of the right of 
distribution on the international level took place in parallel with other important 
developments, such as increased disparities under national laws as to the extent 
of the right holder’s control over distribution in different forms, such as rental. In 
many ways, the harmonisation of the distribution right (and especially its exhaus-
tion) has served to mitigate the concerns not directly connected to the mere sale 
and resale of copies. Whereas some aspects are covered elsewhere, this section 
will focus on the obligations under the international treaties in terms of the right 
of distribution and, in particular, the reach of the right beyond the initial distri-
bution of copies.  
This section provides a summary of the four instruments: the BC, the WIPO 
CT, the UCC and the TRIPS. Whereas the obligations under the BC in terms of 
distribution are rather limited in scope, the WIPO CT is the only international 
instrument recognising a broad right of distribution applicable to all types of 
works. The UCC, although not recognising the right explicitly, and of diminishing 
importance in general, provides an example of deriving control over distribution 
of lawful copies in the absence of an explicit exclusive right. Although the right 
of first distribution did not make it into the final text of TRIPS, the significance 
of its initial draft is briefly addressed. Last but not least, the section concludes 
with a brief discourse on the interpretation of the obligations under the EU acquis. 
 
 
3.1.5.1. Limited right of first distribution under 
the Berne Convention 
The main international instrument of copyright harmonisation, the BC, does not 
contain provisions which would oblige the signatories to provide copyright 
holders with a right of distribution regardless the type of a work.384 Although the 
right of distribution applicable to all types of works was discussed on a few 
occasions, the current text provides for such a right only in regard to cinemato-
graphic reproductions and adaptations. Thus, the BC does not provide for a 
general right of distribution like, for example, it does for the right of repro-
duction.385  
                                                                                             
384  Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as amended on 
September 28, 1979). 
385  Ricketson (1987), p. 402. General right in this context means a right which applies to the 
entire spectrum of works protected under copyright. General right is also used elsewhere to 
distinguish between a right of distribution applicable to every act of dissemination as opposed 
to a right covering solely acts of initial dissemination.  
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The Brussels conference of 1948 marks the beginning of discussions on the 
necessity to introduce the right of distribution under the BC. Rights of different 
scope were suggested, from a narrow distribution right covering acts of first 
putting copies into circulation to a broader one, also covering acts of subsequent 
distribution.386 While neither proposal succeeded, a limited distribution right was 
introduced for cinematographic works as well as for cinematographic reproduc-
tions and adaptations. This right is, to this day, the only distribution right recognised 
by the BC.  
Distribution right under Article 14(1) of the BC is narrow in two aspects. First, 
it provides authors of literary, scientific, or artistic works with a right to authorise 
distribution of cinematographic adaptations and reproductions of works. Thus, 
the right of distribution is limited to cinematographic reproductions and adapta-
tions of pre-existing works. Second, the right covers only the acts of the first 
distribution, meaning the initial act of putting into circulation, or the first 
release.387 Provisions of the Article were considered largely redundant in the sub-
sequent negotiations which led to the adoption of the WIPO CT, as they state the 
rights which were already recognised, especially with regard to reproduction and 
adaptation rights.388  
Interestingly enough, the proposal to simultaneously also include such a right 
for musical works was declined as too far-reaching.389 This suggests that there 
were different market constellations at that time. One of the possible factors could 
be the development of magnet tape recorders, which enabled sound recording of 
a high quality, and their commercialisation in the following years. Commercial 
distribution of cinematographic works outside cinemas was not yet anticipated at 
that time. This supports the view that the right was of importance for musical 
works but of little importance to cinematographic reproductions and adaptations 
and hence accepted only for the latter category.390 
 
 
                                                                                             
386  Ficsor (2002), p. 150. Also, see section 3.1.2. 
387  While it does not follow clearly from the English text of the Convention whether only 
initial or also subsequent distribution is meant, the French text gives a hint by wording the 
right as “putting into circulation of the works thus adapted or reproduced”. See also Ricketson 
and Ginsburg (2006), p. 665; Ficsor (2002), p. 147; Dreier and Hugenholtz (2016), p. 64; 
Karnell (1982), p. 286. 
388  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Third Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part III. New Items. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/III/2-III 1993, p. 5. 
389  For instance, the British delegation was of the opinion that “any limits on the distribution 
of copies should be dealt with contractually … otherwise, the purchaser of a lawfully made 
copy should have the right to dispose of it as he wished”. See more in Ricketson (1987), p. 405; 
Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 663. 
390  Ricketson (1987), p. 405. 
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3.1.5.2. Right of distribution as a part of the translation right under 
the Universal Copyright Convention 
The Universal Copyright Convention, adopted in 1952 and revised in 1971, also 
does not explicitly provide for the right of distribution.391 To a certain extent, it 
can be attributed to the approach adopted by the drafters of the Convention and 
its overall aim “not to create a uniform copyright statute, but rather to fuse the 
diverse domestic copyright systems into a simple workable international 
agreement”.392  
Instead of providing an extensive list of rights to be granted, the Convention 
obliges states to provide adequate and effective protection of the rights of authors, 
corresponding to adequate and effective protection as offered by civilized coun-
tries.393 Although certain delegations supported explicitly listing the exclusive 
rights, it was argued that their enumeration in the UCC could be read limita-
tively.394 Inclusion of the right of distribution was specifically discussed by 
German and Spanish delegations.395 However, it was opposed by others, as it 
would discourage certain countries from joining the Convention.396  
The right of translation is the only right explicitly recognised by the UCC. An 
author should have an exclusive right to "make, publish, and authorise the making 
and publication of translations of works".397 Out of these acts only the authorising 
of publication of translation was said to have a separate meaning and practical 
importance; other acts would generally not be questioned.398 Publication of trans-
lation, in turn, means the "reproduction in tangible form and the general distribu-
tion to the public of copies of work from which it can be read or otherwise 
visually perceived”.399 Thus, the scope of the right concerns specifically instances 
                                                                                             
391  For some time, the UCC was considered an alternative to the BC, but its importance has 
diminished. There are at present 100 contracting parties to the UCC, compared to 174 parties 
to the Berne Act of 1886. For the up-to-date list of signatories, see: for Berne Convention 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=15; for the UCC 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/other_treaties/parties.jsp?treaty_id=208&group_id=22. 
(Accessed on July 14, 2019). 
392  Tannenbaum (1955), p. 16. 
393  Bogsch (1958), pp. 4–5. 
394  Ibid., p. 224. 
395  Analytical report of the observations made in the draft Universal Copyright Convention 
by governments and inter-governmental organisations. Intergovernmental Copyright Confer-
ence, Geneva 1952. UNESCO DA/4, p. 4. 
396  Observations Made on the Draft Universal Copyright Convention by Governments and 
Inter-Governmental Organisations. International Copyright Conference, Geneva. UNESCO/ 
DA/3/ADD.1 1952, p. 18. 
397  Universal Copyright Convention as revised on 24 July 1971, Art. 5. For a view that pro-
vision of explicit right is due to the controversy of translation, see Bogsch (1958), p. 5. 
398  Bogsch (1958), p. 69. 
399  Universal Copyright Convention as revised on 24 July 1971, art. 6. 
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where work is disseminated through providing copies as opposed to live perfor-
mance of a work. 
Even the recognition of translation right caused some debates, as states were 
generally interested in making foreign works available in their countries at suffi-
ciently early date.400 An important limitation in the form of a compulsory license 
is provided in Article 5(2). States may impose a compulsory license to translate 
and publish a work if certain conditions are met. First, there has to be no trans-
lation within seven years from the date of original publication, or editions of such 
translation should be out of print. Second, it has to be proved impossible to obtain 
a license from the right holder themselves. The BC contained very similar pro-
visions – authors were granted an exclusive right to make or authorise translation 
of their works, which expired 10 years from the publication of the original 
work.401 However, since the Berlin Act of 1908, the exclusive right to authorise 
translation under the BC was extended to last during the general term of pro-
tection.402 
Accordingly, the right to produce copies of translation and distribute them 
could likely be deducted from the right of authorising publication of translation 
recognised by the UCC. However, there are uncertainties as to the exact meaning 
of distribution. French and Spanish texts of the UCC use “disposing of work” as 
a substitute for distribution. German text provides for “making translation acces-
sible” and, surprisingly, Portuguese text puts it as “communicating translation to 
the public”. Given the variety of wordings, it seems that sale could fall within the 
scope, while the mere offer for sale or rental could be disputed.403 
 
 
3.1.5.3. Right of first distribution under the initial draft of the TRIPS 
At the time of negotiations on the PPBC, subsequently leading to the adoption of 
the WIPO CT, another important international instrument was adopted. Formally 
Annex 1C to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) also addressed right of distribution, albeit in a very limited manner. The 
issue of digital technology and transmissions were not addressed by the TRIPS 
but left to the committee working on the PPBC.404 However, due to its wide 
membership, it had an impact on the ongoing negotiations in many copyright-
related aspects.405  
                                                                                             
400  Bogsch (1958), pp. 230–231. 
401  Convention Concerning the Creation of An International Union for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works. Berne 1886, Art. 5. 
402  Revised Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Belin Act 
1908, Art. 8. 
403  Bogsch (1958), p. 91. 
404  Ficsor (1995), p. 115. 
405  For the impact of the TRIPS on other agreements, see Ficsor (2002), pp. 52–53. 
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The Chairman’s text, which served as a draft for negotiations, contained right 
of first distribution and right of importation, both of which did not make it into 
the final text. According to the draft, economic rights of copyright holder should 
include the right of importation of lawfully produced copies and “the right to 
make the first public distribution of the original or each authorized copy of a work 
by sale, rental, or otherwise except that the first sale of the original or such copy 
of, at a minimum, a computer programme shall not exhaust the rental or impor-
tation right therein”.406 Hence, the draft of the TRIPS was set to recognise a broad 
right of first distribution in a sense of also encompassing rental and lending. It 
was much in line with the developments on the EU level at the time, where the 
exclusive rental and lending rights have been harmonised under the respective 
Directive.407 
Interestingly, the Article on the right of first distribution did not make it into 
the final text, unlike the rental right recognised under Article 11 and obliging the 
signatories to provide the rental right at least in respect of computer programmes 
and cinematographic works. The relation between codifying the right of first 
distribution and the rental right will be dealt with in the next chapter.408 Here, it 
is appropriate to highlight the proposed wording of the right of distribution which, 
unlike following international instruments, explicitly refers to the first distri-
bution: 
 
[T]he right to make the first public distribution of the original or each authorized 
copy of a work by sale, rental, or otherwise except that the first sale of the original 
or such copy of, at a minimum, a computer program shall not exhaust the rental or 
importation right therein.409 
 
A comment made to the draft of the Article also deserves a special attention, as 
it has actually been included in the final text: 
 
It is understood that, unless expressly provided to the contrary in this agreement, 
nothing in this agreement shall limit the freedom of PARTIES to provide that any 
intellectual property rights conferred in respect of the use, sale, importation and 
other distribution of goods are exhausted once those goods have been put on the 
market by or with the consent of the right holder.410 
                                                                                             
406  Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods. Chairman’s Report to the GNG. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 1990, 
p. 8. 
407  Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and 
on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. 27 November 1992. 
OJ L 346/61 
408  The interface between the exhaustion principle and the right of rental is dealt with in 
section 4.1.2. 
409  Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods. Chairman’s Report to the GNG. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 1990, 
p. 8. 
410  Ibid. 
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In the final text, the comment was modified to become Article 6, titled Exhaus-
tion. Instead of leaving the question out of scope, the Article now clarifies that 
the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is excluded from the dispute settle-
ment mechanism as to avoid different interpretations in the absence of provi-
sions.411 Hence, as can be clearly seen, distribution right in the context of the 
TRIPS negotiations solely concerned the first distribution, i.e. acts of initial 
putting copies into circulation. Distribution, in turn, was viewed rather broadly, 
as also encompassing rental and other ways of distribution. As will follow from 
the next subchapter, negotiations on the PPBC, which resulted in the adoption of 
the WIPO CT, developed in a slightly different way. 
 
 
3.1.5.4. Right of distribution under the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The WIPO CT is the only international instrument addressing the right of distri-
bution for all types of works. The Treaty was adopted following the negotiations 
on the PPBC and a decision to sign a separate agreement instead. Hence, the draft 
of the Treaty was prepared by the committee working on the possible protocol 
and reflected the discussions. 
Two alternatives on recognising a general right of distribution were included 
in the basic proposal on the substantive provisions of the Treaty. Alternative A 
provided the right to authorise making a work available through sale or other 
transfer of ownership (distribution right), and the right of importation. Alternative 
A also stated that contracting parties would be free to provide that the right is 
exhausted in respect of copies sold in that territory (i.e. national exhaustion). The 
right of importation, on the other hand, would not be subject to exhaustion, but 
would not apply to importation for private and non-commercial use. Alternative 
B provided the right to authorise making a work available through sale or other 
transfer of ownership (distribution right) and freedom to introduce exhaustion of 
the right after the first sale or other transfer of ownership (i.e. permitting inter-
national exhaustion).412 
Alternative A was strongly favoured by the US, whereas alternative B was 
explicitly supported by Australia, Brazil, and Canada. The final text is an 
amended version of Alternative B, permitting international exhaustion. Article 
6(1) of the WIPO CT provides an exclusive right to authorise the making avail-
able to the public of the original or copies of their works through sale or other 
transfer of ownership. The wording of Article 6(2) was slightly modified and now 
reads as follows: “Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the freedom of Contracting 
Parties to determine the conditions, if any, under which the exhaustion of the right 
                                                                                             
411  Gervais (2008), p. 198. 
412  Basic Proposal for the Substantive provisions of the Treaty on certain questions 
concerning the protection of literary and artistic works to be considered by Diplomatic 
Conference. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring rights questions. 
WIPO CRNR/DC/4 1996, pp. 35–37. 
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in paragraph (1) applies after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the 
original or a copy of the work with the authorisation of the author.”413 
Accordingly, the WIPO CT became the first international treaty to treat dis-
tribution right at length and the only one to harmonise an exclusive right of dis-
tribution extending to all types of copyright-protected works. It is also the first 
treaty to address exhaustion of the distribution right in some way, besides the 
TRIPS agreement, that leaves it out of scope. However, interpretation of neither 
provisions is unambiguous.  
First, we will turn to the scope of the obligations under Article 6. What seems 
to be uncontested is that the Treaty accords the right of authorising the first dis-
tribution, i.e. the right of first putting into circulation.414 However, according to 
some interpretations, the right of distribution under the Treaty extends beyond 
the first distribution. Namely, it requires the contracting parties to grant copyright 
holders a broad right of distribution also covering any subsequent disposal. The 
broad right of distribution, in turn, might be subjected to exhaustion under certain 
circumstances, some of which are provided under Article 6(2).415 
The literal reading of Article 6(1) would suggest that it is precisely the broad 
right of distribution that is meant, i.e. that it extends to all the subsequent acts of 
disposal. It would seem unreasonable to draft the right in a broad way if the only 
purpose was to secure the right of first distribution. The latter could be achieved 
in a much simpler way by recognising a right of first distribution instead of 
providing the right of distribution seemingly covering subsequent disposal only 
to subject it to exhaustion. However, one might want to put the final text of the 
Treaty in the context of the preceding negotiations, not only at the diplomatic 
conference but also those under the working sessions on the PPBC, briefly out-
lined in the preceding sections. 
The right of distribution covering all the subsequent acts of disposal beyond 
the first putting into circulation was generally not accepted. A broad right 
received support subject to the condition that the exhaustion of the right through 
first sale would take place. Moreover, alternative wordings of the right of first 
distribution and the right of distribution were discussed simultaneously with the 
negotiations on the rental right. One of the ways to ensure that rental remained 
within the copyright holder’s control would be to modify the conditions for the 
exhaustion of the right of distribution. Hence, initially, harmonising only the 
aspects that should survive exhaustion received enough support. 
One possible indication of an intent to harmonise a broad right of distribution 
could be the fact that despite making the right of rental a separate right, the right 
of distribution in its broad wording remained. However, the history of negotia-
tions shows that there was another consideration impacting the presented options. 
The very existence of the two alternatives of the article on the right of distri-
bution, which only differed in regard to the territoriality of exhaustion, indicate 
                                                                                             
413  WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/94, art. 6. 
414  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 695; Ficsor (2002), p. 486. 
415  As seems to be suggested in Reinbothe and Lewinski (2015), pp. 110–114. 
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that another possible reason for drafting the right widely was the (unsuccessful) 
attempt to harmonise the territoriality of exhaustion. This would simply not be 
possible would the right be drafted as concerning solely the first distribution. 
Hence, one could question assuming the obligation under Article 6 to provide a 
broad right to control any subsequent disposal following the first putting of a 
work into circulation.  
Given the different views on the scope of the right of distribution, it is not 
surprising that there are also divergent perceptions of Article 6(2). If one inter-
prets the WIPO CT as providing the minimum obligation to recognise the right 
of first distribution, the wording of Article 6(2) has no bearing on the circum-
stances of exhaustion if it is provided under national law.416 As the Treaty 
requires only the right of first distribution to be recognised but does not preclude 
granting a wider protection, the wording in no way affects the freedom of the 
parties to legislate.417  
On the other hand, understanding the obligations under the WIPO CT as 
requiring extending the scope of the right to the subsequent disposals would call 
for a different understanding of Article 6(2). Namely, that a limitation to this right 
in the form of exhaustion is only permissible subject to the provisions in the 
second paragraph.418 However, even if it would be so, the limitation in the form 
of exhaustion solely concerns the right of distribution in the meaning of the first 
paragraph (i.e. distribution through a transfer of ownership). Hence, it achieves 
nothing more than recognition of the right of first distribution through the transfer 
of ownership, with a possibility to grant a wider protection. Any other acts (also 
subsequent disposal) that might fall under the distribution right under national 
laws would in no way be affected by the provisions of Article 6 of the WIPO 
CT.419  
                                                                                             
416  With the exception that it must take place with authorisation of the right holder. This 
would, however, be a relevant consideration only in case copies are not produced with 
authorisation of the right holder, e.g. under a compulsory license. Otherwise, the exclusive 
nature of the right of distribution already ensures that any first distribution occurs with the 
copyright holder’s authorisation. The situation arose, for instance, in CJEU, EMI Electrola 
GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and others. (1989) Case C-341/87, Judgment of 24 January 
1989. The case was decided on the grounds other than authorisation, see section 3.2.2.2. 
417  See Ficsor (1997), p. 212. Also, it is supported by the CJEU in CJEU, Laserdisken ApS v 
Kulturministeriet. (2006) Case C-479/04, Judgment of 12 September 2006. See more on the 
case in section below. 
418  See Reinbothe and Lewinski (2015), pp. 110–114. Alternatively, that exhaustion must be 
implemented in every case but only some conditions are predetermined by the Treaty. This 
would, however, be difficult to reconcile with the minimum obligations under international 
treaties and possibility to provide wider protection, as well as the intention of parties during 
the negotiations.  
419  The right of distribution under the WIPO CT concerns distribution in a narrow meaning, 
i.e. excluding such acts as rental and lending, hence the wording “through sale or other transfer 
of ownership”. See sections 3.1.2. and 3.1.3. 
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Accordingly, the view that Article 6(2) precludes any exhaustion unless it 
occurs after the first sale or other transfer of ownership can be contested.420 More-
over, it is only understandable that the second paragraph mentions the first sale 
or other transfer of ownership, as it corresponds to the definition of the right in 
the first paragraph and highlights that the minimum obligation solely concerns 
distribution as making a work available through a transfer of ownership of copies, 
and that exhaustion of the right is subject to conditions set by the contracting 
parties. 
In this context it is also important to mention that although the right of making 
available covering digital transmissions was put under the article on the right of 
communication to the public under the WIPO CT, parties are free to qualify them 
as falling under the right of distribution.421 Therefore, it was important to dif-
ferentiate between acts considered to always fall within distribution right (dis-
semination of tangible copies through sale or other transfer of ownership) and 
acts of making available, which do not necessarily fall within the distribution 
right.  
For the former category, i.e. tangible copies, Article 6 provides that conditions 
for exhaustion are to be determined by the contracting parties. For the latter cate-
gory, i.e. copies resulting from the digital transmissions, which may or may not 
fall under the distribution right, there are no specific obligations in regard to 
exhaustion upon an authorised first distribution. This is supported, inter alia, by 
the Agreed Statement, which does not preclude the application of the right of 
distribution to digital transmissions but merely indicates that provisions of the 
article are aimed solely at the (conventional) tangible distribution.422 Hence, there 
is nothing in the WIPO CT to preclude copy-related forms of digital trans-
missions.423 
 
 
3.1.5.5. Interpretation of the international obligations under 
the EU acquis 
The interpretation of the right of distribution under the BC has hardly caused any 
troubles in the context of EU copyright harmonisation. As Article 19 of the BC 
does not preclude claiming greater protection if such is afforded by national law, 
the rights provided in the Convention are minimum rights.424 Moreover, they have 
to be considered with limitations and exceptions provided in national law to the 
                                                                                             
420  On Article 6(2) as precluding exhaustion unless it takes place upon first sale of a copy, see 
Reinbothe and Lewinski (2015), p. 112. 
421  Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), p. 424. 
422  Ficsor (1997), p. 213. Also, section 4.1.5. 
423  Ibid., p. 213. 
424  von Lewinski (2008), p. 132. 
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extent permitted by the BC.425 Since the BC obliges states to provide a right of 
distribution only for cinematographic reproductions and adaptations and for 
cinematographic works, it is of limited impact, especially following the adoption 
of the WIPO CT. As follows from the ongoing discussions at the time of the 
adoption of the BC and also supported by the French text, distribution solely 
means acts of first putting into circulation and does not extend to the acts of sub-
sequent distribution.426 
Distribution right under the WIPO CT, on the other hand, received much more 
attention, both in the literature and in the CJEU jurisprudence. The WIPO CT 
was approved by the European Communities in 2000,427 ratified by the EU in 
2009 and, subsequently, came into force in 2010.428 Besides, the aim of the 
Directives adopted in the field of EU copyright law is, inter alia, to harmonise the 
laws of the MS to bring them into compliance with the obligations on the inter-
national level. Consequently, the CJEU occasionally refers to the WIPO CT while 
interpreting the Directives in the field of copyright.  
First, in the Laserdisken case, the Court has rightly held that the provisions of 
the WIPO CT only oblige the right holder’s exclusive control to be secured over 
the acts of making available through the first sale or other transfer of owner-
ship.429 Hence, the CJEU further ruled that Article 6(2) concerning exhaustion of 
the right of distribution did not impose any obligations in regard to the specific 
rules governing exhaustion. Therefore, the provisions of the Treaty and of the 
InfoSoc Directive were complementary for interpreting the scope of the right of 
distribution and its exhaustion under the EU law.430  
Later, in the Peek & Cloppenburg case, the CJEU again held that distribution 
under the WIPO CT is linked exclusively to the transfer of ownership.431 How-
ever, the Court drew a conclusion which is in conflict with the concept of mini-
mum harmonisation under the WIPO CT. Namely, the Court held that the InfoSoc 
Directive should have been interpreted as far as possible in the light of the WIPO 
CT provisions.432 The latter resulted in the CJEU ruling that expression 
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“distribution by sale or otherwise” under the InfoSoc Directive should be inter-
preted as meaning solely acts of distribution which entail a transfer of ownership.433 
Whereas the WIPO CT obliges the contracting parties to provide control over 
distribution of a work through sale or other transfer of ownership, it does not 
preclude granting wider protection, even by widening the scope of the right of 
distribution. Hence, reliance of the Court solely on the wording of the respective 
article of the WIPO CT does not seem satisfactory. Although there may be many 
reasons to confine the right of distribution under the InfoSoc Directive solely to 
the acts of transfer of ownership, relying on the WIPO CT should not have been 
a decisive one. 
Similarly, in the Art & Allposters case the CJEU supported the reasoning of 
the EC that the right of distribution applies solely to tangible objects that were 
put on the market with authorisation of the right holder.434 The Court referred, 
inter alia, to the WIPO CT and the Agreed Statement to support the reasoning.435 
The same was held in regard to the rental right in the VOB case, which did not 
even concern the right of rental. The CJEU differentiated the rental right from 
lending through establishing that the former applied solely to tangible copies, 
relying on the WIPO CT and, in particular, on the same Agreed Statement.436 
Whereas in some cases the CJEU relied on the WIPO CT to construct the 
scope of the right of distribution narrowly, in other cases it has done the opposite. 
For instance, in the Donner case the CJEU acknowledged the necessity to give 
distribution the meaning in accordance with the WIPO CT, simultaneously 
holding that the content of the notion of distribution must be given an independent 
interpretation under EU law.437 The Court held that distribution is not an instant 
act but, instead, consists of series of acts from the conclusion of a sale contract to 
its performance.438 Hence, by advertising and enabling delivery of copyright-
protected works, one carried out distribution to the public within the meaning of 
the Directive.439 Similar reasoning we also find in the Syed case, where the right 
of distribution was examined in conjunction with Article 6(1) of the WIPO CT.440 
In a similar case, the Dimensione Direct Sales case, the CJEU relied on the 
finding in the Donner case, that the acts preceding conclusion of a sale contract 
might fall within the distribution right, even when it is a mere offer of a contract 
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of sale binding to its author.441 The CJEU found that offering copyright-protected 
works for sale may constitute an infringement of the distribution right under 
Article 4(1) of the InfoSoc Directive irrespective of the fact whether or not an 
actual sale took place if it invites consumers to purchase it.442 
Accordingly, on the one hand, the right of distribution under the InfoSoc 
Directive has been interpreted narrowly against the background of the WIPO CT, 
whereas on the hand, it had been given a broad and independent meaning. Hence, 
whilst interpreting the Treaty as providing an obligation to recognise the right of 
first distribution solely through the sale of copies or other transfer of ownership, 
the Court gave the same meaning to the right of distribution under the InfoSoc 
Directive. What does not stem directly from the obligations under the WIPO CT 
is recognising the preparatory steps for distribution of copies as falling under the 
right of distribution. 
 
 
3.2. Harmonisation of the right of distribution 
under the EU acquis 
Right of distribution as such was not subject to EU harmonisation before the 
beginning of 1990s. However, its conflict with the internal market objectives was 
long anticipated. Right of distribution under national laws became subject to a 
few preliminary rulings by the CJEU on the intersection of exclusive copyright 
rights and the free movement of goods within the EU. Harmonisation of the 
general right of distribution was not discussed by the EC before the first Green 
Paper in 1988, and even then it was considered excessive and unnecessary in the 
absence of a greater interest in its harmonisation.  
The broad general right of distribution appeared for the first time in the draft 
of the Software Directive, although the underlying Green Paper did not mention 
it at all. It appeared again shortly after in the Rental and Lending Rights Directive 
as a neighbouring right, and, finally, in the InfoSoc Directive. Despite the dif-
ferent wording of the right under the Directive from that under the WIPO CT, its 
scope is often read imitatively as covering solely acts of distribution by sale or 
its equivalent. 
The prevailing view is that the right of distribution under the EU acquis 
applies solely to tangible copies, notwithstanding the UsedSoft and Ranks judg-
ments concerning the Software Directive and the VOB case where the lending 
right under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive was applied to e-books.443 
The alternative view is that the right applies equally to copies lacking tangible 
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support. The right of distribution acquired a distinctive character under the 
acquis. It is no longer a corollary to the right of reproduction and encompasses 
various acts (potentially) leading to the transfer of ownership of a copy. 
This section examines the development of the right of distribution under the 
EU acquis through the prism of the scope of control accorded by the right beyond 
the first distribution of a work. Against the background of the previous section, 
here it is examined how the right was shaped under the CJEU jurisprudence in 
order to fulfil its function in the changing circumstances of work’s exploitation. 
 
 
3.2.1. Enquiries of the European Commission 
before the harmonisation 
Before the beginning of the 1980s, copyright policy and legislation in the EU MS 
was, with few exceptions, entirely a matter of national laws. With the develop-
ment of the internal market and increase in intra-community trade, it became 
evident that certain aspects of copyright (or IP in general) conflict with the inter-
nal market, especially with the free movement of goods. Although the first 
Directives in the field of copyright were adopted at the beginning of 1990s, they 
partially built upon case law of the CJEU, which on a few occasions had to rule 
on the compatibility of certain national laws with the objectives of the EEC 
Treaty. 
The first study on copyright in the context of EU integration was carried out 
by Dietz on behalf of the EC in 1977. The report provided mainly a comparative 
review of copyright legislation of then nine MS and sought to address issues 
arising from technological development.444 It was observed that a separate right 
of distribution was recognised explicitly only in half of the MS, namely in 
Germany, Denmark, Italy and the Netherlands.445 The primary purpose of the dis-
tribution right (if recognised) was to provide control over lawfully produced 
copies. Distribution of unlawfully made copies would be considered an infringe-
ment even in the absence of an explicit right of distribution.446  
Generally, the right was seen as conflicting with the Treaty of Rome, in par-
ticular with the provisions on the free movement of goods.447 Nonetheless, the 
report suggested including the express provision of the right of distribution and 
its exhaustion during the first phase of harmonisation.448 The Model Law on copy-
right which was being developed at that time could serve as a basis.449 Also, it 
was stressed that in order to effectively eliminate the contradiction between the 
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free movement of goods and the right of distribution, it would also be necessary 
to harmonise the preconditions and the term of protection.450  
Another paper considering the harmonisation of the right of distribution was 
the Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology published by the 
EC in 1988. It came as a follow-up to the White Paper of 1985 on Completing 
the Internal Market by 1992.451 Disparities in IP legislation of the MS impacted 
intra-community trade to the extent that copyright would become a subject of a 
separate paper with a specific focus on copyright protection of computer pro-
grammes.452 The resulting Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of tech-
nology addressed issues of privacy, protection and distribution of audio-visual 
and sound works, and protection of databases and computer programmes.453 
A separate part of this Green Paper of 1988 was dedicated to the right of dis-
tribution, which varied considerably between the jurisdictions. The right of dis-
tribution for the purpose of the report meant authorising making available of 
copies of a work to the public, providing control over the commercial exploitation 
of a work within a given jurisdiction.454 The possibility to introduce the right of 
distribution for all or particular types of works was explored. Interestingly, 
control over all the forms of distribution for the entire duration of copyright 
protection was considered clearly excessive.455  
As the EC received no requests from the MS to harmonise the right of distri-
bution and there was relatively strong support only when it came to audio-visual 
works, the paper concluded that the matter could be effectively dealt with on the 
national level.456 Lending and rental rights, on the other hand, could become an 
issue, but intervention was not considered justified at that point.457 The only 
urgent matter to address was the copyright protection of computer programmes, 
and for that reason, a Directive was to be drafted. Distribution right, nevertheless, 
was not included into the preliminary list of rights to be harmonised.458 
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3.2.2. CJEU examining the conflict between the right of 
distribution and the objectives of the internal market 
Conflict between the exclusive IP rights and the objectives of the internal market 
was already anticipated before the start of copyright harmonisation in the late 
1980s. Recognition of the right of distribution was particularly problematic, as it 
distorted the internal market by hindering the free movement of goods. In the 
absence of harmonisation, few references for a preliminary ruling were made to 
the CJEU to clarify the relation between copyright protection under national laws 
and the objectives of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty. Half of 
the requests came from Germany, while the rest from Denmark and the UK.459  
These are the cases which laid ground for the subsequent harmonisation of the 
Community exhaustion principle under the secondary law. Returning back to the 
report prepared by Dietz, which was published after the first major case on the 
matter, the right of distribution was perceived as an intolerable extension of 
copyright protection.460 The question of Community exhaustion was thus a “ques-
tion of whether copyright, with its easy accessibility and long duration should 
adopt the character of a formless and unexamined industrial property right for 
practically all industrial goods, which must surely lead to a process of copyright 
self-destruction”.461  
Hence, the brief discourse on the case law below must be seen in the similar 
light – through weighing the pros of distribution right against the cons of 
restricting the freedom of movement. Three major aspects were addressed in 
these cases, which are important for understanding the subsequent harmonisation. 
First, it is a delineation of the scope of the right of distribution under national 
laws towards considerations under the free movement of goods. Second, it is a 
distinction between rental and other types of distribution. Third, it is the signi-
ficance of consent and exercise of the rights under the national copyright law. 
 
 
3.2.2.1. Right of distribution in conflict with  
the free movement of goods 
The first aspect, the interface between the national copyright law and the free 
movement of goods, was considered in four cases, three of which concerned the 
importation of copies of a work from another MS without obtaining a separate 
authorisation of the copyright holder. All of the copies in question were lawfully 
produced and placed on the market in another MS or outside the Community with 
the right holder’s consent.  
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Deutsche Gramophone is the very first case examined by the CJEU con-
cerning the copyright protection in general, and the right of distribution in par-
ticular.462 The referring court suspected that the exclusive right of distribution 
under the German Copyright Act might have been in conflict with Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty.463 The German court considered the exhaustion provision under 
the copyright act to be a possible solution to the problem. However, as the provi-
sions of the national law were not entirely clear, the court was uncertain whether 
a particular interpretation would be against the EEC Treaty.464  
Namely, the referring court was not sure whether exhaustion under the 
national law applied to copies marketed abroad and, if not, whether opposing 
distribution of such copies would be against the objective of the EEC Treaty.465 
The referring court thus asked whether it would be contrary to the EEC Treaty to 
interpret German law as allowing the copyright holder to rely on the right of 
distribution to prevent marketing of copies of work which were put into circu-
lation with their consent in another MS. 
The CJEU established that copyright falls within industrial and commercial 
property under Article 36 of the EEC; thus certain restrictions on the free move-
ment of goods were justified on the basis of copyright protection.466 The Court 
also held that relying on the right of distribution to prevent marketing of products 
already distributed by the right holder in a different MS on the sole ground that 
that distribution did not take place in a present MS would isolate national markets 
and be against the objectives of the Treaty.467 It was thus held that such exercise 
of the right of distribution was against the free movement of goods if it is invoked 
solely because initial distribution occurred within another MS. 
The second case, Musik-Vertrieb, concerned the facts similar to that of 
Deutsche Grammophon.468 This time, however, the referring German court asked 
whether it was compatible with the free movement of goods and, in particular, 
Article 30 of the EEC, for a copyright holder (through a collective society) to 
exercise the exclusive right of distribution through claiming a payment for 
placing already distributed copies imported from another MS, where in that other 
MS royalty rates are lower.469 Accordingly, the lawfulness of import and putting 
into circulation of these copies was not questioned. Rather, it was questioned 
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whether claiming a payment upon import on the basis of the exclusive distri-
bution right was a measure having an equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions. 
According to the observations submitted by the EC, the difference in prices 
between the MS was no ground for isolating the markets, but exactly the reason 
behind insisting on the free movement of goods. Moreover, it was the objective 
of the common market to have the market shaped by economic factors rather than 
artificial measures taken by the governments.470  
The CJEU established that the territoriality of copyright protection in the 
absence of harmonisation did not prevail over the single market objective as it 
lead to partitioning.471 Examining whether collecting a payment upon import of 
goods placed on the market in another MS was contrary to the Treaty, the CJEU 
held that it would amount to a partitioning of the market and thus was pre-
cluded.472 It was further stressed that the copyright holder, with a view to the 
common market and the free movement of goods, was free to choose where to 
place their work on a market in their best interest.473 
In the third case referred to the CJEU by the Danish court, Dansk Super-
marked, the Court examined whether goods lawfully placed on the market in one 
MS could be prevented from being marketed in a different MS on the basis of 
copyright, trade mark or marketing legislation.474 Although a larger part of the 
judgment concerns marketing legislation, certain parts deal specifically with 
copyright and trademarks. For instance, the CJEU re-established that national 
legislation cannot prevent goods from being marketed in a MS if they were law-
fully put on the market with the copyright holder’s consent in another MS.475  
Hence, the Court created a so-called Community exhaustion concept to deal 
with the conflict between the exclusive rights under copyright and their detri-
mental effect to the internal market. The exhaustion principle developed under 
certain national laws proved to be handy for denying control over subsequent 
distribution of copies when particular conditions were met, namely, when the 
copies were distributed within the community with the authorisation of the rights 
holder. Once the right holder exercised the right, they lost not only control over 
the subsequent distribution but also the ability to claim additional remuneration. 
Thus, a tool of restricting the scope of distribution right under national law was 
appropriated by the Court. One should, however, distinguish between exhaustion 
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on national level and the Community one, as the latter’s function was limited to 
the conflicts between the free movement of goods between the MS, at least before 
copyright harmonisation.476 
Given that the Court de facto held national exhaustion under national laws 
incompatible with the EEC Treaty, the question that arises is whether it also pre-
cluded international exhaustion. Although it was not the case, the next CJEU 
judgment indicated the tendency of limiting exhaustion to the EEC-wide one. In 
the Polydor case, the CJEU ruled on the justifiability of preventing import of 
goods lawfully put on the market in non-EEC countries on the basis of the right 
of distribution.477 The Court was ultimately asked whether the principle 
developed in the previous cases should find its application to the goods that were 
placed on the market in Portugal. Although not a party to the EEC Treaty at the 
time, Portugal was a party to a separate Agreement with the EEC on the abolish-
ment of quantitative restrictions on imports. The defendant in the proceedings 
claimed that the Agreement had the same objectives as the Treaty, hence it was 
not against the Treaty to import to the United Kingdom copies that were put into 
circulation in Portugal.  
The Court, however, disagreed and held that the agreement in question and 
the EEC Treaty did not have the same purpose. Preventing import of goods from 
Portugal could be justified on the ground of protection of industrial property in 
the United Kingdom.478 The case as such did not call for the prohibition on the 
import of copies put into circulation outside the MS but merely held that in that 
particular case such restriction was justified. It also very clearly differentiated 
between the EEC Treaty establishing a single market and the agreements with 
third countries, even if they also called for the abolishment of quantitative 
restrictions on imports. Why distinction had to be drawn between the de facto 
similar treaties providing for abolishment of trade restrictions is nevertheless 
unclear.479 
 
 
3.2.2.2. Authorisation of first distribution as  
the essential function of the right 
Besides the creation of the Community exhaustion concept, the case law of this 
time de facto harmonised another two important matters that later were taken into 
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account when harmonising copyright under secondary EU law. This section 
focuses on the aspects related to the exercise of the exclusive right of distribution, 
which became of utter importance to defining the conditions for limiting the 
control of right holder over the subsequent distribution. As will be seen in the 
next chapters, these considerations are not limited to the right of distribution; they 
are equally important in the cases concerning delineation of the scope of other 
dissemination-related rights. 
A strong argument for limiting the reach of the exclusive right was upheld by 
the Court in the Musik-Vertrieb case. The internal market and the free movement 
of goods provided the copyright holder with an opportunity to choose where and 
how to put a work into circulation in their best interest.480 Hence, the collecting 
societies were not allowed to claim additional remuneration upon the importation 
of copies from another MS based on the difference of the royalty rates between 
the MS. The significance is prominently illustrated by the next case.  
In EMI Electrola v Patricia the CJEU, upon a reference from the German 
court, had to rule whether a manufacturer of sound recordings could rely on the 
exclusive right of distribution to prevent the import of goods lawfully put on the 
market in a different MS.481 This time, however, lawfulness depended not on the 
consent of the right holder to the original distribution, but on the fact that the 
copyright protection had already lapsed in that different MS.  
In its decision, which is surprisingly concise, the CJEU referred to the pre-
vious case Musik-Vertrieb where it had ruled that the copyright holder may not 
rely on the exploitation right to oppose importation of goods put on the market in 
another MS with their consent.482 It then proceeded to distinguish the situation 
from the proceedings in question on the basis of the absence of consent to the 
initial act of distribution.483 Nonetheless, instead of developing this line of argu-
mentation further, the Court went on to state that the restrictions on the free move-
ment of goods lied in the differences in the term of protection. The latter was 
linked to the existence of the right rather than exercise; hence, relying on an 
exclusive right to prevent distribution was justified.484 
Notably, the Court decided to focus on the term of protection rather than on 
the question of restricting the reach of the exclusive rights. This is noteworthy 
because the case was brought on the ground that initial distribution in another MS 
did not take place with the consent of the right holder, but only lawfully. This 
distinction is significant, as during the exhaustion principle development its 
preconditions changed from concerning lawfully published or those put into 
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circulation to copies to copies distributed with the authorisation of the right 
holder.485  
The Court could have also discussed in this case whether the absence of 
consent as a precondition for exhaustion, as provided under national law, was a 
justified ground to prevent the import of copies otherwise lawfully produced and 
put into circulation. Moreover, the lawful copies in question were produced not 
under a compulsory license or under other similar circumstances where the right 
holder had not had a possibility to exercise the right. Contrariwise, the situation 
took place because the term of protection lapsed. Hence, the right holder had 
actually had an opportunity to exercise their right. 
 
 
3.2.2.3. Exploitation through rental distinguished from distribution 
As examined in the beginning of this chapter, the development of technology 
enabled new ways of exploitation, potentially opening markets separate to the 
one for the sale of copies. It is prominent that the CJEU took it into account when 
dealing with the conflict between exclusive control over the copies of a work and 
the free movement of goods. In the Warner Brothers case, the Court exempted 
the rental of copies from the Community exhaustion rule.  
The facts of the case were similar to the previous cases. Copies were sold with 
the authorisation of the right holder in the UK and subsequently lawfully 
imported to Denmark.486 However, unlike in the previous cases, the copies were 
not resold but made available for rental. At that time, the right of rental was 
recognised in Denmark but not in the UK. Recognising an exclusive right of 
rental or at least exempting it from falling under exhaustion under national laws 
was on the agenda of the then-ongoing negotiations on the PPBC and the EU 
Directives. 
The question the CJEU had to address was whether the copyright holder could 
rely on the exclusive right to authorise rental recognised under the Danish law to 
prevent rental of copies which were lawfully put into circulation in another MS 
and then imported into Denmark. The Advocate General (AG) proposed to rule 
that, similar to the other cases, preventing rental of copies already put on the 
market was incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. He relied, inter alia, 
on the judgment in the Musik Vertvieb case, and the statement that the right holder 
may decide freely over the circumstances of the exploitation of a work but may 
not take advantage of disparities that exist under national laws.487 
The Court ruled differently than what the AG proposed. The CJEU started 
with establishing that such laws as the one at the present proceedings had an effect 
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equivalent to restrictions on imports. Therefore, it was necessary to consider 
whether the legislation was justified on the grounds of protection of industrial 
and commercial property.488 The CJEU went on to stress that in this case the 
application of the right was determined by the type of transaction and not the 
origin of the copies.489  
Turning to rental itself, the Court reasoned that, as demonstrated by the EC 
and given the advances of technology, a new market for distributed copies had 
emerged. However, the right holders would not receive a fair share of the market 
unless they were able to authorise the rental. Therefore, recognising the right of 
rental was justified on the grounds of industrial property protection.490 Hereafter, 
the Court upheld the existence of the right and ruled that it was not against the 
free movement of goods to enforce the right of rental on the copies put into 
circulation in another MS even if that other MS only protected the initial placing 
of the copies on the market.491 
 
 
3.2.3. Harmonisation of the right of distribution  
under secondary EU law 
The CJEU jurisprudence before the copyright harmonisation under secondary EU 
law, as examined in the section above, clarified four essential matters. First, that 
it is contrary to the objectives of the EEC Treaty to prevent importation of goods 
already lawfully put on the EEC market, invoking the right of distribution on the 
sole ground of the first putting into circulation taking place outside the MS.492 
Second, the case law established that the import of the copies lawfully put on the 
market in third countries could be justified on the grounds of industrial property 
protection, as was decided in Polydor. Third, although importation of copies 
already put on the market in another MS could not be prevented based on 
territoriality, their subsequent exploitation in a different form could still be 
reserved to the right holder if it was necessary to protect their interest in the fair 
share of the other market. Finally, the right holder could also rely on the right of 
distribution to prevent importation of copies already lawfully put on the market 
in a MS where copyright protection had lapsed.  
                                                                                             
488  CJEU, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome Video ApS v Erik Viuff Christiansen. (1988) 
Case C-158/86, Judgment of 17 May 1988, paras 10–11. 
489  Ibid., p. 12. 
490  Ibid., paras 15–16. 
491  Hence, effectively denying any comparable “Community exhaustion principle” for the 
right of rental. See section 4.2.1.3. 
492  Emphasis on lawfully, as it was not discussed in the case law whether consent to first 
distribution is an absolutely necessary condition for exhaustion. The answers were formulated 
in accordance with the questions referred by national courts, which were coming from 
jurisdictions indeed requiring consent. Although it was discussed by the AG in his Opinion in 
the EMI Electorola case, it was never articulated in any of the CJEU judgments. 
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The case law of this period thus neither precludes international exhaustion, as 
it merely states that preventing import from countries outside the Union can be 
justified. Nor does it prescribe the conditions for exhaustion. Instead, it holds 
exhaustion compatible with the EEC Treaty if the copies lawfully put on the 
market in one of the MS are not prevented from entering the market of another 
MS on the sole ground that it did not occur in the second MS. Finally, it allows 
right holders to enforce the right of rental irrespective of the exhaustion of distri-
bution right in a different MS. It, however, leaves it unresolved whether the right 
of rental is necessarily inexhaustible even upon distribution taking place within 
the same MS. 
The late 1980s brought major developments in the field of computing and 
information technology, promoting discussion on the future of copyright in 
increasingly changeable circumstances. Furthermore, it became apparent that 
disparities in copyright laws across the MS often resulted in a distortion of the 
internal market and free movement of goods. Not least, copyright was considered 
internationally as an instrument to protect investment into the development of 
technology products, such as computer programmes.  
The Green Papers initiated by the Commission at that time addressed the 
matters of copyright in the light of these multiple perspectives. Based largely on 
the results of these papers and the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the first stage of 
copyright harmonisation commenced with the adoption of the few Directives in 
the field of copyright in the early 1990s. Whereas the right of distribution is 
harmonised under multiple Directives, both as the author’s right and the neigh-
bouring right, the analysis will focus on two Directives: the Software Directive 
and the InfoSoc Directive. First, they are of the utmost importance to the harmo-
nisation of the exclusive rights. Second, their respective provisions on the right 
of distribution became subject for a few preliminary rulings for the interpretation. 
 
 
3.2.3.1. Right of distribution under the Software Directive 
The proposal for a Directive on the protection of computer programmes (Soft-
ware Directive) was drafted in 1989 as a follow-up to the Green Paper on copy-
right and the challenge of new technology in 1988. Following the negotiations on 
the international level, and, even before any harmonisation under the inter-
national treaties, the EC proposed to make computer programmes the subject 
matter protected by copyright.493  
                                                                                             
493  Whereas the purpose of protecting computer programmes under copyright is outside of the 
scope of this thesis, it suffices to mention one comment by Reichman. Subjecting computer 
programmes to all the rights under copyright would transform the latter into providing a 
“patent-like protection on the softest possible conditions for the longest possible time”. See 
Reichman (1992), p. 815. 
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Whereas the preceding Green Paper did not list the right of distribution among 
the proposed rights, Article 4(c) of the original proposal for a Directive explicitly 
included the right: 
 
4. Subject to the provisions of Article 5, the exclusive rights referred to in Article 
1 shall include the right to do or to authorise: 
(c) the distribution of a computer program by means of sale, licensing, lease, rental 
and the importation for these purposes. The right to control the distribution of a 
program shall be exhausted in respect of its sale and its importation following the 
first marketing of the program by the right holder or with his consent.494 
 
The explanatory memorandum does not provide many insights into how the right 
of distribution arrived in the proposal and why it had been worded in that way. 
Instead, it merely states that the author would usually control directly or indirectly 
distribution of computer programmes by sale or otherwise. Under the proposal, 
the right of distribution would be exhausted once a product was placed on the 
market with consent, and, likewise, the right of importation would be exhausted 
once a product was imported into the Community with the authorisation of the 
right holder.495 
The European Economic and Social Committee did not comment on the 
inclusion of the right of distribution in its opinion but suggested some minor 
changes to the language.496 Following the comments from the European Parlia-
ment, the EC presented an amended proposal, where the wording of Article 4(c) 
remained the same.497 The final text adopted shortly after, however, contained 
slightly modified wording for the right of distribution under Article 4.498 The 
Directive was codified in 2009, with no changes to Article 4 except the splitting 
the provision on the exhaustion of the right into a separate paragraph. 
Accordingly, the right of distribution under Article 4(1)(c) of the Software 
Directive now reads as follows: 
 
4.1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, the exclusive rights of the right 
holder within the meaning of Article 2, shall include the right to do or to authorise: 
(c) any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of the original com-
puter program or of copies thereof.499 
                                                                                             
494  Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs. COM (88) 
816 final. 17 March 1989.  
495  Ibid., p. 11. 
496  Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer 
programs. Economic and Social Committee 89/C 329/02.  
497  Amended proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs. 
COM(90) 509 final. 18 October 1990.  
498  Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs 91/250/EEC. 14 May 
1991. OJ L 122/42 
499  Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on 
the legal protection of computer programs (Codified version). 5.05.2009. OJ L 111/16 
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Distribution in the Software Directive is thus defined broadly, as encompassing 
rental as well as sale, and given the initial wording of the Directive, possibly also 
lease, licensing, etc.500 Ultimately, the Directive was adopted at a moment when 
the right of distribution was defined broadly under many national laws and under 
the negotiations on the PPBC. Moreover, the right of distribution is the only dis-
semination-related right recognised under the Directive.501 
The views on whether or not the right of distribution encompasses digital 
copies or copies produced on the recipient’s end through transmission differ, even 
after the landmark UsedSoft judgment.502 Some, notwithstanding the case law and 
the broad language, suggest that distribution encompasses solely acts related to 
copies fixed on a tangible medium, thus not covering digital transmissions.503 On 
the other hand, others support the view that the expression “any form of distri-
bution” included digital delivery even before the UsedSoft case, explained by the 
Directive’s aim to provide sufficient protection to computer programmes.504 
 
 
3.2.3.2. Right of distribution under the InfoSoc Directive 
At the time of the ongoing negotiations on the WIPO CT in 1995 the EC released 
the Green Paper on Copyright in Information Society. The paper concerned the 
application of copyright to “the new products and services in the information 
society, including certain legal and technical aspects which are inseparably linked 
with the effective exercise of rights.”505 The paper was followed by another Green 
Paper in 1996, which addressed the right of distribution at greater length than the 
original one. 
Whilst by 1995 almost all of the MS recognised the exclusive control of the 
copyright holder over distribution, there were major differences. Control over 
distribution could be safeguarded either through an explicit separate right, or due 
to the fact that it fell within the scope of the broader right of circulation or publi-
cation. The latter also influenced the treatment of the exhaustion principle of dis-
tribution right, meaning the scope of the control over distribution beyond the first 
putting into circulation.506 At that point, no international treaty recognised a 
                                                                                             
500  Bentley (2006), p. 223. 
501  Right of communication to the public appeared for the first time in the Rental and Lending 
rights Directive in 1992 as a neighbouring right and it did not encompass the making available 
right. 
502  On UsedSoft, see sections 4.2.3.3. and 4.2.3.4. 
503  See Bentley (2006), p. 223; Bentley and Lee (2016), p. 254; Janssens (2014), p. 116. 
504  Blocher and Walter (2010), p. 134. 
505  Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of technology – Copyright issues requiring 
immediate action, COM(88) 172 final. 7 June 1988, p. 7.  
506  The follow-up to the Green Paper on copyright and related rights in the Information 
Society. COM (96) 586 final. 20 November 1996, p. 17. 
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general right of distribution. The right was recognised under secondary EU law 
only in regard to computer programmes and, at the time of the Green Paper of 
1995, the proposed Database Directive, adopted shortly after in 1996.507 
Following the second Green Paper of 1996, the EC prepared a draft proposal 
for a Directive aimed at harmonising certain matters of copyright and covering 
all the types of a work. The Directive was presented in 1997 under the name of 
the Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the Information Society (InfoSoc Directive).508 While it implemented 
initiatives spelled out in the Green Papers, it was also closely linked to the nego-
tiations on the WIPO CT, in which the EC played an important role.509 Hence, 
recital 15 of the InfoSoc Directive provides that the Directive serves, inter alia, 
to implement a number of new international obligations, where the WIPO CT is 
one of them. 
The text of the Directive finally adopted in 2001 does not differ much from 
the initial wording proposed in 1997. Article 4(1) reads as follows: 
 
Member States shall provide for authors, in respect of the original of their works 
or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any form of distri-
bution to the public by sale or otherwise.510 
 
The Article is accompanied by recital 28, which seems to clarify that the right of 
distribution shall cover dissemination in tangible form:511 
 
Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to control 
distribution of the work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale in the 
Community of the original of a work or copies thereof by the rightholder or with 
his consent exhausts the right to control resale of that object in the Community. 
This right should not be exhausted in respect of the original or of copies thereof 
sold by the rightholder or with his consent outside the Community. Rental and 
lending rights for authors have been established in Directive 92/100/EEC. The 
distribution right provided for in this Directive is without prejudice to the provi-
sions relating to the rental and lending rights contained in Chapter I of that 
Directive. 
 
                                                                                             
507  Directive 1996/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on 
the Legal Protection of Databases. 27 March 1996. OJ L 77/20. 
508  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society. COM (97) 628 final – 
97/0359 (COD), 21 January 1998. 
509  Ibid., p. 3. 
510  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
22.6.2001. OJ L 167/10. Art. 4(1).  
511  In contrast to the right of communication to the public, see Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), 
pp. 423–424. 
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According to the explanatory document, the Proposal did not aim to introduce 
radical changes to the existing framework of copyright, but rather to address the 
environment in which works were exploited.512 As to the right of distribution, it 
was generally accepted that it concerned physical copies only, as it would be in 
line with the WIPO CT and also with the acquis communautaire to use the con-
cept of a copy or original as exclusively referring to the fixed copies that can be 
put into circulation as tangible objects.513 However, neither the Directive nor the 
Preparatory documents specify which exact provisions are based on the WIPO 
CT or explain the difference in the wording of specific rights with the respective 
provisions under the WIPO CT. For instance, the Economic and Social Com-
mittee did not propose any alterations to the parts of the Directive which trans-
pose the obligations of the WIPO CT and did not indicate the provisions in 
question.514  
Whereas there is little doubt that, at the very least, Article 4’s aim is to imple-
ment Article 6 of the WIPO CT, the way to achieve it is a bit unclear.515 First and 
foremost, the wording of the right of distribution under InfoSoc Directive is dif-
ferent than that under the WIPO CT and at first sight seems broader. First, the 
right of distribution under the InfoSoc refers to any firm of distribution by sale or 
otherwise, hence, seemingly not limited to the transfer of ownership. The WIPO 
CT, on the other hand, seems to subject distribution to a broader concept of 
making a work available. Nevertheless, it covers solely such making available 
through sale or other transfer of ownership.516 
Whereas some scholars interpret the right of distribution under the InfoSoc 
Directive broadly as covering any form of distribution, including rental and 
lending, others perceive that the Article provides only for the right covering 
distribution through sale or other transfer of ownership.517 The latter under-
standing has also been endorsed by the CJEU, as the Court interpreted the Article 
as mirroring the provisions of the WIPO CT.518 In the light of the adoption of the 
                                                                                             
512  “The proposal does not introduce radical changes to the existing Internal Market 
regulatory framework in the area of copyright and related rights. It is the environment in which 
works and other subject matter are being created and exploited which has changed – not the 
basic copyright concepts.” Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society. 
COM (97) 628 final – 97/0359 (COD), 21 January 1998, p. 8. 
513  Ibid., p. 27. 
514  Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a European Parlia-
ment and Council Directive on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society. Economic and Social Committee 98/C 407/06., p. 31. 
515  See Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), p. 423. It has also been confirmed by the CJEU, see 
section below and section 3.2.4.2. 
516  The WIPO CT defines the right as “the making available to the public of the original and 
copies of their works through sale or other transfer of ownership”. 
517  For the former view see von Lewinski and Walter (2010), p. 993. For the latter view see 
Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), p. 426. 
518  See more in section below.  
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Rental and Lending Rights Directive, which harmonises the rights of rental and 
lending in a greater detail, the question seems of minor importance. 
Another important question is whether the right of distribution under the 
Directive encompasses digital copies. The majority interprets Article 4 as covering 
solely tangible copies.519 Whereas this is an interesting question dealt with else-
where in this thesis, it is important to note that the legislator aimed to allocate the 
right of distribution solely to the copies fixed on a tangible medium and to cover 
all the acts of digital transmissions with the right of communication to the public. 
Whether the technological changes call for subjecting digital copies to the right 
of distribution under the InfoSoc Directive, similarly to the conclusion achieved 
by the CJEU in the context of the Software Directive in UsedSoft, is, first and 
foremost, a question of the desirable implications for the scope of subsequent 
control.520 
Hence, the harmonisation of the right of distribution at the time of the 
Directive’s adoption may not have been such a revolutionary move. Many MS 
provided control over distribution of lawful copies in some form.521 Also, at this 
time the right has been seen as related to the tangible copies. Nevertheless, the 
subsequent harmonisation through the jurisprudence of the CJEU has, without a 
doubt, increased the role of the EU harmonisation in national law-making. As 
will be shown next, the reach of the right under the Directive was extended 
beyond lawful copies and beyond the very act of transfer of ownership. 
 
 
3.2.4. CJEU developing the scope of the right of distribution 
Whereas harmonising the right of distribution was meant first and foremost to 
achieve compliance with the obligations under the WIPO CT and to abolish the 
adverse impact of national copyright laws on the freedoms of the internal market, 
the harmonisation went beyond these objectives. This section examines the way 
the CJEU shaped the scope of the harmonised right in the light of the inter-
pretation of the WIPO CT, with the focus on acceptable control beyond the 
circumstances of the first marketing of copies of a work. 
Four major issues of balancing the need to provide an adequate protection of 
the right holder’s interest in controlling the distribution of a work with the need 
to maintain the boundaries of exclusive control are identified. First, although very 
questionably relying on the WIPO CT, the Court denied subjecting the temporary 
                                                                                             
519  But see on the right’s potential to cover digital copies when they substitute physical 
distribution, Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), pp. 423, 425. 
520  See also section 4.3.2. 
521  For instance, it was established in Sweden and Norway that their laws were already in 
conformity with Article 4(1) as they provided the right of distribution covering tangible 
copies, see Prop. 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället – genomförande av 
direktiv 2001/29/EG, m.m., p. 81; Ot. prp. nr. 46 (2004–2005) Om lov om endringer I åndsver-
kloven m.m., p. 27. 
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exhibition of a lawfully acquired piece of furniture to a separate authorisation 
from the right holder pursuant to the right of distribution. Second, the CJEU 
extended the concept of distribution to cover acts besides the transfer of owner-
ship if they form a series of acts leading to one. Third, the Court protected the 
right holder’s interest in controlling the lawfully distributed but altered copies 
opening a new market. Fourth, the Court extended the concept of distribution in 
its broad sense to Internet transmissions and digital copies, where it found it 
justified to limit the right holder’s control over subsequent dissemination through 
the mechanisms in place under the Directive. 
 
 
3.2.4.1. Narrow interpretation of the right as encompassing 
transfer of ownership 
In the Peek & Cloppenburg case the CJEU was asked to rule whether the right of 
distribution under the InfoSoc Directive covered acts of making a work available 
other than through sale of copies.522 The Court held in this regard that there is 
little explanation of the concept of distribution of a work under the Directive. It 
then proceeded to examine the scope of the concept under the WIPO CT, as pro-
visions of the InfoSoc Directive implemented the Treaty and should have been 
interpreted as far as possible in the light of the WIPO CT provisions.523 
Accordingly, the Court held that the expression “distribution by sale or other-
wise” should be interpreted as meaning solely acts of distribution which entail a 
transfer of ownership.524 
Although the language of Article 4 is rather broad, providing for any form of 
distribution by sale or otherwise, the fact that it implements the WIPO CT and 
the abovementioned judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg contributed to the view 
that the scope of the right is nonetheless narrow. One view is that the right of 
distribution under the InfoSoc Directive covers solely acts where a transfer of 
ownership takes place, leaving such acts as rental and lending for other direc-
tives.525 Another view is that just as the Software Directive does, the InfoSoc 
Directive provides for a broad right, including rental and lending and other forms 
of distribution. This is so even though in Peek & Cloppenburg the CJEU ruled 
differently. The arguments of the CJEU appear unconvincing as the WIPO CT is 
considered to provide only minimum rights.526  
The very essence of the Peek & Cloppenburg case was whether the copyright 
holder could rely on the right of distribution to prevent a showing of a work 
                                                                                             
522  CJEU, Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA. (2008) Case C-456/06, Judgment of 17 
April 2008. 
523  Ibid., paras 29–31. 
524  Ibid., paras 33, 35–36. 
525  Bechtold (2006), p. 364; Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), p. 424. 
526  von Lewinski (2010), pp. 993–994. 
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(a piece of furniture) at the shop front. The outcome of the ruling seems reason-
able, unlike the Court’s reliance on the WIPO CT. One opinion is that such a 
narrow interpretation of the right of distribution in the light of the WIPO CT 
might have been motivated by balancing the copyright with the freedoms under 
the Treaty.527 Whereas the Court did not pay any particular attention to the 
Treaties, the AG did in his opinion, which was followed by the CJEU at least to 
the outcome.  
Inter alia, the AG emphasised that even though the InfoSoc Directive seeks to 
provide a high level of protection, one should not oversimplify this goal by 
assuming that any ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the right holder.528 
Hence, the AG reasoned that allowing the right holder to rely on a broadly inter-
preted right of distribution extending to temporary use would be liable to restrict 
the free movement of goods. Therefore, it would go beyond safeguarding the 
right of distribution to preclude third persons lawfully acquiring a copy of a work 
from making it temporary available.529 
 
 
3.2.4.2. Broad interpretation of the right as encompassing 
preparatory steps, subsequent distribution, and counterfeit copies 
On the other hand, the right of distribution was given a broad scope when it comes 
to two other important points. First, rather than designating distribution solely to 
the act of transfer of ownership following the preceding jurisprudence, the CJEU 
interpreted it as comprising a series of acts which, at the very least, lead to the 
transfer of ownership. Second, the right was extended to cover counterfeit copies. 
In the Donner case, the CJEU acknowledged once more the necessity to give 
the right of distribution the meaning in accordance with the WIPO CT.530 At the 
same time, the Court held that the content of the notion of distribution must be 
given an independent interpretation under EU law and not be attached to the 
legislation applicable to a transaction in question. Therefore, according to the 
Court’s interpretation, distribution is not an instant act but consists instead of the 
acts leading to the conclusion of sale contract and its performance.531 Towards 
the circumstances of the case in question, the Court held that advertising and 
enabling delivery of copyright-protected works fell under the right of distribution 
to the public within the meaning of the InfoSoc Directive.532 
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Somehow in line with the previous judgment, in Dimension Direct Sales the 
CJEU recalled that, according to the case law, acts preceding conclusion of sale 
contract might be falling within distribution right even when it constitutes a mere 
offer binding to its author.533 The CJEU found that offering copyright-protected 
works for sale may constitute an infringement of the distribution right under 
Article 4(1) of the InfoSoc Directive irrespective of the fact whether or not an 
actual sale had taken place.534 Although this is in line with many national laws,535 
it extends the reach of the harmonisation under InfoSoc.  
In the latest Syed judgment, the Court went even further by ruling that the 
storage of goods bearing a protected work might constitute an infringement of 
the right of distribution, leaving it for a national Court to determine.536 The Court 
relied largely on the Dimension Direct Sales judgment, stressing that it is not 
excluded that acts preceding the conclusion of a sale contract fall under the con-
cept of distribution.537 Although sale is not a necessary element, it must be proven 
that goods indeed are intended to be distributed to the public.538 In the case in 
question, the Court held that the mere fact that the goods were identical to those 
offered at the store could not imply that they were meant for distribution.539 Such 
interpretation would amount to extending the protection beyond the framework 
established by EU law.540 Essentially, the CJEU held that such an act might con-
stitute an infringement but it would be for a national Court to determine.541 The 
AG, on the other hand, proposed to rule that an infringement of the right of dis-
tribution took place, considering that an offer for sale extended to goods in 
storage that have a direct link to those on display in a shop.542  
What is interesting about the last two cases summarised above is that they 
relate to counterfeit copies and, thus, seem to extend the application of the right 
of distribution under the Directive to unlawful copies. Whereas the right of dis-
tribution under international law is harmonised to provide the right holder control 
over lawfully produced copies, under the CJEU jurisprudence the reach of the 
right can also comprise counterfeit goods. Although the CJEU did not rule on this 
matter directly, the Court held that an infringement of the right of distribution 
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potentially took place, where counterfeit copies were being advertised for sale or 
stored for the subsequent distribution.  
What does not seem to be questioned at all is that the right of distribution 
under the InfoSoc Directive extends to all the acts of distribution, primary as well 
as secondary, e.g. further circulation. Whereas the views on whether the right of 
distribution under the WIPO CT harmonises solely the right of first distribution 
are divided, it does not seem to be the case under the InfoSoc Directive. Unless 
exhaustion applies, the right of distribution covers any initial or subsequent dis-
tribution of a copy. Moreover, application of exhaustion does not necessarily 
result in a free subsequent circulation, as will be explained below. 
One prominent example of copies that are subject to exhaustion but none-
theless cannot be further distributed without authorisation are copies which have 
been substantially altered by the first acquirer. In the Art & Allposters case the 
Court had to rule on whether marketing of copies originally distributed by the 
right holder but subsequently altered by the first acquirer infringed the distri-
bution right of the right holder.543 The referred questions were essentially about 
the exhaustion principle and the right of reproduction and will be commented on 
in the next chapter. However, it is interesting how the Court approached the ques-
tion of the right of distribution. The CJEU stated, inter alia, that “the consent of 
the copyright holder does not cover the distribution of an object incorporating his 
work if that object has been altered after its initial marketing in such a way that 
it constitutes a new reproduction of that work”.544 Hence, the subsequent circu-
lation of copies was not exempted from the right holder’s authorisation. 
This appears to extend the scope of the distribution right to any subsequent 
distribution, as even after the first marketing of a copy its acquirer cannot freely 
dispose of that copy, e.g. by altering it and selling it further. The main argument 
of the Court was that alteration amounted to a new reproduction, for which there 
was also a new market, which the right holder was interested in controlling.545 
Even if the first acquirer would be eligible to resell the acquired copy pursuant to 
the limitation to the right of distribution in a form of exhaustion principle, they 
would not be eligible to resell the altered copies without a separate authorisation. 
The degree to which a copy must be altered in order to require a separate authori-
sation for its resale is subject to discussion, although it is clear that existence of 
a new market for such copies would speak against limiting the control of the right 
holder. 
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3.2.4.3. Distribution of digital copies and distribution 
through transmission 
Whereas the Court has not ruled on the applicability of the right of distribution 
under the InfoSoc Directive to distribution of digital copies or to distribution 
though transmission, it had a chance to interpret the right of distribution under 
the Software Directive and the lending right under the Rental and Lending Rights 
Directive on similar issues. Although it could be argued that the rights could or 
ought to have a different scope under the different instruments and, hence, the 
cases are of limited importance to each other, they will nonetheless be examined 
towards a broader picture of the justifiability of the exclusive control over dis-
semination beyond the first communication of a work.  
The right of distribution under the EU acquis has been considered by the 
CJEU in the absence of a tangible copy only twice and so far on the basis of 
Software Directive. A reference on the applicability of the right of distribution 
under the InfoSoc Directive to the copies of e-books in the Tom Kabinet case is 
now awaiting the CJEU’s judgment.546 Even in the cases concerning the Software 
Directive the right of distribution itself was addressed indirectly, as the issue at 
stake was rather its exhaustion. Hence, the judgments will be covered here only 
insofar as they concern the right itself and addressed in a greater detail in the next 
chapter dealing with the exhaustion principle.547 
Both cases under the Software Directive concerned either the conditions 
which had to be met for exhaustion of distribution right to apply or consequences 
of exhaustion. There is very little discussion on the scope of the right of distri-
bution itself or its applicability to dissemination through digital transmission. 
Yet, the CJEU on some occasions touched upon the substance of the right of 
distribution. First, the Court suggested that the right of distribution could extend 
to online transmissions by holding that “online transmission method is the func-
tional equivalent of the supply of a material medium”.548 Second, the Court dis-
missed the EC argument that making a copy of computer programme available 
on the Internet would fall exclusively under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive 
and thus not be subject to exhaustion. The CJEU stated that an act of commu-
nication to the public under Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive changes into an act 
of distribution under Article 4 of the Software Directive if a transfer of ownership 
occurs.549 The Court relied, inter alia, on the Opinion of AG Bot, who submitted 
that the wording of the right of distribution under Article 6(1) of the WIPO CT 
through “making a work available” unequivocally indicates that transfer of 
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ownership changes a mere fact of communication to the public into an act of 
distribution.550  
The Court did not make it clear whether it is absolutely necessary to classify 
an act of initial dissemination by the right holder under the distribution right 
before examining whether conditions for exhaustion are met. To put it in other 
words, the Court did not provide an indication that the copyright holder dis-
seminating a copy or a work in a way falling within the distribution right is an 
essential condition to be met to enable exhaustion of the right. The nature of acts 
of dissemination could perhaps be considered irrelevant as long as it formally 
resulted in a transfer of ownership. 
Following this logic, it could be argued that the right of distribution under the 
Software Directive is applicable solely to tangible copies, but dissemination of 
copies lacking tangible support is capable of triggering application of exhaustion 
of the right of distribution, nevertheless. However, application of exhaustion in 
this case would only exempt further distribution in the meaning of the Software 
Directive from the right holder’s authorisation, hence, solely the distribution of 
copies fixed on a tangible carrier. 
This, however, would result in an absurd situation. Such reasoning may lead 
to a conclusion that the copyright holder generally does not have right to control 
the initial dissemination of copies lacking tangible support, or that only the right 
to control the distribution of physical copies is harmonised. This may not have 
been the intention of the legislator aiming to provide strong protection, even con-
sidering the absence of any other dissemination-related rights harmonised under 
the Software Directive. These premises also would not support the very outcome 
of the UsedSoft case, the admissibility of “resale” of digital copies, as it would 
not cover the acts of distribution of copies not fixed on a tangible medium.  
Another landmark case on the application of the distribution right to digital 
copies is the VOB case.551 The case dealt with the applicability of the lending 
right to digital copies and the subsequent applicability of exception to that right. 
Lending has historically been a part of a wider distribution right and was gradu-
ally separated from it to avoid the application of the exhaustion principle. The 
reasoning of the Court in the VOB case is, hence, of a great relevance in the con-
text of the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination. Also, 
whereas in the UsedSoft case the Court did not spend much time on the relation 
between the distribution right and digital copies, it did so in the VOB case. 
Unlike the very straightforward reasoning of the CJEU in the UsedSoft case, 
the Court addressed at length the justifications of the exclusion of digital copies 
from the scope of the lending right. The analysis concluded that there were no 
decisive grounds to preclude intangible copies from falling under the right.552 
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Next, the Court proceeded to examine whether e-lending activity as described in 
the circumstances of the case fit the scope of the right. The CJEU held that it was 
indeed the case as the library allowed one copy to be available to one user at any 
particular point of time and only for a limited period.553 
Coming back to the digital copies, the Court reasoned that there were no 
decisive grounds for exempting them from falling within the scope of the right of 
lending. First, the Rental and Lending Rights Directive did not make it clear that 
such possibility had to be ruled out altogether. Moreover, at the time of the adop-
tion of the Directive, such new forms of exploitation could not have been antici-
pated.554 Second, holding that intangible copies were outside of scope would be 
contrary to the high level of protection envisaged by the Directive.555 The latter 
is exactly the argument that supports interpreting the UsedSoft case as holding 
that the right of distribution under the Software Directive could also encompass 
distribution of digital copies.  
What is evident from these cases is that the major part of the reasoning of the 
Court is dedicated to examining the justifiability of covering the digital copies 
with the rights in question and, in particular, subjecting them to respective limi-
tations. Although in the UsedSoft case the Court spends some time justifying 
qualifying a transaction in question as constituting a transfer of ownership, it is 
done mainly to rationalise the application of exhaustion and not the application 
of the right of distribution itself. Hence, the cases point towards a conclusion that 
there is little doubt that such online acts resemble the dissemination that could 
easily fit into the wide concept of distribution. Rather, the cases are decided on 
the basis of whether or not the right holder’s further control over dissemination 
is desirable and whether the application of limitations inherent to the particular 
form of distribution under the Directive appears appropriate. 
 
 
3.3. Material dissemination and the right of 
distribution: tangibility and beyond 
 As evident from the analysis in this chapter, the relation between the right of 
distribution and the concept of material dissemination as securing the right 
holder’s control over the first putting of copies into circulation is much more 
nuanced than suggested under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. Whereas in 
many cases the right holder cannot rely on the right of distribution to control 
subsequent distribution of copies, there are cases where considerations stretch 
beyond the mere first exercise of the right. 
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This section presents the main findings of the analysis by listing the circum-
stances that point towards restricting or extending the right holder’s control to the 
subsequent acts of distribution. Because the right of distribution covers, in 
essence, dissemination of copies, subsequent acts mean first and foremost resale 
of distributed copies or any other way of putting them into circulation. The results 
show that the key consideration is the ability of the right holder to exercise the 
right for the first placement of a work on a market, provided that there is no major 
interference with this market and the subsequent disposal of such copies does not 
result in a distinctive market offering a significant potential value. 
 
 
3.3.1. Circumstances pointing towards restricting the exclusive 
control beyond the first dissemination 
On the basis of the analysis under this chapter, three aspects indicating that the 
function of the right of distribution was fulfilled are identified. It shall be stressed 
that these aspects only permit considering whether restricting further control over 
the copies is justified and not giving any definite answer. The first aspect is the 
exercise of the right, enabling the copyright holder to obtain remuneration 
through the initial act of distribution. The second is the objective of restricting 
the exercise of the right of distribution to what is necessary to safeguard the spe-
cific subject matter. The third and final aspect is the considerations of public 
policy and the objectives of limitations, albeit, so far, specific to the question of 
extending the right to digital distribution. 
 
 
3.3.1.1. Exercise of the right as an essential condition 
Whether examined against the background of internal market freedoms under the 
Treaties or harmonisation under secondary EU law, the recurring theme in the 
CJEU’s reasoning behind restricting further control over dissemination is the fact 
that the right holder through authorising the first distribution of copies was given 
a chance to exercise control over putting them into circulation and to obtain 
remuneration. 
According to the reasoning of the CJEU, the right holder can choose freely 
where to put a work into circulation in their best interest.556 This is especially so 
within the Community, which is characterised by the free movement of goods 
and the freedom to provide services. Hence, the copyright holder is given an 
opportunity to authorise dissemination but should not expect to have a total 
control over any subsequent dissemination. The same is true for the distribution 
of digital copies. The fact that the right holder has exercised their right with an 
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intention to obtain remuneration corresponding to the economic value of a copy 
points towards the acceptability of restricting further control over such copies.557 
Whereas there are instances where such control is justified, as will be elabo-
rated in the next section, the control over subsequent dissemination solely on the 
territorial ground, namely that the copies were first put into circulation in another 
MS, is not admissible under the EU acquis.558Although copies first distributed 
abroad in some circumstances may be subject to further control upon their 
importation, the territoriality of the exhaustion of the right of distribution under 
national law is not a valid ground to interfere with the objectives of the internal 
market.559 
The importance of the exercise of the right through authorisation is also evi-
dent in cases where further control was allowed in the absence of an opportunity 
to do so. For instance, the right holder was allowed to rely on the right of distri-
bution to control further marketing of the copies which were lawfully produced 
in another MS due to the fact that the term of protection had lapsed.560 In the light 
of the above, it may be derived that in such a case the right holder could not 
exercise their right in that other MS due to the differences in national laws. Hence, 
the right holder’s control over further dissemination of copies in a different MS 
for which there was no possibility to obtain remuneration was justified.  
The prominence of the authorisation could also be attributed to extending the 
right of distribution to cases clearly concerning counterfeit. In such cases the 
issue at stake, of course, was primary distribution rather than secondary, as 
making a work available was not authorised by the right holder in the first place. 
The right holder was allowed to intervene with marketing of unlawful copies 
relying on the right of distribution, however, only in cases where such dissemi-
nation clearly fell under the meaning of distribution as related to the transfer of 
ownership.561 
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3.3.1.2. Limiting the purpose of authorisation to appropriate 
remuneration 
The second aspect is closely related to the previous one. Because the aim of grant-
ing the exclusive right to authorise distribution is the opportunity to ask for 
remuneration, the question of the extent of such reward is central. Whilst the 
InfoSoc Directive provides that the aim is to ensure the appropriate reward, there 
are very few indications of what that might be.562 Nonetheless, the CJEU pro-
vided some hints to the extent of remuneration accorded to the right holders. 
The CJEU’s remark on the right holder’s ability to exercise the right of distri-
bution according in their best interest already provides an indication.563 Remu-
neration depends on the author’s exercise of the right, whereas the legislation 
only provides the conditions to enable appropriate reward by allocating the 
exclusive rights. Accordingly, the right cannot be relied on to claim additional 
remuneration after the first distribution of a copy. For instance, when the copy 
which was put on the market with the right holder’s consent is then exported to 
another MS, where the royalties would have been higher. 
The same consideration has been held applicable when examining the exten-
sion of the limitation of the right of distribution (i.e. in the form of exhaustion) to 
digital copies. To demand additional remuneration for the subsequent dissemi-
nation of copies distributed by download against the payment of remuneration 
corresponding to the economic value of a copy would go beyond what is neces-
sary to safeguard the subject matter concerned.564 
It goes without saying that the ability to ask for remuneration is confined 
solely to the acts covered by the right of distribution. For instance, the Court 
denied the claim for remuneration for use of a work that did not fall under the 
distribution right under the InfoSoc Directive.565 The high level of protection and 
the aim of adequate reward did not justify the extension of the right.566 Never-
theless, as explored in the next section, the adequacy of remuneration must be 
examined towards the specific form of exploitation. For instance, the Court held 
that control over all the subsequent distribution of a copy in the form of rental 
                                                                                             
562  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
22.6.2001. OJ L 167/10, recital 10. 
563  CJEU, Musik-Vertrieb membran GmbH and K-tel International v GEMA. (1981) Joined 
cases 55/80 and 57/80, Judgment of 20 January 1981, para. 25. 
564  CJEU, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. (2012) Case C-128/11, Judgment of 
3 July 2012, para. 63. 
565  CJEU, Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA. (2008) Case C-456/06, Judgment of 17 
April 2008, para. 40. 
566  Ibid., paras 37–38. 
132 
was justified on the basis that the initial remuneration would not properly capture 
the number of occasions the work is exploited.567 
 
 
3.3.1.3. Public policy behind the limitation as a relevant 
consideration 
The third important consideration is public policy, or the objectives of the specific 
limitations to the right holder’s control over subsequent dissemination of a work. 
Interestingly, this aspect is prominently present in cases concerning the extension 
of the right of distribution and related rights and limitations thereof to digital 
copies. Examining such cases, which are also dealt with later in this chapter, 
prompted the Court to assess whether subjecting such situations to the treatment 
envisaged by the Directives from the analogue age is justified from a policy 
perspective. 
For instance, the Court held that the importance of libraries and e-lending 
leads to the conclusion that e-lending by libraries cannot be ruled out of the frame-
work meant for lending of tangible copies. This also meant that the limitations on 
the control over subsequent lending could likewise be applicable to e-lending if 
they had essentially similar characteristics.568 Similarly, not subjecting digital 
copies of computer programmes to the same limitations as in respect of tangible 
copies (in the form of exhaustion) would undermine the objective of that limitation 
and go beyond what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject matter.569 
 
 
3.3.2. Circumstances pointing towards admissibility of  
the exclusive control beyond the first dissemination 
This section highlights the circumstances that justify extending the exclusive 
control of the copyright holder beyond the first distribution of the copies. Three 
main aspects that call for the exclusive control of the right holder under the CJEU 
jurisprudence have been identified. First is the absence of consent to the first 
putting into circulation of copies. The second aspect is the emergence of new 
markets and potential additional remuneration. Third is the intention to prevent 
interference with the primary market. 
 
 
                                                                                             
567  CJEU, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome Video ApS v Erik Viuff Christiansen. (1988) 
Case C-158/86, Judgment of 17 May 1988, para. 15. 
568  CJEU, Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht. (2016) Case C-174/15, 
Judgment of 10 November 2016, para. 51. 
569  CJEU, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. (2012) Case C-128/11, Judgment of 
3 July 2012, paras 62–63. 
133 
3.3.2.1. Absence of consent to dissemination  
The authorisation of distribution is equally important for finding the grounds for 
limiting control and for extending control. This aspect has been used by the Court 
to distinguish between cases where copies were distributed with right holder’s 
authorisation from cases where copies were distributed only lawfully. For 
instance, one of the cases concerned the right holder’s reliance on the right of 
distribution to prevent the marketing of copies lawfully produced in another MS 
due to the fact that protection had lapsed.570  
In this case, notwithstanding the fact that the right holder had a chance to 
exercise the right in that other MS in the past, the Court held that the right holder 
could still exercise their right over imported copies. Such disparities in national 
laws on the term of protection justified the restrictions on the freedoms under the 
Treaties.571 Seen from a slightly different angle, the disparities in the term of pro-
tection meant that the right holder was deprived of a possibility to authorise the 
initial distribution of copies in question and, hence, to obtain appropriate reward 
for them.  
Consent thus is an essential indicator of the fulfilment of the function of the 
right, and its absence points towards endorsing further control over distribution. 
A similar conclusion was reached by the CJEU in the case concerning the ability 
to exercise the rental right following the first distribution of copies abroad, where 
such right was not recognised.572 Consent is also an important consideration in 
cases where the copies are distributed with the right holder’s authorisation but 
undergo a substantial alteration before being put back into circulation. The CJEU 
held that the right holder’s consent does not cover distribution if the copies were 
altered in substantial way.573 Therefore, the characteristics and the presentation 
of copies was of importance in determining whether or not the copyright holder 
might be assumed to have consented to the distribution.  
 
 
3.3.2.2. New markets for exploitation 
A very powerful argument in extending control over further distribution has been 
the emergence or existence of a new (or existing but distinct) market for exploi-
tation. This could mean a different way to exploit the same distributed copies or 
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the emergence of a market as the result of the alterations of the copies after their 
first distribution.  
First and foremost, the CJEU jurisprudence distinguished between the two 
types of corporeal exploitation which are subject to different treatment. The 
emergence of a distinct market for the tangible copies besides their sale, namely 
rental, justified control over the copies beyond their first being put into circulation 
through sale.574 Such exploitation offered a great potential source of revenue and, 
hence, had to be subjected to the right holder’s control. Therefore, the repeated 
exploitation of a work by the right holder was secured.575 
Another prominent example of the new market consideration is the alteration 
of copies by their acquirer with intent to distribute them. Whereas, understand-
ably, the deficiencies caused by the mere use of copies would not be of major 
importance to their subsequent disposal, major alterations that increase the value 
of the copy would.576 The value of these altered copies could present a new 
opportunity for exploitation.577 Hence, extending the right holder’s control over 
subsequent distribution would ensure that that they were not deprived of an 
appropriate reward for that new exploitation opportunity. 
 
 
3.3.2.3. Interference with the primary market 
The last aspect, although not explicitly discussed by the CJEU in cases con-
cerning distribution, appears to be the interference of secondary dissemination 
with the primary market. It, however, can be derived from cases where the Court 
extended the reach of the right of distribution to any act in a chain leading to the 
distribution of a work and, also, counterfeit copies. The very essence of the right 
is to secure the right holder’s control over marketing of a work, which enables 
obtaining remuneration.578 
These developments highlight the necessity to consider not only granting the 
right of distribution but ensuring that it provides an adequate tool to prevent acts 
which are not authorised. Accordingly, distribution was given a broad meaning, 
and the right of distribution would encompass preparatory steps.579 Similarly, the 
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reach of the right was extended to cover counterfeit copies, which, without a 
doubt, interfere with the market of lawfully produced and distributed copies.580 
 
 
3.3.3. Tangibility as an indispensable characteristic of material 
dissemination or an archaic attribute 
Whereas the right of distribution, as well as the notion of material dissemination, 
has primarily been associated with the distribution of tangible copies, the 
developments under the EU copyright acquis have challenged this view. There 
are two main issues associated with extending the scope of the right beyond the 
tangible copies. First is the question whether extension of the right is justified in 
relation to the digital copies. Second is the question whether extension of the right 
is justified in relation to distribution of such digital copies by transmission. 
Whilst the two aspects are, in reality, deeply connected, the distinction 
between them has the function of representing the extent to which the analogous 
treatment of “digital” distribution is accepted. This is so because digital copies 
can be put on a tangible medium, such as a CD. Hence, we could argue that the 
treatment should be the same for copies downloaded from the Internet and put on 
a CD (or USB), and for copies originally distributed as tangible copies.  
On the other hand, we could also argue that for the application of the limitation 
to the right of distribution, the copies in question must first be put into circulation 
in a form covered by the right of distribution, traditionally seen as implying the 
presence of tangible copies. The question that arises here is whether distribution 
right then can or ought to encompass ways of dissemination beyond the sale of 
(digital) copies on a tangible medium, for instance, through transmission of 
digital copies. 
To a certain extent it can be argued that digital copies already come within the 
scope of the right of distribution. Digital copies here mean copies in digital for-
mats that do not require a separate tangible medium but, in fact, are always fixed 
on one, be it a hard drive, a server or a CD. An example is a song in .mp3 format, 
which can be stored on the hard drive of a computer or on a CD. In the latter case, 
such a copy would be considered tangible, as it would reside on a separate 
tangible object, and, hence, be subject to the right of distribution. In the former 
case, the copy would arguably be considered intangible and, traditionally, outside 
the scope of the right of distribution. 
In that regard the CJEU has held that one should not imply that digital copies 
are not covered by the rights traditionally related to physical copies, such as dis-
tribution and lending. Their distribution could not be anticipated at the time of 
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adopting the legislation.581 Moreover, there is no decisive distinction between the 
tangible or intangible nature of a copy. Hence, the Court reasoned that denying 
limitation on exclusive control over subsequent distribution solely because of the 
absence of a tangible copy would go beyond what is necessary to safeguard the 
specific subject matter.582 Similarly, considering the importance of lending, 
limiting the permissible derogation from the right on the basis of the absence of 
a physical copy would not be justified.583 
The other part of the question on the possibility of applying the right of distri-
bution outside the realm of sale of physical copies is whether the right could or 
ought to cover the delivery of copies through transmission. Again, the CJEU 
found it justified in the particular circumstances of two cases. The very basis of 
the reasoning was the statement that, from an economic point of view, sale of a 
tangible copy and download of a digital copy are similar. Hence, the digital trans-
mission is the functional equivalent of distribution on a tangible medium.584 Very 
similarly, the Court found that e-lending is an adapted version of lending. There-
fore, if the process of e-lending has essentially similar characteristics to conven-
tional lending, the lending right and its limits could apply.585  
Although the approach of the Court may seem revolutionary, it is important 
to keep in mind that the reasoning of the CJEU in these cases is heavily based on 
their circumstances.586 The Court is rather careful when drawing general conclu-
sions and examines the justifications behind extending or not extending the scope 
of the right in each and every case. Moreover, the absence of justifications behind 
excluding digital copies from the right of distribution or lending do not auto-
matically also justify the application of limitations. 
 
 
3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine the connection between material dissemination 
rights and the right of distribution and how it has been challenged by the develop-
ments under the EU acquis. The analysis of the background to the harmonisation 
of the right under the acquis illustrates the common understanding that the distri-
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bution right ought to be limited to the initial distribution. Relying on the notion 
of material dissemination, limiting control was justified once the function of the 
right has been fulfilled through the first exercise. The EU legislator has relied on 
the notion when harmonising the right of distribution under the acquis through 
recognition of the broad right encompassing primary and secondary acts but 
subject to the exhaustion principle de facto exempting secondary acts from 
requiring authorisation. 
However, securing the right holders’ control over every initial putting into 
circulation of copies of a work was not the only and, perhaps, not even the main 
objective of the harmonisation. Two crucial circumstances at the time of harmo-
nisation were the emerging markets for rental of copies and the conflict between 
the exclusive distribution right with the free movement of goods within the EEC. 
Divergent national laws did not only distort the free movement of goods but also 
advanced partition of the markets and market conditions. Whereas the emerging 
rental market has been (partially) dealt with under the Rental and Lending Rights 
Directive, harmonising of the right of distribution under the InfoSoc Directive 
was the key effort to resolve the conflict between the national laws and the free-
doms of the internal market. 
Accordingly, the picture of the function of the recognising the right under the 
EU acquis is rather complex. Whereas the analysis of the background shed light 
on the circumstances that have impacted, inter alia, the wording of the right under 
the Directives, next the analysis turned to the normative scope of the right and in 
particular the acts of secondary distribution. Laying down the broad right of dis-
tribution accompanied by exhaustion under the InfoSoc Directive went beyond 
merely addressing the conflict between the national laws and copyright territo-
riality in the context of the free movement of goods within the EU, and it effec-
tively harmonised the scope of the right under the national laws. 
Harmonising the scope of the right of distribution under the InfoSoc Directive 
in the form of a broad right and the exhaustion principle reflects the notion of 
material dissemination rights. Control over each primary distribution of a work, 
meaning the putting into circulation of new copies, is subject to authorisation by 
the right holder. Once the right has been exercised and the copies have been put 
into circulation, their further distribution is not subject to authorisation. Hence, 
the right of distribution secures the right holder’s opportunity to exploit a work 
through authorising each distribution and obtaining renumeration for each copy. 
Once the opportunity to obtain remuneration has been provided, further control 
is limited for the purpose of attaining other objectives, e.g. the free movement of 
goods within the Community. 
Enumerating the clear-cut rule of exhaustion of the right of distribution under 
the full harmonisation InfoSoc Directive appears to be rather static, considering 
the subsequent development under the EU acquis reshaping the normative scope 
of the right of distribution. Without focusing on the principle, which will be 
examined in a greater detail in Chapter 4, it is observed that the subsequent juris-
prudence of the CJEU points towards a more flexible interpretation of the material 
dissemination approach in the context of the distribution right, not envisaged at 
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the outset of harmonisation. First, the Court has extended the application of the 
right of distribution to the cases which were not contemplated by the legislator, 
such as the cases of digital dissemination. Second, despite the exhaustion prin-
ciple providing a limit to the right of distribution, no immediate conclusions on 
the scope of subsequent control can be drawn on the sole basis of authorised 
distribution. 
The main considerations in examining the need to restrict the reach of the right 
of distribution beyond the first distribution are the exercise of the right in relation 
to each copy, obtaining appropriate remuneration, and the public policy behind 
the limitation. On the one hand, they closely relate to the notion of material dis-
semination. On the other hand, fulfilling these criteria may not necessarily lead 
to the ultimate answer, as further circumstances are increasingly being taken into 
account. 
Obviously, the absence of consent to the primary distribution would render 
any secondary distribution of the copies unlawful. However, the consent (or 
authorisation) requirement has attained new shades. Even though the primary dis-
tribution is authorised by the right holder, it may be necessary to take a closer 
look at what exactly the right holder has consented to. The primary reason seems 
to be the new ways of exploiting a work, which could not be anticipated at the 
time of authorising primary distribution. This is in line with the notion of material 
dissemination, which relies on the right holder’s opportunity to estimate the 
market for a work and ask for appropriate remuneration. The emergence of a not 
anticipated secondary use could thus justify submitting it to the right holder’s 
authorisation. 
The aspect of consent and its scope is also closely linked to two other important 
considerations: emergence of a new market and interference with a primary 
market. Both emphasise the economic significance of control over the circum-
stances of a work’s exploitation. Secondary distribution (resale) of tangible 
copies is generally exempted from authorisation and the right holder is able to 
take such a resulting secondary market into account. Emergence of a distinct 
market for distributed copies (e.g. through substantial alteration of copies) would 
not only likely be unanticipated by the right holder (hence, not taken into 
account), it would also potentially interfere with the primary market to a much 
greater extent than the regular secondary market for distributed copies. 
In the context of these developments, the all-or-nothing approach of the 
exhaustion principle appears outdated. Evaluation of the degree of control 
accorded to the right holder under the right of distribution no longer relies solely 
on the notion of the primary or secondary distribution, as suggested by Article 4 
of the InfoSoc Directive, but on an overall assessment of the circumstances of a 
work’s exploitation. Hence, even seemingly more straightforward cases of distri-
bution of tangible copies require an increasingly tailored assessment, which 
would be even more true in respect of digital distribution. 
Therefore, the CJEU’s judgment in UsedSoft, extending the right of distri-
bution or at least the exhaustion principle to copies of software distributed digi-
tally, is prominent. Whereas in economic terms digital distribution may closely 
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resemble the physical distribution envisioned at the time of harmonisation of the 
right, there are by all means more aspects to be taken into account. Given the 
variety of works and forms of digital distribution, the assessment of possible sub-
stantial interference with a primary or new market would require a much more 
nuanced analysis than the fact of initial authorisation. 
The findings of this chapter will be taken as a basis for the analysis of the 
development of the exhaustion principle under Chapter 4 and the right of com-
munication to the public under Chapter 5. Development of the exhaustion prin-
ciple as an instrument of limiting control over subsequent dissemination will be 
assessed in the light of the increasing need for a flexible approach to assessing 
the overall circumstances. The findings of this chapter will also inform the 
analysis of the development of the communication to the public right, which, inter 
alia, will focus on identifying the tendencies pointing towards the convergence 
of approaches to material and immaterial dissemination under the right.  
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4. EXHAUSTION PRINCIPLE AS AN INSTRUMENT 
TO LIMIT CONTROL OVER SUBSEQUENT 
DISTRIBUTION 
The exhaustion principle is a general limit to the right of distribution, which is 
nearly as wide-spread as the recognition of the exclusive right of distribution 
itself.587 Whereas the principle is found across all the fields of IP, this chapter 
focuses solely on the exhaustion principle in the field of copyright. Despite the 
similarities in some of the justifications for exhaustion, the principle under copy-
right has a distinctive character.588 Under copyright, the principle is associated 
with the right of distribution and constitutes its most significant limitation.589 In 
basic terms, it could be summarised as providing that the right holder loses con-
trol over subsequent distribution of a work or copies thereof upon the first 
instance of authorised putting on the market. Although there are a few theories 
explaining the principle, in the context of this thesis exhaustion is viewed pri-
marily from the perspective of remuneration theory, suggesting that the author 
could have had an opportunity to receive an appropriate reward upon the first 
alienation of a copy.590 
Being an inherent limit to the right of distribution, the rationale of exhaustion 
is in direct connection to the notion of material dissemination, as it is an instru-
ment of delineating exclusive control over every exploitation of a work through 
distributing copies. Not necessarily the only form of limiting exclusive control, 
the exhaustion principle is a particular construct which reflects the idea of 
limiting the reach of the exclusive right once its function has been fulfilled. It is 
through this prism the principle will be analysed in this chapter: as fulfilling the 
function of the material dissemination approach by systematically restricting the 
scope of subsequent control over distribution once an opportunity to obtain 
appropriate remuneration has been provided. 
The development of technology has challenged the scope of the exhaustion 
principle. Historically, the principle has been associated with the dissemination 
of tangible copies of a work through sale, which is the core of the distribution 
right. Technological development, however, prompted the discussion of the pos-
                                                                                             
587  See the WIPO on exhaustion being a general limit of the right and as not falling under 
Article 9(2) of the BC, Interface between Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and 
Competition Law. WIPO CDIP/4/4 REV/STUDY/INF/2. June 1, 2011, p. 8. 
588  On the exhaustion as a commonly accepted principle according to which the lawful buyer 
of a tangible object on which a work is fixed has a right to resell it, see Riis et al. (2013), p. 
460; Schovsbo (2012). On the differences between exhaustion under different IP rights, see 
Rognstad (2003), pp. 450–451; Joos (1991), pp. 43–51. 
589  On exhaustion as the Achilles’ heel of the right of distribution, see Ohly (2009), p. 219. 
590  Blocher and Walter (2010), p. 134. Further on the theories of exhaustion, see Hugenholtz 
(1996), pp. 96–97; Joos (1991), pp. 51–67. Also, see Lucas holding that the principle is backed 
by different types of considerations but lacking clear boundaries, Lucas (2010), p. 306. 
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sibility and the desirability of extending the reach of the principle to dissemi-
nation taking place outside the realm of tangible copies. Furthermore, even in 
respect of tangible copies, the exhaustion principle alone might not effectively 
delineate the scope of exclusive control, taking into account the competing 
interests arising from new and not previously anticipated ways to exploit already 
distributed copies. 
As copyright grants a variety of independent rights, application of the exhaus-
tion principle is not the only and equally not always the concluding step of 
limiting the exclusive control over distribution, as discussed in Chapter 3.591 
Although it is by all means a powerful and straightforward tool, it is important to 
emphasise that the principle does not entail the complete loss of control over fur-
ther exploitation. As will be explored, the principle exempts only certain 
secondary acts which rely on the initially authorised dissemination and does not 
sanction any separate act of exploitation, e.g. creation and distribution of new 
copies. 
Towards the overall focus of this thesis, the present chapter explores the 
exhaustion principle as an instrument of limiting control over subsequent distri-
bution, reflecting the material dissemination notion. Together with chapters 2, 3, 
and 5, it serves to address the first overall research question, namely how the 
development of the rights of distribution and communication to the public under 
the EU acquis reflects the distinction between material and immaterial dissemi-
nation. More specifically, it assesses the strengths and shortcomings of the 
exhaustion principle in delineating the scope of the exclusive right according to 
the developments of technology and the acquis. The following sub-questions are 
set to be answered: 
 
What circumstances have influenced the need and the form of harmonisation of 
the exhaustion principle under the EU acquis? 
What role has the exhaustion principle played in limiting the scope of the exclusive 
distribution right pursuant to material dissemination under secondary EU law? 
How does the exhaustion principle perform its function of limiting the right of 
material dissemination given the subsequent development of technology and the 
acquis? 
 
Exhaustion being an inherent boundary of the right of distribution, the analysis 
in this chapter is closely connected and builds upon the findings of Chapter 3 on 
the development of the right. In order to answer the questions, first, the back-
ground to harmonising the exhaustion principle on the EU level and the relevant 
circumstances on both national and international levels are analysed. 
Second, the harmonisation of the principle under secondary EU law and the 
varying objectives behind it are explored. In particular, the development of the 
exhaustion principle from dealing with the territoriality aspect of copyright 
(under the Community exhaustion principle) into an instrument of placing a 
                                                                                             
591  See section 3.3.2. 
142 
general limit on the normative scope of the right of distribution under the acquis 
is emphasised. 
Third, the CJEU’s interpretation of the principle is examined against the back-
ground of material dissemination. Next, it is discussed how the principle performs 
its function given the developments of technology, markets, and new ways of 
disseminating copies of a work, relying on the previously identified circum-
stances pointing towards admissibility of exclusive control beyond first dissemi-
nation.592 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 4.1. provides the background to 
the harmonisation of the principle. Besides the developments at the international 
level, three crucial aspects influencing the need, as well as the form of harmoni-
sation, are discussed: the emergence of the rental market for copies of a work, the 
territoriality of exhaustion as a policy tool, and the significance of the conditions 
leading to exhaustion of the distribution right. These aspects are also discussed 
in the context of Scandinavian copyright acts and the amendments that took place 
following the harmonisation under the EU acquis. 
Part 4.2. deals with the harmonisation of the principle under the EU acquis. It 
starts with the jurisprudence of the CJEU preceding harmonisation under the 
Directives and establishing the Community exhaustion principle. Next, it pro-
ceeds with the analysis of the legislative history of the exhaustion principle under 
the Software, the Rental and Lending, and the InfoSoc Directives. Part 4.3. deals 
with role of exhaustion in restricting the scope of the distribution right pursuant 
to material dissemination. Against the background of the developments under the 
acquis, it is discussed whether the principle fulfils its function given the emerging 
markets for distributed copies and the changing circumstances of work’s exploi-
tation. Particular attention is paid to the ability to adapt in the situations where 
further control is justified and where the distribution of a work takes place outside 
the realm of tangible copies. 
 
 
4.1. Background to the harmonisation of the 
exhaustion principle under the EU acquis 
Although exhaustion was discussed in conjunction with the right of distribution 
ever since the first negotiations on copyright harmonisation, the only binding 
international instrument explicitly referring to it is the WIPO CT, which also 
recognised a right of distribution. The rationales behind the harmonisation as well 
as the wording of the principle are not incidental but build upon the preceding 
discussions on the necessity to introduce a boundary of the right of distribution 
would it to be recognised internationally. 
                                                                                             
592  Namely, part 0. on the relation between the right of distribution and material dissemination 
following the developments under the acquis. 
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This section identifies four aspects explaining the significance of harmoni-
sation of the exhaustion principle on the international level. The first aspect is the 
recognition of the exclusive right to control the first distribution of a work neces-
sitating the introduction of exhaustion. The second aspect is the need to secure 
the right holder’s control over rental of the copies in the circumstances where the 
right of distribution is recognised in its broad form under national law. The third 
aspect is the significance of the conditions leading to exhaustion of the right. The 
last aspect it is the territoriality of exhaustion as a matter of international trade 
policy. 
 
Exhaustion is of major importance to recognising the right of first putting copies 
into circulation as opposed to the right of distribution covering every subsequent 
act of putting into circulation. Whereas the idea that the extent of exclusive con-
trol granted by IP rights in respect of each copy shall be limited is of a universal 
nature, the term “exhaustion” was first coined in the German scholarship in the 
field of patents and later extended to other fields of IP.593 
As explored in Chapter 3, during negotiations on the harmonisation of copy-
right on the international level, the right of distribution was supported only pro-
vided that it is accompanied by a general limit.594 Hence, the exhaustion principle 
was employed under the negotiations to designate such limit. For instance, during 
the negotiations on the Model Law in the field of copyright, exhaustion was dis-
cussed as a one-sided solution to the detriment of the copyright holder to solve 
the property right in a copy problem.595 Furthermore, exhaustion was discussed 
simultaneously with the right of distribution and not in a separate section dedi-
cated to exceptions to exclusive rights. 
Similarly, under the negotiations on the PPBC, the right of distribution, 
originally appearing on the agenda, was dropped for a few sessions because it 
was not widely supported in its broad form. For instance, it was evident that the 
                                                                                             
593  Puig (2013), p. 162.; Joos (1991), pp. 23–36. 
594  See the proposal for the SCA, where it was stressed that the right to control the 
dissemination of copies should systematically be restricted so that it cannot be relied on in 
subsequent dissemination of copies. SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och 
konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 246. Subsequent transfers of issued copies were not subject 
to the copyright holder's consent, meaning that the right of dissemination to the public was 
exhausted by authorising the first transfer. Ibid., p. 96.  
595  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Third 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Memorandum 
prepared by the International Bureau. CE/MPC/III/2 1990, p. 44. 
4.1.1. Recognition of the right of first distribution under
 international law
144 
right to resale should not survive the first distribution.596 Accordingly, the 
exhaustion principle was considered for the purpose of achieving the "termination 
of the right of distribution”.597 Where the broad right of distribution was to be 
recognised rather than the right of first distribution, it would have to be accom-
panied by the exhaustion principle. 
 
 
4.1.2. Securing control over exploitation through rental 
Due to the different rationales behind exhaustion and the absence of a consensus 
on its scope or the appropriate scope of the right of distribution, the early nego-
tiations on international harmonisation failed. However, in the era of expansion 
of the exclusive rights, it soon became evident that the disparities in national laws 
on the matter of exhaustion had much broader consequences. The right of distri-
bution under national law in this period frequently covered all acts of dissemi-
nation that concerned a tangible copy of a work, be it a transaction equalling sale, 
rental, lending, etc.598 Consequently, if a country did recognise a broad right of 
distribution exhausted upon the first distribution, it might as well provided that 
right to control subsequent dissemination in the form of rental and lending was 
exhausted. 
The first extensive negotiations on copyright exhaustion took place in the con-
text of the negotiations on the Model Law on copyright. The right of distribution 
and its exhaustion were not considered the key issue, as there were doubts as to 
whether it was at all necessary to harmonise them. The alternative could be 
recognising the right of rental instead – a solution which seemed much more 
acceptable in different countries.599 The draft of the Model Law did not provide 
for a separate right of rental but instead secured it by adjusting the wording of the 
exhaustion principle, as demonstrated below. 
The scope of the general right of distribution under the Model Law is broad 
and covers distribution by “sale or other transfer of ownership or by rental, lease 
or lending”.600 Section 19, in turn, under the heading “Free Resale [and Lending]” 
defines its boundaries: 
 
                                                                                             
596  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Third Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part III. New Items. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/III/2-III 1993, pp. 9–10. 
597  Ibid., p. 3. 
598  This is, for instance, the case in the Scandinavian countries, where the right of distribution 
is construed broadly. 
599  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Third 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Memorandum 
prepared by the International Bureau. CE/MPC/III/2 1990, pp. 48–49. 
600  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Memorandum 
prepared by the International Bureau. II Draft provisions. CE/MPC/I/2-II 1989, p. 7. 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 8, it shall be permitted, without the 
author's authorisation and – except in the case referred to in Section 9 – without 
payment of remuneration, to 
Resell, or otherwise, transfer the ownership of a copy of a work after the first sale 
or other transfer of the ownership of the copy [.] [;]. 
[(ii) lend to the public a copy of a work expressed in writing – other than a com-
puter program – by a library or archive whose activities do not serve direct or 
indirect commercial gain.]601 
 
Accordingly, acts amounting to rental, lease or lending were clearly differentiated 
from sale or transfer of ownership. The right holder’s exclusive control over 
rental and lending was secured even after the first distribution of copies, as only 
subsequent resale or other transfer of ownership would be permitted. The exhaus-
tion principle under the Model Law made subsequent rental and (optional) 
lending of copies of a work subject to the right holder’s authorisation. The pur-
pose was achieved by providing that the right of rental survives exhaustion rather 
than by providing a separate exclusive and inexhaustible right of rental. 
This particular wording of the exhaustion principle is interesting, as, unlike 
the subsequent international harmonisation of exhaustion, the principle is worded 
positively. Rather than stating that the copyright holder retains full control over 
distribution unless certain conditions are met, it provides that an acquirer of a 
copy is permitted to dispose of a work through transfer of ownership or lending. 
This approach is more open than the negative wording of the WIPO CT and the 
EU Directives.602 
The importance of recognition of the right of distribution and its exhaustion 
materialised at a time when rental and lending became a significant form of 
exploitation of copies. Thus, it became necessary to modify exhaustion in coun-
tries where it was already regulated.603 During the subsequent negotiations for the 
PPBC, which led to the adoption of the WIPO CT, it was explicitly proposed that 
only the rights that shall survive exhaustion, namely the rental and lending rights, 
be regulated.604 One of the main driving forces behind the recognition of the right 
of rental was the existence of the exhaustion principle under national laws.605 
                                                                                             
601  Ibid., p. 11. 
602  See, sections 4.1.5. and 4.2.2., respectively. 
603  For the discussion, see Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the 
field of copyright. First Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of 
copyright. Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau. III Comments on the draft 
model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. CE/MPC/I/2-III 1989, p. 20. 
604  Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fourth Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention. Memorandum prepared 
by the International Bureau. BCP/CE/IV/2 1994, p. 13. 
605  In the absence of it, a separate right would not be a necessity as rental generally constitutes 
one of the forms of distribution. See Longdin and Lim (2013), p. 544. For the EU law 
perspective, see Gotzen (1990), p. 299. 
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The negotiations on the PPBC partially followed the Model Law and defined 
the right of distribution broadly as including rental and lending. Exhaustion of 
the right of distribution was defined in the following way: 
 
The "exhaustion of the right of distribution" is the termination of the right of dis-
tribution in respect of any copy of the work where ownership has been transferred 
for the first time by means of an implicit or explicit authorisation of the author of, 
or other original owner of the copyright in, the work. The "first sale doctrine" is 
the doctrine on which such exhaustion of the right is based.606  
 
The wording must be viewed in conjunction with the wording of the right of dis-
tribution itself, which was defined broadly as covering both the change of 
ownership and possession.607 By providing that exhaustion occurred upon a trans-
fer of ownership, the drafters limited the scope of exhaustion to exclude mere 
transfer of possession, as would be the case with rental.608 Such wording was 
supported by the fact that exhaustion in many countries applied only to the change 
of ownership in order to secure the rental right.609  
Accordingly, the main justification for the distinction between ownership and 
possession for the purpose of exhaustion appears to be securing the rental right. 
By the time the negotiations on the WIPO CT started, it was generally accepted 
that the right of distribution would mostly refer to the transfer of ownership, as 
the rights of rental and lending were made a separate part of the agenda. With the 
latter being generally recognised and harmonised as a separate right, the question 
that arises is whether the distinction between ownership and possession in the 
solely exhaustion context still carries any significance. 
 
 
4.1.3. Significance of the conditions of exhaustion 
Another consideration that goes hand in hand with the section above is the sig-
nificance of the conditions prompting for the exhaustion of the right and the scope 
of the latter. Whereas the most commonly accepted trigger today is the first dis-
tribution of copies, it has not been the only way to introduce the limitation to the 
right of distribution. Moreover, the conditions could also differ between the types 
of works.610 
                                                                                             
606  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Third Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part III. New Items. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/III/2-III 1993, p. 3. 
607  On the right of distribution covering change of ownership and possession, see section 
3.1.3. 
608  On rental being affected by the exhaustion principle, see Quintais and Poort (2018), p. 45. 
609  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. First Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part II. (Draft). 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/I/3 1991, p. 20. 
610  Copyright acts in Scandinavian countries, for instance, originally contained two separate 
provisions on exhaustion of the right of distribution depending on a type of a work. Exhaustion 
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The copyright acts in the Scandinavian countries, for instance, for quite some 
time did not define the sale of copies as a precondition to exhaustion. The SCA 
provided that when a literary, musical, or artistic work was published, the copies 
could be disseminated further and be publicly displayed.611 The NCA provided 
for exhaustion in respect of artistic, literary, musical, and scientific works. The 
copies could be freely disseminated to the public when a work was published, 
with the exception of copies of musical works, which could not be rented without 
the copyright holder’s consent.612  
Hence, originally, the right of distribution under the Scandinavian copyright 
acts would be exhausted not upon the sale or transfer of ownership but upon a 
work being published.613 The definition of a published work was also of 
importance for a number of other provisions and, thus, was defined in a separate 
provision.614 According to the SCA, a work was published when copies of a work 
were lawfully put on the market or otherwise disseminated, with “lawfully made 
available” referring primarily to acts authorised by a right holder.615 According 
to the NCA, a work was published when a reasonable number of copies was put 
on the market with the copyright holder’s consent.616 
Whereas the sale of copies would be an inevitable consequence of publishing 
and putting copies into circulation, publishing as a condition is ultimately broader 
than a mere sale. Not least in the context of extending the principle to dissemi-
nation other than through sale of copies on a tangible medium.617 Whereas further 
discussion on the conditions of exhaustion is outside the scope of this chapter, it 
is important to keep in mind that sale is not the only acceptable precondition to 
                                                                                             
(konsumption) became regulated under a single provision of the SCA in 1992 in accordance 
with Prop. 1993/94:49 Ändring i övergångsbestämmelserna till lagen (1993:1007) om ändring 
i upphovsrättslagen. 
611  SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 246. 
Article 23 dealt with literarily and musical works, whereas Article 25 dealt with artistic works. 
612  Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 11. The SCA, in turn, 
provided for the right of rental not subject to exhaustion in respect musical notes. The 
provision was modified to encompass copies of musical works in 1982 in accordance with the 
Prop. 1982/83:40 Om ändring i lagen (1960:729) om upphovsrätt till litterära och konstnärliga 
verk. 
613  The SCA uses term “utgivet”, and the NCA uses the term “utgitt”. 
614  For instance, it was important for dealing with exceptions to the exclusive rights, such as 
private copying, public display, etc. 
615  SOU 1956:25 Upphovsmannarätt till litterära och konstnärliga verk: lagförslag, p. 167. 
616  Ot. prp. nr. 26 (1959–1960) Om lov om opphavsrett til åndsverk, p. 8. The requirement of 
a reasonable number of copies implemented Article 4(4) of the BC (Brussels revision of 1948) 
and meant to differentiate between the types of works in order to determine the reasonable 
number. Ibid., p. 19. 
617  Whilst appropriating the principle of exhaustion understood through the sale or transfer of 
ownership presents difficulties not only from the perspective of copyright, appropriating the 
concept as referring to putting copies on a market with the right holder’s consent may appear 
slightly less troublesome. 
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exempt the subsequent dissemination from exclusive control of the copyright 
holder. Hence, any international harmonisation relying on the term of transfer of 
ownership in this respect could also be seen as harmonising solely the resale of 
distributed copies.618 
 
 
4.1.4. Territoriality of exhaustion as a policy tool 
Copyright protection is territorial and so are the rights granted to the copyright 
holder. With a different scope of exclusive rights and conditions of exhaustion, 
the question that arises is what territoriality means in the context of cross-border 
trade. Should it matter for the purpose of applying exhaustion whether or not the 
copies in question were distributed for the first time in a given jurisdiction or 
abroad? Shall the right of distribution be enforced in respect of all the copies put 
into circulation for the first time in a given jurisdiction, even if they were already 
distributed abroad? These are ultimately the questions which depend on a variety 
of considerations outside copyright. 
The two widely recognised types of exhaustion principle under the national 
copyright laws are national and international exhaustion. The former means that 
the right of distribution is only exhausted when a copy in question is put into 
circulation in the territory of that particular country. The latter, in turn, means 
that putting the copies into circulation in any country exhausts the right of distri-
bution, even in a given jurisdiction.619 Yet another category, regional exhaustion, 
restricts applicability of exhaustion to copies distributed in a particular region or 
territory (e.g. EEA-wide exhaustion). 
Territoriality of exhaustion makes a difference in the context of cross-border 
trade as well as the copyright policy. Depending on the regime, the cross-border 
movement of goods and services can be severely distorted.620 The harmonisation 
of the right of distribution subject to exhaustion would not be complete unless the 
territoriality aspect was settled. So far, there is no agreement on the international 
level as to the mode of exhaustion, although some international or supra-national 
organisations such as the EU maintain their own regimes. In the EU, the regional 
exhaustion is practiced, which is closer to national exhaustion. It precludes 
unauthorised import of copies unless they were put into circulation for the first 
time with the authorisation of the right holder in one of the MS.621 
During the early international negotiations on the Model Law, the question of 
territoriality of exhaustion was not widely discussed, although some comments 
                                                                                             
618  See Hilty for a similar point: exhaustion provision might be read as referring solely to the 
resale of tangible copies. Hence, prohibiting exhaustion of other rights is outside the scope of 
the provision unless the resale of tangible copies is involved. Hilty (2018), p. 867. 
619  See Schovsbo (2012). 
620  Yusuf and von Hase (1992), p. 116; Slotboom (2005), pp. 421–440. 
621  Further on exhaustion under the EU law, see section 4.2. 
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on the necessity to reach an agreement were made.622 In the course of the subse-
quent negotiations on the PPBC, territoriality was discussed at length. It was not 
clear what relationship existed between the territoriality of copyright protection 
and the territoriality of exhaustion, and the separate right of importation was seen 
as a way to deal with the latter. If such right was recognised, exhaustion would 
inevitably become national.623 
Under the negotiations on the PPBC, international exhaustion was seen as 
favourable to international trade. However, although it would reduce copyright’s 
influence on international trade and stimulate import and competition, it would 
also diminish the copyright’s territoriality, which could result in a single source 
of supply and loss of control over exploitation. Hence, the TRIPS Agreement was 
considered to be an appropriate instrument to deal with the matter. The latter, 
however, provided common standards of IP protection without also spelling out 
the limitations to the rights.624 
Although territoriality of exhaustion is also outside of the scope of the WIPO 
CT, there was some discussion on the appropriate solution. As addressed in 
Chapter 3, the first alternative was to recognise the right of distribution, accom-
panied by the national exhaustion and the right of importation.625 The recognition 
of the right of importation would be of a minor importance, as national exhaustion 
would already secure the copyright holder’s right to oppose putting into circu-
lation of copies distributed abroad. The second alternative would provide the 
right of distribution accompanied by the exhaustion provision not connected to 
any particular territory. As the result of negotiations, the Treaty leaves it for the 
parties to regulate the circumstances of exhaustion, hence, enabling international 
exhaustion. Although the WIPO CT did not adopt international exhaustion, it was 
expected that it would become generally acceptable to the parties once every 
country had the same level of protection, i.e. if distribution right is recognised.626 
 
 
4.1.5. Exhaustion principle under international law 
The BC developed from recognising rights rather narrow in scope to granting a 
couple of broad general rights accompanied by a possibility to introduce excep-
tions and limitations to such rights in order to secure the interests of parties other 
                                                                                             
622  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Report prepared by 
the Committee. CE/MPC/I/3 1989, p. 25. 
623  Committee of Experts on a Possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fourth Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention. Memorandum prepared 
by the International Bureau. BCP/CE/IV/2 1994, pp. 13, 24. 
624  Yusuf and von Hase (1992), p. 130.  
625  See section 3.1.5.3. 
626  Yusuf and von Hase (1992), p. 130. 
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than copyright holders.627 This was motivated by a de minimis approach to pro-
vide a basic necessary level of copyright protection for right holders around the 
globe at the specific time. Although up to now most of the rights under the BC 
are limited in scope (e.g. to the subject matter), none of them is "exhausted" or 
ceases to exist upon a certain act by the right holder.  
The closest example to exhaustion would perhaps be the expiration of the right 
of translation ten years following the date of a publication of a work, present in 
the BC before the Berlin Act of 1908.628 Although there is no provision on the 
exhaustion of the distribution right in the absence of the recognition of a broad 
distribution right itself, it was understood that the potential recognition of a broad 
right of distribution would necessarily have to be accompanied by the limits to 
the right. 629 
Whereas the right of distribution was discussed but not adopted under the 
TRIPS negotiations, the statement which relates to the exhaustion principle 
became the draft of Article 6 of the Agreement:  
 
It is understood that, unless expressly provided to the contrary in this agreement, 
nothing in this agreement shall limit the freedom of PARTIES to provide that any 
intellectual property rights conferred in respect of the use, sale, importation and 
other distribution of goods are exhausted once those goods have been put on the 
market by or with the consent of the right holder.630 
 
The final version of Article 6 dealing with exhaustion, instead of leaving the 
question out of scope, clarifies that exhaustion is excluded from the dispute 
settlement mechanism in order to avoid different interpretations in the absence of 
provisions.631 Hence, there are no obligations arising from the TRIPS in regard 
to the scope and the applicability of exhaustion.632 
                                                                                             
627  In the context of recognition of the right of reproduction, see Proposals for Revising the 
Substantive Copyright Provisions (Articles 1 to 20). Document S/1. Prepared by the 
Government of Sweden with the Assistance of BIRPI. 1967, p. 43. 
628  It is arguable though whether expiration of the right was attributed to an action by the right 
holder or to the limits of the right as such. See Convention Concerning the Creation of An 
International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. Berne 1886, Art. 5. The 
time limitation on the right of translation was removed from the BC but is still present under 
the UCC, see previous chapter, section 3.1.5.2. 
629  The BC grants the right of first distribution for cinematographic works, which does not 
cover subsequent distribution. Hence, the question of exhaustion does not arise. See section 
3.1.5.1. and the Records of the Intellectual Property Conference of Stockholm 1967. Vol. 2. 
WIPO 1971, p. 853. 
630  Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods. Chairman’s Report to the GNG. MTN.GNG/NG11/W/76 1990, 
p. 8. 
631  Gervais (2008), p. 198. 
632  Frankel (2016), p. 217. 
151 
The WIPO CT, on the other hand, is less straightforward on the matter in the 
light of harmonising the right of distribution and the right of rental. Exhaustion 
was discussed extensively during the negotiations only insofar as its territoriality 
was at stake. The wording itself was developed during the negotiations on the 
PPBC and reflects the efforts of harmonising the exclusive rights. Article 6(2) of 
the WIPO CT reads as follows: 
 
(2) Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the freedom of Contracting Parties to 
determine the conditions, if any, under which the exhaustion of the right in para-
graph (1) applies after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the original 
or a copy of the work with the authorisation of the author. 
 
The wording of the provision is ambiguous and became subject to a couple of 
statements by certain delegations, which were to be reflected in the records.633 
The uncertainties about the interpretation of the obligations (if any) in regard to 
the exhaustion principle should also be viewed in conjunction with the harmoni-
sation of the right of distribution itself.634  
Article 6(2) of the WIPO CT is interpreted either as not influencing the free-
dom of parties to introduce exhaustion or any conditions thereof, or as not going 
beyond the condition(s) mentioned in the article. If one interprets the WIPO CT 
as according the minimum obligation to recognise the right of first distribution, 
the wording of Article 6(2) has no bearing on the circumstances of exhaustion if 
any is provided under national law.635 However, some understand the Article as 
providing that limitation to the right of distribution in the form of exhaustion is 
only permissible subject to the provisions in the second paragraph, it being the 
first sale or other transfer of ownership.636 
Another statement which relates to exhaustion is the one offered by the Chair-
man during the negotiations and by subsequent voting included in the final text:  
 
                                                                                             
633  Brazil, for instance, understood the Article as meaning that the Treaty in no way influences 
conditions national laws might impose on exhaustion of the right of distribution, with the 
scope of the latter being the one harmonised under the Treaty. See the Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference on Certain copyright and neighboring rights questions.1996 Volume 
II. WIPO Publication No. 348(E) 1999, p. 782. 
634  See section 3.1.5.3.  
635  However, consider the condition that distribution must take place with authorisation of the 
right holder. This would, however, be a relevant consideration only in case copies are not 
produced with authorisation of the right holder, e.g. under a compulsory license. Otherwise, 
the exclusive nature of the right of distribution already ensures that any first distribution occurs 
with the copyright holder’s authorisation. The situation arose, for instance, in CJEU, EMI 
Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and others. (1989) Case C-341/87, Judgment of 
24 January 1989. The case was decided on grounds other than authorisation. 
636  Reinbothe and Lewinski (2015), p. 112. I tend to disagree with the latter view given the 
negotiations on the PPBC and the WIPO CT, the scope of the right of distribution, and 
intention of the parties. See also section 3.1.5.3. 
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As used in these Articles, the expression 'copies and originals' being subject to the 
right of distribution and the right of rental, refer exclusively to fixed copies that 
can be put into circulation as tangible objects.637 
 
The meaning of the statement can be misunderstood without taking a closer look 
at the history of the negotiations on the WIPO CT and the adopted umbrella 
solution for covering the acts of online dissemination. As was touched upon in 
Chapter 3, the statement served to differentiate between the obligations related to 
the right of distribution and the obligations under the umbrella solution, 
according to which the right to control digital transmissions could also be imple-
mented by means of the right of distribution.638 Hence, Article 6 refers solely to 
distribution on a tangible medium, providing for a right of first distribution either 
through the explicit right of first distribution or through a broad right which could 
also be subject to exhaustion once exercised by the right holder. Digital trans-
missions, which could fall under the right of distribution, are not subject to any 
other requirements than that they should be covered by an exclusive right. Hence, 
they are not subject to Article 6(2). 
The statement merely indicates a minimum obligation, which means that right 
of distribution is to be granted at least in respect of the tangible copies.639 
Accordingly, it shall not be interpreted as precluding application of the right of 
distribution beyond the marketing of tangible copies. Nevertheless, the statement 
is often used as an argument for not extending the scope of the right of distri-
bution to the acts of online dissemination640 or confining the scope of the right of 
distribution under the EU secondary law to solely tangible copies.641  
Article 6(2) of the WIPO CT has attracted the attention of the CJEU on only 
a few occasions. For instance, the Court considered it in the Laserdisken II case, 
                                                                                             
637  Records of the Diplomatic Conference on Certain copyright and neighboring rights. Draft 
Agreed Statements concerning Treaty NO. 1 submitted by Main Committee I to the 
Conference, meeting in Plenary. CRNR/DC/92 Corr. 1996, p. 2. Also Records of the 
Diplomatic Conference on Certain copyright and neighboring rights questions.1996 Volume 
II. WIPO Publication No. 348(E) 1999, p. 777. 
638  More on the point, see section 3.1.4. Also, section 5.1.6. 
639  Ficsor (2002), p. 486; Karapapa (2014), p. 311; Ficsor (1997), p. 213. 
640  For instance, see Savič (2015). Karapapa (2014), Reinbothe and Lewinski (2015), p. 113. 
However, see Rognstad on Article 6(2) of the WIPO CT as not precluding the application of 
exhaustion to copies created through online service, Rognstad (2014), p. 10. 
641  The EC relied on the international obligations under the WIPO CT and the Agreed 
Statement concerning Article 6 of the WIPO CT when claiming that the right of distribution 
applies solely to tangible copies in the Art & Allposters case. The CJEU agreed with the EC, 
stating that exhaustion applies to tangible object incorporating a work that has been placed on 
the market with the right holder’s consent. See CJEU, Art & Allposters International BV v 
Stichting Pictoright. (2015) Case C-419/13, Judgment of 22 January 2015, para. 40. Similarly, 
in the VOB case, the Court ruled that the right of rental can only be interpreted as referring to 
tangible copies, referring to the same Agreed Statement under the WIPO CT, see CJEU, 
Vereniging Openbare Bibliotheken v Stichting Leenrecht. (2016) Case C-174/15, Judgment 
of 10 November 2016, paras 32–35. 
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where the defendant in the proceedings challenged the validity of exhaustion pro-
vision under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. The CJEU has rightly held that 
there are no obligations on Community as a contracting party stemming from the 
WIPO CT to provide for a specific rule on exhaustion in Community law.642 In 
the Peek & Cloppenburg case, the Court held that interpreting Article 4(2) of the 
InfoSoc Directive on the exhaustion of the right of distribution should be done in 
the light of Article 6 of the WIPO CT as a whole.643 
 
 
 4.2. Harmonisation of the exhaustion principle under 
the EU acquis 
The exhaustion principle in copyright has, to certain extent, been harmonised 
under the EU acquis. First, through the case law of the CJEU, precluding exercise 
of the right of distribution to prevent importation of copies put into circulation in 
a different MS (i.e. essentially forbidding exercising national exhaustion in 
respect of such copies). At this stage, the CJEU was not concerned with copyright 
as such, but rather with ensuring that the divergent national copyright laws would 
not interfere with the objectives of the internal market, in particular with the free 
movement of goods.  
Second, on the basis of the CJEU’s jurisprudence and the international 
harmonisation of exclusive rights, the EC undertook the task of harmonising 
certain matters of copyright law. Among other issues, the exhaustion of the right 
of distribution became subject to regulation under the Directives. Hence, exhaus-
tion is of dual meaning under the EU acquis: as a rule solving the conflict between 
the national copyright law and the Treaties, and as a rule within the statutory 
copyright law under the acquis.644 
This part addressed the development of the principle under the EU acquis, 
from the CJEU establishing the principle of Community exhaustion to the CJEU 
shaping the scope of exhaustion under secondary EU law. This section explores 
how harmonisation of the principle under the Directives was guided, inter alia, 
by international developments and how it went beyond mere codification of pre-
ceding CJEU case law. 
 
 
                                                                                             
642  CJEU, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet. (2006) Case C-479/04, Judgment of 12 
September 2006, para. 40. 
643  CJEU, Peek & Cloppenburg KG v Cassina SpA. (2008) Case C-456/06, Judgment of 17 
April 2008, para. 34. 
644  Westkamp (2017), p. 43. 
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4.2.1. Exhaustion principle as an instrument to solve the conflict 
between copyright and the objectives of the Treaties 
As explored in Chapter 3, the exhaustion principle under national laws became 
an instrument of the CJEU in dealing with conflicts between exclusive rights 
under copyright and the objectives of the Treaties. By deciding whether pre-
venting import between the MS in each particular case was justified on the 
grounds of IP protection, the CJEU also shaped the permissible boundaries of 
exhaustion under national laws. This section examines the main outcomes of the 
cases preceding the adoption of the Directives for exhaustion on the MS level. 
First is the incompatibility of national exhaustion with the free movement of 
goods if exercised solely on the basis of territoriality of the principle under 
national law. Second is the relation between exhaustion and the new form of 
exploitation of copies in the form of rental. 
 
4.2.1.1. Incompatibility of national exhaustion with the EEC Treaty 
As indicated above and explored in Chapter 3, the exhaustion principle under 
national law proved to be a useful instrument for the CJEU for dealing with cases 
where exclusive rights under national copyright laws interfered with freedoms 
under the Treaties. Moreover, the territoriality of exhaustion could serve not only 
internal market freedoms but also trade policy as such. Whereas national exhaus-
tion would harm the free movement of goods within the internal market, main-
taining international exhaustion per se does not distort the free movement of 
goods.  
In the first cases on the right of distribution under national laws the CJEU had 
to decide whether exercise of an exclusive right of distribution ran contrary to the 
objectives of the EEC Treaty if it aimed to prevent marketing of copies lawfully 
distributed and imported from another MS. It just so happened that all the three 
cases came from jurisdictions which had already recognised a broad right of dis-
tribution and its exhaustion (Germany and Denmark). Hence, the CJEU could use 
the principle of exhaustion as an instrument to resolve the conflict.  
In the famous Deutsche Grammophon case, the CJEU ruled that it would be 
against the free movement of goods to exercise the right of distribution granted 
to phonogram producers under the German law if the copyright-protected goods 
were already lawfully placed with the right holder’s consent on the market in one 
of the MS.645 In other words, MS were precluded from allowing copyright holders 
to prohibit import of goods on the sole ground that their distribution first occurred 
in another MS. This meant, for instance, that national exhaustion could not be 
invoked in relation to such copies.  
In the similar circumstances of the Musik-Vertrieb case, the Court decided that 
it was also against the free movement of goods to invoke the right of distribution 
                                                                                             
645  CJEU, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. 
KG. (1971) Case C-78/70, Judgment of 8 June 1971, paras 12–13.  
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to claim royalties for the import of copies which were already lawfully put into 
circulation with the right holder’s consent in another MS.646 In the third case, 
Dansk Supermarked, the CJEU established that it was equally against the free 
movement of goods to invoke the right of distribution to prohibit marketing of 
goods which were already lawfully put into circulation with right holder’s con-
sent in another MS.647 
Hence, what the CJEU established in these cases is that it was against the 
objectives of the EEC Treaty to prevent importation of goods already lawfully 
put on the EEC market by invoking the right of distribution. There could be dif-
ferent grounds for preventing importation of such goods, potentially in line with 
the Treaty, but exercising the right of distribution and national exhaustion in such 
circumstances was not permissible. This is essentially the Community exhaustion 
principle derived from the CJEU’s jurisprudence before harmonisation under the 
Directives. As will be seen in this chapter, in the course of EU copyright harmo-
nisation, the Community exhaustion principle has been interpreted outside of its 
initial boundaries, extending, inter alia, to prohibiting international exhaustion. 
 
 
4.2.1.2. Significance of consent for the application of the 
Community exhaustion principle 
Although the significance of consent was not examined in the preceding case law, 
the application of the Community exhaustion principle in later cases was limited 
to instances where the first putting into circulation of the copies took place not 
only lawfully but also with the authorisation of the right holder.  
In EMI Electrola v Patricia the CJEU held that the EEC Treaty did not 
preclude right holders from relying on the rights of reproduction and distribution 
to prevent importation of copies that were already lawfully put on the market in 
another MS, where the copyright protection had already expired.648 Accordingly, 
the copies in question were initially put into circulation lawfully, but without the 
consent of the right holder. In his Opinion, the AG relied heavily on the previous 
case law in other fields of IP, namely patent law, where consent was an essential 
condition for exhaustion to occur.649 
The CJEU partially followed the reasoning of the AG, although without 
referring to the case law from the patent law cases. The Court contrasted the cir-
cumstances of the proceedings with those considered before in the Deutsche 
                                                                                             
646  CJEU, Musik-Vertrieb membran GmbH and K-tel International v GEMA. (1981) Joined 
cases 55/80 and 57/80, Judgment of 20 January 1981. 
647  CJEU, Dansk Supermarked A/S v A/S Imerco. (1981) Case C-58/80, Judgment of 22 
January 1981. 
648  CJEU, EMI Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and others. (1989) Case C-341/87, 
Judgment of 24 January 1989. 
649  Opinion of Advocate General in EMI Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and 
others. (1988) Case C-341/87. 29 November 1988., paras 16–20. 
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Grammophon and Musik-Vertrieb cases, where importation of the copies law-
fully placed on the market by the owner or with their consent could not be pre-
vented. The CJEU reasoned that it was different from the situation where the 
copies were distributed lawfully but in the absence of consent. Moreover, the 
Court held that the problem did arise from the difference in the term of protec-
tion.650 The length of protection was linked to the very existence of the right and, 
hence, the restrictions on the import could be justified. 
In the absence of harmonisation of the term of protection, the outcome seems 
reasonable in that the EEC Treaty did not interfere with industrial property pro-
tection, namely with its length. On the other hand, the judgment could be criti-
cised as not spending much time on clarifying the significance of the right 
holder’s consent for the application of the exhaustion principle. Now that the term 
of protection is harmonised under the acquis, similar situations are unlikely to 
arise. Moreover, the subsequent Directives harmonised the conditions for exhaus-
tion, and it is equally unlikely that there would be large disparities in national 
laws as to whether or not the right holder’s consent is necessary for exhaustion 
to apply. Nonetheless, the outcome of the cases emphasises the importance of 
authorisation for determining the consequences of the first distribution, i.e. 
whether the copyright holder has had a chance to exploit a work through the 
exercise of an exclusive right.651 
 
 
4.2.1.3. Denying the Community exhaustion principle for 
exploitation through rental 
Besides precluding exercising national exhaustion of the right of distribution in 
relation to the resale of the copies lawfully placed on the market in another MS, 
the CJEU also had a chance to rule on admissibility of preventing further rental 
of such copies. For instance, whilst it was clear that resale within the Community 
could not be prohibited, would the same apply to further rental of such already 
distributed copies? It should be recalled that before the harmonisation of the 
rental right under secondary EU law, national laws differed. Whereas some coun-
tries recognised the rental right, it was often a part of a broader distribution right 
and potentially also subject to exhaustion. 
In the Warner Brothers case the Court had to rule whether the right of rental 
recognised in some MS could be invoked against the rental of copies already dis-
tributed in different MS. Import of such copies could not be prevented on the 
basis of the right of distribution pursuant to the Community exhaustion principle, 
but rental was a grey area. The question was answered in the affirmative. It 
allowed the copyright holders to invoke the right of rental (if recognised in a 
                                                                                             
650  CJEU, EMI Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and others. (1989) Case C-341/87, 
Judgment of 24 January 1989, para. 10.  
651  See also section 3.2.2.3.  
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particular jurisdiction) to prevent rental of copies which were already put into 
circulation within the Community.652 
The right of rental thus was exempted from the Community exhaustion prin-
ciple as formulated for the distribution right. Right holders could rely on their 
right of rental if such was recognised under national law to enforce control over 
copies already distributed abroad. The judgment merely provided that further dis-
tribution through rental could be prevented by the virtue of the rental right under 
national law but did not oblige the MS to recognise such a right. On the other 
hand, the judgment has also emphasised the importance of exercising the exclu-
sive right, as the rental right would be rendered worthless if the right holder could 
not authorise exploitation.653 
Hence, the Warner Brothers judgment clarified that the Community exhaus-
tion principle in respect of the distribution right did not prejudice the exercise of 
the rental right over distributed copies if such right was recognised under national 
law. A few years later, the exclusive right of rental was recognised under 
secondary EU law under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive, effectively 
differentiating rental from distribution and mitigating the discrepancies between 
national laws. However, yet another question arose: how does the (now separate) 
rental right interact with the Treaty provisions? For instance, could the right 
holder exercise the rental right to prohibit rental of copies in a MS, where the 
copies have been imported from another MS where their rental was authorised?654 
 This is exactly the issue the Court was facing in the Laserdisken case, referred 
to after the adoption of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive.655 The CJEU 
was asked to rule on whether it would be contrary to the Treaty to rely on the 
right of rental to prohibit copies from being rented in a MS if their rental was 
authorised in another MS.656 Hence, the question was identical to the one asked 
in Deutsche Grammophon, albeit in the present case in relation to the rental right. 
Unlike in the Deutsche Grammophon case, in Laserdisken the question was 
answered in the negative. Hence, it was not contrary to Articles 30 and 36 of the 
EEC Treaty to prohibit rental of copies even if their rental was previously 
authorised in another MS.  
The CJEU based its reasoning on differentiating rental from distribution, 
largely relying on the Warner Brothers case, where the Court distinguished 
between distribution and rental and held that the exhaustion of the distribution 
                                                                                             
652  CJEU, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome Video ApS v Erik Viuff Christiansen. (1988) 
Case C-158/86, Judgment of 17 May 1988. 
653  Ibid., para. 18. 
654  See Rosenbloum on the gradual harmonisation of rental aspects. Rosenbloum (1995), pp. 
584–585. 
655  CJEU, Foreningen af danske Videogramdistributører, acting for Egmont Film A/S, Buena 
Vista Home Entertainment A/S, Scanbox Danmark A/S, Metronome Video A/S, Polygram 
Records A/S, Nordisk Film Video A/S, Irish Video A/S and Warner Home Video Inc. v 
Laserdisken. (1998) Case C-61/97, Judgment of 22 September 1998. 
656  Ibid., para. 8. 
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right in regard to a specific copy does not exempt rental of that copy from the 
right holder’s authorisation. Whereas in Laserdisken the CJEU had to reason 
solely in the context of the rental right on whether first authorisation of rental 
exhausted the right to authorise rental of the same copy in another MS, it again 
resorted to distinguishing rental from distribution. The Court has held that “the 
same reasoning must be followed as regards the effects produced by the offer for 
rental.”657  
Referring to the AG opinion, the CJEU further stipulated that: “… the exclu-
sive right to hire out various copies of the work contained in a video film can, by 
its very nature, be exploited by repeated and potentially unlimited transactions, 
each of which involves the right to remuneration. The specific right to authorise 
or prohibit rental would be rendered meaningless if it were held to be exhausted 
as soon as the object was first offered for rental.”658 
Hence, the question of extending the application of the Community exhaus-
tion principle formulated for the right of distribution to the rental right was 
resolved by virtue of distinguishing between the rights. The ultimate outcome of 
non-application of the Community exhaustion principle is that the right of rental 
can be exercised in each MS separately even though rental of the same copy may 
have been already authorised in a different MS. Whereas the previous case law 
has established rental as an independent form of exploitation not influenced by 
the exhaustion of the right of distribution, in the Laserdisken case the Court con-
firmed the right holder’s ability to partition the rental market within the Com-
munity. 
In this respect, the reference to the Warner Brothers case in the context of 
Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive on non-exhaustion of the right of commu-
nication to the public is remarkable. The EC referred to the judgment alongside 
the Coditel I judgment suggesting that Article 3(3) is only a clarification of the 
established fact that the provision of services does not give rise to exhaustion.659 
This is fascinating because the Warner Brothers case does not deal with the ques-
tion of exhaustion of the rental right but rather the consequences of exhaustion of 
the distribution right and separation of rental from other types of distribution. At 
the time of the publication of the proposal for the InfoSoc Directive in 1997, the 
Court had not yet ruled in the Laserdisken case. However, the Laserdisken case 
also concerned the right holder’s ability to partition the rental market within the 
Community rather than dealing with the question of whether the exercise of the 
right can be restricted outside cross-border situations. 
 
 
                                                                                             
657  Ibid., para. 18. 
658  Ibid., para. 18. 
659  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
Information Society. COM (97) 628 final. 10 December 1997, p. 27. See also section 5.2.2.3. 
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4.2.2. Harmonisation of the exhaustion principle under 
secondary EU law 
Following the first stage of harmonisation through the Community exhaustion 
rule developed under CJEU jurisprudence, the second stage of copyright harmo-
nisation further unified the conditions of exhaustion with a view of harmonising 
the right of distribution under the EU acquis. The provisions on exhaustion under 
the acquis serve two primary objectives: first and foremost, as follows from the 
preceding case law of the CJEU and the objectives of the Treaty, to eliminate 
adverse effect of the national copyright law on the internal market; second, along 
with the introduction of the general right of distribution, to provide limits for such 
a broad right. Another important function of harmonising the exhaustion, recog-
nition of the rental right, had already been achieved at the time through the adop-
tion of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive. 
Exhaustion is harmonised under the four Directives: the Software Directive of 
1991 (as codified in 2009), the Database Directive of 1996, the Rental and 
Lending Rights Directive of 1992 (as codified in 2006), and the InfoSoc Directive 
of 2001. Three of these Directives are examined in this section, but the Database 
Directive is not examined in detail for several reasons. First, it concerns the 
databases solely, and the wording of exhaustion is nearly identical to that under 
the Software Directive.660 Second, unlike the latter Directive and the InfoSoc 
Directives, exhaustion provisions have not been subject to any preliminary 
rulings from the CJEU. Exhaustion under the Rental and Lending Rights 
Directive was also not subject to interpretation. However, its legislative history 
is important for understanding the negotiations on the text of the InfoSoc 
Directive. 
 
 
4.2.2.1. Exhaustion principle under the Software Directive 
The exhaustion principle was first substantially harmonised under the EU copy-
right acquis under the Software Directive adopted in 1991. Article 4 of the initial 
draft from 1988 provided that:  
 
Subject to the provisions of Article 5, the exclusive rights referred to in Article 1 
shall include the right to do or to authorise: 
(c) the distribution of a computer program by means of sale, licensing, lease, rental 
and the importation for these purposes. The right to control the distribution of a 
                                                                                             
660  See second part of Article 5(c), which is only slightly different from Article 4(2) of the 
Software Directive. Namely, it establishes that the first sale of a copy exhausts the right to 
control resale rather than the right of distribution, as is the case under the Software Directive.  
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program shall be exhausted in respect of its sale and its importation following the 
first marketing of the program by the right holder or with his consent.661 
 
The preparatory work did not provide much explanation for the offered wording, 
especially considering the absence of the intent to harmonise the right of distri-
bution at all in the preceding Green Paper.662 The wording has only been backed 
by the statement that it is common to have the right of distribution exhausted 
upon the first sale with the right holder’s consent and that an exclusive right to 
control rental and lending of the copies shall survive the first distribution.663  
In its opinion, the European Economic and Social Committee supported the 
draft for not dealing with territoriality of exhaustion but proposed a slightly modi-
fied version, which would clarify the subject matter (copies): 
 
4 (c) the distribution of copies of a computer program by means of licensing, sale, 
lease, rental and the importation for these purposes. The right to control the distri-
bution of a copy of a program shall be exhausted in respect of the sale or impor-
tation of that copy following the first sale of that copy to any person by the 
rightholder or with his consent.664 
 
The final wording of the Directive, which remained unchanged in the subsequent 
codification, is a very similar one, despite restricting exhaustion territorially to 
the Community: 
 
4 (c) any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of the original 
computer program or of copies thereof. The first sale in the Community of a copy 
of a program by the rightholder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution 
right within the Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control 
further rental of the program or a copy thereof.665 
 
The exact wording of the exhaustion principle after the adoption of the Directive 
was mainly discussed in the light of its territoriality. The EC’s view was that the 
Directive precludes international exhaustion as it only mentions exhaustion for 
the copies put into circulation within the Community.666 The position is difficult 
                                                                                             
661  Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs. COM (88) 
816 final. 17 March 1989. 
662  See section 3.2.3.1. 
663  Proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer programs. COM (88) 
816 final. 17 March 1989, p. 11. 
664  Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer 
programs. Economic and Social Committee 89/C 329/02. 
665  For the latest wording, see Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs (Codified version). 
5.5.2009. OJ L 111/116. 
666  Report from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament and the Economic 
and Social Committee on the implementation and effects of Directive 91/250/EEC on the legal 
protection of computer programs. COM (2000) 199 final. 10 April 2000. p. 11.  
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to question in the absence of further explanations. While it is understandable that 
the legislator would aim to prevent national exhaustion, as it would conflict with 
the existing CJEU case law (even if the cases were not mentioned in the pre-
paratory works), it does not necessarily mean that international exhaustion had to 
be ruled out too.667 
Some countries were reluctant to adopt Community-wide exhaustion instead 
of international exhaustion following the adoption of the Directive.668 Even 
though Sweden and Norway harmonised certain aspects falling under the Soft-
ware Directive before it was adopted, territoriality was not settled even after the 
Directive was adopted.669 Both governments considered the Directive to be 
unclear on the matter of territoriality of exhaustion.670 Moreover, the Directive 
was also viewed as not requiring full harmonisation.671  
The wording of the exhaustion principle relying on the concept of sale is in 
line with the international developments at the time. Namely, the Directive was 
initiated when harmonising the exhaustion principle was considered for safe-
guarding the right of rental under international treaties. It can be argued that it is 
also the case under the Software Directive. As Gotzen wittily described it, an 
exception to an exception to an exclusive right was, de facto, a proposal for 
introducing a right of rental for computer programmes.672 
If that would be the only justification for spelling out the exhaustion principle 
under the Software Directive, it would appear to lose its meaning in the light of 
the Rental and Lending Rights Directive adopted shortly after. Nevertheless, it is 
surprising that, when the Directive was codified in 2009, the legislator still relied 
on the concept of sale, disregarding the developments.673 Hence, although the 
                                                                                             
667  On the opposite view, namely that international exhaustion would interfere with the 
internal market, see von Lewinski (2005), p. 233. 
668  Namely, Sweden and Norway, both the EFTA states at the time. Sweden became an EU 
MS shorty after in 1995, while Norway is an EEA MS. 
669  Countries followed the recommendation published by the WIPO in 1982, the EC’s Green 
Paper and the on-going discussions on protecting software under the copyright. See Prop. 
1988/89:85 Om upphovsrätt och datorer, pp. 6–8. Same changes were implemented in Norway 
in 1989, following the Ot. prp. nr. 33 (1989–90) Om lov om endringer I åndsverkloven 
(opphavsrett og edb). 
670  For Sweden, see Prop. 1992/93:48 Om ändringar i de immaterialrättsliga lagarna med 
anledning av EES-avtalet, p. 124. For Norway, see Ot. prp. nr. 84 (1991–1992) Om lov om 
endringer I lov 12 mai 1961 nr 2 om opphavsrett til åndsverk m.v. og i enkelte andre lover 
som følge av EØS-avtalen, pp. 19–20.  
671  Prop. 1992/93:48 Om ändringar i de immaterialrättsliga lagarna med anledning av EES-
avtalet, pp. 110, 122–123. 
672  Gotzen (1990), p. 299. 
673  Hilty (2018), p. 867. 
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wording of the right and possibly exhaustion is flexible enough to encompass 
distribution of digital copies, uncertainty exists whether it is the case.674 
The provision is interpreted in a way that exhaustion of the broad right of 
distribution takes place only through one type of distribution, i.e. through sale. 
Hence, following the first sale, the right of distribution is exhausted with an 
exception of rental.675 The traditional understanding is that the exhaustion of the 
right applies only to tangible copies of a computer programme, i.e. fixed on a 
tangible medium.676 However, when a function of delivery by transmission 
achieves making available a copy without infinitely repeating its performance, 
such use might come within the scope of the right.677 
 
 
4.2.2.2. Exhaustion of the neighbouring right of distribution under 
the Rental and Lending Rights Directive 
In the middle of the 1980s the question of whether the rental and lending rights 
recognised under some national laws shall be exhausted together with the right 
of distribution following the first sale was unresolved.678 The CJEU ruled in 
Warner Brothers that the EEC Treaty did not preclude the MS from prohibiting 
the import of copies lawfully sold in a different MS if import was for the purpose 
of subsequent rental, subject to the author’s consent in that MS. Following the 
judgment and international negotiations on the recognition of the right of rental 
as surviving exhaustion, the exclusive rights of rental and lending made it into 
the EC’s agenda on copyright harmonisation. 
While initially rental and lending rights were discussed only in regard to sound 
recordings and videograms, they soon gained support for all types of works.679 
Rental and lending rights are nevertheless not as such covered in this part. Besides 
providing the copyright holder with an exclusive right of rental and lending, the 
Rental and Lending Rights Directive also harmonised neighbouring rights. One 
                                                                                             
674  On the flexibility of wording, see Blocher and Walter (2010), p. 136. Also, the CJEU ruled 
that the distribution of digital copies through download fell under the right of distribution and 
its exhaustion under the Software Directive, see sections 3.2.4.3. and 4.2.3.4. 
675  Janssens (2014), p. 118. 
676  Ibid., p. 119. 
677  Blocher and Walter (2010), p. 137. However, video-on-demand can make a difference. If 
it is less costly than a physical copy, then copyright holder might want to claim remuneration 
per each and every view. See Ibid., p. 138. 
678  Dietz in his commentary stated that the CJEU would probably hold that the non-exhaustion 
of the right of rental is contrary to the EEC law, would such case be referred. However, the 
CJEU ruled otherwise. See Dietz (1986), pp. 49–50.  
679  For the initial idea, see the Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of technology – 
Copyright issues requiring immediate action, COM(88) 172 final. 7 June 1988, pp. 155–166.; 
on the introduction of the general right of rental, see the follow-up to the Green Paper on 
copyright and related rights in the Information Society. COM (96) 586 final. 20 November 
1996, p. 15. 
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of the neighbouring rights under the Directive is the right of distribution, which 
is, similar to the author’s right of distribution, subject to exhaustion. 
The development of the wording of the provision is especially of interest, as 
it was later copied into the draft of the InfoSoc Directive. According to the 
Proposal presented in 1990, a neighbouring right of distribution would be 
exhausted upon the following conditions, which is, essentially, a summary of the 
case law preceding harmonisation:680 
 
7(2). If a subject matter referred to in paragraph 1 has been put into circulation 
within the Community by the right owner or with his consent, then its import into 
another Member State may not be prohibited by virtue of the right referred to in 
paragraph 1.681 
 
Accordingly, exhaustion in such wording would rule out the possibility to distort 
the import of the copies put into circulation in another MS but only by virtue of 
the right of distribution. Hence, the wording focuses not on the exhaustion prin-
ciple as such, but on the consequences of first distribution of copies within the 
Community. It is indeed in line with the previous CJEU jurisprudence, which did 
not prescribe the exact conditions for exhaustion, but merely precluded some 
which interfered with the internal market by distorting free movement of goods 
between the MS. Thus, the exhaustion principle could have had different wording 
under the national laws of the MS, as long as it did not prevent imports from the 
other MS on the basis of copyright and right of distribution.  
The final text of the provision, surprisingly, had very little in common with 
the original and resembled the wording of the later-adopted InfoSoc Directive.682 
It is worded in the negative and instead of referring solely to the permissibility of 
import of already distributed copies, focuses on stating that the right is not subject 
to exhaustion unless certain conditions are met. The conditions, in turn, were 
changed too, from putting copies into circulation to the first sale within the Com-
munity:  
 
9(2). The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect 
of an object as referred to in paragraph 1, except where the first sale in the Com-
munity of that object is made by the rightholder or with his consent.683 
                                                                                             
680  See the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee: “7(2) is no more than a 
codification of judgements of the European Court (see, for example, case 158/86) and could 
be deleted”. Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on rental right, lending right, and 
on certain rights related to copyright. 91/C 269/17. OJ C 269(34), 1991. 
681  Proposal for a Council Directive on rental right, lending right, and on certain rights related 
to copyright. COM (90) 586 final. 28 February 1991, p. 37.  
682  For the indication that the wording was changed as a result of a proposal by one MS to 
bring it closer to the Software Directive, see von Lewinski (2010), p. 331. 
683  Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and 
on certain rights related to copyright in the field of intellectual property. 27 November 1992. 
OJ L 346/61 
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Although the exhaustion principle as provided for the neighbouring right of dis-
tribution has never been subject to the CJEU ruling or, as it seems, to extensive 
research, the history of its adoption sheds little light on the reasons driving sub-
sequent development, namely the drafting history of the InfoSoc Directive. The 
latter adopted the wording of exhaustion as provided under the Rental and 
Lending Rights Directive without any discussion whatsoever.  
The wording was considered to follow from CJEU case law, which was true 
only in respect of the first version of the provision. First, the subsequent version 
of the provision turned a limitation to the exercise of the exclusive right of distri-
bution in the name of the free movement of goods into the only limitation per-
missible to the neighbouring right of distribution. Second, the application of 
exhaustion was limited from putting copies into circulation to sale of an object. 
Considering the significance of the adopted wording for the later developments, 
the absence of an explanation for modifying the wording is highly unfortunate. 
For instance, the adoption of the Directive resulted in major changes to the 
copyright legislation of Scandinavian countries. First and foremost, both Sweden 
and Norway modified the conditions upon which exhaustion occurred. Whereas 
previously the right of distribution would be exhausted upon a work being pub-
lished, now it took place once a work was sold.684 Hence, the scope of the acts 
which trigger exhaustion was decreased from any putting into circulation to acts 
amounting solely to a transfer of a copy or sale. Second, the Directive seemed to 
some extent clarify the EC’s approach to the territoriality of the exhaustion. The 
SCA was changed to provide for EEA-wide exhaustion of the right of distri-
bution, albeit reversed later.685 The Norwegian government, on the other hand, 
did not consider the matter resolved and the Norwegian Act was amended to pro-
vide for EEA-wide exhaustion as late as 2005, following the adoption of the 
InfoSoc Directive.686 
 
 
4.2.2.3. Exhaustion principle under the InfoSoc Directive 
The adoption of the InfoSoc Directive continued the full-scale harmonisation 
initiated under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive. It was full-scale in a 
sense that it would harmonise a number of exclusive rights, namely the very core 
of exploitation rights, and stretch over all subject matters. Exhaustion became 
                                                                                             
684  The SCA would now provide that copies which were transferred could be freely 
disseminated further, and the NCA would provide that copies which were sold could be 
disseminated further. The difference in the wording was mitigated by an additional statement 
in the NCA which provided that the same applied to copies made public and otherwise 
transferred with authorisation of the right holder. For the changes into the SCAe see Prop. 
1994/95:58 Uthyrning och utlåning av upphovsrättsligt skyddade verk. For the NCA, see Ot. 
prp. nr. 15 (1994–1995) Om lov om endringer i åndsverkloven m m. 
685  Prop. 1994/95:58 Uthyrning och utlåning av upphovsrättsligt skyddade verk, pp. 36–37. 
686  Ot. prp. nr. 15 (1994–1995) Om lov om endringer i åndsverkloven m m, p. 81. 
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one of the subjects included in the draft, and, whereas it was said that Article 4(2) 
only codified the preceding case law, harmonisation has clearly gone beyond. 
The Green Paper of 1988, which preceded negotiations on the InfoSoc 
Directive, stipulates that initially the exhaustion principle related solely to the MS 
within which the right of distribution arose, but later it was adapted to the needs 
of regional and international markets.687 As it has further been confirmed, the 
CJEU through its case law already ensured that the common market would not 
be distorted by national copyright law. Outstanding issues were minor and better 
dealt with at the national level, unlike the right of rental and lending.688 
In the next Green Paper of 1995, the exhaustion principle was already named 
a central one in Community law, providing the CJEU with the means of recon-
ciling free movement of goods with the territoriality of IP rights.689 The wording 
of the then-in-force Software Directive and the Rental and Lending Right 
Directive was seen as reflecting the previous case law of the CJEU and preventing 
MS from distorting the internal market by maintaining international exhaus-
tion.690 To fill the gaps in copyright harmonisation, the wording of the exhaustion 
principle for the neighbouring right of distribution under the Rental and Lending 
Right Directive was set as a point of departure in the Follow-up Green paper.691  
The very aim of harmonising the exhaustion principle under InfoSoc was to 
prevent the distortion of the internal market.692 The initial draft of Article 4(2) 
reads as follows: 
 
The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of 
the original of their works or of copies thereof, except where the first sale or other 
transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder 
or with his consent.693 
 
As can be seen, the initial wording is identical to that under the Rental and 
Lending Rights Directive for the exhaustion of the neighbouring right of distri-
bution. The Economic and Social Committee supported the position of the EC. 
                                                                                             
687  Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of technology – Copyright issues requiring 
immediate action, COM(88) 172 final. 7 June 1988, p. 148. 
688  Ibid., pp. 152–153. 
689  Green Paper on Copyright in Information Society. COM(95) 382 final. 19 July 1995, p. 
44.  
690  Ibid., p. 47. 
691  The follow-up to the Green Paper on copyright and related rights in the Information 
Society. COM (96) 586 final. 20 November 1996, p. 18. 
692  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
Information Society. COM (97) 628 final. 10 December 1997, p. 27.  
693  Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonisation of certain 
aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society. COM (97) 628 final. 12 
December 1997, p. 45. 
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The exhaustion principle had to be confined to the Community in line with the 
preceding case law.694  
The adopted text of Article 4(2) is almost the same as the initial one except 
for small changes:  
 
The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of 
the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of 
ownership in the Community of that object is made by the rightholder or with his 
consent.695  
 
Whereas the preceding Directives provide for exhaustion solely upon sale, the 
InfoSoc Directive words it in a way resembling the wording of the WIPO CT, i.e. 
concerning sale or other transfer of ownership. 
Generally, the provision of Article 4(2) is considered to provide for full har-
monisation of the exhaustion principle.696 Even though, as positioned during the 
negotiations, the wording is based on the text of the WIPO CT and also relies on 
the codification of the CJEU jurisprudence, some contest these premises. I sub-
scribe to the view that harmonisation under the InfoSoc Directive went further 
than necessary for accession to the WIPO Treaties or codification of previous 
case law.697 In the light of the background preceding harmonisation, it is rather 
surprising that there was nearly no discussion on the appropriate wording of the 
provision. Of course, codifying the outcomes of the previous judgments under 
the Directive could be a logical step in harmonising certain matters of copyright. 
However, it went clearly beyond the case law without sound preparatory work on 
the matter. Copying wording from a previous Directive serving different objec-
tives does not seem appropriate.  
The provision went far beyond then-existing case law in terms of territoriality 
of exhaustion by prohibiting international exhaustion.698 The validity of the pro-
vision has even been challenged due to the prescribed territoriality.699 The con-
cern expressed by the EC was that MS maintaining national exhaustion could 
prevent importation of copies from the MS which maintained international 
exhaustion, in the absence of authorised placement on the EEC market. To my 
mind, this concern must be put into the context of harmonising consent as a pre-
requisite for Community exhaustion. Although this section will not extend into 
                                                                                             
694  Opinion on the proposal for a Council Directive on the legal protection of computer 
programs. Economic and Social Committee 89/C 329/02.  
695  Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on 
the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society. 
22.6.2001. OJ L 167/10  
696  von Lewinski (2005), pp. 234–235. On the CJEU interpreting the Directive proceeding 
from the assumption of it as a full harmonisation directive, see Sganga (2018a), p. 126. 
697  See also Cohen Jehoram (2001), p. 539; Karapapa (2014), p. 324. 
698  Cook (2010), p. 360. For a different view, see von Lewinski (2005), p. 233. 
699  In the case CJEU, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet. (2006) Case C-479/04, Judgment 
of 12 September 2006. See more in the following section. 
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the subject of consent, it will briefly illustrate how to avoid the problem in a dif-
ferent way than prohibiting international exhaustion altogether. 
If, for instance, the consent requirement for exhaustion was not harmonised 
on the EU level, MS would not be able to rely on national exhaustion to prevent 
importation of copies that were lawfully (not necessarily with the consent of the 
copyright holder) imported from another MS. This way distortion could be 
avoided, i.e. the copies which lawfully entered the EEA territory (for example, 
due to international exhaustion of the distribution right in one of the MS) could 
not become subject to import prohibition in any other MS. However, consent as 
a prerequisite of exhaustion under, inter alia, the InfoSoc Directive, eliminates 
this scenario.700 
The question whether the exhaustion of the distribution right under the 
Directive encompasses the copies not fixed on a tangible medium is closely con-
nected to the question whether the right itself covers dissemination by trans-
mission.701 The Directive seem to imply, rather ambiguously, that only tangible 
copies are subject to exhaustion. Recital 29 provides the following:  
 
The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line ser-
vices in particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work or 
other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of the 
rightholder. Therefore, the same applies to rental and lending of the original and 
copies of works or other subject-matter which are services by nature. Unlike CD-
ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material 
medium, namely an item of goods, every on-line service is in fact an act which 
should be subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides. 
 
The recital seems to have been motivated by preceding case law, although it is 
by far an overreaching conclusion.702 It has been rightly criticised, inter alia, on 
the grounds of making it seem like under the EU copyright acquis the service v 
goods dichotomy corresponds to tangible v intangible object dichotomy.703 Going 
beyond the tangible or intangible nature of a copy, it is also unclear why online 
delivery is associated exclusively with online services.704 Still, in UsedSoft, alt-
                                                                                             
700  In this regard see also CJEU, EMI Electrola GmbH v Patricia Im- und Export and others. 
(1989) Case C-341/87, Judgment of 24 January 1989. The CJEU ruled that MS could prevent 
importation of copies lawfully put on the market in a different MS but in the absence of the 
right holder’s authorisation. 
701  For the discussion, see 0. 
702  On the case law that seem to have prompted the inclusion of the recital, see Geiger and 
Schönherr (2014b), p. 417. On the case law not supporting the rigid demarcation, see Tjong 
Tjin Tai (2003), p. 208. See also section 5.2.2.3. 
703  For instance, it excludes material copies made by a user of a service. See Spedicato (2015), 
pp. 46–47.  
704  Tjong Tjin Tai (2003), p. 208. 
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hough in the context of the Software Directive, the CJEU seems to have advanced 
an argument that exhaustion can apply to copies produced from a service.705 
 
 
4.2.3. CJEU developing the exhaustion principle 
The scope of the exhaustion principle under the Software and the InfoSoc Direc-
tives was referred to the CJEU for interpretation on a few occasions. Although 
the amount of case law on the matter is considerably smaller than the cases 
dealing with exclusive rights, most of the cases on the right of distribution con-
cern its boundaries as articulated by the exhaustion principle. While in the years 
following the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive the cases concerned mainly the 
conditions of exhaustion, in recent years the focus shifted to the applicability of 
exhaustion to online dissemination.  
The following key elements of the CJEU jurisprudence characterise exhaus-
tion as the limit to exclusive right following first putting copies into circulation. 
First, the jurisprudence limits exhaustion to an EEA-wide scope, which provides 
right holders with even more control over the market. Second, sale or other trans-
fer of ownership as a trigger of exhaustion under the jurisprudence generally nar-
rows down the cases falling under exhaustion provision. Third, the jurisprudence 
extends the reach of the principle to digital copies and delivery by download, 
ensuring that the boundaries of control are kept even in the absence of tangible 
mediums. Last, the jurisprudence at times defined the consequences of exhaus-
tion, which not necessarily can be resolved by the exhaustion principle. 
 
 
4.2.3.1. Territoriality of exhaustion and further control over 
distribution 
Despite every attempt from the EC to ensure that the InfoSoc Directive would be 
interpreted as precluding the MS from maintaining not only national but also 
international exhaustion, the MS had their doubts. Accordingly, InfoSoc, simi-
larly to the older Directives, was referred to the CJEU on the question of terri-
toriality of exhaustion. In the Lasersiken II case the party challenged non-applica-
bility of exhaustion to copies initially distributed outside the EEA area and the 
validity of the provisions of the Directive as a whole.706 The CJEU held that the 
Directive was valid and the provisions were to be interpreted as precluding 
national law to provide for exhaustion of the right of distribution for copies 
marketed outside the EEA.  
                                                                                             
705  Rognstad (2014), p. 14. 
706  CJEU, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet. (2006) Case C-479/04, Judgment of 12 
September 2006. Interestingly, the case was referred to the CJEU by the Danish court. 
Scandinavian countries maintained international exhaustion before harmonisation under the 
EU acquis.  
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Despite a judgment of the average length, the Court deals with the inter-
pretation of Article 4(2) with impressive efficiency. In eleven paragraphs, it 
explains the questions and the arguments put forward by the parties and answers 
them. The Court derives two conditions from the wording which must be fulfilled 
for the right to be exhausted: a copy must be put into circulation with the right 
holder’s consent, and first distribution must take place within the Community.707 
Moreover, the Court establishes that the Article read in conjunction with recital 
28 and the preamble provide for full harmonisation and does not leave the MS 
open to provide international exhaustion.708  
Proceeding to the objectives of the Directive, the CJEU holds that prohibition 
of international exhaustion is the only entirely consistent interpretation of the 
provision in the light of the internal market. International exhaustion, if main-
tained by the particular MS, would “inevitably give rise to barriers to the free 
movement of goods and the freedom to provide services”.709 Given that the pre-
vious case law only found national exhaustion to be interfering with the internal 
market, this point could clearly have been elaborated further. Even though in the 
Polydor case the CJEU allowed the exercise of the right of distribution in relation 
to copies coming from outside the EEA, it decided the case on the grounds that it 
was justified in particular circumstances and not that it would otherwise distort 
the internal market. 
Hence, the CJEU extended the right holder’s control over dissemination of 
copies beyond first distribution if copies were first put into circulation outside of 
the Community. The position of the right holder in the Community market was 
strengthened, as they de facto were granted total control over first circulation of 
copies within the Community. The right holder was given an opportunity to rely 
on the right of distribution to separate Community market from the other markets. 
Territoriality of copyright protection became the primary instrument to support 
partitioning of the market. 
 
 
 4.2.3.2. Sale or transfer of ownership as a condition of exhaustion 
In line with the Community exhaustion principle developed under the CJEU 
jurisprudence, the exhaustion under the Directives was interpreted as essentially 
requiring right holder’s consent to distribution and sale of copy or other transfer 
of ownership. As will be seen, the sale or other transfer of ownership has been 
interpreted both narrowly and broadly, depending on the case. 
In the Laserdisken II case concerning mainly the territoriality of exhaustion, 
the CJEU derived two conditions that must be fulfilled for the right to be 
                                                                                             
707  Ibid., para. 21. 
708  Ibid., para. 24., also confirmed in CJEU, Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting 
Pictoright. (2015) Case C-419/13, Judgment of 22 January 2015, para. 30.  
709  CJEU, Laserdisken ApS v Kulturministeriet. (2006) Case C-479/04, Judgment of 12 
September 2006, para. 26. 
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exhausted: a copy must be put into circulation with the right holder’s consent, 
and first distribution must take place within the Community.710 The WIPO CT 
was interpreted as not requiring any particular conditions for applying exhaustion 
after first sale.711 It is, however, unclear whether the Court interpreted the WIPO 
CT as requiring first sale as a precondition to exhaustion.712 
In UsedSoft in the context of the Software Directive, the CJEU considered the 
meaning of sale in the case concerning copies produced on the recipient’s end 
following an authorised download of a copy. The key question for establishing 
whether such copies would be subject to exhaustion was whether the transaction 
in question could be regarded as a first sale of a copy of a program.713 As the 
Directive did not make any reference to national law for interpreting the term of 
sale, it must have been given a uniform interpretation through the Union and des-
ignated an autonomous concept of EU law.714  
The Court found that a download of a copy and the conclusion of a user license 
agreement formed an indivisible whole and since the user license agreement 
made a copy usable for an unlimited period in return for payment, it must have 
been regarded as a transfer of ownership. Thus, a download of a copy of a com-
puter programme for disposal unlimited in time in return for a fee constituted a 
transfer of ownership.715 The Court also held that it made no difference whether 
a copy was offered on a tangible medium such as a CD or via download, as it 
remained inseparable from a user license agreement from the point of view of the 
acquirer.716 
Hence, the sale or transfer of ownership was interpreted not solely on the con-
ditions of the license agreement in question but rather according to the overall 
outcome of a transaction. An important element of regarding the transaction a 
sale within the meaning of the exhaustion provision was the consideration that 
through making available of copies of software the vendor was able to obtain 
remuneration corresponding to the economic value of a copy. Hence, it supports 
the purpose of the right of distribution as enabling obtaining remuneration 
through the exercise of the right. Once the right has been exercised and the remu-
neration obtained, further control can be restricted unless the circumstances call 
for the opposite.717 
It is, however, unclear whether the same reasoning could be applied under the 
InfoSoc Directive. In UsedSoft the Court relied on the Software Directive being 
                                                                                             
710  Ibid., para. 21. 
711  Ibid., para. 42. 
712  For further discussion, see section 3.1.5.3.  
713  CJEU, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. (2012) Case C-128/11, Judgment of 
3 July 2012, para. 38. 
714  Ibid., para. 40. 
715  Ibid., paras 44–46. 
716  Ibid., p. 47. 
717  See section 3.3.2. 
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lex specialis to counter the arguments posed under the InfoSoc Directive.718 To 
my mind, the statement on lex specialis character shall not be imperative for 
interpreting similar cases under the InfoSoc Directive. Neither should it indicate 
that the same reasoning cannot be applied under the InfoSoc Directive nor should 
it designate the interpretation beforehand. Whereas there is no reason to treat 
functionally similar situations differently and striving for coherent interpretation 
is generally upheld, a consistent result can be achieved through other means.719 
 
 
4.2.3.3. Distribution through transmission and digital copies 
Although the application of the right of distribution to dissemination by trans-
mission partially answers the question of the applicability of the right to copies 
lacking tangible support, this section summarises the CJEU’s approach to coun-
tering the arguments denying application of the exhaustion principle to digital 
copies based on the absence of a tangible medium. 
Whereas it is commonly accepted that the exhaustion principle applies to 
copies of a work put into circulation and seems unambiguous at first glance, 
CJEU jurisprudence shows that there is confusion about to what the exhaustion 
principle relates. For instance, in the Art & Allposters case the CJEU, with a view 
to the WIPO CT, held that the “exhaustion of the distribution right applies to the 
tangible object into which a work or its copy is incorporated if it has been placed 
on the market with the copyright holder’s consent”.720 
This is clearly misleading as exhaustion concerns a work or a copy of a work 
and not its medium. The right of distribution is not as such controlling the dis-
posal of a tangible medium, but rather a copy that happens to be fixed on a tan-
gible medium. The Court reached a correct conclusion in the later Ranks case, 
where it stated the opposite – exhaustion concerns a copy of a programme and 
not the material medium on which it is placed.721  
When it comes to the applicability of exhaustion to digital copies without a 
tangible medium, so far guidance has been provided solely under the Software 
Directive. In the UsedSoft case the Court was asked to rule whether exhaustion 
applied when an acquirer obtained a digital copy with the right holder’s consent 
by downloading it from the Internet. Interestingly enough, the Court did not start 
with examining whether the initial dissemination of copies fell under the right of 
distribution but proceeded directly to the conditions for exhaustion to occur.722 
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The main argument of the CJEU was that exhaustion applied because the trans-
action in question was interpreted as a sale. However, the Court also countered 
two major arguments advanced by the EC and the vendor. 
One of the arguments was that exhaustion under the Directive related only to 
tangible copies and not to copies downloaded from the Internet.723 In this regard, 
the Court held that the language of Article 4(2) of the Software Directive does 
not make any distinction between copies with or without a tangible support. 
Limiting the exhaustion principle to tangible copies would provide right holders 
with excessive control over intangible copies, which would go undoubtedly 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of copyright protection.724 
Although there is, so far, no ruling on the applicability of exhaustion to digital 
copies under the InfoSoc Directive, the CJEU was asked to rule on it in the con-
text of lending of e-books in the VOB case.725 One of the aspects the Court 
addressed was whether it was permitted under the EU acquis to make application 
of an exception to lending right subject to the condition that the right of distri-
bution is exhausted in accordance with Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. The 
Court held that the lending right under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive 
also covered lending of e-books and that national law could make the application 
of an exception to the right of lending depending on the exhaustion of the right 
of distribution under the InfoSoc Directive.726  
Hence, the Court did not rule on the applicability of exhaustion to copies of e-
books but rather on the circumstances of the application of an exception to the 
lending right. However, as the lending right was held applicable to intangible 
copies (e-books), it seems logical that the same would be the case for applying 
exhaustion under Article 4(2) of InfoSoc to intangible copies. If that is not the 
case, i.e. exhaustion under InfoSoc applies solely to tangible copies, it essentially 
renders the lending right applicability to intangible copies useless. By making 
application of an exception to the lending right dependant on exhaustion which 
is not applicable to intangible copies, MS would de facto block the application of 
exception as such. Although the judgment does not permit direct conclusion that 
exhaustion extends to all types of works, it shows a tendency to do so.727 
Accordingly, when interpreting the provisions on the exhaustion principle and 
its extension to digital copies, the Court, in line with the reasoning on the right of 
distribution itself, relied mostly on the discussion about whether treating func-
tionally equivalent situations differently was justified on the sole basis that the 
acts concerned copies without a tangible medium. Hence, there was little doubt 
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that the acts in question could fall within the scope of the right and exhaustion; 
the question was whether the treatment should be equivalent. 
 
 
4.2.3.4. Consequences of exhaustion for subsequent control 
Whereas according to the exhaustion principle under the EU acquis the right 
holder loses further control over distributed copies, it is in no way absolute and 
could even be rather limited, as will be sown in this section. First, the scope of 
the right that is exhausted is confined to a specific type of distribution and is 
without prejudice to other forms of distribution or other exclusive rights. Second, 
emergence of a separate market for distributed copies will prompt subjecting their 
marketing to a separate authorisation. Third, the ways in which the copies might 
be disposed of are limited. 
Turning to the first aspect, it is inevitable that the interpretation of the scope 
of the right of distribution under the Directive also influences the consequences 
of exhaustion. In the Peek & Cloppenburg case the CJEU did not rule on exhaus-
tion, but on the scope of the right of distribution, which is of importance for 
understanding the scope of the right that is exhausted following initial distri-
bution.728 The CJEU ruled that the right of distribution under the Directive covers 
solely acts of sale and acts amounting to a transfer of ownership.729 Hence, the 
exhaustion of the right of distribution would lead to loss of control over sub-
sequent distribution solely through sale or other acts of transfer of ownership.  
Notwithstanding the loss of control over subsequent sale of copies, exhaustion 
of the right of distribution does not sanction free disposal of such copies in the 
event they were substantially altered. In the Art & Allposters case, the CJEU had 
to decide whether the exhaustion principle applied to copies that were sold with 
the authorisation of the right holder but with subsequent alteration of the original 
medium.730 The Court stated that the consent of the right holder did not cover 
distribution of such new object incorporating a work and the resale should have 
been authorised. Also, the CJEU noted that the right of distribution would be 
exhausted only upon the first sale of that new object.731 
Hence, the right holder’s control over subsequent distribution can be 
extended. As the Court rightly pointed out, exhaustion did not cover the alteration 
of an existing object even if it was sold with the consent of the right holder in 
case this alteration, taken as a whole, had resulted in a new object.732 However, 
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in my view, the outcome must be interpreted as linked not to a tangible medium 
as such but rather to the alteration of the way a work is presented.733 Such modi-
fications might potentially increase the value of copies and open new exploitation 
opportunities that conflict with the right holder’s interests.734 
Furthermore, it is important to note that further non-commercial transfer of 
such altered objects would most certainly not fall under the distribution right and 
be outside control of the right holder. Notwithstanding moral rights, the acquirer 
of a copy of a work is generally free to modify an acquired copy in any desirable 
way. Nonetheless, they cannot do so on a large-scale commercial basis interfering 
with the new or potential market for a work. Hence, the ruling shall not be read 
as holding that the act of distribution of new objects rendered inapplicable the 
exhaustion of the right of distribution in regard to the original copies. The 
exhaustion for the original copies shall still be valid but it only allows disposal of 
those original copies of a work and not their alteration and subsequent distri-
bution. 
The acceptable ways to further dispose of a copy following the exhaustion of 
the right of distribution are further limited to the acquired copy as opposed, for 
example, to a backup copy. For instance, the Ranks case examined by the CJEU 
did not concern the applicability of exhaustion as such, but instead whether a 
subsequent acquirer of a computer programme could rely on exhaustion of the 
right of distribution to resell their backup copy in the absence of the original 
copy.735 The Court has ruled that a backup copy could not be passed on without 
obtaining the authorisation of the right holder. 
The case received somewhat limited attention, even in the legal scholarship, 
as its application at first glance seems to be rather narrow and based mainly on 
the findings in the landmark UsedSoft judgment.736 Nevertheless, the significance 
of the judgment is in establishing that although an acquirer is not allowed to sell 
a backup copy of a computer programme if the original copy is damaged, 
destroyed or lost, they are not deprived of the ability to resell it all together.737 
Even though the case did not give any guidance as to how it might be achieved, 
it suggests that the vendor shall allow download of a copy through its webpage.738 
In my view, this is a very reasonable outcome for the case, where the interests of 
an acquirer of a computer programme are balanced with the interests of a copy-
                                                                                             
733  On the same point, see Griffiths (2016). 
734  CJEU, Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright. (2015) Case C-419/13, 
Judgment of 22 January 2015, paras 19, 48.  
735  CJEU, Aleksandrs Ranks, Jurijs Vasiļevičs v Microsoft Corp. (2016) Case C-166/15, 
Judgment of 12 October 2016. 
736  See, for example, Colby (2017), Wolk (2017), Geiregat (2017). 
737  This is at odds with the view that back-up copies could be passed to the next acquirer 
together with the original one. See Blocher and Walter (2010), p. 139. 
738  Subsequent acquirer shall be able to download a copy from a vendor’s webpage, see CJEU, 
Aleksandrs Ranks, Jurijs Vasiļevičs v Microsoft Corp. (2016) Case C-166/15, Judgment of 12 
October 2016, para. 54. 
175 
right holder in controlling the market for a work.739 Whereas, as a general rule, 
the acquirer of software can resell their license, the exclusive control over further 
distribution of a backup copy is reserved to the right holder. 
Turning to the outcome of UsedSoft, once the right of distribution is exhausted 
upon the first sale of a copy, that copy can be further resold and used by the next 
acquirer. Nevertheless, copy is a loosely formulated notion in this regard as there 
was no passing on a copy in this case but only sale of a license key combined 
with an opportunity to download the software in question from the vendor’s 
webpage. In a sense, the outcome of exhaustion of the right was that the acquirer 
of a copy could resell the license key and that the next acquirer became a lawful 
acquirer which enabled them to avoid the concern of breaching the right of repro-
duction.740 
At least in regard to computer programmes, resale of a license entails the 
resale of a copy in the meaning of the Software Directive.741 This is also sup-
ported in the Ranks case, where the Court held that one cannot be deprived of the 
possibility to resell their own copy even though the original copy has been 
destroyed, damaged or lost.742 The possible solution would be to let the next 
acquirer download a copy from the vendor’s webpage.743 Hence, to satisfy the 
conditions of exhaustion, it suffices that the right holder provides copies for 
unlimited use against payment of a fee corresponding to economic value. 
 
 
4.3. Exhaustion principle in relation to material 
dissemination: strengths and shortcomings 
Restricting control over material dissemination ought to ensure that the right 
holder’s control does not extend further than necessary to enable obtaining 
appropriate remuneration in order to avoid unnecessarily obstructing further 
dissemination. The aim of the exhaustion principle under the EU copyright 
acquis, as articulated in the UsedSoft case, points into the same direction. The 
objective of the exhaustion principle is to restrict control over distribution of a 
work to what is necessary to safeguard the subject matter.744 
This part will put the exhaustion principle as developed under the EU acquis 
into the context of material dissemination. The scope of the principle will be 
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examined towards the relevant considerations for either limiting or safeguarding 
control of the right holder over subsequent distribution, identified in Chapter 3.745 
Hence, the strengths and the deficiencies of exhaustion in contemplating all the 
relevant aspects will be assessed. 
As will be shown, whereas the exhaustion principle proved to be an effective 
tool for achieving restriction of exclusive control to what is necessary in specific 
cases, it is much less flexible in others. The latter is well illustrated by CJEU 
jurisprudence on the right of distribution, in particular in relation to the digital 
environment. Also, the rather predetermined approach to the harmonisation of 
the rights and permissible boundaries has forced the CJEU to look for policy 
arguments in extending the logic behind the principle to other rights. 
 
 
4.3.1. Role of exhaustion in limiting exclusive control to first 
distribution 
As has been explored in the previous chapter, based on the developments under 
the EU acquis, there are three major circumstances pointing towards the justifi-
ability of restricting control over further distribution. First is the fact that right 
holder has exercised their exclusive right. Second is the fact that right holder had 
a chance to obtain appropriate remuneration. Third are considerations of public 
policy behind the recognised limitations, where the subsequent use in question 
does not clearly come within the scope of the right and exception. 
When it comes to the first consideration, being restricting of control over fur-
ther distribution upon the exercise of the right, the exhaustion principle under the 
EU acquis seems to achieve just that, at least in regard to distribution through 
sale. Confining the application of the exhaustion principle solely to cases where 
copies were sold or ownership over them was otherwise transferred with the 
authorisation of the right holder ensures that the loss of subsequent control 
happens solely upon the actual exercise of the right. 
Hence, the exhaustion principle under the EU copyright acquis reflects the 
objective of material dissemination in a sense that it ensures that the right holder 
has control over each and every act of exploitation through distribution unless the 
conditions provided by exhaustion are met. This goes hand in hand with the 
second aspect, the ability to obtain remuneration. In the particular circumstances 
of the sale of (tangible) copies, the right holder is in a position to ask for appro-
priate remuneration for each copy. Accordingly, exhaustion of the right upon sale 
or other transfer of ownership safeguards the author’s ability to ask for appro-
priate remuneration.746 
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The third major consideration is the resort to public policy. In the course of 
the development of the exhaustion principle this aspect became prominent in the 
cases dealing with the necessity to consider limiting control over subsequent acts 
in cases not clearly coming within the scope of established mechanisms. For 
instance, that would be the case of extending the reach of exhaustion under the 
UsedSoft case. The exhaustion principle is least flexible in relation to this aspect. 
Whereas the Court found it useful for dealing with cases closely resembling 
situations the legislator had in mind when drafting the provisions, the extent to 
which the concept in its narrow sense can be adapted is limited.747 However, the 
exhaustion principle can also be considered in its broad sense, as expressing the 
idea that exclusive control shall not go beyond what is necessary to enable 
obtaining appropriate remuneration. 
Whereas the exhaustion principle under the EU acquis achieves limiting the 
control of the right holder to the first exercise of the right of distribution and 
obtaining appropriate remuneration in the case of distribution of tangible copies, 
the legislative choices make the principle of very limited practical importance in 
potential cases not concerning mere sale. Unless, of course, the principle is inter-
preted in a broader fashion, as was done by the CJEU in the context of the distri-
bution of digital copies.748 
The wording of the principle interferes with the ability to adapt the notion to 
the changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation. For instance, exempting 
further resale from exclusive control could have been achieved in a different and 
much less restrictive way. One example could be the wording of exhaustion under 
the first draft of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive, merely exempting fur-
ther importation of distributed copies from the reach of the right of distribution.749 
However, turning the provision under the InfoSoc Directive into the only admis-
sible condition upon which the right of distribution may be restricted substantially 
limited the flexibility of assessing a situation at stake. 
 
 
4.3.2. Ability to adapt when securing further control is justifiable 
Besides indications pointing towards restricting further control over dissemi-
nation, the analysis of the development of the EU copyright acquis reveals three 
considerations upholding extending control beyond first distribution. In the par-
ticular context of the exhaustion principle, it would mean the flexibility of the 
latter to account for the circumstances of dissemination influencing the permis-
sible scope of control following the first exercise of the right. The three con-
siderations identified in Chapter 3 are the absence of consent to the dissemination, 
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the emergence of new markets for the distributed copies, and the interference 
with the primary market.750 
At first sight, the exhaustion principle safeguards consent as it is a precon-
dition to even considering restricting exclusive control. The principle would 
simply not apply at all in the absence of an unauthorised initial distribution. How-
ever, due to the nature of the exhaustion principle, it does not permit drawing any 
further conclusions beyond the fact that the right holder has authorised sale of the 
copies. Consider, for instance, the Art & Allposters case, where the CJEU 
examined whether marketing of the altered copies could be prevented on the basis 
of the right of distribution. The Dutch Court asked whether the distribution right 
and its exhaustion under the InfoSoc Directive governed the answer to the ques-
tion. Furthermore, if it did, the Court was also asked to rule whether it was per-
missible to rely on the notion developed under national law, according to which 
there was no longer any question of exhaustion if the acquirer substantially 
altered the copies and disseminated them to the public.751 
Rather than holding, as it would have to, that the exhaustion principle under 
the InfoSoc Directive had no bearing on the answer to the question, the Court 
proceeded to examine whether in such case the right holder has consented to dis-
semination of altered copies. The CJEU found that through the alteration process 
in question new copies were created and the right to distribute them was not 
exhausted. Essentially, the Court reached a conclusion comparable to the one the 
Dutch courts reached under national law. However, it overlooked the fact that 
exhaustion under the Directive only clarifies the permissibility of further resale 
of copies, which would be evident if exhaustion was worded in a way merely 
confirming this. 
Flexibility for taking into consideration new markets as the second relevant 
aspect is also not something that the exhaustion principle is generally concerned 
with. Whereas in the course of the development the principle has been adapted to 
exclude forms of distribution forming a distinct market such as rental, other 
potential markets for the distributed copies would now have to be contemplated 
by the recognition of new or an extension of existing exclusive rights.752 Hence, 
whenever a new market for copies is unlocked by technology, the exhaustion 
principle would not be a suitable tool to secure such uses. 
Interestingly, exempting new uses from the reach of exhaustion turned what 
was once a small exception from exhaustion into a rule.753 Certain acts were 
exempted from exhaustion through the recognition of distinct exclusive rights 
such as rental. They, in turn, were hardly subject to a wider discussion on the 
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necessity of introducing exhaustion-like provisions, or in more general terms, a 
wider discussion on maintaining mechanisms to systematically restrict the scope 
of the right to what is necessary. 
The third aspect relevant to the assessment of desirability of extending the 
control of the copyright holder beyond initial dissemination is interference with 
the primary market. This is similarly not accounted for by the exhaustion prin-
ciple. The only way in which the principle ensures that the market is not interfered 
with is that it only exempts copies already put into circulation and the acts which 
are confined to a specific territory. Hence, exhaustion does not sanction produc-
tion and distribution of new copies by the third parties. 
Although the CJEU’s jurisprudence has occasionally reshaped the right of dis-
tribution and at times adapted exhaustion to take into consideration the relevant 
aspects outlined here, the provisions themselves come up short. As has been 
explored in this chapter, the wording of exhaustion under copyright harmo-
nisation served many functions, including differentiating rental and lending from 
other forms of distribution. Hence, its wording should not be interpreted as the 
only conceivable expression of an approach to material dissemination. It could, 
of course, be the case that the legislator intended authorised sale to be the one and 
only possible precondition for exhaustion of the right. However, the juris-
prudence of the Court seems to indicate otherwise.754  
Whereas defining the right of distribution and its exhaustion through the trans-
fer of ownership can be explained and possibly justified by the circumstances of 
harmonisation, the developments might require a slight modification. This does 
not mean that exhaustion should necessarily be amended to be triggered by cir-
cumstances other than transfer of ownership. Necessary result could also be 
achieved by considering the logic behind the exhaustion principle in the broader 
context. 
 
4.3.3. Potential of exhaustion as a limit to exclusive control over 
material dissemination in the online environment 
Whereas the possible extension of the right of distribution to the acts of online 
dissemination encountered some resistance, this is even more so in case of the 
application of the exhaustion principle. The CJEU’s jurisprudence provides 
precedents for applying the principle to copies distributed by download, although 
they are rather limited to specific circumstances. The latter is perhaps under-
standable in the light of the nature of the exhaustion principle and its inflexibility, 
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as described above. On the other hand, jurisprudence also indicates the develop-
ment of similar principles in the context of other exclusive rights.755 
The main argument against the application of the principle in cases of online 
transmissions is that both the right of distribution and exhaustion should oversee 
solely tangible copies, leaving digital copies and online transmissions to other 
rights. As fair as this seems to be, this line of reasoning often results in a denial 
of (any) limits to control over dissemination in the online context; restricting fur-
ther control, arguably, would be justified solely for acts of material distribution. 
It is necessary to clearly demarcate whether one argues against the application of 
exhaustion online because it is not a perfect construct, against the application of 
exhaustion to acts only remotely resembling material dissemination, or against 
the application of any limits, including in the form of exhaustion, to control over 
acts of online dissemination. 
Whereas I find the first two arguments to a certain extent justifiable, the very 
last one seems highly unreasonable. Even more so if it is justified on the grounds 
that dissemination taking place online is of a solely immaterial nature. In this 
regard, I tend to support the view that, although it is obvious that the exhaustion 
principle originates under rather different circumstances and is closely tied to 
physical copies, the absence of such tangible copies as such cannot mean that the 
limitation on the scope of legal protection intended by the exhaustion principle is 
not appropriate in other cases.756  
The recent jurisprudence of the CJEU relying on the material dissemination 
construct in the online setting to uphold the application of certain exceptions 
originally designed for tangible copies illustrates the importance of assessing the 
broader picture. It includes not only the infamous UsedSoft case but also the VOB 
case, where the CJEU at length discussed justifications beyond extending the 
reach of the lending right and its limitation to e-books. The Court considered it 
important to preserve the limitations formulated in the analogue era despite 
slightly different but largely equivalent circumstances.757 Moreover, the Court 
took a very cautious approach, as the absence of justifications to exclude digital 
copies from the right of distribution or lending did not automatically also justify 
the application of limitations to these rights. 
Indeed, the Court acknowledged the exhaustion principle in its broader sense. 
In UsedSoft the Court stressed that to read the exhaustion principle narrowly 
would allow the right holder to circumvent the provision, thus its effectiveness 
would be undermined.758 Similarly, in the Ranks case the CJEU held that an 
acquirer of a computer programme cannot be deprived of the possibility to resell 
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that copy only because it was lost, damaged or stolen, as it would undermine the 
effectiveness of the exhaustion principle.759 
Nonetheless, it is also evident that an attempt to apply the material dissemi-
nation approach online runs into the inflexibility of the exhaustion principle as 
laid down under secondary EU law. However, this pitfall can be avoided if the 
exhaustion principle is not considered in its narrow sense as the one and only 
solution for implementing limits on exclusive control following the material dis-
semination approach, but in its broader meaning. The exhaustion principle shall 
not be disregarded or overlooked in the context of online dissemination, rather its 
role and development shall be discussed. 
 Rognstad, for example, argues that the CJEU in UsedSoft should have 
respected the decision of the legislator to limit the right of distribution to tangible 
copies and recalled that the right of communication to the public is not subject to 
exhaustion. Next, if the Court deemed that restricting the resale of such copies 
did go beyond what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject matter, it could 
have proclaimed such national rules contrary to the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (TFEU).760 Riis et al., in turn, state that although it is indeed 
problematic that the Court stepped over its mandate and went beyond the wording 
of the legislation, it has nevertheless pointed copyright in the right direction, as 
the flexibility exercised in the case lies at the very heart of copyright.761 
The UsedSoft judgment also seems to have advanced a kind of user right, pre-
viously unknown under (EU) copyright. For instance, Hilty comments that the 
Court essentially dealt with a right to use, because the copy in question was not 
the one created by the first acquirer. The issue was the use of copies created by 
the third parties, which was lawful due to the non-use by the first acquirer.762 
Hilty holds that the question of access as such is more of a contractual nature, i.e. 
whether the right holder accepts that the initial acquirer will be substituted by a 
third party.763 However, overruling contractual freedom in the case could have 
been motivated by protecting the position of the first acquirer, who paid full price 
and wants to realise its residual value through the secondary market.764 
Accordingly, the association of the exhaustion principle with material 
dissemination is both the strength and the weakness of the latter. It is especially 
evident in cases concerning the distribution-like dissemination in the online 
environment. On the one hand, the exhaustion principle provides a clear boundary 
to the right holder’s control over dissemination in the form of distribution, 
enabling subsequent dissemination and disposal of copies. Against the back-
ground of the online environment, however, such a clear-cut solution may not be 
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763  Ibid., p. 872. 
764  Ibid., p. 874. 
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highly appropriate in circumstances where the actual conditions differ con-
siderably. 
On the other hand, the development of the exhaustion principle under the EU 
acquis as associated solely with distribution of tangible copies has led to 
scepticism over the possibility of considering the principle in its broader sense in 
the online context, or, put differently, the extension of the approach to material 
dissemination in the online context. First, the arguments against the application 
of the principle often stem from the very wording of the provision. Second, it is 
easy to circumvent the principle by disseminating copies in a way that does not 
fall within the provided definition, with a view to potentially unlimited possi-
bilities offered by digital technologies. Hence, successfully arguing that exhaus-
tion does not apply in a particular case secures the right holder potentially 
unlimited control over any aspect of work’s exploitation. 
 
 
4.4. Conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine the place of the exhaustion principle in limiting 
the scope of the right of distribution pursuant to the notion of material dissemi-
nation. Namely, it assessed the role and the potential of the principle in restricting 
the scope of the right in the context of the changing circumstances of a work’s 
exploitation and increasingly flexible approach to the defining permissible scope 
of right holder’s control under the EU acquis. For the purpose of the analysis, 
exhaustion was understood in its narrow meaning as a particular construct 
limiting the scope of the right of distribution once an opportunity to receive 
remuneration has been provided. Hence, the analysis relied predominantly on the 
remuneration theory of exhaustion and built on the findings of the Chapter 3. 
The analysis of the background to harmonising the principle on the inter-
national and the EU levels revealed that its harmonisation served objectives far 
beyond mere restriction of control over secondary distribution. First, confining 
the wording of the principle to transfer of ownership of a copy has served to 
secure the right holder’s exclusive control over subsequent rental of already dis-
tributed copies. Second, determining the principle’s territorial application was of 
importance to international trade due to the territorial nature of copyright. 
Whereas the attempts to harmonise the principle on the international level have 
failed largely due to disagreement on the territorial reach of exhaustion, the 
extensive harmonisation has taken place under the EU acquis. 
The chapter has traced the process of harmonising the exhaustion principle 
under the EU acquis from tackling the territoriality of the exclusive rights in the 
context of the internal market to drawing the boundary of the right of distribution. 
The harmonisation of the exhaustion principle under the EU acquis served two 
separate yet ultimately interconnected objectives: to eliminate the adverse effect 
of the territorial nature of copyright on the free movement of goods within the 
internal market, and to delimit the scope of the (fully) harmonised right of distri-
bution under the EU secondary law. 
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First, the development of the Community exhaustion principle under the 
CJEU jurisprudence has been assessed. The principle precludes the exercise of 
the right of distribution under the national laws if it prevents the import of copies 
already put into circulation within the EEA with the right holder’s authorisation. 
Second, the chapter has analysed the exhaustion principle as harmonised under 
secondary EU law. It has been emphasised that, whereas tackling the territoriality 
of exhaustion was crucial to the functioning of the internal market, full harmoni-
sation of the permissible limit of the right of distribution might have been 
premature, given the lack of discussion on the purpose and wording of the provi-
sion in the preparatory documents to the Directives. 
Subsequent developments under CJEU jurisprudence have had two major 
implications for the role of the exhaustion principle as delimiting control over 
distribution pursuant to the material dissemination notion. First, the all-or-
nothing approach of exhaustion in its narrow sense as stipulated under the 
InfoSoc Directive has clearly been challenged. Emerging circumstances which 
could not be taken into account by the right holder at the time of authorising 
primary communication might call for submitting secondary communication to 
the exclusive control of the right holder despite the de facto application of the 
exhaustion principle. This does not only raise the question of the scope of the acts 
exempted from authorisation by virtue of the exhaustion principle but also sug-
gests the principle is no longer capable of providing a more or less clear picture 
of the legitimate right holder’s expectations. 
Second, the development of the right of distribution and the right of commu-
nication to the public indicates that harmonisation of the exhaustion principle in 
its narrow meaning under the InfoSoc Directive has implicated the development 
of a more consistent and systematic approach to the question of admissible con-
trol over the acts of secondary dissemination. The all-or-nothing approach of 
Article 4(2) of InfoSoc made the extension of the principle beyond the right of 
distribution undesirable in the light of changing circumstances of a work’s 
exploitation. Even within the realm of the conventional sale of tangible copies of 
a work, the principle falls short of providing a satisfactory instrument, accounting 
for the factual circumstances and emerging markets for distributed copies. 
Some of the contemporary challenges the exhaustion principle faces could be 
dealt with by proclaiming the rule as dealing solely with the resale of tangible 
copies if they have not been substantially altered. However, on the EU level, 
given the full harmonisation under the InfoSoc Directive and the CJEU’s 
unwillingness to leave any matters to the MS, it could be to further detriment to 
legal certainty. Whereas the exhaustion principle indeed emerged to simply 
exempt the secondary distribution of copies form the right holder’s control, under 
the EU acquis it has been turned into the only possible limit to the right of distri-
bution and, furthermore, strongly contrasted to other dissemination-related rights, 
in particular, the right of communication to the public. 
Hence, confining the meaning of exhaustion to its original connotation is sup-
ported, provided that exhaustion is then considered in its broader meaning, as 
(partially) restricting exclusive control over dissemination following the initial 
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authorisation enabling the right holder to obtain appropriate remuneration. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 5 on the right of communication to the public, the 
developments under the acquis indicate that the strong contrast between the rights 
on the basis of ambiguous denial of the application of the exhaustion principle in 
its narrow sense has implicated the development of the consistent approach to 
examining the need to restrict or extend the exclusive control over secondary dis-
semination in the changing circumstances of work’s exploitation. 
Whereas the CJEU has redefined the approach to material dissemination to 
take into account the circumstances of exploitation beyond mere authorisation, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, the exhaustion principle as harmonised under the 
Directives no longer provides a clear picture of the relevant considerations. 
Although it played the decisive role in shaping the scope of control accorded 
under the right of distribution at the time of harmonisation under the Directives, 
the subsequent development has downplayed its role. 
Furthermore, although the CJEU has extended the principle to seemingly 
functionally equivalent acts of digital distribution, it is arguable whether this 
development hit the right note rather than obscured the reality and confused legal 
certainty. Whereas the very outcome in the form of exempting secondary distri-
bution from authorisation of the right holder might be reasonable, the means of 
attaining it are much less so. Given the blurred meaning of the exhaustion prin-
ciple under the EU acquis, employment of the all-or-nothing approach does little 
to adapt the copyright framework to the needs of today. 
Even though employing the exhaustion principle in its narrow sense as har-
monised under the InfoSoc Directive to achieve the objectives of the material 
dissemination approach is questioned in the light of the developments and the 
need for flexibility, considering the exhaustion principle in its broader meaning 
is certainly endorsed. Chapter 5 will examine the detriment to legal certainty 
caused by the denial of a possibility to recognise a comparable limit to exclusive 
control in the context of the right of communication to the public.  
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5. RIGHT OF COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC 
BETWEEN MATERIAL AND IMMATERIAL 
DISSEMINATION OF A WORK 
The right of communication to the public is one of the core economic rights, 
whose importance has been on a steady rise ever since the transition to the online 
environment as the primary channel of disseminating a work. During the last cen-
tury, its significance evolved from securing control over communicating a per-
formance of a work to the audience beyond the immediate reach of performance 
in space and time to sanctioning broad control over nearly any aspect of a work’s 
dissemination through communicating its content in either a direct or indirect 
way.765 
Just as it is important to distinguish between the broad right of distribution 
encompassing any act of disposing of copies of a work and the narrow right of 
distribution through sale of copies, it is also crucial to differentiate between the 
right of communication to the public and the rights of communication to the pub-
lic. Whereas the latter refers broadly to the different rights encompassing the dis-
semination of a work other than through distributing copies, the former is one of 
those rights with its distinctive scope. Whereas the background to the harmoni-
sation of the right under the EU acquis will be analysed from a broader perspec-
tive of communication rights, the analysis under the EU copyright acquis will 
focus primarily on the right of communication to the public as harmonised under 
the InfoSoc Directive. 
Rights of communication to the public are traditionally viewed as protecting 
immaterial exploitation of a work.766 Hence, unlike with the material dissemi-
nation rights such as distribution, no overall limit on the extent of the control that 
should be accorded to the copyright holder beyond the first communication of a 
work is generally recognised. The right holder, in general, has a right to authorise 
or prohibit each and every act of communication falling within the scope of the 
right. Nonetheless, the developments under the acquis suggest that any limits on 
the extent of control are not ruled out from the outset. As will be seen on the 
example of the EU copyright acquis and, in particular, the CJEU jurisprudence, 
some boundaries to the exclusive control are desirable to avoid granting more 
control than necessary to the detriment of other objectives. 
Given the breadth of the scope of the right of communication to the public as 
harmonised under the EU acquis and the variety of acts it covers, this chapter 
does not have an ambition to provide an all-encompassing picture of the right.767 
                                                                                             
765  For instance, the right of communication to the public under the EU acquis covers direct 
communication of content of a work such as through broadcast of performance or streaming 
of a song. It also encompasses indirect communication such as through making a digital copy 
of a work available for (un)limited access or disposal. 
766  Depreeuw (2014), p. 245. 
767  For further analysis of the right, see Ibid., p. 340. 
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The purpose of the discussion in this chapter is to assess how the development of 
the scope of the right of communication to the public has contested the confine-
ment of the right to the solely immaterial dissemination notion. Furthermore, 
relying on the analysis in chapters 2, 3 and 4, this chapter is set to highlight how 
the reasoning of the CJEU in defining the scope of the right essentially blurs the 
boundaries between material and immaterial dissemination. As will be demon-
strated, the approach is greatly inconsistent as the variety of uses fall under the 
single broad right of communication, with very little room for appreciating the 
differences in the specific circumstances of a work’s exploitation. 
Therefore, the enquiry will focus on the aspects central to the material 
dissemination approach. These are, as outlined in chapters 3 and 4, the circum-
stances pointing towards permissibility of limiting exclusive control over 
dissemination and the circumstances supporting exclusive control beyond the 
initial act of communication. Hence, it will also be of utmost importance to dif-
ferentiate between the primary and secondary acts of communication. This is so 
because the application of the material dissemination concept does not render 
inapplicable any control over works’ dissemination but only exempts dissemi-
nation of already distributed copies from exclusive control. 
To put it differently, it does not sanction production and dissemination of new 
copies without authorisation securing appropriate remuneration for the right 
holder. Equally, the limit to the right of communication to the public in regard to 
subsequent control over each authorised act of communication would not sanc-
tion any independent communication. Hence, for the purpose of the analysis, the 
initial acts, which are always subject to authorisation, will be distinguished from 
the secondary acts, control over which is justified to a different extent in varying 
circumstances. This also implies that the analysis focuses predominantly on the 
secondary acts in relation to primary communication authorised by the right 
holder. 
This chapter together with chapters 2, 3 and 4 serves to answer the first overall 
research question, which is how the development of the rights of distribution and 
communication to the public under the EU acquis reflects the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination. More specifically, the present chapter 
provides an understanding of the rationales for harmonising the right of commu-
nication to the public, including placing it in stark contrast to the right of distri-
bution. Next, it illustrates how the rigid distinction between the rights has been 
challenged by subsequent developments. This is achieved by addressing the fol-
lowing sub-questions: 
 
What circumstances have influenced the need and the form of harmonisation of 
the right of communication to the public under the EU acquis? 
How was the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination enshrined 
under secondary EU law and what were the driving forces? 
Does the development of the right of communication to the public under the EU 
copyright framework reflect immaterial dissemination and, if so, how? 
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In order to answer these questions, first, the background to harmonising the right 
of communication to the public at the EU level and the developments influencing 
its scope are analysed. Besides a short enquiry into the concept of communication 
and the evolvement of the technology enabling it, the harmonisation of the right 
at the international level, especially in the context of the digital agenda, is 
analysed. Second, the developments at the EU level besides the adoption of the 
InfoSoc Directive are addressed, such as CJEU jurisprudence on the conflict of 
the right with the freedoms of the internal market and the adoption of the Satellite 
and Cable Directive regulating retransmissions. 
Third, the harmonisation of the right of communication to the public under the 
InfoSoc Directive and the subsequent jurisprudence of the CJEU are analysed 
from the perspective of primary and secondary communication. The findings of 
the analysis are contrasted with the notion of immaterial communication to con-
clude to what extent the development of the right of communication to the public 
continues to reflect the immaterial dissemination notion. 
The chapter is divided into three parts. Part 5.1. provides the background to 
the harmonisation of the right under the EU copyright acquis. It addresses the 
development of communication rights from the performance right to the broad 
notion of the communication right under the WIPO CT. Part 5.2. focuses on the 
harmonisation of the right of communication to the public under EU secondary 
law and the CJEU shaping the boundaries of the right. Whereas the focus is on 
the right as harmonised under the InfoSoc Directive, this part also addresses cer-
tain other developments important from the perspective of secondary commu-
nication, such as the retransmissions under the Satellite and Cable Directive. 
Part 5.3. is set to assess how the development of the scope of the right of 
communication to the public under the acquis has shifted its place in the material-
immaterial dissemination equation. This part focuses on three major aspects: 
significance of conferring control over any subsequent communication by 
default, circumstances pointing towards limiting the extent of control beyond the 
initial communication, and the place of secondary acts relying on infringing com-
munication. 
 
 
5.1. Background to the harmonisation of the right of 
communication to the public under the EU acquis 
Leaving aside the breadth of the expression “communication” in the definition of 
communication rights and turning to the premises of the immaterial dissemi-
nation notion,768 there are numerous ways of communicating a work’s content to 
the public without producing and distributing tangible copies. Going back to the 
time when the need to distinguish between the ways of disseminating a work 
                                                                                             
768  As outlined in section 2.2.1. 
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arose, the main way of exploiting a work in the absence of copies was through its 
performance to a present public.769  
Technological development, such as the emergence of broadcasting, enhanced 
communication of a work through broadening the reach of performance beyond 
the immediately present public. Not only did it enable further (simultaneous or 
time-shifted, altered or unaltered) communication of a live performance to a 
broader public, broadcasting entered the ranks of primary channels, as works 
could also be communicated directly without relying on the prior live perfor-
mance.  
Next, cable networks, including the Internet, added another layer to commu-
nication channels. Similarly, they provided a channel for extending the reach of 
a live performance or broadcast thereof. Furthermore, they also facilitated inde-
pendent communication not relying on the acts of live performance or broadcast. 
With the emergence of the Internet, the reach of communication of a work 
became virtually unlimited. In many cases, the development de facto eliminated 
the initial constraints of immaterial dissemination in extracting the appropriate 
value of a work because of the inability to precisely estimate demand and the 
limits on an audience confined to space and time. 
Hence, technology developed in layers and enhanced communication tar-
geting a wider audience. At the same time, the characteristics of these ways of 
dissemination differed from the initial form of public performance, allowing 
much greater control over communication and the receiving public. The fact that 
all these uses except live performance were harmonised under a single right of 
communication to the public under the EU acquis is capable of giving an impres-
sion how inherently complex it must be to define any common criteria for 
limiting, where necessary, exclusive control over secondary communication.770 
This section outlines the background of harmonisation of the right of commu-
nication to the public under the EU acquis. First, it contextualises the right within 
the broader concept of communication rights to highlight which uses were 
primarily targeted by the obligations under international law. Second, it outlines 
the driving forces behind recognition of the broad right of communication and its 
extension to online dissemination. Third, it summarises the relevant obligations 
under the international treaties. 
Throughout this thesis, the terms material and immaterial dissemination are 
primarily used to designate the approaches to regulating exclusive rights based 
on their ability to secure appropriate remuneration through the authorisation of 
each primary act.771 However, this chapter must distinguish between two mean-
ings of immaterial in the context of the rights of communication to the public. 
Under international negotiations “immaterial” is primarily used to describe the 
                                                                                             
769  Or recitation, which is a more suitable term for literary works and is also used in the BC.  
770  See Lund on the problems caused by the usage of broad concepts that are given a very 
specific content. Nevertheless, they are necessary for dealing with all the different ways to 
exploit a work, Lund (2001), p. 620. 
771  As outlined in section 2.2.1. 
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set of rights of communication of a work other than through distributing physical 
copies. Hence, the term “immaterial” is used not as suggesting no limits to exclu-
sive control granted by the right.  
On the other hand, this is what took place under the EU acquis, where the 
harmonised right of communication to the public has been associated with the 
notion of immaterial dissemination as justifying placing no general limits on the 
right holder’s control. Therefore, in order to avoid misunderstandings, this chap-
ter will use the term intangible instead of immaterial where it refers to commu-
nication other than through tangible copies without implying any particular stand 
on the scope of the right. 
 
 
5.1.1. Communication rights and the notion of communication 
Whereas the right of distribution is the central right for so-called copy-related 
rights, communication to the public builds on a variety of more specific rights 
grouped by the absence of a tangible medium. Collectively, these rights are 
referred to as the rights of communication to the public.772 Hence, it is important 
to differentiate between the notion of communication to the public as a broader 
concept covering divergent ways to present a work, and the right of commu-
nication to the public covering a specific type of exploitation. As will be evident, 
the scope of the latter differs depending on the instrument of international or EU 
harmonisation or on national law. 
For instance, the WIPO Glossary from 1980 defines communication to the 
public as: 
 
Making a work, performance, phonogram or broadcast perceptible in any appro-
priate manner to persons in general, that is, not restricted to specific individuals 
belonging to a private group. This notion is broader than publication and also 
covers, among others, forms of uses such as public performance, broadcasting, 
communication to the public by wire, or direct communication to the public of the 
reception of a broadcast.773 
 
Accordingly, the notion is a broad one and comprises the variety of acts of 
making a work perceptible to the public. Similarly, under negotiations on the 
Model Law the following definition was used for the joint concept of commu-
nication to the public:  
 
                                                                                             
772  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), pp. 580–582. 
773  WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights. WIPO 
Publication No. 816 (EFS) 1980, p. 42. The CJEU has at times referred to the Glossary in 
conjunction with the WIPO CT. For instance, see CJEU, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) 
Limited v Ireland and Attorney General. (2012) Case C-162/10, Judgment of 15 March 2012, 
para. 34. 
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“Communication” of a work to the public (including the display, performance or 
broadcast thereof) “to the public” is the making of the work available to the public 
through means other than distributing copies. The whole process which is needed 
for, and leads to, the making available of the work to the public is “commu-
nication”, and the work shall be considered “communicated” even if no member 
of the public to which it was thus made available actually receives, watches or 
listens to the work.774  
 
Under this definition the concept of communication to the public would cover 
any way of making a work available except through the distribution of copies, 
even if no member of the public actually perceives it in any way.  
On the other hand, under the negotiations on the PPBC, notion of commu-
nication was defined as following: 
 
“Communication to the public” is the transmission by electronic, electric or simi-
lar means (either by wire or without wire) of the image or sound or both of a work 
or the sound of recording (including the display of a work and the performance or 
broadcast of a work or a sound recording) in a way that the said image or sound 
can be perceived by any person on the same conditions at a place or places whose 
distance from the place where the transmission is started is such that without the 
electronic, electric or similar means the images or sound would not be perceivable 
at the said place or places.775  
 
Whereas it is similar to the definition under the Model Law, instead of relying on 
the term of making available to define the acts, it uses transmission by electronic, 
electric or similar means. This is explained by the Protocol aiming first and fore-
most at harmonising the right of communication through transmission, including 
digital transmissions, as will be shown below.776  
Accordingly, there are various understandings of the notion of communication 
to the public. Two main ones ought to be highlighted. A broad concept of com-
munication comprises any act of making a work available for perception by 
others outside a private circle. A narrow concept of communication is connected 
to transmissions that make a work perceptible to the distant public. The latter 
corresponds more to the communication to the public right as recognised under 
the WIPO CT and harmonised under the EU acquis.777 Hence, any act that makes 
a work perceptible to the public appears to fall under the communication of a 
                                                                                             
774  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. I Introduction. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau. CE/MPC/I/2-II 1989, p. 2. 
775  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. First Session. 
Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part II. (Draft). Memor-
andum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/I/3 1991, p. 29. 
776  At the beginning of the negotiations, communication to the public was discussed mainly 
in conjunction with other rights, and only insofar it concerned the term public. 
777  Importantly, the WIPO Glossary includes direct communication of a reception of a broad-
cast into the scope of communicating a work to the public. 
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work. Only the distribution of copies is generally exempted. Nevertheless, such 
broad language could theoretically encompass distribution of copies, as it is also 
in the end making a work perceptible. 
Rights of communication to the public, aimed to secure the right holder’s 
control over exploitation of a work, comprise different rights covering the acts of 
communication of an immaterial nature in a sense of the absence of material 
mediums.778 Hence, the key feature is making a work perceptible to the public. 
Notably, the rights of communication to the public protect exploitation of a work, 
thus communications within the restricted group of people that do not affect 
exploitation of a work should not be subject to control.779 
Rights of communication to the public have been gradually recognised on the 
international and national levels for all types of works, which has not always been 
the case. For instance, the BC does not grant a general right of communication to 
the public, but instead few rights covering different types of communication for 
various types of works.780 These fragmented provisions on the different types of 
communication rights are often redundant or self-contradictory.781  
At the time of the adoption and the subsequent revisions of the BC, ways of 
communicating a work were typically associated with a particular type of a work. 
For instance, the BC maintains the distinction between performance and reci-
tation rights as they cover musical and literary works, respectively. The develop-
ment of technology and the emergence of the online environment in particular 
blurred the disparities and the types of communication are no longer confined to 
a single type of work.782 The differences, however, have not disappeared alto-
gether. Ultimately, sound recording is more comparable to a performance or 
broadcast than a painting, for which the right of display (not harmonised under 
international law) would be much closer. 
 
 
5.1.2. Performance as the initial form of communication 
Historically, the right of public performance was among the first widely recog-
nised rights under copyright and the first when it comes to intangible dissemi-
nation.783 Whereas it was primarily associated with live performances to a present 
public, later development of technology overcame the time and distance chal-
lenges of communicating a performance to a distant public, but not in the same 
                                                                                             
778  Depreeuw (2014), p. 245. For the grounds for using the term “intangible” rather than 
“immaterial” in this context, see section above. 
779  Ibid., p. 340. 
780  Dreier and Hugenholtz (2006), p. 49. 
781  Ginsburg (2004), p. 2. 
782  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 703; Depreeuw (2014), p. 341. Also, Ricketson (1987), 
p. 424. 
783  More on the brief history of public performance right, see Quintais and Poort (2018), pp. 
14–24.  
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way for all works.784 The BC maintains a distinction between public performance 
and other types of communication to the public, using the criteria of public to 
which the communication is directed.785 The right of public performance under 
the BC covers acts (whether assisted or not by technical devices) directed at the 
present audience as opposed to acts of transmission to the public not present at a 
place.786 
The right of public performance was recognised for the first time under the 
Brussels Act. Article 11 of the BC then introduced it for dramatic and musical 
works, which at that time were the primary subject matters for performance. 
Another right of performance is recognised under Article 14(1)(ii) for cinemato-
graphically adapted or reproduced literary or artistic works.787 Yet another article 
(Article 11ter) provides for the right of recitation for literary works. Essentially, 
both performance and recitation rights cover very similar acts, albeit in relation 
to different subject matters. 788 Nonetheless, attempts to reconcile these two rights 
did not succeed.789 
Although at the time of the Brussels Conference in 1948 most countries already 
provided the public performance right, its adoption was not straightforward. This 
was mainly due to various exceptions existing under national laws. Not least, it 
was feared that the recognition of a general right of performance would provide 
right holders with excessive exclusive control that might influence other fields of 
law, such as competition law.790  
The right of public performance under the BC covers solely acts of commu-
nication to a present public. While the performance itself can be a direct (live) or 
a recorded one, the public must be present at the premises where performance 
                                                                                             
784  Performance was a primary way to communicate and exploit a work before the development 
of technologies for recoding, time-shifting, etc. See also Depreeuw (2014), p. 341. 
785  See more in the Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. 
First Session. Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention Part II. 
(Draft). Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/I/3 1991, p. 28. 
786  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 703. 
787  Brussels text included the right of performance and presentation, the latter is covered by 
the term “performance” under the Stockholm Act. See Sterner et al. (1968), pp. 19–20. 
788  On Article 11ter amplifying Article 11, see Ricketson (1987), p. 111. Also, Stewart and 
Sandison (1989), pp. 123–124; Nordemann et al. (1990), p. 118. It is also further supported 
by the fact that under the negotiations on the PPBC the definition of public performance 
included public recitation. See the Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne 
Convention. First Session. Questions concerning a possible protocol to the Berne Convention 
Part II. (Draft). Memorandum prepared by the International Bereau. BCP/CE/I/3 1991, p. 28. 
On the absence of clarity behind the differentiation see also Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), 
pp. 714–716. On the other hand, Nordemann explains it by the fact that earlier only a 
performance required the copyright holder’s consent, but not a recitation. See Nordemann et 
al. (1990), p. 118. 
789  Nordemann et al. (1990), p. 119. 
790  On the point see Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 712; Stewart and Sandison (1989), p. 65.  
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occurs.791 The phrase “by any means or process” was included into Article 11 at 
the Stockholm conference to reconcile the right with the provision under Article 
13, which provided for a right of recording of musical works and subsequently 
performing them from such a recording using technical means.792 Thus, Article 
11 of BC covers performance of dramatic and musical works which is either live 
or recorded and either assisted or not by technical means, but to a present public. 
While it may seem that the right covers solely so-called push communication, 
where a work is communicated without a request from the audience, it might as 
well cover pull communication or communication on demand. Namely, the 
WIPO in its Guide to the BC from 1976 stated that there was no difference 
between a live performance and a discotheque where customers choose their 
music by using coins.793 Thus, it suggested that the scope of public performance 
is much broader than push communication. In the light of the subsequent develop-
ments and the harmonisation of a broad communication to the public right under 
the WIPO CT, along with the making available right aimed specifically at on-
demand transmission, it could perhaps be contested whether such cases fall under 
the performance right under the BC. 
 
 
5.1.3. Broadcasting as broadening the reach of performance 
to a remote public 
With the development of technology, the new ways of dissemination emerged, 
allowing transmission of signals carrying copyright-protected content to a much 
broader public than that potentially reached by a public performance to a present 
audience. Broadcasting of a performance became one of the ways to reach a pub-
lic not present at the premises. Besides the broadcasting of a performance, tech-
nology also enabled broadcasting of a work itself, even if it would generally not 
be subject to performance but of recitation or even display.794  
Hence, the emergence of broadcasting resulted in the two main advances. 
First, it allowed a live performance to be communicated to a much wider public 
not present at the premises.795 Second, it provided a primary channel of dissemi-
nation not dependent on the performance, i.e. through broadcasting a film or 
                                                                                             
791  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), pp. 704, 715. 
792  Sterner et al. (1968), p. 27.  
793  Guide to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris 
Act, 1971). WIPO Publication No. 615(E) 1978, p. 64.  
794  On broadcasting being a communication of a work see also Opinion of Advocate General 
in Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) 
and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08). 3 February 2011, para. 117. 
795  See Gordon on artistic performance becoming a public good with the development of 
technology and ability to reach audience beyond a concert hall. Gordon (2003), p. xv. 
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sending images accompanied by music.796 In the first case, the recognition of an 
exclusive right of broadcasting would secure the right holder’s ability to control 
any subsequent use of performance and the new market for its consumption. In 
the second case, the right would ensure that the broadcasting as a separate way 
of exploiting a work is subject to right holder’s authorisation and, hence, secure 
remuneration. 
Faced with new channels of communication, such as through broadcasting, 
copyright holders and various intermediaries sought to protect their interests in 
potential commercial exploitation of works. Essentially, broadcasting enabled the 
same performance of a work, whether transmitting a live or a recorded one.797 
Whereas the relation between copyright and broadcasting is a complex one, the 
current section will briefly touch upon broadcasting as a subject to the exclusive 
author’s right.798 
It would perhaps seem logical to cover broadcasting with the recognised right 
of public performance, as the only difference was the presence of the public at 
the receiving end and technical means involved.799 Rightly so, the option was 
discussed at the negotiations on the BC revision but was not adopted.800 Instead, 
Article 11bis(1)(i) was introduced to the BC in order to provide a right of 
authorising broadcasting limited to literary and artistic works. Whereas there is 
no definition of broadcasting in the text of the BC, some derive it from the wording 
of the Article to mean the wireless diffusion of signs, sounds, or images.801 Others 
refer to the Rome Convention, which provides that it is a communication of works 
to the public by radio diffusion.802 
The right of authorising broadcasting under the BC is understood to include 
only wireless communication, which is also reflected in the heading of the 
Article. Communication by wire is instead covered by the right of communication 
to the public by wire under Article 11bis(1)(ii). On the other hand, the right of 
                                                                                             
796  The two-fold nature of broadcasting in respect of communication of a work is also 
highlighted in the draft of the Model Law on copyright. The author is granted a right of 
broadcasting, which is the right to communicate a work (including the display, performance, 
or broadcast of a work) to the public by broadcasting. See Committee of Experts on Model 
provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First Session. Draft model provisions for 
legislation in the field of copyright. I Introduction. Memorandum prepared by the International 
Bureau. CE/MPC/I/2-II 1989, p. 7. 
797 On the history of broadcasting and the relation to copyright law, see Quintais (2017), pp. 
56–61. 
798 Broadcasting is also subject to neighbouring rights. For an extensive summary of 
regulation, see Guibault and Melzer (2004). 
799  This is if broadcasting is seen as receiving a signal on a TV set which is placed in a public 
space. If broadcasting is instead considered as sending a signal carrying a work or its per-
formance, other arguments arise. 
800  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 722. 
801  See Nordemann et al. (1990), p. 124. 
802  Ricketson (1987), p. 439. Radio-diffusion, in turn, is understood to include both radio and 
television. See Stewart and Sandison (1989), p. 124. 
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communication to the public of the performance of dramatic and musical works 
covers both communication by wire and wireless communication.803 Similarly, 
the right of communication to the public of the recitation of literary works under 
Article 11ter(1)(ii) covers both types of communication. 
Whereas it is unclear whether the right of broadcasting covers rebroadcasting 
from the wording of Article 11bis(1)(i) alone, it is somehow clarified in the next 
paragraph. According to Article 11bis(1)(ii), rebroadcasting or any commu-
nication to the public of broadcast by wire is subject to an exclusive right when 
it is performed by an organisation other than the original one. However, it is not 
very clear why each act of retransmission is subjected to authorisation or how to 
differentiate between the primary broadcast and any retransmissions.804 
Accordingly, Article 11bis(1)(ii) seems to exempt the acts of retransmission 
either through rebroadcasting or communication by wire when it is made by the 
same organisation having initial authorisation. It is, however, questionable on 
what conditions these acts are exempted. Namely, whether retransmission can 
reach new territories, take place at a different date, etc. On the one hand, where 
no new organisation is involved and retransmission is a simultaneous one, it 
seems not to constitute communication requiring authorisation under Article 
11bis of the BC, even if it takes place in a different territory.805 On the other hand, 
the wording also suggests that, in principle, any act of retransmission is a relevant 
act, even if directed at the same public.806 
Hence, the outcome seems to be that every act of broadcasting, whether a 
primary or a secondary one, is an act of exploitation requiring the right holder’s 
authorisation.807 Whereas the right to authorise primary broadcasting is covered 
under the first paragraph of Article 11bis(1), secondary acts of retransmission are 
within the scope of the right pursuant to Article 11bis(1)(ii). Nevertheless, acts 
of retransmission are exempted if they are carried out by the same organisation 
as the initial broadcast. Given that the only condition for secondary acts of broad-
casting to fall within the exclusive right is that these acts are carried out by an 
organisation other than the original one, this condition deserves special attention. 
Whereas the text of Article 11bis(1)(ii) refers to an organisation other than the 
original one, it was by far not the only option discussed during negotiations on 
Article 11bis. The question whether and when retransmission of a broadcast 
                                                                                             
803  Nordemann et al. (1990), p. 124. 
804  Depreeuw (2014), p. 280. 
805  On simultaneous transmissions, see Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 737. Also, under 
the negotiations on the Model Law, simultaneous rebroadcast by the same organization was 
exempted from the exclusive right. See Committee of Experts on Model provisions for 
legislation in the field of copyright. First Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the 
field of copyright. I Introduction. Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau. 
CE/MPC/I/2-II 1989, p. 21. 
806  Depreeuw (2014), p. 290. 
807  On the secondary act of broadcasting, see Depreeuw (2014), pp. 290–291; Quintais (2017), 
p. 61. 
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would require consent became subject to extensive debate.808 Notably, another 
criterion discussed was the reach of the public. The alternative solution would be 
that no separate authorisation was necessary for simple retransmission that did 
not extend the reach of a primary broadcast and merely improved the quality of 
reception.809  
The concept of a new public as a prerequisite for qualifying retransmission as 
requiring a separate authorisation was dismissed as too vague, inter alia, on the 
ground that it could be argued that every transmission by different technical 
means would reach a new public and become subject to another authorisation.810 
The latter had to be avoided in order to ensure that the broadcasting organisation 
with authorisation would be able to send the signal through its stations irrespec-
tive of the way of doing so and without the need to obtain additional authori-
sation.811 
In the context of Article 11bis(1)(ii), the reference to a different organisation 
appears no less vague. Indeed, the concept provides very little guidance on why 
acts of retransmission should be subject to the exclusive right at all. Also, the 
reference does not clarify why retransmissions by the original broadcaster should 
always be exempted from the authorisation requirement, including when they 
result in a foregone profit for the copyright holder. The negotiations on the Model 
Law suggest that the relevant factor is not only a new organisation, but also 
whether the retransmission is simultaneous and unaltered.812 
Some interpret the history of the BC as not implying that unaltered simulta-
neous retransmission to the same coverage area would be subject to authori-
sation.813 This is supported by the fact that retransmission of a broadcast by cable 
by a third party was not a reality back at the time of the Brussels conference and, 
hence, not contemplated by the provisions. Essentially, what the provision meant 
to achieve was that retransmission outside the transmission area of first broadcast 
required authorisation, which falls back on the notion of a new public.814 
Although the new public criterion has been rejected, in my opinion, it is relevant 
consideration even if put in conjunction with a new organisation requirement. 
                                                                                             
808  For instance, the UK delegation suggested to include three conditions for rebroadcasting 
to fall under the exclusive right: if it takes place in a country of the Union other than the 
original broadcast; if it is done by a body other than the original broadcaster; and if it is 
broadcasted to audience not contemplated by the original body. See Records of the Intellectual 
Property Conference of Stockholm 1967. Vol. 1. WIPO 1971, p. 671. 
809  Depreeuw (2014), p. 285. 
810  Ibid., p. 286. 
811  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 733. 
812  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Memorandum pre-
pared by the International Bureau. III Comments on the draft model provisions for legislation 
in the field of copyright. CE/MPC/I/2-III 1989, p. 28. 
813  Peukert (2017), p. 891. 
814  Ibid., p. 891. 
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Essentially, the reason for granting the exclusive right to authorise an act is to 
secure the exploitation of a work. Hence, subjecting acts of retransmission to 
exclusive control must intend to provide an opportunity for the right holder to 
obtain remuneration. However, whether such retransmission has a potential of 
generating additional value will depend on aspects far beyond the identity of the 
organisation. For instance, it will depend on whether a new public is reached, i.e. 
the potential audience is willing to pay for it, presumably not having access to the 
work before. Whether or not this public is reached by a different organisation 
should be of minor importance.815 
Hence, it is not utterly convincing to differentiate between the original broad-
caster and different organisation for this purpose.816 Although it could be argued 
that the right holder is in a better position to negotiate the remuneration with an 
original broadcaster than with a different organisation, it would also raise the 
question of competition. For instance, it is not justified from an economic point 
of view to subject simultaneous transmissions to additional remuneration, which 
the right holder must have claimed from a single broadcaster.817 All this suggests 
that the new public may still be relevant for examining the reach of the broad-
casting right in regard to retransmissions. Importantly, the new public would have 
to be assessed in such cases, not in the territorial sense but in the economic 
sense.818 Because what is essential for the authors is the remuneration corre-
sponding to the territory in which the broadcast can be received.819 
Yet another aspect that is relevant to the subsequent development of the right 
of communication to the public on the EU level is viewing the public receipt of a 
broadcasting signal as an act of communication to the public.820 On the one hand, 
copyright protection and the rights of communication to the public shall leave 
enough space for enjoyment of the work and its reception.821 On the other hand, 
the advancement of reception technology required a delimitation between mere 
reception and communication of a work as an act relevant to exploitation.822 
Although the question of public reception of communication as an act of com-
munication to the public is not resolved, qualifying it as an act of communication 
requiring authorisation received some support.823 One argument is that, even if it 
                                                                                             
815  See also CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael 
Hoteles SA. (2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, paras 40–41. And the 
Opinion of Advocate General in Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) 
v Rafael Hoteles SA. (2006) Case C-306/05. 13 July 2006, para. 50. 
816  See Reimer calling for the revision of Article 11bis on the grounds that the Article is not 
clear on the matter of retransmissions. Reimer (1979b), p. 564. 
817  Peukert (2017), p. 893. 
818  Depreeuw (2014), p. 344. 
819  Ulmer (1986), p. 713. 
820  For instance, by placing a TV receiver in a pub or other public place. 
821  Depreeuw (2014), p. 344. 
822  Ibid., p. 317. 
823  Ibid., p. 265. 
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is not a substitute for existing form of exploitation, the right holder shall be able 
to participate where the use of a work generates income by attracting the 
public.824 Furthermore, it should not matter whether an entity receiving a signal 
publicly is making any profit, as long as it affects the right holder’s right to exploit 
a work.825 The mere reception and distribution of a signal by a collective antenna, 
on the other hand, would not constitute communication to the public.826 
In a sense, the broadcasting right is a highly technical one, which covers a 
specific form of exploitation extending to a wider public. Hence, there are 
concerns about the breadth of the right and possibilities to restrict it, not least in 
relation to retransmissions.827 Hence, Article 11bis(2) provides the parties with a 
possibility to establish the conditions under which the right may be exercised, 
provided that they do not prejudice the right to obtain equitable remuneration.828 
This presents a possibility of compulsory licenses that would turn the right into a 
remuneration right.829  
Article 11bis(2), which provides an option for states to introduce a com-
pulsory license for the retransmission of a broadcast, is the only Article under the 
BC in relation to communication rights which provides a possibility to limit 
control over subsequent communication. In the late 1970s BIRPI (United Inter-
national Bureaux for the Protection of Intellectual Property, the predecessor of 
the WIPO) discussed the need to update the Convention with a possibility to 
restrict the rights.830 The rights under consideration were first and foremost the 
right of translation and the broadcasting right.831 The discussion resulted in nego-
tiations with developing countries and the adoption of the Paris Act, which 
provided them with a possibility to define exceptions to translation and 
reproduction rights.832 
 
 
                                                                                             
824  Ibid., p. 338. 
825  Ibid., p. 338. On the matter addressed by the CJEU, see section 5.2.3.2.1.3.  
826  Ibid., p. 285. 
827  Ibid., p. 299. 
828  On compulsory licensing under Article 11bis(2), see Quintais (2017), pp. 61–70. 
829  See Schovsbo on compulsory licensing, emphasising the significance of anticompetitive 
effects created by copyright. Schovsbo (2011), p. 325. 
830  One of the options under the consideration was to provide a general possibility to restrict 
the rights. Another option was to provide an exception for educational purposes, either for all 
the parties or solely for the developing countries. 
831  Study of the Entire Situation of International Relations in the. Field of Copyright. The 
BIRPI Memorandum. BIRPI/SGC-I/7 1969., pp. 8–9. 
832  Under the Paris Act, Article II (9) of the Appendix to the Berne Convention. Broadcasting 
right was not among the rights, but it is generally covered under Article 11bis of the Stockholm 
Act. See Ulmer (1971), p. 363. 
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5.1.4. Communication to the public from an act of secondary 
to an act of primary communication 
Besides the right of performance and the right of broadcasting, the third type of 
rights covering intangible dissemination under the BC is the right of communi-
cation to the public. The right is granted not in respect of a work itself but its 
performance (or recitation in the case of literary works) or broadcast.833 One 
example would be communication to the public of a broadcast by its public receipt, 
touched upon in the previous section. The right of communication to the public 
under the BC was quite separate from performance and broadcasting rights.834 
The main function of the right is to subject acts of subsequent communication to 
the exclusive control of the right holder. 
No blanket right of communication to the public is provided under the BC. 
Instead, the scope of the right is derived from several provisions.835 First, the BC 
grants the right of communication to the public of performance of musical and 
dramatic works under Article 11(1)(ii).836 Similarly, it provides for the right of 
communication to the public by wire or analogue instruments of broadcast of 
literary and artistic works under Article 11bis(1)(ii) and 11bis(1)(iii) of the BC. 
Second, the BC grants the right of communication to the public of the recitation 
of literary works under Article 11ter(1)(ii). Third, the BC also recognises the right 
of communication to the public of adapted literary or artistic works under the 
Article 14(1)(ii). 
Whereas at the time of the BC adoption and revision the communication to 
the public right was of secondary importance and covered, in essence, secondary 
acts of communication relying on the initial acts (such as performance, broadcast, 
etc.), its significance increased with the emergence of the online environment. At 
the outset of online dissemination and negotiations on the WIPO CT, the question 
that arose was whether the reach of the fragmented right of communication to the 
public under the BC extended to online dissemination. Views differed.837 
Under the negotiations on the Model Law in the early 1990s the definition of 
the scope of the right of communication relied on the provisions of the BC.838 
                                                                                             
833  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), p. 741. 
834  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Sixth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VI/16-INR/CE/V/14 1996, p. 29. 
835  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), pp. 730–731. Also, Ricketson (1987), p. 432. 
836  Before the Stockholm Act of 1967 the wording of the provision was slightly different, 
using the term distribution: “11(1) The authors of dramatic, dramatico-musical or musical 
works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing: (ii) the public distribution by any means 
of the presentation and performance of their works”. 
837  Ricketson and Ginsburg (2006), pp. 742–743. Also, see Ginsburg on the application of the 
BC, Ginsburg (2004), p. 8. 
838  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. Memorandum 
prepared by the International Bureau. III Comments on the draft model provisions for 
legislation in the field of copyright. CE/MPC/I/2-III 1989, p. 22. 
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Nonetheless, under the Model Law the rights of communication were systema-
tised. Besides the rights of performance and broadcast, the draft included the right 
to authorise communication of a work (including the display, performance or 
broadcast of a work) by cable or any other means.839 Communication to the public 
as a concept was also discussed under the negotiations on the PPBC, but mainly 
in respect to the definition of public. However, it was back into the programme 
under the discussion on digital transmissions in 1995. The question was how to 
deal with digital transmissions and delivery in the absence of certainty as to 
whether rights under the BC already covered such uses. Besides the proposal to 
recognise a new right of transmission, the application of reproduction and distri-
bution rights was discussed.840 
The question of possible extension of the right of communication to the public 
to the acts of online transmission was equally on the agenda. Unlike the other 
rights under consideration, the right of communication to the public was not 
widely harmonised on the international level and applied in different scope to 
different works (or rather their performances, recitations, and broadcasts). Hence, 
the introduction of a broad right of communication to the public was also dis-
cussed. Following the negotiations, the question of extending the scope of the 
right of communication to the public to all types of work was combined with the 
question of digital transmissions.841 Hence, one of the main driving forces (if not 
the chief one) behind the recognition of the broad right of communication to the 
public was the intent to extend it to digital transmissions.842 
From then on, the right of communication to the public was discussed as con-
cerning a work rather than its performance or broadcast. More precisely, discus-
sion on digital transmissions dealt explicitly with situations where a work was 
initially communicated through online transmission, without relying on previous 
acts such as performance or broadcasting. Such communication would mean 
making a work perceptible (equivalent to performance) and not merely a trans-
mission of a signal that extended the reach of the previous communication of a 
work. Whereas it is a reasonable development, today the right must be viewed 
beyond the transmission realm, as every transmission might not be per se equal 
to exploitation.843 
 
 
                                                                                             
839  Committee of Experts on Model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. First 
Session. Draft model provisions for legislation in the field of copyright. I Introduction. 
Memorandum prepared by the International Bureau. CE/MPC/I/2-II 1989, p. 7. 
840  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Fifth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/V/9-INR/CE/IV/8 1995, p. 59. Some delegations 
supported also the application of the right of display, see Ibid., p. 68. 
841  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Sixth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VI/16-INR/CE/V/14 1996, p. 24. 
842  Ficsor (2002), pp. 494–495. 
843  Hence, the right should not be aligned solely with it. See Depreeuw (2014), p. 343. 
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5.1.5. Broad right of communication to the public and 
the digital agenda 
The late 1980s marks a shift in the approach to exclusive rights under inter-
national law. Perhaps the first glimpse of it, although not in the negotiations on a 
binding legal instrument, can be traced under the discussions on the Model Law, 
which served as a draft for the subsequent discussion on the PPBC. The tendency 
to talk about separate categories of works and respective rights gradually dis-
appeared. This can be traced clearly in the two outcomes of the negotiations on 
the Model Law. First, the right of recitation was assimilated with the right of 
performance, and the latter was still discussed separately from other forms of 
intangible dissemination. Second, a blanket right of communication to the public 
covering all types of works was included in the draft. Therefore, the right would 
be broader than the communication to the public right under the BC, where it 
covered communication of performance, recitation or broadcast rather than a 
work.844 
The tendency to broaden the scope of the right continued under the nego-
tiations on the PPBC. Out of the communication rights, only the right of broad-
casting was addressed in greater detail at the outset of the negotiations. Never-
theless, the right of communication came under the spotlight in conjunction with 
its possible application to digital transmissions. There was more or less a con-
sensus on a need to recognise a right to authorise the transmission of a work that 
would apply in a digital environment, but there was no agreement on which right 
shall be applied.845 The notion of the right of digital transmission inevitably over-
lapped with the rights recognised under the BC, namely the right of broadcasting 
and, partially, the right of communication to the public.846 The extension of the 
right of communication to the public was considered a possible option, that 
would, however, also result in some traditional forms of exploitation falling 
within its scope. 
The main proponent of assigning the right of communication to the public to 
digital transmissions was the EC. The EC made a Proposal which was later copied 
into the WIPO CT (with the only difference that under the WIPO CT the pro-
vision would refer to Article 11 as a whole): 
 
 
                                                                                             
844  See the previous section on the initially secondary character of the right of communication 
to the public relying on a primary communication through performance, broadcast, etc. On the 
other hand, the right under the Model Law covered solely communication by wire. 
845  Some suggest that the whole purpose behind the right to authorise digital transmissions 
was to secure control over all digital performances and distribution regardless whether in the 
public or private sphere. See McManis (1996), p. 272. 
846  See the statement by the delegation of Japan, Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol 
to the Berne Convention. Sixth Session. Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VI/16-
INR/CE/V/14 1996, pp. 24–25. 
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Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 
11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and 
artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to 
the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making avail-
able to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may 
access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.847 
 
The EC proposal introduced a making available right as a sub-right of the right 
of communication to the public. Although it was the first time making available 
would be used as a designation of a right, the concept was not unknown under 
the BC. Besides the first being present in the earlier definition of publication 
under the Convention, it is also used for calculating the term of protection under 
Article 7 of the BC. A work being made available was a precondition to a lawful 
quotation exception under Article 10. The expression “making available” relates 
to every form of publication of a work and is not restricted to copies but extends 
to radio diffusion and merely provision of access.848 
Furthermore, the term making available is also defined in the WIPO Glossary. 
To make a work available to the public means “to offer a work to the public in 
such a way as to make it accessible according to its characteristics, through 
exhibition, publication, performance, broadcasting, or other forms of commu-
nication to the public.”849 Hence, the making available concept covered both 
copy-related and non-copy related presentation of a work to public. In the absence 
of a consensus on a suitable right for digital transmission, the term making 
available was endorsed as a basis of the umbrella solution.850 Whilst it meant that 
the right of making available covering digital transmissions is placed under the 
right of communication to the public under the WIPO CT, the contracting parties 
are free to implement it under other rights, including the right of distribution.851 
During the discussion few concerns were raised as to the extension of the right 
of communication to the public to online transmissions. The delegation of Japan 
has rightly pointed out that one shall be careful with expanding the right of com-
munication to the public, as it may in the end cover not only new forms of elec-
tronic communication but subject matters already covered by other rights not 
harmonised by the BC, such as public display, as well.852 The UNESCO delega-
tion developed the argument a bit further, stating that a difference shall be 
                                                                                             
847  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Seventh Session. 
Proposals of the European Community and its Member States. BCP/CE/VII/1-INR/CE/VI/1 
1995, p. 3. 
848  Ficsor (2002), pp. 168–169.  
849  WIPO Glossary of Terms of the Law of Copyright and Neighboring Rights. WIPO 
Publication No. 816 (EFS) 1980, p. 153. 
850  Ficsor (2002), p. 169. 
851  See more on the provision in sections 3.1.5.4. and 5.1.6.2. 
852  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Sixth Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VI/16-INR/CE/V/14 1996, p. 25. This is indeed so if 
we consider the adopted right of making a work available to the public. 
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maintained between the acts of transmission and acts of communication to the 
public. Covering the former with the right of communication to the public was 
advantageous for authors.853 
Similarly to UNESCO, the Business Software Alliance (BSA) presented a view 
that the nature of an act shall play a role in, for instance, whether a copy is created 
only in memory or on a hard drive, or a work can be accessed online. The right 
of distribution was the preferred option for covering certain types of acts.854 The 
American National Music Publisher Association rightly underlined that digital 
transmission could, at the same time, involve other rights such as public per-
formance, communication and distribution.855 The Electronic Industries Alliance 
stressed the importance of ensuring that distributed digital copies could be further 
disposed of by end users, like in the tangible world, to maintain a balance between 
end users and right holders.856 
UNESCO supported the proposal of the EC in general, i.e. to use the commu-
nication to the public right for dealing with digital transmissions, but was scep-
tical about the part on the making available right in the light of the absence of any 
proposed exceptions to the right. Also, it was feared that in relation to analogue 
communication that was covered by certain provisions of the BC, the proposal 
could extend the coverage of acts of performance, broadcasting, and commu-
nication outside of normal exploitation of a work.857 
Harmonising the right of making available to the public encompassing online 
dissemination under the broader right of communication to the public influenced 
the nature of the latter right. Whereas under the BC the right would deal with the 
acts of secondary transmission, now through the making available right its scope 
would extend to the acts of primary communication. Hence, acts with different 
characteristics and subject to different regulation in analogue circumstances 
would become subject to a single broad right in the digital environment. 
Such as shift from different rights in analogue circumstances to a single right 
in the online context implicates drawing the appropriate boundaries of the scope 
of granted protection, where exclusive control over any subsequent (secondary) 
acts undermines the access to a work and competition. Therefore, by placing the 
right of making available under the right of communication to the public, the very 
different ways of communicating a work would be put together. Namely, direct 
communication of a work’s content, secondary communication of a work 
extending the reach of primary communication and making a work available for 
access.858 The right of making available would fundamentally differ from the 
traditional communication rights such as performance or broadcast, as it would 
                                                                                             
853  Ibid., p. 29. 
854  Ibid., p. 31. 
855  Ibid., p. 30. 
856  Ibid., p. 34. 
857  Committee of Experts on a possible Protocol to the Berne Convention. Seventh Session. 
Report adopted by Committee. BCP/CE/VII/4-INR/CE/VI/4, p. 21. 
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focus not on transmission but rather making a work available for access. Thus, 
even though in the analogue world the concept merely brought together the dif-
ferent forms of dissemination, its scope in the context of the online environment 
would be rather different. 
 
 
5.1.6. Harmonisation of the right of communication to 
the public under international law 
As was outlined in the section above, harmonisation of the right of commu-
nication to the public under the BC is rather fragmented. It relates to acts of trans-
mission which are secondary to a work’s communication such as through perfor-
mance or broadcast. The importance of recognition of the broad right materialised 
with the emergence of the digital environment and the possible extension of the 
right from covering secondary acts to encompassing the primary acts of commu-
nication of a work. 
The WIPO CT harmonised a broad right of communication to the public and, 
hence, addressed the lacunae of protection granted under the BC. This section 
focuses specifically on the provisions under the WIPO CT, as its adoption became 
the main driving force behind the harmonisation of the right of communication 
to the public on the EU level, and the European legislator relied on the wording 
on the Treaty when drafting the InfoSoc Directive. 
 
 
5.1.6.1. Broad right of communication to the public under 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The Diplomatic Conference adopting the WIPO CT followed the negotiations on 
the PPBC and built upon the results of the submissions from the delegations. The 
aim of harmonising the right of communication to the public under the Treaty 
was to expand the limited scope of the right recognised under the BC, filling in 
the blank spots.859 Furthermore, the adoption of the right also implemented initia-
tives under the digital agenda concerning digital transmissions. The “side effect” 
of the process was creation of a broad right covering communication from a live 
performance to online delivery.860 
The draft proposal by the Chairman of the text of the Treaty under Article 10 
(Article 8 in the final text) was almost verbatim a copy of the Proposal made by 
the EC: 
 
Without prejudice to the rights provided for in Articles 11, 11bis, 11ter, 14 and 
14bis of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy 
the exclusive right of authorising any communication to the public of their works, 
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including the making available to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a 
place and at a time individually chosen by them.861 
 
The only difference was the wording of the first sentence, namely that Article 
11bis was included as a whole, unlike the PPBC. This would essentially mean 
that the Treaty was without prejudice to the BC provisions on the communication 
to the public or broadcasting or rebroadcasting of the literary and artistic works 
and communication to the public by loudspeaker. Even more importantly, the 
provisions of Article 11bis(2) would not be affected, and, thus, the ability of states 
to opt for implementing non-voluntary licenses for retransmission of broadcast.862 
The adopted text of the WIPO CT, however, differs to the effect that only 
Article 11bis(1)(iii) could be affected by the WIPO CT, probably because of the 
application of the right of communication to the public under the WIPO CT to 
wireless transmissions as well. Article 8 is hence modelled after the general right 
of reproduction,863 and reads as follows: 
 
Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 11(1)(ii), 11bis(1)(i) and (ii), 
11ter(1)(ii), 14(1)(ii) and 14bis(1) of the Berne Convention, authors of literary and 
artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to 
the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including the making avail-
able to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may 
access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
 
The Article is accompanied by the Agreed Statement, which confirms that the 
Treaty is without prejudice to the option of introducing compulsory licenses 
under Article 11bis(2) of the BC: 
 
Agreed statement concerning Article 8: It is understood that the mere provision of 
physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself 
amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Conven-
tion. It is further understood that nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party 
from applying Article 11bis(2). 
 
The first part of the Article extended the right of communication to the public by 
wire or by wireless means to all types of works. The proposal stressed that com-
munication to the public covers acts of making available by means or processes 
other than distributing copies. Further, communication implied transmission to 
                                                                                             
861  Basic Proposal for the Substantive provisions of the Treaty on certain questions 
concerning the protection of literary and artistic works to be considered by Diplomatic 
Conference. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring rights questions. 
WIPO CRNR/DC/4 1996, p. 42. 
862  Ibid., p. 44. 
863  Depreeuw (2014), p. 346. 
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the public not present where it originates.864 Hence, it would cover all the com-
munication of a work besides distributing copies and communicating a work to a 
present public. It can be concluded that private performance would fall outside 
the scope of the right, whereas broadcasting would come within the scope.865 
Although initially a separate right of transmission was discussed for dealing 
with communication to a remote public, it was argued that opting for the right of 
communication to the public to cover such acts made the wording consistent with 
the BC.866 Article 8’s reference to communication by wire or by wireless means 
might appear confusing in the context of online dissemination. The distinction 
between communication by wire and wireless communication was developed 
under the BC with regard to then existing technologies, i.e. to differentiate 
between broadcasting and other ways of transmitting a signal carrying a work. In 
the context of the online environment, it would be of no relevance whether a user 
or a person communicating a work or making it available accesses the network 
through wi-fi, cable network or mobile network. Essentially, the connection 
always passes through cables (the Internet’s backbone) or satellites (for mobile 
networks). 
Unlike the right of distribution under the Treaty, the right of communication 
to the public under the WIPO CT is commonly understood as encompassing acts 
of initial and subsequent transmissions of a work.867 It is also understood that the 
right does not cease to exist upon any circumstances, although certain limitations 
and exceptions may be applied in accordance with the principle of minor reser-
vations.868 Receipt of the transmission is not an essential condition, meaning that 
the public need not to actually perceive a work. The only condition is that persons 
to whom access is offered form a public.869 
Against the background of the previous section and the obligations under the 
BC, the right of communication to the public essentially harmonises both acts of 
primary and secondary communication by extending the concept originally used 
to characterise secondary communication. It covers any communication of a work 
to a distant public, be it an act relying on performance to the present public or 
                                                                                             
864  Basic Proposal for the Substantive provisions of the Treaty on certain questions 
concerning the protection of literary and artistic works to be considered by Diplomatic 
Conference. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring rights questions. 
WIPO CRNR/DC/4 1996, p. 44. 
865  Hugenholtz and van Velze (2016), p. 800. 
866  Basic Proposal for the Substantive provisions of the Treaty on certain questions con-
cerning the protection of literary and artistic works to be considered by Diplomatic Con-
ference. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring rights questions. 
WIPO CRNR/DC/4 1996, p. 46. 
867  Ginsburg and Budiardjo (2018), p. 156; Reinbothe and Lewinski (2015), pp. 132–133. 
868  Basic Proposal for the Substantive provisions of the Treaty on certain questions con-
cerning the protection of literary and artistic works to be considered by Diplomatic Con-
ference. Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring rights questions. 
WIPO CRNR/DC/4 1996, pp. 46–48. 
869  Ginsburg and Budiardjo (2018), p. 157. 
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not, including any further communication. Given the selectivity of coverage of 
secondary acts of communication by exclusive rights under the BC, it is inter-
esting that such an extension did not raise objections or further debate at the time 
of adoption of the Treaty. 
The right of communication to the public under the WIPO CT has been called 
a “safety net” for right holders, as it covers all forms of communication not 
recognised under the BC.870 Nonetheless, this does not mean that any exception 
to the right are ruled out from the outset. For instance, the WIPO CT does not 
preclude the contracting parties from exempting rebroadcasting from the reach of 
the right of communication to the public.871 
 
 
5.1.6.2. Right of making available to the public under 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
The second part of Article 8 provides for the right of making available to the 
public, which was negotiated during preceding discussions on the PPBC. Although 
the BC could be interpreted as already covering acts of digital transmission, 
spelling the right out explicitly in the text of the Treaty would ensure that was the 
case.872 Hence, one could view the right of making available as “neither a 
reaffirmation nor a novelty” but simply as resolving an ambiguity as to whether 
the communication to the public right under the BC covered pull technologies.873 
Furthermore, it could be seen as clarifying whether the protection of com-
munication of a work extends also to a public separated in time.874 
Considered in isolation from the other rights under the BC, the right of com-
munication to the public under the Convention covered only secondary acts. 
Indeed, the right would probably be wide enough to cover retransmission of a 
broadcast or a performance on the Internet. However, it may not cover trans-
mission of performance or of a work originating on the Internet. For this, the 
extension of the right of broadcast or performance would be necessary. However, 
as the right of communication to the public under the WIPO CT covers any act 
                                                                                             
870  Efroni (2011), p. 274. 
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872  Basic Proposal for the Substantive provisions of the Treaty on certain questions con-
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of communication, this was achieved under the right of communication to the 
public, but without considering the limitations associated with the respective 
rights.  
Turning back to the making available right under the WIPO CT, although it is 
often discussed separately, in practice it falls under the wider scope of commu-
nication to the public. The making available right is the result of the umbrella 
solution developed during the negotiations on the PPBC in the absence of a con-
sensus on what right should cover on-demand digital transmissions.875 According 
to the solution, acts of digital transmission could be covered by any right.876  
The Proposal prepared by the Chairman explained that “the relevant act is the 
making available of the work by providing access to it. What counts is the initial 
act of making the work available, not the mere provision of server space, com-
munication connections, or facilities for the carriage and routing of signals. It is 
irrelevant whether copies are available for the user or whether the work is simply 
made perceptible to, and thus usable by, the user”.877 Hence, the right would cover 
both transmissions resulting in a creation of digital copies on a recipient’s end 
and those communicating it by making it perceptible, functionally equivalent to 
a performance or broadcast. 
Interestingly enough, the proposal stressed the initial acts of making available, 
which indeed supports the thesis that, first and foremost, recognition of the right 
to communicate a work though online transmission as a primary channel was at 
stake. According to the wording, only on-demand acts of communication fall 
within the scope. This is not too clear, as also noted during the Diplomatic 
Conference. Replying to a comment from the delegation of Singapore on this 
matter, the EC delegation confirmed that the provision intended to cover only 
truly on-demand services.878 Near-interactive services (such as through sub-
scription) would not be covered in the view of the EC. Others contend that push-
technologies are included, i.e. where a work is sent as an e-mail attachment, 
meaning that access is on-demand rather than the transmissions itself.879 
Placing the right of making available to the public into the same article as the 
right of communication to the public was criticised. The Australian delegation 
suggested keeping the rights of communication to the public and making 
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available separate by at least moving the second part of the article to a new 
paragraph and including making available in the heading.880 Indeed, placing the 
right of communication and the right of making available under the same article 
seem to have resulted in confusion.881 
The right of making available to the public under the WIPO CT thus covers 
acts of making a work available by wire or by wireless means for the public to 
access it at the place and time chosen by them. The phrase “from a place and at a 
time individually chosen by the members of the public” was supposed to clarify 
both the public concept and that the on-demand use would come within the 
scope.882 This is possibly the broadest possible definition of the right to control 
dissemination. This is supported, inter alia, by the broad understanding of the 
making available concept and the usage of the making available expression in the 
definition of the right of distribution. Equally, it is difficult to come up with any 
conceivable boundaries of the right deriving from its wording as it seems to cover 
nearly everything.  
However, as it was introduced to primarily cover digital transmissions, it 
would most probably not extend to making a work available through displaying 
a tangible object incorporating a work. Equally, the on-demand nature of the acts 
intended to fall under the right implies that broadcasting would also be out of the 
scope due to the lack of individual choice.883 Furthermore, individual point-to-
point communication would likely also be excluded.884  
Although the wording puts it in a way that the public can decide when and 
where to access a work, it is fundamentally a very distinct characteristic of the 
online environment. The latter enables on-demand consumption without the need 
to subscribe to broadcasting. As accurately indicated by Ginsburg, the making 
available right is essentially access right, even though it creates the impression of 
control being put into the end user’s hands.885 Combined with the clarification 
that it does not matter whether or not a copy is provided to a user, it is an over-
broad right covering de facto any possible act that (remotely) has to do with a 
work online. 
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5.2. Harmonisation of the right of communication 
to the public and making available 
under the EU acquis 
As outlined in the section above, the background to the harmonisation of the right 
of communication to the public is rather complex. Whereas the notion of the com-
munication rights comprises several rights covering the different ways of making 
a work perceptible, the right of communication to the public under the EU acquis 
grew, with a very few exceptions, into a general right covering all the possible 
ways to exploit a work not associated with the distribution of copies on a tangible 
medium.886 However, if we consider that the communication of a work to the 
public from a tangible copy such as a recoding on a CD would also fall under the 
right, the copy-related rights such as distribution are, in essence, just a pre-
paratory step.  
The harmonisation of the right under the EU acquis relies largely on the 
Directives, in particular the InfoSoc Directive. Unlike the right of distribution, 
the rights of communication to the public under national laws prior to the Direc-
tives were subject to CJEU jurisprudence in very few cases. The analysis of this 
part focuses predominantly on the InfoSoc Directive and the CJEU jurisprudence 
on it. Whereas the Satellite and Cable Directive is briefly examined in this part, 
the recently adopted Digital Single Market (DSM) Directive is left out of the 
scope of the enquiry as not addressing the scope of the right of communication 
to the public.887 
 
 
5.2.1. Developments besides the adoption of 
the InfoSoc Directive 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the right of communication to the public 
under the InfoSoc Directive, it is appropriate to briefly address a few other 
developments. Four important matters will be addressed in the present section. 
The first aspect is the Court’s jurisprudence examining the conflict between the 
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exclusive rights of communication and the freedom to provide services under the 
Treaty. The second aspect is the jurisprudence of the Court drawing a line 
between the rights of material and immaterial dissemination in relation to the 
same tangible copy. The third is the enquiries of the EC on the necessity to 
harmonise the right of communication to the public and the interpretation of the 
preceding case law. The fourth and final is the limited regulation of retrans-
missions under the Satellite and Cable Directive. 
 
 
5.2.1.1. Conflict between the exclusive rights of communication 
to the public and the freedom to provide services under 
the CJEU jurisprudence 
Before the harmonisation of the right of communication to the public under the 
InfoSoc Directive, other rights of communication were examined under the CJEU 
jurisprudence. Given the development of the right of communication to the public 
as encompassing all the uses traditionally covered by separate rights, the judg-
ments considering these rights are of direct relevance.888 The cases considered in 
this section examine ways a work can be exploited, which are now covered under 
the right of communication to the public under the acquis. 
Rights of material dissemination such as the right of distribution under 
national copyright laws manifestly interfered with the free movement of goods 
objective of the Treaty.889 The conflict between the rights of intangible dissemi-
nation and the objectives of the Treaty was less obvious.890 Not only would the 
exclusive rights of communication be closely interconnected and subject to 
complex licensing schemes, they would interfere with the freedom to provide 
services rather than free movement of goods. 
The cases outlined below illustrate how the issues at stake and the Court’s 
reasoning in examining the compatibility of the rights of intangible dissemination 
with the TFEU Treaty were less straightforward than in cases concerning material 
dissemination and the free movement of goods. The variety of licenses involved 
in the provision of services complicated weighing the objectives of the internal 
market with that of copyright and contract law. The latter is supported, inter alia, 
by the fact that the defendants in both Coditel cases built their defence largely on 
the infringing nature of territorial license relied on by plaintiff either in the light 
of freedom to provide services or on competition grounds. 
Three cases exploring the relation between the exclusive rights of an intangible 
nature and the Treaties will be examined here. Whereas all the cases became 
landmark ones, the first two also became the ground for a specific regulation 
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890  Dietz (1985), p. 379. 
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under the InfoSoc Directive, differentiating the right of communication to the 
public from the right of distribution.891 The third landmark case was decided after 
the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive but ought to be addressed here to illustrate 
the changing considerations at stake. 
The Coditel I case is the first of two cases with the same factual background 
examining the possible conflict of the exclusive right of intangible dissemination 
under national copyright law with the TFEU Treaty. In this landmark case the 
CJEU was asked to rule whether it would be against the freedom to provide services 
under Article 59 of the Treaty (now Article 56 TFEU) to rely on the exclusive 
right of performance under national copyright law to prohibit unauthorised cable 
retransmission of a signal originally authorised in a different MS.  
As was elaborated at the beginning of this chapter, the right of public perfor-
mance is traditionally the first widely recognised right of communicating a work 
in “immaterial” (in the meaning of intangible) form. At the time preceding the 
harmonisation of the right at the EU level, it was recognised in all the nine MS. 
However, there were substantial differences when it came to modern mass com-
munication technology such as broadcasting and cable retransmissions, which 
was the issue at stake in the Coditel cases. Treatment of such technology differed, 
especially in the light of international harmonisation under the BC which allowed 
compulsory licensing.892  
The questions about the interpretation of the Treaty arose in the proceedings 
where an assignee of an exclusive license to distribute a film in Belgium (Cine 
Vog) claimed compensation from an assignee of the right in a different MS 
(Coditel). The reason was that the latter picked up a signal containing a film in 
Germany and subsequently retransmitted it by cable in the former’s exclusive 
territory without authorisation. The defendant (Coditel) argued that prohibition 
of transmission on the basis of an exclusive license confined to a single MS would 
be in breach of Article 59 of the Treaty safeguarding the freedom to provide 
services. The Court was asked, in essence, whether an assignee of the right of 
performance could rely on its exclusive license to claim compensation for an 
unauthorised transmission of a signal that was authorised in a different MS in the 
light of the TFEU and the freedom to provide services.  
The EC in this case argued that the case law on the right of distribution and 
the free movement of goods would not be applicable. In relation to the application 
of the Community exhaustion to the present case, the EC argued that “that prin-
ciple may not be applied to copyrights where there is no material medium. These 
are essentially performing rights. If there is no material medium the criterion of 
marketing cannot be used to determine the extent of the exclusivity of the right”.893 
Hence, the EC aimed to distinguish between tangible and intangible dissemination 
to deny the application of the Community exhaustion principle to the latter. 
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The Court distinguished the situation at the proceedings from the one that 
arises in the context of works, the disposal of which is inseparable from the 
circulation of a material medium (such as books and recordings). In the present 
case the right holder had, according to the Court, a legitimate interest to calculate 
fees based on an actual or probable number of performances. Hence, requiring a 
fee for every showing of a work constituted an essential function of copyright for 
this particular type of work.894  
When it comes to the freedom to provide services, the CJEU recalled that 
Article 59 does not preclude exercise of IP rights unless such exercise constitutes 
arbitrary discrimination or restriction on trade between the MS, i.e. when it results 
in creation of artificial barriers.895 However, assignment of right of performance 
confined to a territory of a MS did not, in principle, constitute an obstacle, as it 
would be impractical to divide licenses differently when the television broad-
casting was relying upon legal broadcasting monopolies. Hence, the assignee 
could rely on their right in the proceedings against a company retransmitting into 
the assignee’s exclusive territory the signal lawfully originating in a different 
MS.896 
The outcome of the case could be justified considering that it solely concerned 
retransmission of a signal originating abroad. It is important to keep in mind that 
the judgment did not clarify if the assignee could also prohibit retransmission of 
their initial transmission originating within the same territory.897 However, the 
reasoning of the Court could have been less ambiguous. The distinction between 
the different types of works served little besides a slightly inaccurate generali-
sation that non-exhaustion for particular acts of intangible dissemination neces-
sarily translates into no limit to the control over any act of dissemination con-
cerning a digital copy of a work.898 
Whereas subjecting retransmission to exclusive control could be justified in 
this case on the basis that such communication, inter alia, reached far beyond the 
intended territory and interfered with the envisioned form of exploitation, it can-
not be assumed that the same justifications would surface in all the cases of 
retransmission. Indeed, a general rule of non-exhaustion for any of the ways of 
communicating a work in intangible form cannot be derived from this case.899 
Exhaustion was neither the subject of the case nor examined by the Court. What 
the Court did was to hold that in the circumstances of the case with a view to a 
specific type of a work and the way it was exploited, enabling obtaining 
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remuneration for each showing was an essential function of copyright. Certainly, 
it precluded retransmission of a signal originating abroad; however, it did not 
preclude retransmission of a signal within the same territory.900  
Still, the case is often interpreted as precluding the exhaustion of the rights 
covering intangible dissemination, including the right of communication to the 
public.901 However, what some scholars call the “doctrine of securing repeated 
exploitation of a work” developed in Coditel I can also amount to a slight exag-
geration.902 Every dissemination-related right granted to the right holder protects 
repeated acts of exploitation in the meaning of authorising every separate act of 
communication. Exhaustion of the right in the context of the right of distribution 
only limits the extent to which each act of exploitation can be subject to further 
control. However, in no way does it restrict the right holder’s freedom to 
authorise any new and independent act of exploitation. Accordingly, this and the 
following cases must be analysed very carefully to avoid overinterpreting their 
outcome beyond the specific circumstances of the proceedings. 
The distinction drawn between the types of works and their relation to material 
and immaterial dissemination is largely arbitral at this point. The film industry 
no longer relies solely on broadcast, and, just like other types of copyright-
protected works, films can be distributed as tangible or digital copies to individual 
users or streamed on-demand rather than broadcasted to a wider public at a 
specific time. Dissemination of films through distribution of tangible copies was 
hardly contemplated at the time, as it took off only in the late 1980s when the 
technological development enabled dissemination through copies at a reasonable 
price. Comparing remuneration for films and for books at that moment also seems 
a very ambiguous task.903 
In the continuation of the case the defendant argued against the exercise of the 
exclusive performance right on competition grounds.904 In the Coditel II case the 
Court had to rule on the same facts but in a different context. Coditel argued this 
time that Article 85 of the Treaty (now Article 101 of the TFEU) precluded agree-
ments which assigned the exclusive license confined to a particular MS for a 
specified amount of time. The CJEU ruled that, taking into consideration the 
characteristics of the cinematographic industry and its market, limiting the 
assigned rights geographically as such did not amount to distortion of competi-
tion under the Treaty even though the area could coincide with national 
                                                                                             
900  Later confirmed in CJEU, Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten 
und Musikverleger registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs GmbH (2017) 
Case C-138/16, Judgment of 16 March 2017. See 0.  
901  See, for instance, von Lewinski and Walter (2010), p. 986. On the judgment as precluding 
exhaustion of the right of communication to the public, see Karapapa (2014), p. 310. 
902  Schricker (1989), p. 469. 
903  The cost of production of a film would be much higher than of a book, and its performance 
would be the only way to recoup investment. 
904  This is not surprising because comparable cases from the domain of the free movement of 
goods concerned also competition under the TFEU. 
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borders.905 Nevertheless, the exercise of such assigned right could amount to 
distortion, which would have to be ascertained on a case-by-case basis.906 
Accordingly, the outcome of these two cases is next. First, relying on the 
exclusive performance right to object to retransmission of an authorised signal 
originating in a different MS into one’s exclusive license territory could not be 
prohibited on the basis of the freedom to provide services under TFEU. Second, 
notwithstanding the above, invoking the right could be precluded under Article 
101 of the TFEU if the exercise of the right, given the circumstances of the 
market, was to distort the particular market. 
Hence, in the cases of unauthorised retransmission into territories not intended 
by the original transmission and in breach of an exclusive territorial license, 
relying on the exclusive right of performance was justified even though it distorted 
the freedom to provide services. Nonetheless, it could come into conflict with the 
objectives of competition within the internal market. The cases could also be seen 
as essentially examining the exercise of the exclusive rights assigned on the 
territorial basis in respect of secondary communication against anticompetitive 
practices and the abuse of rights.  
After the adoption of the InfoSoc Directive, the CJEU had a chance to 
examine the exclusive rights associated with intangible dissemination and their 
conformity with Article 56 of the TFEU on the freedom to provide services only 
on few occasions. The Article has been invoked, inter alia, in the cases of CMO, 
which will not be examined here.907 However, the right of communication 
through broadcast was also indirectly examined in the FAPL case, where the 
question was, inter alia, whether national law prohibiting import and sale of 
decoding devices intended to receive a broadcast were incompatible with the 
freedom to provide services under Article 56 TFEU.908  
The Court examined the national legislation in the light of the freedom to 
provide services rather than the free movement of goods, as the sale of a device 
was a secondary aspect of such legislation.909 The CJEU found that the legislation 
in place prevented the persons from enjoying the services originating in a 
different MS, and, hence, the latter constituted a restriction on the freedom to 
provide services unless objectively justified.910 Although football matches were 
not protected as IP under the EU law, it did not preclude national laws from 
                                                                                             
905  CJEU, SA Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others v 
Ciné Vog Films and others. (1980) Case C-62/79, Judgment of 18 March 1980, paras 15–16. 
906  Ibid., p. 17. 
907  For instance, see CJEU, OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. 
v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s. (2014) Case C‑351/12, Judgment of 27 February 2014. 
908  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-
403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment of 
4 October 2011, para. 54. 
909  Ibid., paras 80–83. 
910  Ibid., paras 87–89. 
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conferring such protection, which, in turn, could justify the restrictions on the 
freedom to provide services.911 
The Court, recalling the Musik-Vertrieb case, started with stating that the 
specific subject matter of IP is “to ensure for the right holders concerned pro-
tection of the right to exploit commercially the marketing or the making available 
of the protected subject-matter, by the grant of licences in return for payment of 
remuneration”.912 However, as the Court continued, it does not guarantee the 
highest possible remuneration but only appropriate remuneration for each use of 
IP, reasonable to actual or potential number of persons enjoying or wishing to 
enjoy the service.913 In relation to broadcast, it must be reasonable in respect of 
its parameters, such as actual and potential audience, language version, etc.914 
The claimant in this joint case claimed that the use of a decoder acquired 
abroad undermined the exclusive broadcast rights and should have been 
prohibited on the basis of national legislation. The Court disagreed, holding that 
nothing precluded the right holder from asking for appropriate remuneration 
when broadcasting was agreed on.915 The aim of placing restrictions on the sale 
and the use of decoding devices aimed to enable additional remuneration based 
on territorial exclusivity. This went beyond what was necessary to ensure appro-
priate remuneration for the right holder in question.916 The circumstances were 
contrasted with the Coditel I case, where the cable retransmission took place 
without obtaining authorisation in the MS of the origin of communication and 
without paying an appropriate remuneration to the right holder.917  
The case cannot either be directly compared to the judgments on the free 
movement of goods concerning the right of distribution.918 First, the FAPL case 
concerned the primary act of broadcast with the authorisation of the right holder, 
notwithstanding the fact that their reception did not match the intended territory 
or the type of license. In the Deutsche Grammophon and Musik-Vertrieb cases, 
on the other hand, the issue was secondary acts of distribution. Hence, the ques-
tion in the FAPL case can be summarised as essentially inquiring whether it is 
permissible to prohibit the sale of decoding cards where they enable receival of 
authorised broadcast but are not intended for use in a specific MS on the basis of 
their price. In the Coditel I case, in turn, the question was about an unauthorised 
retransmission of an authorised signal into a different territory, where this retrans-
                                                                                             
911  Ibid., paras 99–104. 
912  Ibid., para. 107. 
913  Ibid., paras 108–109. 
914  Ibid., para. 110. 
915  Ibid., para. 112. 
916  Ibid., paras 115–116. 
917  Ibid., para. 119. Essentially, without paying appropriate remuneration for reaching 
unintended public. 
918  Although some have called the issue at stake in the FAPL case a parallel import of 
broadcasting services. See Kaburakis et al. (2012), p. 322. 
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mission also interfered with the exploitation of a work based on the delay between 
the showing of a movie in the cinema and its broadcast.919 
What is interesting is that the answer to the question in the FAPL case was not 
influenced by the fact that the decoding devices that were used by the owners of 
commercial establishments were meant for private use only.920 The Court rea-
soned that the danger of users acquiring a private license instead of a commercial 
one also existed in purely national situations; hence, the prohibition of impor-
tation on this ground was not admissible.921 However, one has to also acknow-
ledge that the conclusion is without prejudice to the assessment of the use of 
broadcast for commercial purposes following its reception. Indeed, in the latter 
part of the judgment the Court established that public receipt of a broadcast on a 
TV set at a commercial establishment such as a pub constituted a communication 
to the public of works broadcasted.922  
Accordingly, although the broadcaster could not prohibit the sale of decoding 
devices in other MS, they could obtain additional remuneration for the public 
receipt of a broadcast, at least when the latter included works where copyright 
belonged to the broadcaster.923 Consequently, the remuneration for the commu-
nication to the public through screening of broadcasts at commercial establish-
ments would be another premium paid to the broadcasters, at least in the cases 
such as at the proceedings.924 
The relation between these cases has been lively debated. One view is that the 
FAPL case rewrote the accepted legal position by holding that the subject matter 
of copyright entitled the right holder to appropriate remuneration but not to 
deriving an exclusivity premium.925 Another view is that the status quo was pre-
served but made more complicated.926 What is evident is that the cases arose at 
very different times and diverse circumstances within a complex system of 
licensing arrangements. Whereas they do not allow for an all-encompassing 
generalisation of their outcomes, they provide valuable guidance on the con-
                                                                                             
919  Opinion of Advocate General in Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others 
v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd  
(C-429/08). 3 February 2011, para. 196. 
920  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others  
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, para. 132. 
921  Ibid., paras 130–131. 
922  See more in section 5.2.3.2.1.3. Also, CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd 
and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment of 4 October 2011, paras 183–207. 
923  This is because the Court only examined the public receipt of a broadcast in the light of 
Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
924  An interesting question is whether broadcaster or any other copyright holder of works 
contained in a broadcast could claim additional remuneration for its public screening when 
the establishment in question was in fact in possession of a commercial license. 
925  Batchelor and Montani (2015), p. 597. 
926  Marušić (2011), p. 275. 
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siderations relevant to examining permissible or desirable control over authorised 
communication.927 
 
 
5.2.1.2. Distinction between the rights of distribution and 
communication to the public in relation to a tangible copy 
Generally, cases concerning intangible dissemination began to reach the CJEU 
slightly later than cases on matters of dissemination of tangible copies. The 
reason is likely two-fold. First, the material dissemination dominated the chan-
nels of a work’s exploitation before technology enabled exploitation without the 
involvement of tangible mediums. Second, the free movement of goods was a 
somewhat clearer concept under the Treaty, and the intra-EU trade in goods was 
one of the biggest interests behind establishing the internal market. 
Certainly, provision of services within the EU touched upon slightly different 
matters than that of intra-EU trade in goods. While it is understandable that these 
differences could call for a slightly different treatment in the context of the Trea-
ties, which the Court was essentially interpreting, the same might not be true in a 
purely copyright context. Setting aside the questionable generalisation drawn 
between immaterial and material dissemination rights under the acquis on the 
basis of the Court’s reasoning in the Coditel cases, the CJEU has also emphasised 
the need to consider dissemination as a whole. 
Whereas distribution of a tangible object could relate both to the free move-
ment of goods and the freedom to provide services, towards the specific circum-
stances of the case the CJEU would consider only one of the aspects if the second 
was a secondary one.928 This section will thus briefly illustrate through the 
Court’s jurisprudence how the circumstances of a work’s exploitation influenced 
the freedom towards which the exercise of the exclusive right was examined. 
In the Tournier case, the owner of a discotheque brought proceedings against 
the director of CMO on the grounds that the latter charged unreasonably exces-
sive and abusive royalties for performance of musical works and refused to 
license only a part of their collection. The referring Court asked the CJEU to 
examine a couple of questions in the light of Articles 30, 59, 85 and 86 of the 
EEC Treaty. By its fifth question, the Court asked whether it would be against 
Articles 30 and 59 to claim royalties for the performance of a work using a sound 
recording purchased in a different MS and in respect of which the right of distri-
bution was exhausted. 
                                                                                             
927  See Batchelor and Montani questioning whether the judgment is relevant in cases other 
than satellite communication, like communication satellite to internet or beyond. Batchelor 
and Montani (2015), p. 598. 
928  For instance, CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure 
and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) 
(2011), Judgment of 4 October 2011, paras 78–84. 
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First, the CJEU recalled the Coditel I case and drew an analogy between the 
films that were the subject matter in the former case and music, the subject matter 
in the present proceedings. Musical works, the Court held, had to be distinguished 
from other works, dissemination of which was inseparable from the circulation 
of a tangible medium.929 The CJEU proceeded to establish in a sense a two-fold 
nature of musical works. The Court stipulated that, despite the fact that Article 
30 of the EEC Treaty on the free movement of goods exempted import of already 
distributed copies of sound recordings from the right holder’s authorisation, such 
imported copies could also be used for exploitation through public performance.  
Accordingly, the considerations under the free movement of goods and the 
freedom to provide services had to be reconciled in the present case. The copy-
right holder could invoke the right of performance to claim royalties for the public 
performance of a sound recording even though the right holder could not claim 
any royalties for further marketing of a sound recording already put on the market 
within the Community.930 The outcome of the case was that Articles 30 and 59 
did not preclude the right holder from relying on their right of public performance 
in a situation such as one in the proceedings. 
A very similar reasoning was adopted by the Court in the Laserdisken case, 
where the CJEU made it even more obvious that the exhaustion of one right does 
not render all other rights inapplicable: “the release into circulation of a picture 
and sound recording cannot therefore, by definition, render lawful other acts of 
exploitation of the protected work, such as rental, which are of a different nature 
from sale or any other lawful act of distribution.”931 One of the reasons to clearly 
differentiate between the rights was, of course, to avoid the application of the 
developed Community exhaustion principle to acts other than mere resale of 
copies.932 
Hence, these decisions illustrate the systematic approach to the interface 
between the exclusive rights under copyright and the objectives of the Treaty. 
The relevant considerations depend not so much on the presence of a tangible 
copy but rather on the nature of the exploitation in question. Indeed, the presence 
of a tangible copy can point to the direction of limiting exclusive control under 
the copyright on the basis of the Treaties, using the developed Community 
exhaustion principle. However, the circumstances of subsequent dissemination 
must be examined. Moreover, the outlined jurisprudence also emphasises the 
                                                                                             
929  CJEU, Ministère public v Jean-Louis Tournier. (1989) Case C-395/87., Judgment of 13 
July 1989, para. 12. 
930  Ibid., para. 13. 
931  CJEU, Foreningen af danske Videogramdistributører, acting for Egmont Film A/S, Buena 
Vista Home Entertainment A/S, Scanbox Danmark A/S, Metronome Video A/S, Polygram 
Records A/S, Nordisk Film Video A/S, Irish Video A/S and Warner Home Video Inc. v Laser-
disken. (1998) Case C-61/97, Judgment of 22 September 1998, para. 17. Also in CJEU, 
Metronome Musik GmbH v Music Point Hokamp GmbH. (1998) Case C-200/96, Judgment of 
28 April 1998, para. 18. 
932  See also section 4.2.1.3. 
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proper understanding of the exhaustion principle, i.e. as related to a particular act 
of exploitation whose reach does not extend to other forms of subsequent 
exploitation. 
 
 
5.2.1.3. Enquiries of the European Commission 
Against the background revealed above, it is appropriate to turn next to the 
enquiries of the EC into the necessity to harmonise the right of communication 
to the public under the acquis. Whereas the harmonisation was prompted, inter 
alia, by international harmonisation, cases on the intersection of communication 
rights with the objectives of the Treaty influenced a number of legislative choices. 
Given that the jurisprudence was unjustifiably generalised on a few occasions, 
this section will provide an overview of the Commissions’ reasoning on the need 
to harmonise the right, relying, inter alia, on the preceding case law. 
The efforts towards the harmonisation of the rights covering intangible dis-
semination at the EU level started with the EC issuing a couple of Green Papers 
and studies.933 The first Green Paper was presented in 1988 with the broad title 
“Copyright and the challenge of technology – Copyright issues requiring imme-
diate action”. The paper was of a predominantly economic character, setting the 
stage by highlighting the issues of copyright being raised to Community level: 
 
[T]he growing economic importance of the industries needing copyright protec-
tion against ready misappropriation of their products, particularly by copying, has 
naturally produced pressure for the modernization of existing copyright protection 
systems at both national and Community level.934  
 
Although no comprehensive copyright harmonisation was expected to take place 
at the EU level at the time, the paper was followed by another one and, shortly 
after, by a few Directives.935 The next Green Paper on Copyright in Information 
Society was presented in 1995 and became the most important one in the light of 
the subsequent wide harmonisation under the InfoSoc Directive. The paper 
defined a number of policy choices that had to be made in the light of the emer-
gence of the information society and the ongoing attempts of harmonisation at 
the international level.936 The major aspect of the discussion on the information 
                                                                                             
933  At first, papers were prepared by the section responsible for cultural affairs and, a few 
years later, by the Directorate on the Internal Market. It has been argued that the EC adopted 
a predominantly economic approach to identified issues, almost hostile to copyright and 
authors, putting the internal market as a primary focus. See Schricker (1989), pp. 472–474. 
Also, Cohen Jehoram (1992), p. 627. 
934  Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of technology – Copyright issues requiring 
immediate action, COM(88) 172 final. 7 June 1988, p. 3. 
935  For the scepticism, see Schricker (1989), pp. 483–484. 
936  Green Paper on Copyright in Information Society. COM(95) 382 final. 19 July 1995, p. 6. 
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society was the issue of piracy, to which roughly one third of the paper is 
devoted.937 
The jurisprudence of the CJEU became a source of inspiration for the EC. The 
Commission often relied on the preceding jurisprudence to justify the inter-
vention into the copyright law at the national level.938 Indeed, on multiple occa-
sions the outcome of the rulings was generalised to a greater extent than would 
seem appropriate. A couple of examples will be shown below. 
When it came to the question of harmonising the rights of intangible dissemi-
nation, the Coditel I and Warner Brothers cases were recalled. Whereas rental 
right concerned tangible copies and, in many jurisdictions, formed a part of the 
broader right of distribution, it was in a sense assimilated with the right of per-
formance, as it was exempted from the Community exhaustion principle. 
According to the EC, it was in the copyright holder’s interest to benefit from each 
act of exploitation, either though rental or through performance.  
The Green Paper of 1988 stated that, pursuant to the Coditel I case, if a work 
is exploited by successive performances, the first performance does not exhaust 
the right to authorise the next one.939 The paper, regrettably, disregarded the fact 
that, essentially, according to the case, a retransmission of a signal from abroad 
was not permitted, which would not necessarily be the case for any retrans-
mission. Furthermore, the metaphor of exhaustion in this case appears very 
deceptive, as the judgment suggests that if exhaustion would apply in this case, 
then the next performance would not be subject to the right holder’s authorisation. 
The latter is not in line with the objective of the principle of exhaustion as 
articulated under the Community exhaustion principle.940 
Also, surprisingly, the views of the EC were rather different from the EC’s 
position in the course of the Coditel I proceedings. There the Commission argued 
that the CJEU may find that the simultaneous and unaltered retransmission to 
another MS should not require a separate authorisation on the basis that the author 
receives fair remuneration from the company retransmitting a signal.941 Hence, 
in the EC’s view, a separate authorisation would not have been necessary for such 
a retransmission, although national law may still require remuneration to be paid 
to the right holder. In a sense, the approach resembles the outcome in the cases 
concerning import of distributed copies under the right of distribution. The dif-
ference is that import did not give rise to claim additional remuneration, whereas 
retransmission, as argued by the EC in Coditel I, may do so.942  
                                                                                             
937  Schricker (1989), p. 476. 
938  For which it was rightly warned. See, inter alia, Dietz (1985), p. 402. 
939  Green Paper on copyright and the challenge of technology – Copyright issues requiring 
immediate action, COM(88) 172 final. 7 June 1988, p. 163. 
940  Elaborated in the preceding sections 5.2.1.1. and 5.2.1.2. 
941  CJEU, SA Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others v 
Ciné Vog Films and others. (1980) Case C-62/79, Judgment of 18 March 1980, p. 898. 
942  See, inter alia, the Deutsche Grammophon and Musik-Vertrieb cases, section 3.2.2. 
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The case law of the CJEU on intangible dissemination was mentioned under 
the EC papers only in part and predominantly in connection to parallel imports. 
This time the EC accurately summarised the outcome of the Coditel cases: “the 
fact that a rightholder authorizes one broadcast of a film in one section of the 
Community territory does not exhaust his rights over later broadcasts or broad-
casts in other parts of the Community”.943 Although interpreted by some scholars 
as denying any limit to the broadcasting right, it merely recalls that each act of 
broadcasting shall be authorised by the right holder and the Treaty does not pre-
clude the exercise of the right, for instance, on grounds of the freedom to provide 
services. Furthermore, the EC refers explicitly to later broadcasts or broadcasts 
in other parts of the Community and, hence, does not touch upon simultaneous 
retransmissions. If the EC indeed meant that simultaneous retransmissions within 
the same territory should always fall under the exclusive right of broadcast, it 
would be a step well beyond the Coditel I decision. 
Turning back to the right of communication to the public itself, this topic was 
discussed under two sections of the Green Paper of 1995. First, in regard to the 
definition of public, which was defined neither under international law nor under 
the EU copyright acquis.944 Second, in line with the discussions on the PPBC, in 
relation to the acts of digital transmission, which required protection. The need 
to recognise a new right was motivated by the uncertainty as to whether such acts 
were covered by national laws. According to the EC, such acts challenged the 
established understanding of intangible dissemination, which was necessarily a 
point-to-multipoint one. Adopting a common approach to covering acts of digital 
transmissions was also viewed as a necessary step to remove obstacles to the 
freedom to provide services in the internal market.945 
The Green Paper did not propose one clear-cut solution but presented few 
possible options. The first would cover acts of digital dissemination or trans-
mission with a new right, either with a broad scope to include any type of digital 
dissemination (including digital broadcasting) or with a narrower scope confined 
to point-to-point transmissions.946 The second option would be to cover such acts 
by extension of already widely recognised rights. Interestingly, an option to cover 
digital transmission with the right of rental was strongly supported by the EC for 
acts of transmission in the course of commercial activities. This is slightly sur-
prising in the light of the EC initiative to cover acts of making available with the 
communication to the public right under the WIPO CT negotiations.  
                                                                                             
943  Green Paper on Copyright in Information Society. COM(95) 382 final. 19 July 1995, p. 46. 
944  The importance of uniform interpretation of public criteria was viewed in the light of 
clarifying the scope of private use. The discussion followed the one under the negotiations on 
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postponed. Green Paper on Copyright in Information Society. COM(95) 382 final. 19 July 
1995, pp. 53–54. 
945  Ibid., p. 56. 
946  Ibid., p. 56. 
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The likely reasons for considering the right of rental were, on the one hand, 
the expectation that digital distribution would replace tangible distribution and, 
on the other hand, the fact that the rental right has already been harmonised under 
the EU acquis.947 Nevertheless, the option required the examination of “how the 
characteristics of certain commercial operations could be taken into account as 
regards the application of this right”.948 Furthermore, extending the right of rental 
to digital dissemination also called for maintaining a balance between the 
interests of public libraries and right holders.949 
Following the Green Paper of 1995, scholarly debate on the appropriate rights 
to be applied to acts of digital transmission intensified. Some advocated for a 
broad right of communication to the public covering broadcasting and on-demand 
making available whilst preserving essential exceptions.950 Others also supported 
an option to cover on-demand making available acts with the right of distribution 
in order to avoid difficulties caused by the on-demand nature of transmission and 
the separation of acts leading to distribution.951 
The Follow-up Green Paper was presented shortly after in 1996 to reflect on 
the issues raised in 1995 and the public response. Unlike its predecessor, the 
follow-up paper highlighted the uncertainty about dealing with digital trans-
missions in the absence of clarity on the scope of the right of communication to 
the public under the BC and national laws.952 The right of rental was no longer 
considered a viable option. According to the paper, the right of communication 
to the public, with a few exceptions, was the most widely supported solution to 
cover digital dissemination. The result of the paper was thus a proposal to 
harmonise the digital “on-demand” transmissions on the basis of a further harmo-
nised right of communication to the public. For the scope of the proposed rights 
the paper referred to the submission made by the Community and the MS under 
the negotiation on the WIPO CT.953 
 
 
5.2.1.4. Simultaneous retransmissions under the Satellite and 
Cable Directive 
As the analysis under this chapter focuses on the question of the extent of exclu-
sive control over dissemination of a work beyond the authorisation of every 
separate communication, the issue of regulating retransmissions is of particular 
                                                                                             
947  Dreier (1998), p. 632.  
948  Green Paper on Copyright in Information Society. COM(95) 382 final. 19 July 1995, p. 59. 
949  Ibid., p. 59. 
950  Hugenholtz (1996), pp. 101–102. Also, Dreier (1998).  
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interest. Hence, this section briefly outlines the significance of the Satellite and 
Cable Directive, which was adopted in the aftermath of the Coditel I decision.954 
The Directive deals with harmonising certain aspects of copyright law across the 
MS in order to facilitate the broadcasting market within the Community. Namely, 
the major achievement of the Directive is the country-of-origin rule that requires 
broadcasting organisations to obtain a single authorisation from the right holder 
in the country where the communication originates.955  
What is of special interest is the retransmission provision under Article 8(1) 
of the Directive. The Article provides that a MS shall ensure that, in the event of 
a retransmission from another MS, copyright rules are observed, and such 
retransmission takes place on the basis of an individual or collective contractual 
agreement. Hence, on the one hand, the Directive strengthens the protection in 
comparison to the BC, as it precludes statutory licenses.956 On the other hand, it 
introduces collective licensing of retransmissions, provided that such retrans-
missions are not altered and take place simultaneously.957 
Essentially, the Directive addresses solely retransmissions between the MS, 
leaving retransmissions within the same MS subject to national law.958 Whereas 
it confirms that retransmissions are to be authorised by the right holders (without 
spelling it out in the wording of a right), it also ensures that the necessary 
arrangements become simpler. In a sense, it strengthens the argument that 
retransmission to a different MS has a potential economic value for rights holders. 
Likewise, altered or delayed retransmissions are outside the scope of the Directive, 
hence, potentially subject to the exclusive right. 
The limited scope of the application of the rule supports the three main cir-
cumstances pointing towards submitting such secondary acts of communication 
to the right holders’ exclusive right: communication which is delayed in time, 
altered communication, and communication reaching new (national) territories. 
The latter is not least supported by the statement in the preceding Green Paper on 
Television Without Frontiers. Namely, one solution to intra-community retrans-
missions considered by the EC was to remove any restrictions following the legal 
primary transmission.959  
For instance, retransmission would be permitted throughout the common 
market following the right holder’s authorisation for broadcast of a work in one 
MS. Nonetheless, the paper recalled that the CJEU did not follow this line in the 
Coditel I case, as the Court held that right holder was entitled to remuneration for 
                                                                                             
954  Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules 
concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and 
cable retransmission. 6.10.1993. OJ L 248/15 
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every showing of a work.960 Although the Court did not expressly state so in the 
judgment, the Commission stated that if retransmissions outside the original area 
would not be subject to authorisation, the right holder would lose the chance to 
obtain a fee covering such a new audience.961 Hence, ultimately, the new public 
argument was advanced. The relevance of the targeted audience and the audience 
reached by retransmission is further supported by few preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of the Directive. 
For example, in the Egeda case, the Court was asked to rule, inter alia, whether 
public reception of a broadcast through the installation of TV sets in hotel rooms 
fell within the scope of communication to the public or public retransmission 
under the Satellite and Cable Directive. The CJEU highlighted the limited scope 
of the application of the Directive. The rules on communication to the public and 
retransmission covered solely retransmission to a different MS and its primary 
aim was to avoid application of different rules to a single transaction.962 Further, 
the Court recalled the proposal for the InfoSoc Directive, which would be an 
instrument actually dealing with the scope of the rights.963 
In another case, the Court had to rule whether relying on a different organi-
sation for communicating a broadcast in a specific area constituted a separate act 
of broadcast requiring authorisation. Whereas the CJEU held that the acts formed 
a single act of communication, this did not mean per se that the intervention of a 
third party did not require separate authorisation.964 The new audience was 
brought into the picture, because the third party, besides mere retransmission, 
also provided services on its own to the public outside the intended recipient 
circle. Such intervention with initial communication by making a broadcast 
accessible to a new public was not covered by the initial authorisation.965 More-
over, the fact that the third party also obtained fees from these non-intended 
recipients for a separate service supported finding such transmission a distinct 
communication.966 
These cases are also significant to examining the development of the right of 
communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive. Unlike the latter, the 
cases highlight the significance of distinguishing between the primary and 
                                                                                             
960  See Schricker on the EC pushing to remove obstacles to cross-border broadcasting. 
Schricker (1989), pp. 470–472. 
961  Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, especially by 
Satellite and Cable. COM(84) 300 final. 14 June 1984, p. 315. 
962  CJEU, Entidad de Gestión de Derechos de los Productores Audiovisuales (Egeda) v 
Hostelería Asturiana SA (Hoasa). (2000) C-293/98, Judgment of 3 February 2000, paras. 21, 
24. 
963  Ibid., paras 26–28. 
964  CJEU, Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, 
Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) (C-431/09) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium 
BVBA (C-432/09), Judgment of 13 October 2011, para. 70. 
965  Ibid., paras 76, 79, 82. 
966  Ibid., para. 80. 
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secondary acts, i.e. between the act of communication and the act of retrans-
mission. The Canal Digital judgment illustrates how the fact that an act comes 
within the wording of the provision exempting it from separate authorisation is 
not sufficient in itself to support the findings. Rather, consideration should also 
be given to whether such acts interfere with communication or unduly deprive 
the right holder of the market, in particular, when it is done with an intent of 
making a profit. 
Whether retransmission taking place online would be covered is disputed, as 
this factor was not anticipated at the time of the adoption of the Directive.967 
However, the recently adopted Directive on the exercise of copyright and related 
rights applicable to certain online transmissions of broadcasting organisations 
and retransmissions of television and radio programmes has addressed the ques-
tion.968 Article 4 provides that right holders other than broadcasting organisations 
shall authorise through CMO the simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged retrans-
mission, including retransmissions online. Furthermore, Article 7 recognises that 
MS may provide the same rules in respect of retransmissions both under this 
Directive and the Satellite and Cable Directive, where both initial transmission 
and the retransmission take place within a same MS.  
Hence, the new Directive extends the regulation of cable retransmission 
through entrusting CMO to manage them for other types of retransmission, such 
as online. At the same time, pursuant to Article 2(2), the Directive does not con-
cern the retransmission of transmission originating online. Finally, the rules apply 
solely to cross-border transmissions, as is also the case with the Satellite and 
Cable Directive. Nevertheless, the recently adopted Directive allows MS to apply 
the same rules to purely national retransmissions.  
Would the Directive make the provision of Article 4 mandatory for retrans-
missions within the same MS, it would effectively designate a rule for secondary 
communication, which is relying on the initially authorised one. Whereas it 
would not be comparable to the Community exhaustion principle under the right 
of distribution, which exempts the acts from authorisation only in cross-border 
setting, through entrusting CMO with managing the rights, such a rule would 
recognise the need to eliminate the adverse impact of the complex clearance of 
the rights even within a single MS. 
 
 
                                                                                             
967  Hugenholtz (2016b), p. 321. 
968  Directive (EU) 2019/789 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 
laying down rules on the exercise of copyright and related rights applicable to certain online 
transmissions of broadcasting organisations and retransmissions of television and radio 
programmes, and amending Council Directive 93/83/EEC. 17.5.2019. OJ L 130/82 
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5.2.2. Harmonisation of the right of communication 
to the public under the InfoSoc Directive 
Shortly after the Green Paper of 1995 and the follow-up paper of 1996, a Proposal 
for a Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright in the infor-
mation society was presented. The Directive, negotiations on the adoption of 
which stretched over four years, became the main instrument of copyright 
harmonisation in the EU. Notwithstanding what the name suggests, the scope of 
harmonisation stretched well beyond the copyright matters of a purely digital 
nature.  
The explanatory note to the Proposal stated that it did not radically change the 
existing internal market regulatory framework. Rather than being a change in 
basic copyright concepts, it was essentially the environment were works were 
created and exploited that changed.969 From the perspective of subsequent 
development, it is highly debatable if the Directive was such a small step as was 
presented at its outset. Not least, the Directive spelled out rigid rules at a rather 
dynamic time.970 
The priority items of the Proposal followed from the obligations under the 
recently adopted WIPO CT. It was established that implementing the necessary 
changes into national laws would be better achieved at the Community level.971 
The Explanatory Memorandum recalled that Article 8 of the WIPO CT extended 
the traditional right of the copyright holder to authorise or prohibit the non-inter-
active communication of a work to all categories of work. Furthermore, that, upon 
a proposal from the EC, the right also covered interactive transmissions.972 
Despite what could be expected in the light of the preceding Green Papers, the 
part of the Explanatory Memorandum dealing with the right of communication 
to the public jumps immediately to the topic of technological development and 
interactive on-demand transmissions as a new form of exploitation of a work. 
Rather than starting with the notion of communication and its scope outside of 
the digital environment, it proceeds immediately to holding that the right would 
cover interactive (on-demand) transmissions.  
The on-demand transmissions were characterised as storing works in a digital 
form and interactively making them available in a way that enables users to 
access and request transmission at any time.973 Such transmissions were con-
sidered to form a new economic form of exploitation of a work, which should 
                                                                                             
969  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
Information Society. COM (97) 628 Final. 10 December 1997, p. 9. 
970  Hugenholtz (2000b), p. 501.  
971  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
Information Society. COM (97) 628 Final. 10 December 1997, p. 11. 
972  Ibid., p. 19. 
973  Ibid., p. 16. 
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have been subjected to copyright protection though granting an exclusive right to 
authorise them. The latter meant that the right of communication to the public 
(not fully harmonised under the BC) had to be harmonised as a whole under the 
Directive to mitigate the legal uncertainty in the Community, which was caused 
by divergent treatment, as well as to provide adequate and coherent protection of 
the right holder on the market.974 
Whereas harmonisation did not seem as revolutionary for national laws, sub-
sequent development has contested the conclusion.975 This section outlines the 
three main issues relevant to the assessment of the development of the right of 
communication to the public in relation to control over subsequent commu-
nication. First is the recognition of the broad right of communication to the 
public. Second is the recognition of the right of making available under the right 
of communication to the public. Third is the non-exhaustion of the rights as 
stipulated in the Directive. 
 
 
5.2.2.1. Broad right of communication to the public 
Article 3 of the InfoSoc Directive under the heading “Right of communication to 
the public, including the right of making available works or other subject matter” 
harmonises three essential matters. First, it harmonises the right of commu-
nication to the public as extended to any communication to a public not present 
at the place where it originates. Second, it introduces a new right of making avail-
able to the public to cover on-demand digital transmissions. Third, it introduces 
a similar neighbouring right of making available. 
Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive provides that: 
 
Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless 
means, including the making available to the public of their works in such a way 
that members of the public may access them from a place and at a time individually 
chosen by them. 
 
The text of the Article was not substantially altered during the negotiations 
following the proposal for a Directive. The only difference is that the phrase 
“originals and copies of their works” in the Proposal was substituted with simply 
“their works”.976 The change was adopted on the initiative of the Council and 
                                                                                             
974  Ibid., p. 19. 
975  On the InfoSoc Directive and the WIPO CT as not being revolutionary in protecting every 
act of communicating a work in the context of Norwegian copyright law, see Lund (2001), 
p.618. 
976  See Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the Information Society. COM (97) 628 final. 
12 December 1997, p. 44. 
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motivated by the equivalent alteration in the wording of Article 2(a) on the right 
of reproduction for a work.977  
Whereas it might not seem as a substantial modification, the difference 
between this wording and the wording of the right of distribution is occasionally 
used to draw a line between the rights of material dissemination and immaterial 
dissemination to deny any limit to the latter right. Whilst the expression “work” 
in the wording of the rights emphasises the communicative function of the right, 
the expression “originals and copies” also indicates the two-fold nature of the 
copies, for instance, that a copy distributed with the authorisation of the right 
holder may not be used for public performance or broadcasting without obtaining 
a separate authorisation.978 
Recital 23 of the Directive further provides that:  
 
This right should be understood in a broad sense covering all communication to 
the public not present at the place where the communication originates. This right 
should cover any such transmission or retransmission of a work to the public by 
wire or wireless means, including broadcasting. This right should not cover any 
other acts. 
 
Hence, the right of communication under the InfoSoc Directive requires the MS 
to recognise an exclusive right of communication to the public in its broadest 
sense.979 First, the right extends from the acts of retransmission of a performance 
or a broadcast to the primary acts such as broadcast. Second, it is granted in 
respect of all types of works. Third, being a full harmonisation Directive, the 
Directive exhaustively harmonises any permissible exceptions to the right.980 
Fourth, recital 23 suggests that any act of retransmission also falls within the 
scope of the exclusive right.  
The latter is quite a departure from the approach taken under the BC or the 
WIPO CT, where retransmission did not necessarily require authorisation in all 
the cases. Given the considerable extension of the right of communication, it is 
questionable whether such a strict rule going well beyond international obli-
gations is justified. Moreover, following the jurisprudence of the CJEU, the 
significance of the recital is blurred, not least because of the ambiguous scope of 
                                                                                             
977  Common Posititon (EC) No 48/2000 adopted by the Council on 28 September 2000 with 
a view to adopting Directive 2000/.../EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of ... 
on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society. 2000/C 344/1, p. 15.  
978  See section 5.2.1.2.  
979  On the cons of such a general and abstract right, see also Depreeuw (2014), pp. 456–457. 
980  The CJEU has also established that the notion of communication to the public cannot be 
given a wider scope under national law than that under the Directive, as doing so would 
undermine the objective of the Directive and distort the internal market. See CJEU, Nils 
Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, Judgment of 13 February 
2014, paras 34–37. 
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retransmission, which could include either or both simultaneous and later retrans-
mission. 
For instance, in the TVCatchup case the Court held that, although simul-
taneous retransmission constituted an act of communication, the criterion of a 
new public had still to be examined in order to qualify such retransmission as 
falling under the right of communication to the public, unless new technical 
means were used.981 In yet another case, the CJEU held that simultaneous retrans-
mission amounted to an act of communication but not an act of communication 
to the public, as it did not reach a new public despite the new technical means.982 
While it is obvious that a later retransmission (say, from a recording of the origi-
nal one) would fall under the right of communication to the public, exempting 
simultaneous ones could be justified when certain criteria are satisfied.  
Furthermore, it should also be noted that, according to the proposal, “an act of 
communication to the public can involve a series of acts of transmissions”.983 The 
importance of this statement is two-fold. First, as will be shown below, the scope 
of the right under the CJEU jurisprudence is clearly broader than the acts of trans-
mission, which were the primary target of the right under the BC and the WIPO 
CT. Second, a single act of communication can be comprised of a series of acts 
of transmission, which means that whether or not there is an act of communication 
to the public will necessarily depend on objective or subjective criteria.984 
The aim of the Article, first and foremost, is to implement the obligations 
under the WIPO CT by extending the scope of the communication right to all 
types of works and, also, according to the umbrella solution, to cover on-demand 
digital transmission.985 However, as apparent, inter alia, from recital 23, the 
Directive went further by providing a broad right of communication covering all 
the types of communication to the public not present at the place where it origi-
nates, including broadcasting.986 This made it the core economic right under the 
EU acquis covering acts ranging from broadcasting to peer-to-peer file sharing.987  
                                                                                             
981  CJEU, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, 
Judgment of 7 March 2013, paras 23–39.  
982  CJEU, Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverleger 
registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs GmbH (2017) Case C-138/16, 
Judgment of 16 March 2017, paras 26–30. 
983  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
Information Society. COM (97) 628 final. 10 December 1997, p. 25. 
984  This presents a difficulty in establishing criteria determining when an act of transmission 
corresponds to an act of dissemination. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the CJEU shows 
that the significance of transmission for the right of communication to the public diminishes, 
see Depreeuw (2014), pp. 286–288. 
985  Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), p. 419. 
986  On the right being broader than under the BC or the WIPO CT see Dreier and Hugenholtz 
(2006), p. 50; Guibault (1998), p. 13. 
987  Hugenholtz and van Velze (2016), pp. 797–798. 
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Whether or not the making available right shall be considered separately or in 
conjunction with the right of communication to the public is not entirely clear. 
On the one hand, the Explanatory Memorandum provides that the Directive 
grants the right holder a general right of communicating a work to the public for 
all types of works for any communication outside the interactive environment.988 
On the other hand, the same Memorandum provides that the right of commu-
nication to the public extends to the acts of making available for individual access 
from different places and at a different time.989 Further, it specifies that the term 
of communication covers any means or processes of communication other than 
by distributing copies, either by wire or wireless means.990 The case law of the 
CJEU shows a tendency to consider the right of making available a part of a 
broader right of communication to the public.991 
 
 
5.2.2.2. Right of making available to the public 
The second part of Article 3(1) presents, if not the core, then a very important 
part of the Directive, namely recognising, in line with the WIPO CT, the exclu-
sive right of making a work available to the public. As the Explanatory Memo-
randum provides, the scope of the right covers solely interactive on-demand acts 
of digital transmission.992 Hence, broadcast, pay-per-view services or any 
services offering a pre-defined programme or near-on-demand-video shall fall 
outside of the scope.993  
Whereas transmissions appear to still play a role in the context of the right of 
communication to the public, the Explanatory Memorandum stipulates that the 
critical act for making available is the one preceding the actual on-demand trans-
mission.994 Hence, some line could be drawn between the communication to the 
public and making available rights. The former would include an act (or series of 
                                                                                             
988  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
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989  Ibid., p. 5. 
990  Ibid., p. 25. 
991  See, inter alia, CJEU, C More Entertainment AB v Linus Sandberg. (2015) Case C-279/13, 
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Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
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232 
acts) of transmission, whereas the latter finds its application even before any 
transmission takes place. This very much resembles the characteristic of the 
rights of communication to the public under international law. An act falls under 
the exclusive right even if there is no audience receiving the communication.  
In the absence of a clearly defined act that is targeted by the making available 
right and with a view to the breadth of the language of the provision, it is no 
surprise that neither the right’s relation to transmissions is clear nor the right’s 
delineation against acts falling under the right of communication to the public. 
The opinion of the AG, holding that the making available right is the digital 
equivalent of analogue communication to the public right, only further compli-
cates the matter.995 The reference to interactivity of communication achieves little 
to assist in interpreting the scope of the right.996 
 
 
5.2.2.3. Non-exhaustion of the right of communication to the public 
As highlighted in the sections above, unlike under the BC, the InfoSoc Directive 
does not maintain any distinction between the primary and secondary acts of 
communication or clarifies the significance of relying on previous acts of exploi-
tations.997 Instead, Article 3(3) of the Directive stipulates that:  
 
The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by any act of 
communication to the public of a work and other subject matter as set out in 
paragraph 2, including their being made available to the public. 
 
According to the Explanatory Memorandum, Article 3(3) clarifies that an act of 
communication to the public or of making available of a work can be repeated an 
unlimited number of times and every such act must be authorised by the right 
holder, relying on the Coditel I and Warner Brother judgments.998 The explana-
tion thus suggests that every act falling under the scope of the right of commu-
nication to the public and making available is subject to authorisation. However, 
as has been stressed before, this is indeed the case for any exclusive right, 
including the right of distribution. Henceforth, the Article ought to suggest that 
every secondary act of communication is inevitably subject to authorisation, 
referring to the exhaustion principle and case law.999  
                                                                                             
995  Opinion of Advocate General in Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. Case  
C-161/17. 25 April 2018, para. 4. 
996  Guibault et al. (2007), p. 28.  
997  Depreeuw (2014), pp. 458–459. 
998  Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
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999  Also, notwithstanding the fact that Article 3(1) itself suggests that at least cable retrans-
missions fall within the broad right of communication to the public. See Rosén (2014), p. 232. 
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Whereas, at first glance, it would seem like the provision merely codifies the 
jurisprudence subjecting any secondary acts of communication to exclusive rights, 
this connotation will be contested here. First, while some consider the inclusion 
of the statement as a necessary but also an obvious clarification, others hold that 
careful reading of the cases does not lead to the conclusion that exhaustion is 
precluded.1000 Similarly, others hold that the statement is highly contradictory and 
founded on specific historical circumstances of the preceding case law.1001 
I strongly concur with the latter interpretations. As has been explained, the Coditel 
I case, on which the EC was relying, did not decide whether the acts of retrans-
mission within the same territory should be precluded but merely that such retrans-
mission outside of the coverage area (or territory of MS) could be prohibited.1002 
Second, as indicated above, Article 3(3) read in conjunction with recital 29 
illustrates the misinterpretation of the exhaustion principle. These provisions are 
supposed to clarify that each act of communication is subject to authorisation by 
the right holder. However, the same statement would also be true in regard to the 
rights that can be exhausted, such as the right of distribution. Exhaustion of such 
right does not mean that right holder cannot authorise new acts of distribution of 
the copies other than those already distributed. It merely means that the acts of 
secondary distribution cannot be controlled, specifically in regard to already 
distributed copies. Hence, the legislator in this context is stating the obvious, i.e. 
that the right covers each and every act of communication of a work. However, 
by using the term exhaustion, it attempts to subject all the acts of secondary com-
munication to the exclusive right, which is not in line with then- or now-existing 
case law.1003 
This finding is supported by the few references to Article under CJEU 
jurisprudence. We find the Court mentioning the Article while interpreting the 
scope of the right of communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive 
only twice. First, in the Renckhoff case, concerning an act of a new upload of a 
work and, hence, a new independent communication of a work.1004 Second, in the 
TVCatchup case on retransmission of a broadcast on the Internet, where the Court 
                                                                                             
1000  On the necessity of the statement, see Cohen Jehoram (1999), p. 498; von Lewinski 
(1999), p. 774.; On Coditel I not precluding exhaustion see Guibault et al. (2007), p. 26; Hugen-
holtz et al. (2006), p. 24. 
1001  Mysoor (2018), p. 680; Jütte (2017), p. 189; Tjong Tjin Tai (2003), p. 208; Spedicato (2015), 
pp. 42, 46.  
1002  For more, see section 5.2.1.1. Also, Dreier (2006), p. 218. 
1003  This seems to have been confirmed by the CJEU in the TVCatchup case. First, the Court 
states that under Article 3(3) authorisation to communicate a work does not exhaust the right 
to authorise other communication. Second, the Court draws the conclusion that the legislator 
intended to make any transmission of retransmission (using separate technical means) subject 
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found it to be a new use of a work.1005 Accordingly, the reference to exhaustion 
seems to be made solely within the meaning of subjecting any independent act or 
a new use to right holder’s authorisation. 
Before proceeding to the third point, it is necessary to mention recital 29 of 
the Directive, which further provides that the question of exhaustion does not 
arise in the context of the on-line services: 
 
The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and on-line 
services in particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work 
or other subject-matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of the 
rightholder. Therefore, the same applies to rental and lending of the original and 
copies of works or other subject-matter which are services by nature. Unlike CD-
ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual property is incorporated in a material medium, 
namely an item of goods, every on-line service is in fact an act which should be 
subject to authorisation where the copyright or related right so provides. 
 
The recital uses the shaky ground of the Coditel I and Warner Brothers cases once 
more to argue that services cannot lead to exhaustion, including into the notion 
of service not only traditionally intangible dissemination through communication 
but also rental and lending. The recital unnecessarily mixes up the issues from 
different domains, namely a) the necessity of obtaining authorisation for an act 
of secondary intangible communication (corresponds to the question of applica-
tion of exhaustion in the context of material dissemination), b) a definition of 
services and unconvincingly binding them to intangible dissemination, c) misusing 
the term of exhaustion only to confirm that every act of communication must be 
authorised.  
The legislator overlooks the scenario when online delivery is equivalent to 
tangible distribution.1006 Such would be the case, for instance, where a constant 
connection to an online service is not necessary for consumption of a work.1007 
Recital 29 seems to be motivated by the view that exhaustion in online dis-
semination would be incompatible with the aim of encouraging online services.1008 
However, such a rigid distinction may be difficult to reconcile with consumer 
expectations and economic considerations, or may even support contesting its 
binding nature.1009 
                                                                                             
1005  In the context of the right of distribution, a new use metaphor can be compared to the 
right of rental surviving exhaustion of the right of distribution, as it enables new exploitation. 
See also section 3.2.2.3.  
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Rather surprisingly, the only judgment where the CJEU mentions recital 29 is 
the UsedSoft case on exhaustion under the Software Directive. First, the AG 
described the recital as ambiguous and proceeded to interpret it as not precluding 
the application of exhaustion under the Software Directive to the acts of dis-
seminating digital copies of software.1010 The Court, in turn, refrained from inter-
preting recital 29 and merely acknowledged the position of the EC. The CJEU 
has, in essence, avoided interpretation of the recital by holding that the Software 
Directive constitutes a lex specialis to the InfoSoc Directive.1011 It remains to be 
seen how the Court will address the questions referred in Dutch proceedings on 
the resale of e-books.1012 Even though the referring court is asking the CJEU to 
rule on whether dissemination of e-books falls under the right of distribution 
under InfoSoc and, hence, potentially satisfy the conditions of the exhaustion 
principle, the CJEU will likely have to also interpret Article 3(3).  
Even notwithstanding the absence of the conclusive grounds for denying 
exhaustion in the meaning of exempting subsequent acts of communication from 
authorisation, the very decision to do so seems extremely hasty from today’s 
perspective.1013 The developments following the proposal and the adoption of the 
Directive could not have been anticipated at the outset of copyright harmon-
isation. Instead, Article 3(3) unnecessarily complicates the discussion on online 
exhaustion.1014 
 
 
5.2.3. CJEU developing the scope of the right of communication 
to the public 
Given the all-encompassing nature of the right of communication to the public, 
its definition is essential for determining the scope of exclusive rights.1015 Whereas 
the right is spelled out in rather broad language under the InfoSoc Directive, the 
case law on the right of communication to the public is, in the very least, 
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fixed on a tangible medium. Subsequently, Article 3(3) will carry little weight when dealing 
with cases of contemporary dissemination lacking tangible mediums but enabling passing 
access. See Hilty (2018), p. 867. 
1015  Guibault and Quintais (2014), p. 21. 
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confusing.1016 Interpretation of the right as harmonised under the InfoSoc 
Directive became the most controversial aspect of EU copyright law.1017 AG 
Sánchez-Bordona has recently described the body of case law with a quote from 
Ansel Adams: “There is nothing worse than a sharp image of a fuzzy concept”.1018  
An interesting observation is that all but two cases under the jurisprudence on 
the right concern secondary rather than primary communication, in a sense that 
such communication relies and often depends on a previous act. For instance, 
such acts comprise retransmission, which relies on the original broadcast or 
hyperlinking, which in turn relies on a third person uploading a work. Also, in a 
majority of these cases, initial communication has been authorised by the right 
holders. With very few exceptions, jurisprudence examines acts of secondary 
communication. This suggests that it is here where the grey area lies.  
The CJEU has developed a commercial communication right by operating 
with notions of real harm, a new public and profit-making nature as elements of 
the right and extending exhaustion to downloads.1019 As will be shown, despite 
the restrictive wording of the right and Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, the 
Court has sometimes exercised a remarkable flexibility when dealing with the 
boundaries of the right.1020 Whereas the approach of the Court is often somewhat 
unpredictable, the developments have also been praised. In particular, down-
grading the exclusivity of the right holder’s control was supported, as it may lead 
to competition instead of foreclosing any market for subsequent exploiters of a 
work.1021  
Whereas the rich jurisprudence of the Court could be analysed from many 
different angles, for the purpose of this analysis, the focus is on the justifications 
for limiting or extending the right holder’s control over dissemination beyond the 
first communication of a work. Hence, the cases interpreting the right of com-
munication to the public are divided into two groups, corresponding to sections 
5.2.3.1. and 5.2.3.2. of this chapter. The first group is rather scarce and encom-
passes two cases concerning entirely separate acts of communication. The second 
group covers the cases concerning secondary acts of communication, relying on 
initial communication in one way or another.  
Furthermore, the second group is divided into two major categories. The first 
category comprises cases related to performance or broadcast, and the second cate-
gory covers cases of communication happening entirely within the online 
                                                                                             
1016  See Hugenholtz and van Velze (2016), p. 798. 
1017  Quintais (2018), p. 2. 
1018  Opinion of Advocate General in Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. Case  
C-161/17. 25 April 2018, para. 5. 
1019  Westkamp (2017), p. 23. See also on the economic approach of the Court, Guibault and 
Quintais (2014), p. 14. 
1020  See empirical study by Rendas (2018). Also, on the Court being motivated to reach a 
reasonable result at the expenses of traditional copyright concepts, providing flexibility by 
considering fair competition and market effect, see Riis (2013), pp. 139–140. 
1021  Westkamp (2017), p. 39. 
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environment. The main purpose of grouping these cases into categories is to 
illustrate how, depending on the circumstances of the cases, the Court relies on 
the developed notion to a various extent. As shall be seen, the Court demonstrates 
the importance of flexibility when examining the right of such ultimately broad 
scope. Furthermore, the Court also employs arguments which are quite similar to 
those identified under the analysis of the right of distribution. 
 
 
5.2.3.1. Primary acts of communication 
Despite the fact that the number of the cases on the interpretation of the right of 
communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive is rather high, only two 
of them can be categorised as concerning an unauthorised act of primary com-
munication, i.e. originating from a person other than the right holder and without 
the authorisation of the latter. Perhaps it could be attributed to the absence of 
greater doubts whether such cases fall under the scope of the right. Nonetheless, 
the only case concerning a new act of communication which was deemed to fall 
under the scope of the right of communication to the public, was, in fact, decided 
very recently. 
 
 
5.2.3.1.1. Communication through a live performance outside 
the scope of the right 
Although it was more or less clearly explained at the preparatory stage of the 
adoption of the InfoSoc Directive that the right of communication to the public 
would not extend to acts of performance to a present public, a case on the matter 
reached the CJEU as late as in 2010. However, it is also understandable in the 
light of the overreaching character of the right and the blurred boundaries of a 
present and non-present public under the preceding case law.1022  
Ultimately, there is a thin line between the live performance of music to a 
present public and providing access to a live performance by installing a TV set 
in a common space. Essentially, the public is “present” in both cases. The only 
difference is that in the latter case an act of transmission is involved. The Court 
has previously interpreted such transmission as originating not where a TV set is 
installed but, essentially, where the broadcast of the performance originates.1023 
                                                                                             
1022  See earlier case law interpreting the right and relying on the notion of present public, 
section 5.2.3.2.1.3. 
1023  This is a bit puzzling if considered from the perspective of primary and secondary 
communication. Ultimately, transmission originates from a broadcaster. However, it could be 
argued that communication taking placing through public receipt of a broadcast as an act of 
making a work perceptible originates where a TV set is installed. 
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The understanding of a present public has also been rather different under 
national laws, for instance, in the Nordic countries.1024 
The reason why the definition of a present public matters is because the right 
of performance and the right of communication to the public are exploited 
differently and the conditions of their exercise could vary. For instance, in the 
Circul Globus case the dispute in the main proceedings concerned the per-
formance of music during circus and cabaret performances. The owner did not 
obtain a license for such performance from the CMO entrusted by Romanian law 
with managing the rights of communication to the public. He argued that the 
license had already been obtained directly from the right holders and to require 
him to obtain one via the CMO was against the provisions of the InfoSoc 
Directive.  
The referring Court essentially asked whether such public performances fell 
under Article 3(1) of InfoSoc. Furthermore, if they were to fall under this Article, 
whether the Directive precluded national law from entrusting the CMO with 
managing the right. Not too surprisingly, the CJEU ruled that the communication 
to the public right under the Directive does not cover live performance. The Court 
noted that it was not intended under Article 3(1) to cover direct representation or 
performance to a public present at a place where such communication ori-
ginates.1025 Accordingly, the CMO in the proceedings could not claim royalties 
for the public performance. 
What is important in this case is that authorisation from the right holders was 
already obtained, hence they had received a remuneration. Therefore, the CMO 
request for remuneration on the basis of communication to the public right 
essentially was a claim for additional remuneration on the basis that the act fell 
under the right of communication to the public. The reason the Court dismissed 
the claim was the explicit intent of the legislator to exclude public performances 
to a present public from the scope of the harmonised right. As a matter of fact, 
only slightly different cases were considered to fall within the right, in the 
absence of an explicit intent of the legislator to leave them outside of the scope 
of the right. 
 
 
5.2.3.1.2. Upload of a work to a webpage as an act of communication 
Another case on the act of primary communication has been decided by the CJEU 
very recently. Setting aside the fact that the alleged act of communication took 
place in the educational context, be it not the preceding jurisprudence of the 
CJEU, the answer would be a straightforward one.1026 The outcome would most 
                                                                                             
1024  For an overview, see Axhamn (2014), Rosenmeier (2016), Rosenmeier and Blomqvist 
(2018). 
1025  CJEU, Circul Globus Bucureşti (Circ & Variete Globus Bucureşti) v Uniunea Com-
pozitorilor şi Muzicologilor din România – Asociaţia pentru Drepturi de Autor (UCMR - 
ADA). (2011) Case C-283/10, Judgment of 24 November 2011, paras 37–40. 
1026  Ohly (2018b), pp. 1003–1004. 
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certainly be the same one (if it would even make it all the way to the CJEU) if 
the case had been decided in the early 2000s. However, the reasoning would 
likely be much more streamlined. 
The question in the Renckhoff case was whether upload of a copy of a work 
which was already freely available on another webpage with the right holder’s 
authorisation would amount to an act of making a work available to the public.1027 
The Court, in its own fashion, reformulated the question as essentially asking 
whether such upload would be covered by the right of communication to the 
public.1028 Whereas, at first sight, it would appear as if the circumstances are 
comparable to the earlier Svensson case, where the Court did not find an act of 
communication to the public, this case had to be distinguished.1029 Whereas the 
former case concerned a hyperlink which would only provide access to the 
original webpage and a work without altering the way of presenting it and for as 
long as it was still available, in the present case it was a separate act not in any 
way dependant on the original upload besides the copying of a file. 
At the very outset of his opinion, the AG found that upload of a work without 
authorisation constituted, in general, an act of making available.1030 Nonetheless, 
he immediately proceeded to examine the role of the user uploading a work 
without authorisation and the consent of the author to the original making avail-
able of a work. The AG was of opinion that, when a work was already freely 
available without attribution to the author, a regular user could assume that the 
author had no objections to the usage of a work for educational purposes.1031 To 
hold every such user accountable for infringement of the right would undermine 
the freedom of expression and the right to education under the CFR (Articles 11 
and 14(1)).1032  
The CJEU, nonetheless, took a different path. The Court recalled the two 
cumulative criteria of communication to the public developed in the case law (an 
act of communication and a presence of public) and held that the posting of a 
work on a website indeed amounted to the communication as it essentially made 
a work available.1033 The decisive criteria to qualify an act of upload as infringing 
the right of communication to the public in this case became the existence of a 
new public. The claimant, the intervening governments, and the EC rightly 
disagreed on this point.1034 
                                                                                             
1027  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, para. 12. 
1028  Ibid., para. 13. 
1029  See the Svensson case, section 5.2.3.2.2.  
1030  Opinion of Advocate General in Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. Case  
C-161/17. 25 April 2018, paras 61–62. 
1031  Ibid., paras 62–68. 
1032  Ibid., para. 79. 
1033  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, para. 21. 
1034  Ibid., para. 28. 
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The Court held that the upload of a work on a webpage in this case was such 
as to present a work to a new public, which was based on two grounds. First, on 
the grounds that the right would be undermined if the right holder could not object 
or put to an end exploitation of a work on a third-party webpage.1035 Second, based 
on, as it appears, a clear misinterpretation of non-exhaustion provision under 
Article 3(3) of InfoSoc. The Court reasoned that to hold that this new upload did 
not constitute an act of making available would amount to the exhaustion of the 
right of communication to the public.1036 
Relying on these considerations, the Court proceeded to state that the purpose 
of IP as to enable right holders to commercially exploit their work and, accordingly, 
that “In such circumstances, the public taken into account by the copyright holder 
when he consented to the communication of his work on the website on which it 
was originally published is composed solely of users of that site and not of users 
of the website on which the work was subsequently published without the consent 
of the rightholder, or other internet users”.1037 
This is, to say the least, surprising. While it remains to be seen whether the 
case will be upheld in the future, it introduces some unexpected criteria in the 
absence of a need to do so. The case could have been decided solely on the fact 
that an upload of a work on a publicly accessible website is a separate act of 
making available and, thus, a new act of communication to the public.1038 No 
other criteria are necessary in this case, especially not those developed in the con-
text of hyperlinking, where the acts in question did not concern the primary com-
munication of a work at all.  
Rightly so, the case law on hyperlinks was held inapplicable to the present 
case. However, the reasoning of the Court is subject to criticism. The CJEU held 
that jurisprudence on hyperlinking is not applicable because of three reasons. 
First, the case law specifically concerned hyperlinks, and thus circumstances do 
not call for the same balance between the right holders and the users’ interests. 
Second, unlike in the case of hyperlinks, where the original poster controls avail-
ability of a work, in the present case the preventive nature of the right could not 
be secured. Third, unlike in the case of hyperlinks, there was no lack of involve-
ment when a work was actively uploaded.1039 
Overall, the outcome of the case is, of course, justified, keeping in mind that 
the Court left it to the referring Court to consider the application of the limitation 
to the right for educational purposes. However, it would suffice for the Court to 
step back and simply hold that an act of upload constitutes a separate act of 
                                                                                             
1035  Ibid., paras 29–31. 
1036  Ibid., paras 32–33. The reference to the exhaustion principle in this context appears 
misleading, see section 5.2.2.3. 
1037  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, paras 34–35. 
1038  The Court has actually even stated that by holding that an upload constituted a new and 
independent communication. See Ibid., para. 44. 
1039  Ibid., paras 39–45. 
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communication to the public requiring the authorisation of right holder, especially 
that the Court explicitly provides that posting on a webpage “gives rise to a new 
communication, independent of communication initially authorised”.1040 This 
would also be in line with the economic perspective on linking versus a new 
upload.1041 
What is more, the Court brought into the picture the way a work has been 
initially posted on a webpage with the right holder’s authorisation. Despite the 
absence of a discussion on this point (except mentioning it in the facts of the 
case), the operative part of the judgment holds that unauthorised posting of a 
photograph falls under the communication to the public right when it has been 
“previously posted, without any restriction preventing it from being downloaded 
and with the consent of the copyright holder, on another website”. Consequently, 
it opens the doors for arguing that the case might be different if initial posting 
only allows consumption of a work and not its download. Such interpretation of 
the right would clearly not be in line with the objectives of the Directive or obli-
gations under international law.  
The decision is, without a doubt, welcomed in the light of the confusion 
caused by the new public criterion, which often happens to conceal the relevant 
normative considerations.1042 However, it is slightly problematic in its reasoning. 
First, whereas stating at the outset that any upload constitutes an act of commu-
nication, subsequent discussion underplays the significance of the separate act of 
communication as contrasted with the acts relying on an initial act of commu-
nication. Second, by bringing back the public criteria into the assessment con-
cerning a clearly distinct act of communication, the Court causes further uncer-
tainty as to the scope of the right of communication to the public. Third, the Court 
unnecessary brings into the picture the concept of exhaustion, which ought to be 
of no relevance to separate acts of dissemination but only with the acts of subse-
quent exploitation. 
It must be mentioned that the recently adopted DSM Directive aims to facili-
tate, inter alia, the legitimate use of works in the context of teaching activities. 
Article 5 of the Directive provides for a mandatory exception to the rights of 
reproduction and communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive for 
digital use of works for non-commercial teaching purposes, provided that the 
teaching takes place through a secure electronic environment accessible only to 
the students accompanied by the indication of the source.1043 Hence, the provision 
aims to ensure that use for educational purposes is exempted from authorisation 
by the right holder. However, this provision would not cover situations such as 
                                                                                             
1040  Ibid., para. 44. 
1041  Poort (2018), p. 328. Also, Ohly (2018b), p. 999. 
1042  Ohly (2018b), p. 1000. 
1043  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 
on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC 
and 2001/29/EC. 17.5.2019. OJ L 130/92. 
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in the Renckhoff case, as a presentation using the copyright-protected work was 
made freely available on the Internet. 
Accordingly, this case is a great illustration of the need to distinguish between 
primary and secondary acts of communication. As will be addressed in Chapter 
6, it would be beneficial to reconcile the approaches to material and immaterial 
dissemination rights, in particular with respect to the variety of cases falling under 
the right of communication to the public. Whereas, it shall by no means imply 
constructing pre-defined limits by default, at least it would help to systematise 
the jurisprudence and achieve some level of coherence. 
 
 
5.2.3.2. Secondary communication relying on the initial act 
The largest and perhaps the most significant part of the CJEU jurisprudence 
examines whether acts that can be classified as secondary communication relying 
on acts of initial communication fall under acts requiring an authorisation pursuant 
to the right of communication to the public under the EU acquis. The cases 
presented here are very diverse in their circumstances and concern a great variety 
of analogue and digital communication channels. 
The cases have been grouped into two major categories: acts in relation to 
performance and broadcasting and other acts, which are mostly related to com-
munication in the digital environment. The reason is two-fold. First, the right of 
communication to the public harmonises the pre-existing rights related to broad-
casting and retransmission. The question of control over subsequent acts (such as 
retransmission) has been discussed and partially harmonised at the international 
level. The need to exempt certain secondary acts from exclusive control had 
already been acknowledged before the EU harmonisation. 
Second, the harmonisation of the right of making available or the acts of online 
communication, both primary and secondary, was completed in the absence of such 
underlying discussion. Hence, in such cases, the Court, in principle, does not have 
any other grounds to proceed from rather than a broadly worded right and the 
ambiguous statement on its non-exhaustion, as has been explored.1044 Given the 
absence of a clear distinction between the right of making available to the public 
and the right of communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive, no clear 
distinction is maintained either under the CJEU jurisprudence. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.1. Secondary communication in relation to 
a performance or a broadcast 
This section analyses the cases examined by the CJEU in connection to perfor-
mance or broadcast. They can, in turn, be grouped in cases concerning (re)trans-
mission and cases concerning the public receipt of a transmission (broadcast). As 
                                                                                             
1044  See section 5.2.2.3. 
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has been illustrated in the section examining the background of the harmoni-
sation, at the international level such acts appear as secondary exploitation, whose 
status is not clearly resolved. Hence, this section outlines the aspects which are 
relevant for consideration whether the acts of secondary communication consti-
tute a form of secondary exploitation and whether such exploitation should be 
subjected to the exclusive control. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.1.1. Transmission of a broadcast as a part of 
the initial authorised communication 
The SBS case is the only case examining whether there is an act of communication 
to the public when an entity actively transmits a signal carrying a work without 
it being receivable by the general public. In this case the broadcasting organi-
sation transmitted a work-carrying signal to point-to-point distributors, which 
then broadcasted it to the public. The organisation representing the right holders 
claimed that the initial transmission by the broadcasting organisation of a signal 
without the authorisation of the right holder constituted a breach of Article 3(1) 
of the InfoSoc Directive. The question was thus whether the right holder is 
entitled to authorise every act of transmission of a signal in a series leading to the 
broadcast of a work under Article 3(1) of InfoSoc. 
The referring Court asked the CJEU to rule on whether the transmission of a 
signal carrying a work without making this work accessible to the public, but 
which will subsequently be made accessible to the public by signal distributors, 
constitutes an act of communication to the public under Article 3 of InfoSoc.1045 
The CJEU decided the case on the basis of the absence of the public, as the signal 
could not be accessed by viewers.1046 However, the Court also established that 
situation would be different if the transmission of a signal from the distributors 
to the viewers was solely of technical character, in which case the transmission 
in the main proceedings would constitute communication to the public.1047 
Consequently, the CJEU did not rule out the possibility that the broadcasting 
organisation was performing an act of communication to the public altogether. 
The reason behind it seems to have been an intent to ensure that one of the entities 
in the chain of communicating a work is deemed to perform an act of commu-
nication to the public rather than letting the separate processes escape authori-
sation altogether. This is in line with the view expressed under the negotiations 
on the InfoSoc Directive. Namely, that an act of communication can consist of 
                                                                                             
1045  Or, more precisely, as reformulated by the CJEU. See CJEU, SBS Belgium NV v Belgische 
Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM). (2015) Case C-325/14, 
Judgment of 19 November 2015, paras 12–13. 
1046  Ibid., paras 21–22. 
1047  Ibid., paras 30–32. 
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few acts of transmission which must be considered together.1048 In the present 
circumstances, the act of transmission constituted a part of the same act of com-
munication to the public. The entity which actually made the signal available to 
the public (in this case the last in the chain), would be performing an act of com-
munication to the public.  
The CJEU employing the new public concept is not very convincing here, 
although it may have been motivated by its usage in a similar case under the 
Satellite and Cable Directive. In the Canal Digitaal case the Court referred to the 
new public because the transmission in question made a signal available to the 
public.1049 Hence, the Court considered the intended audience and found that a 
transmission in question, in fact, constituted a separate act of communication as 
it was targeting a separate audience. The right of communication to the public 
was used to require an authorisation and, thus, remuneration for an act of trans-
mission, for which authorisation must have been obtained prior the transmission 
of the broadcast. Hence, the ultimate question was also whether the organisation 
representing the right holders could claim remuneration not only from an organi-
sation receiving a signal for subsequent transmission to the receiving public, but 
also from an organisation merely supplying the signal. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.1.2. Retransmission to the same coverage area or 
the circle of intended recipients 
Next, the jurisprudence of the Court addressed the issues of the retransmission of 
the original signal without obtaining a separate authorisation of the right holder 
but reaching, essentially, the same intended public. Although the two cases con-
sidered below concern similar situations, the Court reached the opposite conclu-
sion. It is important to provide the background for the cases, namely which entity 
was relying on the right of communication to the public and what the ultimate 
goal was. 
In the first of the two cases (TV Catchup), the broadcasting organisation itself 
was also the owner of the author’s rights in the works that were broadcasted.1050 
Hence, the broadcasting organisation invoked the right of communication to the 
public to subject the retransmission of its signal, essentially reaching the same 
public, to authorisation. Basically, subjecting retransmission to authorisation 
would either eliminate the competition or subject such retransmissions to 
remuneration. The second case (AKM) was brought by the CMO against the 
                                                                                             
1048  It resembles the reasoning of the Court in cases concerning the right of distribution, where 
the right encompassed preparatory steps. See section 3.2.4.2. 
1049  CJEU, Airfield NV and Canal Digitaal BV v Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Com-
ponisten en Uitgevers CVBA (Sabam) (C-431/09) and Airfield NV v Agicoa Belgium BVBA 
(C-432/09), Judgment of 13 October 2011. 
1050  It is of importance in the context of the Satellite and Cable Directive that permits 
collective licensing for simultaneous retransmissions. See Guibault and Quintais (2014), p. 20.  
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operator of a cable network for distribution of a broadcasting signal to its sub-
scribers. The organisation claimed a payment of remuneration for the retrans-
mission of original broadcast.  
What is also important to note is that retransmission in these cases did not 
concern a specific work but rather the broadcast as a whole. This, essentially, goes 
back to the discussions on the need to exempt the simultaneous unaltered retrans-
missions from a separate authorisation. However, retransmissions seem to have 
been substantially harmonised under the right of communication to the public 
under the InfoSoc Directive.1051 The question that arises in the context of these 
cases is whether the copyright holder shall benefit from each and every act of 
exploitation even after remuneration was obtained, in particular if it reaches the 
same authorised audience. As will be shown, the answer is anything but a black 
or white and will depend on a variety of considerations. 
 
5.2.3.2.1.2.1. Retransmission of a broadcast via the Internet 
The proceedings in the TVCatchup case concerned an online service that allowed 
identified users to stream a live broadcast of the channels which these users were 
entitled to under their analogue license. The affected broadcasters owning the 
copyright in the broadcasted programmes maintained that such service infringed 
their right of communication to the public of such programmes. The referring 
court thus asked the CJEU, inter alia, whether the right of communication to the 
public extended to cases where the third party provided a service by which users, 
who could lawfully receive the broadcast on their TV sets, could receive the con-
tent of the broadcast online upon authentication.1052  
The CJEU, however, reformulated the question to whether the communication 
to the public right under Article 3(1) covers a retransmission of the works 
included in a terrestrial television broadcast by a third party by means of an Internet 
stream available to subscribers entitled to a terrestrial broadcast. Accordingly, the 
Court shifted the focus from retransmission of a signal to retransmission of a 
work. The important peculiarity of the case was that the service only let the users 
who were indeed in the possession of a terrestrial license to authenticate and 
receive a transmission by determining their location.1053 The Court thus examined 
the case on the assumption that all the users were entitled to receive the broadcast 
lawfully through other means than using the online service in question.1054  
The defendant in the proceedings (the provider of the online service) argued 
that online retransmission of the broadcast constituted merely a technical means 
to ensure or improve reception of the broadcast in the intended area. The CJEU 
                                                                                             
1051  Quintais and Poort (2018), p. 42. 
1052  CJEU, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, Judg-
ment of 7 March 2013, para. 18. 
1053  Ibid., para. 10.  
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disagreed with the merely technical function of such retransmission and held that 
it constituted a separate transmission subject to the right holder’s authori-
sation.1055 The Court argued that the circumstances of the case had to be distin-
guished from the earlier cases concerning broadcasting, as in the present case 
retransmission was carried out using a different method.1056 
Significantly, the Court recalled Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, 
providing for non-exhaustion of the right of communication to the public. The 
CJEU held that authorising inclusion of a work in communication to the public 
did not exhaust the right to authorise or prohibit other communications. The EU 
legislature regulated the situations in which a work is put to multiple uses. Hence, 
as the Court suggested here, retransmission through different means constitutes 
such a new use of a work.1057 Accordingly, the CJEU established that, when dif-
ferent means where used to retransmit a work (as in the present case), such 
retransmission constituted a separate act of communication to the public. Hence, 
there was no need to examine whether there had been a new public.1058 
The referring court also asked if the two aspects played any role in establishing 
the existence of an act of communication to the public: the profit-making nature 
of the online service and the fact that the service provider acted in competition 
with the right holder. The CJEU held that the profit-making nature was neither 
an essential nor a decisive condition for there to be an act of communication to 
the public.1059 The competitive nature of the service in relation to the right 
holder’s one, on the other hand, was not relevant for the purpose of categorising 
a transmission.1060 It is regrettable that the Court dismissed these circumstances, 
especially in the light of the subsequent cases on similar grounds where the Court 
reached a different result.  
The Court’s reasoning could have been more considerate. First, nowhere did 
the Court discuss whether such simultaneous transmission of a broadcast online 
constituted a separate act of communication to the public of a specific work under 
the InfoSoc Directive. The Court relied on the provisions of the Satellite and 
Cable Directive to find that this is the case. However, if the same public was 
reached by the retransmission at the very same time, remuneration from the 
receiving public had already been obtained through terrestrial licenses.  
Considering that the right holder in question is actually the broadcasting 
organisation, another question that arises is whether the copyright holder should 
be entitled to additional remuneration for the very same act of communication. 
Moreover, also from the perspective of the user in possession of a terrestrial 
license, it does not seem fair to be deprived of the possibility to obtain (potentially 
                                                                                             
1055  Ibid., paras 27–30. 
1056  Ibid., para. 26. 
1057  Ibid., paras 23–24. 
1058  Ibid., paras 38–39.  
1059  Ibid., paras 43–44. 
1060  Ibid., para. 46.  
247 
more user-friendly) access despite the fact that they had already remunerated the 
right holder. Whereas such a service might be considered as interfering with the 
market for a work and, hence, subject to the exclusive right, the CJEU could have 
done a better job at exploring the implications. 
Furthermore, the significance of the “different technical means” criterion 
appears rather blurry. First, in the latter case of cable retransmission, the Court, 
very surprisingly, did not refer to the TVCatchup case at all. Second, it would 
also be highly questionable whether a slight change of technology in a multi-
stage communication would necessarily constitute a different method.1061 Third, 
it did not clarify the significance of reaching a new public. Overall, the Court 
seems to suggest that a new way of exploiting a communication, even if simulta-
neous and unaltered, is subject to a separate authorisation.1062 Accordingly, the 
Court seems to rely solely on such retransmission being a new use of a work. 
Although the Court denied the relevance of competition and obtaining a profit, 
they seem valid criteria to consider and will be discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2.3.2.1.2.2. Retransmission of a broadcast via a cable network 
The reasoning of the Court in the TVCatchup case could be seen as partially 
reversed in the later AKM case, which so far received limited attention in copy-
right scholarship and succeeding CJEU judgments.1063 In the AKM case on 
simultaneous retransmission, the question referred to the CJEU was whether 
transmission of a broadcast through cable network installations constituted a 
separate act of communication to the public under Article 3(1) of InfoSoc. More 
precisely, the question was whether national law exempting such cable instal-
lations if they comprised of fewer than 500 subscribers was in breach of the 
Directive. Retransmission of the original broadcast took place simultaneously 
through the cable and without altering its content. 
Answering the questions, the Court first examined whether there was an act 
of communication the public requiring authorisation. Surprisingly, the CJEU did 
not refer to the TVCatchup case on the similar matter and did not, generally, speak 
of the transmission in question as a retransmission.1064 Although finding that the 
transmission was done by means other than the original (via cable network and 
not a broadcast), the Court merely stated that the facts permitted qualifying such 
transmission as an act of communication to the public.1065 
                                                                                             
1061  For that reason, Peukert called these criteria isolated. See Peukert (2017), p. 889. 
1062  Geiger and Schönherr (2014b), p. 417. 
1063  For instance, scholars often rely on the TV Catchup ruling without mentioning the AKM 
case. See Ginsburg and Budiardjo (2018), p. 169. On the other hand, see Peukert (2017). 
1064  Which it essentially was, in a sense that it relied on initial transmission to communicate a 
broadcast to the subscribers. 
1065  CJEU, Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverleger 
registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs GmbH (2017) Case C-138/16, 
Judgment of 16 March 2017, para. 26. 
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Next, likewise at odds with the TVCatchup judgment, the Court proceeded to 
the second criterion of communication to the public. Namely, the CJEU examined 
whether there was a new public.1066 The Court found that the right holder’s 
authorisation for a national broadcast clearly also covered the persons that could 
receive the signal retransmitted by the defendant. Accordingly, no new public 
was reached through the transmission in question.1067 Nevertheless, an act of 
communication to the public could have taken place if such secondary trans-
mission would also include broadcasts by different broadcasters from another 
MS.1068 
The operative part of the judgment further specifies the conditions under 
which Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive and Article 11bis of the BC do not 
preclude national legislation that does not cover an act of simultaneous and 
unaltered transmission of a broadcast with the communication to the public right. 
Namely, the Court states that the criterion are satisfied if (re)transmission takes 
place on national territory and “provided that it is merely a technical means of 
communication and was taken into account by the author of the work when the 
latter authorised the original communication, this being a matter for the national 
court to ascertain”. 
Hence, in this case, although establishing that the retransmission in question 
was done using different technical means, the Court found it necessary to 
examine the criteria of the public. Essentially, by restricting the scope of the right 
of communication to the public in the present case the Court avoided double com-
pensation to the right holder.1069 The question that arises is whether there are any 
“levels” of different technical means, according to which the new public ought to 
be taken into consideration. Whereas the subsequent communication of a work 
using a new way of exploitation (e.g. streaming) may indeed justify requiring the 
consent of the right holder, not every slight change may be of the comparable 
level of significance.1070 
While it is difficult to draw a clear picture of when a simultaneous retrans-
mission of a broadcast constitutes a separate act of communication to the public, 
combining some arguments from both cases could perhaps help to define a better 
working criterion for the necessity to obtain authorisation for the retransmission 
of a broadcast. Namely, if a retransmission is simultaneous, unaltered, and aimed 
at the same public, it would not, as a rule, require authorisation (in line with the 
AKM case). However, if such retransmission substantially interferes with the 
interests of copyright holder, it can be deemed a new communication to the public 
and require authorisation (in line with the TVCatchup case). 
                                                                                             
1066  Ibid., paras 27–28. On new public criteria, see, inter alia, section 5.2.3.2.1.3.2.  
1067  Ibid., para. 29. 
1068  Ibid., para. 33. 
1069  Peukert (2017), p. 892. 
1070  See section 6.2.3. Also Ibid., p. 889. 
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“New technical means” is not a very technology-neutral criterion, although it 
may seem like one. Given the constantly evolving technological possibilities, it 
is desirable to define a criterion that is based on a clearer rationale. Perhaps, such 
criteria as interference with exploitation or competition with the right holder 
could be used. Whereas the “new technical means” criterion points towards sanc-
tioning the right holders with obtaining remuneration for each (direct or indirect, 
in competition or not) exploitation, the new public criterion in the AKM case 
points towards limiting the reach of the right where interference is insignificant, 
and no new potential audience is reached. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.1.3. Public receipt of a broadcast as a secondary communication 
The question whether public receipt of a broadcast always falls under the exclu-
sive right of communication to the public is not resolved. Whereas in certain cases 
the CJEU deemed it to fall within the scope of the right, in others it did not. Public 
receipt here means the installation of a TV or radio set outside the private sphere. 
In the cases considered by the CJEU, the sets were installed at commercial 
establishments, either in common spaces such as pubs or in more private ones 
such as hotel rooms. The question was essentially whether making a transmission 
available in a public place rather than in person constitutes a retransmission 
requiring authorisation.1071 
The cases of public receipt of a broadcast represent analogue communication 
rather than that enabled by the digital environment. A public not present at the 
place where the communication originates appears slightly inadequate in given 
circumstances. According to CJEU jurisprudence, installing TV sets constitutes 
a separate act of communication. Hence, the communication in this case would 
actually originate at the place of TV set and, ultimately, at the place of the 
public.1072 Nevertheless, the Court has treated such a public as not present at the 
place where communication originates, clearly having in mind the origin of a 
broadcasting signal instead. 
If put into context, the cases of public receipt of a signal essentially concern 
the question whether different right holders are entitled to remuneration on top of 
that received for a broadcast of a work. Hence, by qualifying an act of public 
receipt under the communication to the public right, the Court accords the right 
holders a claim for additional remuneration when an authorised broadcasting 
signal is received at commercial establishments. It is also important to note that 
the right of communication to the public is harmonised not only as the author’s 
right but also as a neighbouring right for performers, producers, broadcasters, etc. 
                                                                                             
1071  Opinion of Advocate General in Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v 
QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd  
(C-429/08). 3 February 2011, para. 117. 
1072  A bit different but similar point was made by the AG, see Ibid., paras 144–146. Under 
Swedish law, see Axhamn (2007), p. 155. 
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Accordingly, qualifying an act as falling under the communication to the public 
right under Article 3 has far-reaching consequences, allowing a vast variety of 
right holders to ask for remuneration. 
Whereas this thesis is concerned solely with the right of communication to the 
public as a right granted to authors under the InfoSoc Directive, this section will 
include references to the cases from the domain of the neighbouring rights. On 
the one hand, the Court ruled that the neighbouring right of communication to the 
public under Article 8(2) of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive requires an 
individual interpretation based on the compensatory nature of the right.1073 On 
the other hand, the CJEU held later that communication to the public ought to 
have the same meaning for the right under the InfoSoc Directive and the neigh-
bouring rights under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive.1074 The Court 
actively refers to case law under both Directives when examining the scope of 
the communication to the public right under the InfoSoc Directive.1075 
The subject of Article 8(2) of the Rental and Lending Directive is a single 
equitable remuneration paid by the user for the use of a phonogram for any com-
munication to the public: 
 
Member States shall provide a right in order to ensure that a single equitable 
remuneration is paid by the user, if a phonogram published for commercial pur-
poses, or a reproduction of such phonogram, is used for broadcasting by wireless 
means or for any communication to the public, and to ensure that this remuneration 
is shared between the relevant performers and phonogram producers. Member 
States may, in the absence of agreement between the performers and phonogram 
producers, lay down the conditions as to the sharing of this remuneration between 
them. 
 
The latter is thus a remuneration right as opposed to the right under Article 3(1) 
of the InfoSoc Directive. Hence, it is of importance to qualify the act under the 
appropriate Article and Directive as the Court has done in the Del Corso case.1076 
Notwithstanding that, the ultimate goal of both exclusive rights is to secure 
remuneration through a work’s exploitation, and hence it supports the same con-
siderations for both types of rights. 
 
                                                                                             
1073  CJEU, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, 
Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 74–77. 
1074  CJEU, Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesell-
schaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA). 
(2016) Case C-117/15, Judgment of 31 May 2016, paras 32–34. 
1075  For instance, CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) 
Case C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, paras 28–36; CJEU, Stichting Brein v Jack 
Frederik Wullems. (2016) Case C-527/15, Judgment of 26 April 2017, para. 30. 
1076  The case was referred on the basis of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, but the Court 
reformulated the questions to interpret the neighbouring right under Article 8(2) of the Rental 
and Lending Rights Directive. See CJEU, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del 
Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, Judgment of 15 March 2012, para. 64.  
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5.2.3.2.1.3.1. Receipt of a broadcast as an act of communication 
The Rafael Hoteles case was the very first case referred to the CJEU on the inter-
pretation of Article 3(1) and the right of communication to the public. The pro-
ceedings were brought against a hotel that installed TV sets in rooms, enabling 
customers to watch broadcasts of channels subscribed to. SGAE (the body 
responsible for managing IP rights in Spain) claimed that by providing TV sets 
the hotel was communicating to the public in the meaning of Article 3(1) of the 
InfoSoc Directive musical works which SGAE managed. With a view that the 
hotel had not obtained prior authorisation for such communication, SGAE 
demanded compensation.1077 
The referring court thus asked whether installation of TV sets in hotel rooms 
amounted to the communication of musical works included into a broadcast and 
if the hotel guests constituted a public. First, the CJEU noted that the installation 
of TV sets as such did not constitute communication of a work. However, if by 
the means of these sets distribution of a programme-carrying signal took place, it 
constituted an act of communication to the public performed by the hotel 
owner.1078 Transmission of a broadcast through TV sets was a deliberate action 
to provide access to a broadcast rather than a mere technical arrangement.1079 
Perhaps slightly counterintuitively, it was established that installation of the 
TV sets amounted to distribution of a signal and, hence, communication of a 
work.1080 This can be found counterintuitive because mere reception of a signal 
was considered its distribution, amounting to communication of a work. The act 
of installing TV sets does not include any active transmission or retransmission 
on its own. Speaking of which, the Court also found that the acts in question fell 
under Article 11bis(1)(ii) of the BC as they constituted communication by an 
organisation other than the original one.1081 
The notion of receipt of a broadcast as an act of communication to the public 
has since then been upheld in the case law of the Court, both under InfoSoc and 
under the Rental and Lending Rights Directive.1082 The subsequent case law 
focused on the various criteria such as intervention in full knowledge, a new 
public, and a receptive public, rather than on the act of communication as such. 
The situations, in which the Court found an act of communication taking place 
through public receipt of a broadcast are summarised below.  
                                                                                             
1077  CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA. 
(2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, para. 21. 
1078  Ibid., para. 46. 
1079  Ibid., para. 42. 
1080  Ibid., para. 47. 
1081  Ibid., para. 40. 
1082  Under the SCA before the EU harmonisation, the receipt of a signal at the hotel though 
TV sets was considered to fall under the category of performance, where the hotel made 
musical works available to the public against the payment of a fee. See Mornington-målet, 
NJA 1980 s 123. For comment, see Axhamn (2007), p. 153. 
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The joined FAPL/Murphy case concerned circumstances similar to those in 
Rafael Hoteles in a sense that one of the defendants (the owner of a pub) through 
a TV set screened broadcasts of football matches. The only difference in the facts 
concerning communication was that screening was made using a decoding device 
and that it took place in another type of establishment than a hotel. Many ques-
tions were referred to the CJEU, including on obtaining and use of a decoding 
device intended for use in a different market. In this section the case is considered 
only insofar as it interprets the right of communication to the public under the 
InfoSoc Directive.1083 
The referring court asked the CJEU to rule, inter alia, whether a work is com-
municated to the public where a satellite broadcasting signal is received at com-
mercial premises and shown via a single television screen and loudspeakers to 
the members of the public present at the place.1084 Not surprisingly, the CJEU 
held that the circumstances of the case were comparable to those in Rafael 
Hoteles.1085 Following essentially the same line of reasoning as in the preceding 
case, the CJEU ruled that such screening constituted an act of communication of 
a work to the public.1086  
The concept of communication to the public has also been examined in dis-
putes concerning national laws exempting certain establishments from paying 
remuneration, for instance, in the Phonographic Performance Ireland (PPI) case, 
which concerned the Irish law exempting hotels from paying levies for broad-
casting of sound recordings. The claimant in the proceedings, the CMO, con-
tested that law on the grounds of the breach of obligations under the EU Direc-
tives, namely Article 8(2) of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive.  
The issue at stake was comparable to earlier cases, the question was namely 
whether neighbouring right holders were entitled to additional remuneration 
when radio or TV sets were installed at commercial establishments such as hotels. 
Once more, the CJEU held that installing TV sets constituted an act of commu-
nication to the public as it communicated a work to the public that would other-
wise not receive a broadcast.1087 The result of the case was, essentially, that the 
exemption under the Irish law was against the Directive.  
Slightly surprisingly in the light of the preceding case law, the Court did not 
find there to be an act of communication to the public in the Del Corso case, 
where TV sets receiving broadcast of phonograms were installed in a private 
dental practice. Although by installing TV sets the owner of the practice commu-
nicated the work to the public, the list of persons was limited and comprised 
                                                                                             
1083  For the comment in relation to the freedom to provide services, see section 5.2.1.1.  
1084  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, para. 54, question 6.  
1085  Ibid., para. 195. 
1086  Ibid., paras 198–199. 
1087  CJEU, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney General. 
(2012) Case C-162/10, Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 44–47. 
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solely clients that were present there subsequently and not at the same time.1088 
Furthermore, the Court has stressed on the fact that it could not be presumed that 
the usual customers of a dentist were receptive to the broadcast.1089 Hence, the 
Court relied on the criterion of a public rather than communication through a 
receipt, as covered in the section below. This case has understandably received 
quite some attention, and different establishments tried to rely on it in the 
aftermath.1090 
Nearly the same circumstances arose in the OSA case, where a spa establish-
ment had TV sets on the premises and received a broadcasting signal. The CMO 
brought a claim for compensation for unauthorised communication to the public 
of works. The spa establishment maintained that their activity was covered by the 
provision of the Czech Copyright Act exempting health institutions from 
payment of license fees.1091  
Examining whether installing TV sets to receive a broadcasting signal consti-
tuted an act of communication to the public, the CJEU relied on previous judg-
ments, namely on Rafael Hoteles. The spa establishment argued that the nature 
of the public at their facilities was different from hotels and resembled the dental 
practice, in line with the Del Corso judgment.1092 The Court disagreed and held 
that distribution of a signal to TV sets on their premises constituted an act of 
communication to the public.1093 Furthermore, the CJEU held that exceptions 
under Article 5 of InfoSoc did not influence the interpretation.1094 
In yet another case, where the CJEU answered the questions by means of a 
reasoned order, the issue at stake was whether owners of a café acted in breach 
                                                                                             
1088  CJEU, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, 
Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 96–97. 
1089  Ibid., para. 98. This resembles the CJEU decision in the BSA case, where the Court 
reasoned that television broadcast of a graphic user interface of computer programme did not 
fall under the right of communication to the public because it was not communicated in such 
a way that the public had access to its essential element, it being interaction with a user. See 
CJEU, Bezpečnostní softwarová asociace – Svaz softwarové ochrany v Ministerstvo kultury 
(2010) Case C-393/09, Judgment of 22 December 2010, para. 57. 
1090  See CJEU, Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesell-
schaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA). 
(2016) Case C-117/15, Judgment of 31 May 2016.; CJEU, OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro 
práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s. (2014) Case C‑351/12, 
Judgment of 27 February 2014. 
1091  CJEU, OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v Léčebné lázně 
Mariánské Lázně a.s. (2014) Case C‑351/12, Judgment of 27 February 2014, paras 11–13. 
1092  Where there was no public found by the Court, see above. 
1093  CJEU, OSA – Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v Léčebné lázně 
Mariánské Lázně a.s. Case C-351/12. 27 February 2014. Para. 30-34. 
1094  The cited provisions were Articles 5(2)(e), (3)(b) and (5) of the InfoSoc Directive, but the 
Court held that it only concerned the right of reproduction. CJEU, OSA – Ochranný svaz 
autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně a.s. Case  
C-351/12. 27 February 2014. Para. 39–41.  
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of the right of communication to the public under Article 3(1) of InfoSoc by 
transmitting at their premises radio broadcast through radio set and speakers.1095 
The CJEU relied on its previous case law, in essence on the FAPL/Murphy case, 
to arrive at the conclusion that the act indeed constituted communication to the 
public. What is interesting though is that the referring Court was asking the CJEU 
whether the fact of owners using speakers or amplifiers had any effect on the 
answer to the question.1096 
Similar circumstances were considered in the RehaTraining case, where the 
CJEU was asked to rule whether installing TV sets to receive a broadcast in a 
rehabilitation centre amounted to the communication of works to the public. The 
rehabilitation centre relied on the argument that the visitors formed a narrow 
circle of accident victims. The Court disagreed and indicated that the receipt of 
the broadcast at the establishment was fully comparable to situations considered 
in café-restaurants, hotels, and spa establishments.1097 Hence, the Court considers 
public receipt of a broadcast at commercial establishments to constitute an act of 
communication to the public. Even in the case where no communication to the 
public was deemed to take place, the Court reasoned on the basis of the audience 
not forming a public rather than the very act falling outside of the right. The 
section below will summarise these cases in relation to the public as a criterion 
of communication to the public right. 
 
5.2.3.2.1.3.2. Receiving public as a new public 
Against the background of the previous section, here the cases are dealt with 
inasmuch they qualified the public receiving a broadcast though TV sets as a new 
public. Given that any receipt of a broadcast was considered to be an act of com-
munication, the public became the decisive criterion to qualify an act as falling 
under the right of communication to the public. Although the Court does not 
always differentiate between the criteria of communication and the public, some 
relevant considerations for the assessment can be observed. 
First and foremost, the Court seems to derive the new public criterion as rele-
vant factor for finding an act of communication to the public from Article 
11bis(1)(ii) of the BC. As the Court stipulated, “a communication made in 
circumstances such as those in the main proceedings constitutes, according to 
Article 11bis(1)(ii) of the BC, a communication made by a broadcasting organi-
sation other than the original one. Thus, such a transmission is made to a public 
                                                                                             
1095  CJEU, Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores CRL v Ministério Público and Others (2015) 
Case C-151/15, Judgment of 14 July 2015. 
1096  For an overview of the case, see Malaquias (2016), p. 2010. Essentially, the case could 
also be viewed as concerning communication by the loudspeakers.  
1097  CJEU, Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesell-
schaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA). 
(2016) Case C-117/15, Judgment of 31 May 2016, paras 55–56. 
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different from the public at which the original act of communication of the work 
is directed, that is, to a new public.” 1098  
Hence, the CJEU suggests that the mere fact that the communication is made 
by a different organisation indicates that such communication reaches a new 
public. This is further supported by the criterion of intervention, according to 
which the customers physically within the area would not be able to enjoy the 
broadcast in the absence of an intervention.1099 Rather than examining the 
audience in the context of the intent of the copyright holder authorising the 
broadcast, the CJEU suggests that the public shall be defined in isolation from 
the intended public. Meaning that even though these persons were within the 
reach of the original broadcast, the establishment providing the means of 
receiving a signal communicated this broadcast to a new public, which is limited 
to a specific circle of persons, i.e. customers.  
The latter is also evident in the Court’s reasoning in the FAPL case, where the 
CJEU held that right holder authorising a broadcast considers only the owners of 
the TV sets as the potential public.1100 Hence, any public receipt of a broadcast 
would qualify as a communication to the public, as it would include persons other 
than owners of a TV set. The opinion of AG in the FAPL case is interesting 
because it suggests that there is no act of communication to the public. According 
to the AG, the public in this case is present where the communication originates 
(from a TV screen placed in the pub).1101 This is said to be different than in the 
Rafael Hoteles case where there were different TV sets receiving a signal and 
distributing it to different facilities, so that communication was not technically to 
a present public. 
Despite such a broad understanding of the public, the Court employed further 
criteria or, perhaps more precisely, arguments for examining the matter. For 
instance, the CJEU held that installing TV sets at public establishments consti-
tutes an act of communication to the public because it is directed to the public 
that would otherwise not receive the broadcast.1102 Similarly, that circle of 
patients of a rehabilitation centre was not too small or insignificant, particularly 
since they may enjoy works in several places at the establishment.1103 
                                                                                             
1098  CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA. 
(2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, para. 40. 
1099  Ibid., para. 42. 
1100  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, para. 198. 
1101  Opinion of Advocate General in Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v 
QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd  
(C-429/08). 3 February 2011, para. 144. 
1102  CJEU, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney General. 
(2012) Case C-162/10, Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 44–47. 
1103  CJEU, Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesell-
schaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA). 
(2016) Case C-117/15, Judgment of 31 May 2016, para. 58. 
256 
Ultimately, the understanding of public in the CJEU jurisprudence on the pub-
lic receipt of a broadcast is a broad one. The only case that stands out is the Del 
Corso case. The CJEU did not find there an act of communication to the public 
on the grounds that the list of persons visiting the dental practice was limited at 
all times.1104 Furthermore, the customers were characterised as not particularly 
receptive to the works.1105 The judgment, however, interpreted Article 8(2) of the 
Rental and Lending Rights Directive; hence, it remains to be seen if similar 
justifications could be applied in the cases under Article 3(1) of InfoSoc. 
 
5.2.3.2.1.3.3. Profit-making nature of communication 
as an indication of an intervention 
At the very outset of the harmonisation of the right of communication to the 
public under the CJEU jurisprudence, the Court established that the intent of 
establishment and profit-making nature of the installation were the relevant 
criteria. Despite them not being a precondition for finding an act of commu-
nication to the public, both criteria were relevant to the assessment under the 
Rafael Hoteles case.1106  
Similarly, despite recalling that profit was not a decisive factor, the Court 
reasoned that transmission in the FAPL case was carried out to obtain additional 
benefit and attract customers.1107 Likewise, receipt of a broadcast at a rehabili-
tation centre, in the Court’s view, constituted an additional service without a 
medical benefit, thus giving the establishment a competitive advantage.1108 How-
ever, whereas in the Rafael Hoteles case the CJEU held that it cannot be seriously 
disputed that TV sets influenced the price of the rooms, TV installation at a dental 
practice did not have the same impact.1109  
The Court has also denied the argument from the broadcasting organisation 
that TV installation at a hotel gave rise to a claim for additional compensation 
                                                                                             
1104  CJEU, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, 
Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 96–97. 
1105  Ibid., paras 98–99. 
1106  CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA. 
(2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, para. 44; CJEU, Phonographic Perfor-
mance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney General. (2012) Case C-162/10, Judgment of 
15 March 2012, paras 44–47. 
1107  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, paras 204–205. 
1108  CJEU, Reha Training Gesellschaft für Sport- und Unfallrehabilitation mbH v Gesell-
schaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte eV (GEMA). 
(2016) Case C-117/15, Judgment of 31 May 2016, para. 63. 
1109  CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA. 
(2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, para. 44; CJEU, Società Consortile 
Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, Judgment of 15 March 2012, 
paras 98–99. 
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under Article 8(3) of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive. The question in 
the Hotel Edelweiss case was whether wireless communication to the public of a 
broadcast in hotel rooms constituted an act falling under the neighbouring right 
of communication granted to the broadcaster for a rebroadcast of their works to 
the public against the payment of an entrance fee. The CJEU ruled that the 
entrance fee meant solely a fee requested in return for communicating a work to 
the public.1110 The price of the room could not constitute such a fee in the Court’s 
view; it considered such communication an additional service.  
Although this service influenced the hotel price, it was not an act of commu-
nication to the public in the meaning of Article 8(3).1111 This is exactly the case 
that illustrates the complexity of the jurisprudence on the right of communication 
to the public. Whereas the broadcaster could not claim compensation in this case 
on the basis of neighbouring right, it could well do so under Article 3(1) of the 
InfoSoc Directive pursuant to the case law outlined above if the broadcasting 
organisation itself was the copyright holder.1112 
 
5.2.3.2.1.3.4. Practical significance of public receipt constituting 
an act of secondary communication 
The practical outcome of these cases is that they entitle the CMO administering 
communication to the public right to collect royalties for such communication 
through the public receipt of a broadcast.1113 Essentially, Article 3(1) accords to 
the right holders of the broadcasted works an additional claim for compensation 
for each and every receival of a broadcast in a (relatively) public space. Likewise, 
Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the Rental and Lending Rights Directive accord the same 
claim to neighbouring right holders.  
On the other hand, Article 8(3) of the latter Directive does not give rise to a 
claim for additional compensation for broadcasting organisations, as it is designed 
to only do so when the communication is directed to the public and against pay-
ment of an entrance fee. The latter is, of course, without prejudice to other 
provisions granting the right of communication to the public to authors and 
neighbouring right holders. For instance, the same broadcasting organisation can 
claim a payment for public receipt of a broadcast if it owns a copyright for works 
that are broadcasted.  
The overall outcome of these cases is generally supported on the grounds that 
enabling reception of a broadcast for hotel guests is an economically significant 
act that shall be separately authorised.1114 While the latter view could be 
                                                                                             
1110  CJEU, Verwertungsgesellschaft Rundfunk GmbH v Hettegger Hotel Edelweiss GmbH. 
(2017) Case C-641/15, Judgment of 16 February 2017, para. 23. 
1111  Ibid., paras 25–26. 
1112  As an example of a broadcaster being the right holder, see the TVCatchup case, section 
5.2.3.2.1.2.1. 
1113  Leistner (2009), p. 859.  
1114  Ohly (2009), p. 228.  
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supported, the question that arises is whether such an act shall necessarily be con-
sidered a separate act of communication in the absence of active interreference 
with the signal. Even more significant is the question of whether considering 
public receipt as an act of communication to the public ought to be confined solely 
to the acts in context of TV/radio broadcasting or similar (like online streaming) 
since it could be argued that in such cases the right holder has a legitimate interest 
to obtain remuneration for public viewing of communication which is otherwise 
meant for private consumption. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.2. Secondary communication through hyperlinking and 
related activities 
Another part of the case law concerns different acts in connection with com-
munication of a work on the Internet and in one way or another are connected to 
linking. Most significantly, the cases examine whether linking as such constitutes 
a separate act of communication to the public. The most important characteristic 
of linking in the light of this thesis is that a person providing a link is not neces-
sarily the same as the one actually uploading a work. Accordingly, similar to the 
cases of retransmission or public receipt of communication, such communication 
relies on an initial act. The present section outlines the findings of the CJEU on 
linking constituting communication and the relevant considerations for restricting 
or extending the reach of the exclusive right to such secondary acts. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.2.1. Hyperlinking as an act of communication 
The Svensson case was the first of the so-called “linking” cases and, without a 
doubt, the landmark one for the EU copyright acquis. Although in this case the 
CJEU did not find an infringement of the right of communication to the public, 
the Court’s reasoning set an important precedent which laid the ground for the 
future proceedings. The case was brought by the right holders claiming an 
infringement of the right of communication to the public by an operator of a 
webpage providing hyperlinks to their articles, which, as a matter of fact, were 
already freely available on the Internet. 
The referring Swedish court approached the issue at stake very systematically. 
First, it asked the CJEU to rule whether provision of a clickable link constituted 
an act of communication to the public. Second, it asked whether the assessment 
was influenced by the fact that the works in question were already freely available 
on the Internet or that the link was framing the content. Third, it enquired whether 
MS could provide wider protection under the right of communication to the 
public than the one envisaged under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.1115  
                                                                                             
1115  CJEU, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, 
Judgment of 13 February 2014, para. 13. 
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The CJEU, however, reformulated all but the last question to a single one: 
whether provision of a clickable link to works freely available on a different web-
site constituted an act of communication to the public under Article 3(1). The 
Court recalled the two cumulative criteria of communication to the public right: 
an act of communicating a work and it being directed to the public.1116 The CJEU 
found it rather straightforward that hyperlinking constituted an act of commu-
nication. First, the Court recalled that the latter must be construed broadly to 
ensure a high level of protection for right holders. Second, the Court found that 
provision of a link enabling access to a work de facto made it available. Third, as 
the webpage was available to the general public, such communication constituted 
an act of communication.1117 
It is striking that the Court does not spend more time on analysing whether 
linking constitutes an act of communication.1118 Equally, that the CJEU did not 
find it necessary to ask for an opinion of the AG. By extending the reach of the 
right to hyperlinking, the scope of the right of communication to the public was 
substantially widened.1119 The case has understandably provoked a lot of atten-
tion.1120 Although the practical outcome of the Svensson case does not subject 
hyperlinks to freely available authorised content to the authorisation of the right 
holder, the way the Court arrived at the conclusion could be less troublesome. To 
give one example – the CJEU seems to suggest that links to freely available works 
could turn infringing if the consent for original posting of a work was recalled.1121 
This raises the question whether a person posting a hyperlink is obliged to 
monitor the lawfulness and availability of content to which the link points, as 
such situation is clearly outside of the control of a person providing a link.1122  
The Court relied on the Svensson case in the later GS Media case, concerning 
hyperlinks to works made available without the copyright holder’s authorisation. 
Rather than holding that any linking, either to lawfully or unlawfully posted 
work, constitutes an act of communication, the Court distinguished the circum-
stances of the case from Svensson.1123 The Court held that it could not be inferred 
from the Svensson or later BestWater case that lawfulness of the initial making 
available of a work did not influence the assessment. In other words, it could not 
                                                                                             
1116  Ibid., para. 16. 
1117  Ibid., paras 19–22.  
1118  See also Arezzo (2014), p. 539. 
1119  In Svensson it was widened because it covered now secondary acts of making available. 
See Hugenholtz and van Velze (2016), pp. 798, 806. 
1120  Notably, as the first in the series of missteps by the CJEU, see Koo (2018), p. 543. 
1121  CJEU, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, Judg-
ment of 13 February 2014, para. 31. See also later confirmed in the Filmspeler case CJEU, 
Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems. (2016) Case C-527/15, Judgment of 26 April 2017, 
para. 48. 
1122  Arezzo (2014), p. 546. 
1123  CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case  
C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, para. 41. 
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be inferred that posting a link to an unauthorised on-line copy would fall outside 
of the communication to the public right.1124  
The Court acknowledged the argument of the MS and the EC that to consider 
all the links pointing to unauthorised content as an act of communication to the 
public requiring consent of the right holder would have restrictive consequences 
for freedom of expression and information as safeguarded by the CFR and con-
stitute a burden for individuals.1125 Hence, the CJEU reasoned that for the existence 
of an act of communication to the public where a person linked to infringing content 
without pursuing profit to be individually assessed, it was necessary to take into 
account the fact whether a person could not reasonably know about the infringing 
nature of the content.1126 Whereas in the Svensson case, the CJEU ruled at the 
outset that posting a link, in principle, constituted an act of communication, it 
refrained from proceeding from the same assumption in the GS Media case. The 
Court was careful with qualifying any act of linking as an act of communication, 
in line with the concerns expressed by some MS and the EC. Moreover, in 
subsequent cases the Court did not refer to the Svensson or GS Media cases as 
providing that any act of linking in general is an act of communication.1127 
Given the background described above, the new public criteria developed 
under the retransmission case law of the CJEU has found its application to 
hyperlinking under special circumstances. Setting aside the possible critique of 
qualifying hyperlinking as communication, the Court has rightly considered the 
new public only in the Svensson case. There the original communication was 
authorised by the right holder; hence, the question was the control accorded to 
the copyright holder beyond authorising the initial communication.1128 Indeed, 
the new public seems of little to no relevance in the cases of unauthorised 
communication. Any public in this case is not contemplated by the right holder, 
and, thus, new. 
Hence, in the Svensson case the Court held that even though linking consti-
tuted an act of communication to the public, in those circumstances it did not 
                                                                                             
1124  Ibid., para. 43. 
1125  Ibid., paras 44–46. 
1126  Ibid., para. 47. 
1127  Instead, the Court argued that circumstances of the cases are comparable to hyperlinking 
as they likewise make a work available. See CJEU, Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems. 
(2016) Case C-527/15, Judgment of 26 April 2017, paras 37–38. Also see the Ziggo case, 
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knowledge of the relevant facts, provides its clients with access to protected works is liable to 
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of 26 April 2017, para. 34. 
1128  In the GS Media case, the Court explicitly referred to a new public criterion in the cases 
where the initial communication was authorised by the right holder. CJEU, GS Media BV v 
Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 
2016, para. 52. 
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require the authorisation of the right holder as no new public was reached.1129 The 
works in question (articles) have been originally published on the Internet and 
freely accessible to all users. Therefore, no new public was reached by linking to 
the works.1130 
What can then be inferred from these judgments? In the case of Svensson, the 
issue was the extent of control over initial authorised communication, comparable 
to cases of simultaneous retransmission relying on an initial authorised broadcast. 
In this case, following the line of reasoning in former retransmission cases, a new 
public became an important factor to establish an act of communication to the 
public. In the case of hyperlinking to infringing content, the issue at stake is not 
so much further control over communication but a complementary act to infringing 
initial communication. To find this complementary act to always fall under the 
act of communication to the public as a primary offence would be too far-reaching; 
hence, additional considerations shall be taken into account. 
Interestingly, the recently adopted Directive on copyright and related rights in 
the Digital Single Market explicitly excludes hyperlinking from the protection 
granted to the press publishers in the form of the neighbouring right of making 
available to the public.1131 This is provided in conjunction with the clarification 
that the neighbouring right for press publishers does not apply to private or non-
commercial use of press publications by individual users. Hence, whereas hyper-
links can fall within the scope of the making available right under Article 3(1) of 
the InfoSoc Directive, they are explicitly excluded from the scope of the neigh-
bouring right of making available for press publishers. 
 
 
5.2.3.2.2.2. Interference with the initial authorised communication 
This section will briefly outline the relevance of interference with initial commu-
nication as examined by the CJEU in the cases of hyperlinking. Namely, two such 
cases are examined – communicating a work beyond the intended circle of 
recipients and interfering with primary communication through altering its cir-
cumstances. Whereas in the first case the CJEU regards the criteria of interference 
as a primary one for establishing an infringement of the right of communication 
to the public, in the latter case it does not seem to accord it any special attention. 
For instance, in the Svensson case the Court held that if a link would circum-
vent restriction on the access to a work and make it available for the public that 
was not intended, these new users would constitute a new public. Hence, such 
linking, even though pointing to the lawfully communicated work, would be 
                                                                                             
1129  CJEU, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, 
Judgment of 13 February 2014, para. 30. See Rognstad calling the result a conceptual collapse, 
Rognstad (2018), pp. 119–120. 
1130  Ibid., paras 27–28. 
1131  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 
on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC 
and 2001/29/EC. 17.5.2019. OJ L 130/92. Art. 15. 
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infringing unless separately authorised by the right holder.1132 Accordingly, as 
long as a link is provided to authorised content and not in any way interferes with 
the original availability, it is deemed as not requiring authorisation. 
On the other hand, the Court did not consider the type of a hyperlink to be of 
any relevance as long as it does not alter the initial accessibility in terms of the 
public. Namely, the Court stated that the finding that linking to the lawful source 
did not require an authorisation could not be called into question on the basis of 
the way a work appeared on a screen for a person following the link.1133 Later, 
the same approach was confirmed in the BestWater case decided by a reasoned 
order.1134 The CJEU held that embedding of a work itself did not constitute com-
munication to the public as long as the work was in any way altered or commu-
nicated to a new public.1135  
Whereas the Court has probably been guided by the considerations of techno-
logical neutrality in its reasoning, the statement could be too rigid. In some cir-
cumstances linking through embedding could interfere with an initial communi-
cation, be it for the purpose of monetising the webpage views or for the con-
sideration of purely moral nature.1136 Whilst it may very well be a policy choice 
not to distinguish between the different cases for the sake of consistency, the 
impact of such general treatment inevitably conflicts with a degree to which the 
right holder is interested in non-interference with the initial act of commu-
nication.1137 
 
 
5.2.3.2.2.3. Broad understanding of communication in relation 
to the infringing primary communication 
Whereas this thesis is primarily concerned with the constraints on further control 
accorded to the right holder over authorised and, hence, lawful communication, 
                                                                                             
1132  Ibid., para. 31. See also in the GS Media case the CJEU on the intervention with com-
munication through circumventing access restrictions. CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media 
Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, para. 50. 
1133  CJEU, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, Judg-
ment of 13 February 2014, paras 29–30. 
1134  The question referred to the CJEU was whether embedding of a video constituted an act 
of communication to the public under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc with a view that there were 
neither new technical means nor a new public involved. 
1135  CJEU, BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch. Order of the 
Court (2014) Case C-348/13, Judgment of 21 October 2014. Although it is not clear whether 
it matters that the originally posted video is available without a permission from the right 
holder. See http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2014/10/that-bestwater-order-its-up-to.html  
(Accessed on July 14, 2019). 
1136  Such as the right holder’s right to decide how a work is to be presented. On the observation 
that the CJEU’s assessment of the right of communication to the public overlaps with the right 
of divulgation as a moral right, see Marušić (2019). 
1137  See more in section 6.2.1.3. 
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this section briefly explores the case law concerning the acts related to initial 
unlawful communication. Namely, the cases concern, in a sense, secondary acts 
in relation to unauthorised communication by posting a work on the Internet. 
Given the rather loose connection between the initial infringing act of making 
available through upload of a work and the secondary acts in question, the Court 
found it necessary to examine a variety of criteria before arriving at the conclu-
sion whether the acts fell under the right of communication to the public.  
Unlike the previously outlined cases, the circumstances of the proceedings 
addressed here were both enabled and motivated by the nature of online dis-
semination. First, the Internet has enabled communication of a work to a virtually 
unlimited number of persons. Second, it is not always easy to establish whether 
or not certain communication is taking place in the absence of authorisation pur-
suant to the copyright law. Hence, to qualify any act on the Internet in indirect 
connection of a work as an infringement of the right of communication to the 
public, whether intentional or not, would be clearly excessive. 1138 Without going 
into the discussion on the Court essentially harmonising the matters of secondary 
liability, this section summarises three cases where the Court held that through 
hyperlinking or related acts in relation to unlawful content a person committed 
an infringement of the right of communication to the public by intervening with 
a work’s exploitation. These cases are the GS Media, Filmspeler, and Ziggo cases. 
First of all, these cases have substantially widened the scope of the right of 
communication to the public. For instance, a sale of a multimedia player con-
taining links to infringing works was assimilated with hyperlinking on the 
grounds that it also made a work directly available.1139 Furthermore, the Court 
derived from the case law that, as a rule, “any act by which a user, with full 
knowledge of the relevant facts, provides its clients with access to protected 
works is liable to constitute an ‘act of communication’ for the purposes of Article 
3(1) of Directive 2001/29”.1140 Hence, making available and operating an online 
sharing platform was also found to constitute an act of communication.1141 
However, finding a specific act to constitute an act of communication was 
only the first step. Next, the Court held that it is necessary to assess whether it is 
an act directed to a public and falls within the right of communication to the 
                                                                                             
1138  See, for instance, GS Media, where the Court reasoned that to consider all the links 
pointing to unauthorised content as an act of communication to the public requiring consent 
of the right holder would have restrictive consequences for the freedom of expression and 
information as safeguarded by the CFR and constitute a burden for individuals. CJEU, GS 
Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case C-160/15, Judgment of 
8 September 2016, paras 44–46. 
1139  CJEU, Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems. (2016) Case C-527/15, Judgment of 26 
April 2017, paras 37–38. 
1140  CJEU, Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV. (2017) Case C-610/15, 
Judgment of 26 April 2017, para. 34. 
1141  Ibid., para. 39. 
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public, requiring an individual assessment.1142 A set of further relevant con-
siderations was established by the CJEU in the GS Media case, which was 
subsequently used in the following cases. These criteria, besides the intervention 
and communication of a work, include the profit-making nature of intervention 
and the knowledge of the infringing nature of the content.1143  
The GS Media case concerned the proceedings against an operator of a popular 
website that contained links to works hosted on the Internet without the author-
isation of the right holder. Despite several requests from the right holder to 
remove such links, they continued to be available on the website. The national 
court referred to the CJEU several questions in order to clarify whether linking 
to works freely available online in the absence of right holder’s authorisation 
constituted communication to the public under Article 3(1) of InfoSoc. Moreover, 
the court also asked whether knowledge or awareness of the infringing nature of 
content was of relevance in the case, or what the relevant circumstances 
would be.1144 
The CJEU held that for an individual assessment of whether linking in non-
profit making purposes constitutes an act of communication to the public, it is 
necessary to consider whether a person does not know or cannot reasonably know 
that the original communication is not authorised by the right holder.1145 Hence, 
if a person knows about the infringing nature or ought to have known that a work 
is posted illegally, their action should be considered to constitute an act of com-
munication to the public.1146 On the other hand, if such activity is carried out for 
profit, it can be presumed that a person acts in full knowledge. Consequently, if 
the presumption is not rebutted, an act of linking constitutes an act of commu-
nication to the public.1147  
Accordingly, the first step of assessment is the profit-making nature of linking. 
If profit is involved, then the knowledge of the infringing nature is assumed.1148 
If there is no profit involved, it is necessary to consider whether a person does 
not know and cannot reasonably know about the infringing nature of the content, 
or indeed knows or ought to have known. In the former case, as a general rule, 
the person does not intervene in full knowledge and may not be carrying out an 
act of communication to the public.1149 On these grounds, the Court found there 
                                                                                             
1142  CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case  
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1144  Ibid., para. 24. 
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to be a communication to the public both were a defendant operated a platform 
aggregating the hyperlinks to the infringing material, and where a defendant sold 
a multimedia player with pre-installed add-ons with the links to such material. In 
both cases, the Court stressed equally the importance of the profit-making nature 
of the activity and the actual knowledge.  
The Stichting Brein case concerned a multimedia player that contained addons 
with the links to the works available on the Internet either with or without author-
isation by right holders. The multimedia player was marketed, among other 
things, as providing links to the material by circumventing the right holder’s 
authorisation. The organisation representing the right holders claimed that the 
sale of the multimedia player infringed copyright under Article 3(1) of the 
InfoSoc Directive. The referring court hence asked the CJEU to rule whether 
communication to the public right covers the sale of the multimedia player with 
pre-installed add-ons containing hyperlinks to infringing material.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly considering the previous case law of the Court, CJEU 
found that sale of such a multimedia player indeed constituted an act of commu-
nication to the public under Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive.1150 Pre-
installing the add-ons that enabled users to access materials which otherwise 
would be difficult to identify and reach, while acting in full knowledge, amounted 
to an act of communication rather than a mere provision of physical facilities.1151 
Sale of a player for profit in full knowledge of infringing content and marketing 
it as providing access to such content constituted an act of communication to the 
public.1152 
Interestingly, this is contrary to what the EC argued during the proceedings, 
according to the AG.1153 The Commission resided with the defendant, arguing 
                                                                                             
1150  It is important to note that the case does not quote the AKM case on the necessity to 
examine the new public criterion even if different technical measures are used. The case is 
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1152  Ibid., paras 50–52. The outcome resembles the developments under the US copyright law, 
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that a sale of a multiplayer and provision of links cannot be assimilated.1154 The 
EC feared that such excessively broad interpretation of the right of commu-
nication to the public would alter the balance between the rights of all the 
parties.1155 The Court, however, followed the AG’s opinion: posting hyperlinks 
on the webpage was essentially the same as including them in a multimedia 
player.1156  
The Ziggo case is the latest ruling on liability associated with the hyperlinks 
to the infringing content under the communication to the public right. In the main 
proceedings the organisation representing copyright holders ordered Internet pro-
viders to block the domain names of The Pirate Bay (TPB) website. TPB is a 
well-known online platform containing links to torrent files enabling download 
of files from others’ computers, including copyright-protected material made 
available without the right holder’s authorisation. 
Although in the national proceedings it was established that the TPB indeed 
made works available to the public, there were doubts whether the platform com-
municated them to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc 
Directive. The referring court thus asked the CJEU whether communication to 
the public right under the Directive also covers management of a platform which 
by indexation of metadata and providing a search function allows users to locate 
infringing works and share them on a peer-to-peer network. 
The CJEU answered the question in the affirmative, relying primarily on the 
previous case law on linking and the preceding Stichting Brein case. Operators 
of the TPB intervened in full knowledge by providing a system that facilitated 
access to the works and thus communicated them to the public.1157 As the works 
were essentially made available to all the users of the platform, they constituted 
a rather large public and amounted to communication to the public.1158 Turning 
to the GS Media criteria, the CJEU stressed that the operators of TPB deliberately 
encouraged users to make use of such works and knew that infringing material 
was shared.1159 Second, the Court held that it was done so for profit.1160 
There are many aspects to this judgment that seem troubling and problematic. 
First is the Court’s statement that without the operators of such webpages, sharing 
of infringing content would be problematic.1161 Second is the result of the cases 
                                                                                             
1154  Ibid., paras 46–47. 
1155  Ibid., para. 34. 
1156  Ibid., para. 51. 
1157  CJEU, Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV. (2017) Case C-610/15, 
Judgment of 26 April 2017, paras 35–39. 
1158  Ibid., paras 40–43. 
1159  Ibid., para. 45. 
1160  Ibid., para. 46. 
1161  Ibid., para. 36. Also, Opinion of Advocate General in Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and 
XS4All Internet BV. Case C-610/15. 8 Februay 2017, para. 51. 
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effectively regulating secondary liability.1162 Third is the statement that any act 
that provides some kind of access to a work in full knowledge made the applica-
tion of the right stretch to virtually any act where knowledge can be assumed or 
inferred.1163 
 
 
5.3. Extent of control under the right of 
communication to the public: between immaterial 
and material dissemination 
As is apparent from the discourse above, the adoption of the EU Directives was 
only a very early step of the harmonisation of the right of communication to the 
public. The most important developments have taken place under the CJEU 
jurisprudence.1164 The growing importance of the harmonisation of the right at 
the EU level is supported by the fact that almost two decades after the adoption 
of the InfoSoc Directive, some countries choose to recognise the right as a sepa-
rate category to make compliance with CJEU jurisprudence easier. For instance, 
Norway implemented the right as a separate category of the right of making a 
work available only recently, which was motivated by CJEU jurisprudence.1165  
What is evident from the analysis is that the variety of the rulings on the 
interpretation of Article 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive concern secondary acts of 
communication, in one way or another relying on previous acts. The Court, none-
theless, generally does not distinguish between primary and secondary acts, only 
occasionally using such terms as retransmission. Although under the rather 
ambiguous language of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive the EU legislator 
seems to imply that any act, whether primary or secondary, is subject to separate 
authorisation by the right holder, the jurisprudence challenges that understanding. 
                                                                                             
1162  Whereas the EC opposed qualifying the act as communication to the public and suggested 
leaving the secondary liability for MS to regulate, the AG supported addressing it under the 
EU jurisprudence. Opinion of Advocate General in Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All 
Internet BV. Case C-610/15. 8 Februay 2017, para. 3. On secondary liability in this context, 
see Husovec and Van Dongen (2017), p. 15. 
1163  Koo (2018), p. 543. 
1164  Nevertheless, one must keep in mind that due to the nature of the CJEU case law, the 
cases where the Court had to interpret the scope of the right under the EU copyright acquis 
are limited. The proceedings before the Court are predominantly initiated by the national 
courts, in the cases where they deem the interpretation of the national law in question to be 
dependent on the instrument of the EU harmonisation. Hence, the references to the Court are 
made solely at national courts’ discretion.  
1165  See Prop. 104 L (2016 – 2017) Proposisjon til Stortinget (forslag til lovvedtak) Lov om 
opphavsrett til åndsverk mv. (åndsverkloven), pp. 31–34. Sweden, on the other hand, 
recognised the right of communication to the public as a category of a general right of making 
available in 2005, pursuant to Prop. 2004/05:110 Upphovsrätten i informationssamhället – 
genomförande av direktiv 2001/29/EG, m.m., pp. 64–66. 
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In the majority of the cases the Court did find there to be an act of commu-
nication to the public falling under exclusive control of the copyright holder. 
However, the reasoning in these cases as well as in cases where the Court finds 
the communication non-infringing often resembles the arguments associated with 
material dissemination. This is not surprising, considering that, as has been 
shown in the previous chapters, the material dissemination approach in the con-
text of the right of distribution is less than consistent towards the initially envi-
sioned limits of control. Any act of authorised distribution does not necessarily 
result in a complete loss of control over subsequent dissemination.  
On the other hand, as was shown in this chapter, the right of communication 
to the public as supposedly reflecting immaterial dissemination does not neces-
sarily mean that any possible communication falls under the right and, hence, 
requires authorisation. In a sense, the CJEU shall be praised for not referring to 
Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive in all the cases, which would most likely 
prompt ending the assessment there. Notably, the Court referred to Article 3(3) 
only on two occasions, in relation to a separate act of communication and in 
relation to retransmission of an analogue broadcast on the Internet, which was 
deemed to be an act of new use. Hence, it seems that the Court’s interpretation of 
the article is very cautious.1166 
Against this background, in this section cases where the Court reasoned in a 
fashion resembling the objectives of the right of distribution and the material dis-
semination will be highlighted. It will be shown how the arguments are essen-
tially based on the notions of authorisation, new markets, and appropriate remu-
neration as well as how some criteria worked out by the Court cannot be clearly 
connected to material or immaterial dissemination. Instead, they may indicate an 
attempt to provide national courts with flexibility in assessing the cases, however, 
at the cost of legal certainty in such a tightly overseen field as copyright. 
 
 
5.3.1. Control over any subsequent communication by default 
Unlike the right of distribution, which is characterised by its limited scope in 
relation to secondary distribution if the primary act fulfils the criteria of exhaus-
tion, no such general limit exists for the right of communication to the public 
under the EU acquis. The absence of authorisation of any act of communication, 
whether primary or secondary, generally ought to result in the infringing nature 
of such communication. It is equally so in the context of any secondary commu-
nication reaching beyond the borders of the MS of original communication.1167 
In cases where new uses of a work are at stake, authorisation of the new use 
even if it is essentially a secondary communication appears to be of utmost 
importance under the acquis. Consider, on the one hand, the case of substantial 
                                                                                             
1166  See also section 5.2.2.3. 
1167  Pursuant to the Coditel I case and the non-application of the Community exhaustion 
principle. See section 5.2.1.1. 
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alteration and resale of physical copies by a third party following their lawful 
marketing by the right holder.1168 On the other hand, the case of simultaneous 
retransmission of a broadcast on the Internet reaching the same intended public 
can be considered.1169 Both cases concern a potential new market of a work, be it 
due to a new form of presenting a work on a material medium or a new way of 
providing access to authorised communication. Notwithstanding the moral rights 
of the author in the first case, it is essentially the economic aspect of a work’s 
exploitation as a whole which is affected. In neither case would the communication 
reach the originally unintended recipients. However, it would undermine the right 
holder’s market, either the primary one or one enabled by the alteration, or both. 
Whereas in these cases the Court reached essentially the same outcome, the 
nature of the examined rights played a role in the Court’s reasoning. In the former 
case of altering copies otherwise falling under the exhaustion principle and, 
hence, exempted from exclusive control, the CJEU had to justify submitting them 
to further control. In the case of resale of altered copies, the Court had to deal 
with the predetermined stance under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive and 
argue for the justifiability of further control. This led the Court to examine 
whether the right holder consented to such subsequent marketing through the first 
putting of copies into circulation. In the latter case of retransmission, the Court 
proceeded from the statement that any new use of a work must be authorised by 
the right holder and retransmission using different means was indeed a new use. 
Although in the case of retransmission the act did not fall under any exception to 
the right of communication to the public, the Court found it necessary to stress 
the secondary act being a new use.  
Whilst under the right of distribution the acceptance of control over the sub-
sequent distribution in new geographical markets depends largely on the state 
policy on the territoriality of exhaustion, under the right of communication to the 
public reaching any new territory would inevitably amount to new commu-
nication. Accordingly, the lack of authorisation for communication in a particular 
territory is of utmost importance. Consider, for instance, the Coditel I case, where 
the retransmission into a territory not envisaged by the exclusive license from the 
right holder was considered a breach of the right of performance.1170  
Essentially, reach of the new audience not envisaged by the authorisation of 
primary communication interfered with the right holder’s exploitation of a work. 
Whether or not such interference with the exploitation of a work could be 
opposed on the basis of the exclusive communication right in the case depended 
essentially on two elements. First and foremost, whether copyright protects the 
right holder from any interference with the work’s exploitation. The underlying 
reason for this retransmission being an interference with the exploitation was the 
                                                                                             
1168  Essentially, the circumstances of the Art & Allposters case, see sections 3.2.4.2. and 
4.2.3.4.  
1169  Essentially, the circumstances of the TVCatchup case, see section 5.2.3.2.1.2.1.  
1170  CJEU, SA Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others v 
Ciné Vog Films and others. (1980) Case C-62/79, Judgment of 18 March 1980, para. 6. 
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exclusive territorial licensing by the right holder, which secured control over 
separate territories and ensured that the broadcasting windows would be kept in 
place. Henceforth, the second aspect was the question whether relying on the 
exclusive territorial licensing was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty.  
The first aspect remained unexamined. Rather, the Court focused on the 
second aspect, holding that to assign the rights otherwise than on a territorial basis 
would be impracticable for exploiting the works in question.1171 Hence, the Court 
did not answer the question to what extent the right holder can rely on the exclu-
sive right to prohibit any (also insignificant) interference with the work’s exploi-
tation. Instead, given the circumstances of the case, the Court established that in 
this case the Treaty did not interfere with the exclusive right under copyright. 
Whereas the consideration of interference with a work’s exploitation is most 
prominent in cases of secondary acts of communication such as retransmission, 
it can also be derived from cases of unauthorised primary and secondary commu-
nication. Namely, the infringing nature of unauthorised communication in an eco-
nomic sense relies precisely on the foregone profit or an opportunity to exploit a 
work commercially. For instance, the Renckhoff case submitting an act of upload 
to authorisation could be viewed not only as confirming the exclusive nature of 
the right of communication to the public in relation to any new acts of commu-
nication, but also as securing the right holder’s potential market for a work.1172  
Likewise, extending the reach of the right to acts contributing to initially 
infringing communication could also be understood as indirectly contributing to 
eliminating the interference with the right holder’s market.1173 Obviously, such 
stretching of the scope of the right of communication to the public requires some 
very careful considerations. This is also confirmed by the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU, where the Court takes into account fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression and information.1174 Furthermore, it is confirmed by the Court devel-
oping criteria under which such extension might take place rather than submitting 
at the outset that any (in)direct act must be deemed infringing. 
 
 
5.3.2. Limiting control beyond authorising initial dissemination 
Whereas the number of cases where the Court found conduct to infringe the right 
of communication to the public overweighs the cases where there was no 
infringement of the right, few arguments can be derived for limiting the reach of 
the right beyond the initial communication. Both the cases denying and allowing 
                                                                                             
1171  Ibid., para. 16. 
1172  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, paras 30–31. 
1173  For similar considerations in the context of the right of distribution, see section 3.3.2. 
1174  CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case  
C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, paras 45–47. 
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further control are relevant, as they highlight the considerations which under 
certain circumstances call for exempting the acts from exclusive control.  
However, it is important to note that distinction between the primary and 
secondary acts of dissemination is less easy to draw under the right of commu-
nication to the public, especially in the online setting, where the digital environ-
ment accumulates all the different types of communication. For instance, if a 
work is posted online, then a link to a work would generally be a secondary act 
and an upload of a copy a primary one. If a retransmission of analogue signal is 
made online, this could also be seen a separate act, although it relies on the 
primary one. Consequently, drawing any distinction relies not only on whether or 
not there is a primary act but also whether communication can be considered 
sufficiently distinctive. 
As was explored above, every exclusive right provides the right holders with 
control over every act of dissemination in a sense of disseminating new copies or 
authorising a new broadcast or uploading a work on another webpage. Whereas 
the fact that every act of dissemination is subject to the right holder’s authori-
sation is not disputed, the extent of control over any particular act beyond the 
authorisation can be questioned. Whereas for the right of communication to the 
public no general limitation exists, it does not mean that no limits can be imposed. 
Below the two main considerations for justifying limiting subsequent control 
under the EU copyright acquis, which stem from the material dissemination 
approach, are outlined. 
 
 
5.3.2.1. Exercise of the right and non-interference with the market 
The essential element of examining the scope of control in cases concerning the 
right of communication to the public is the exercise of the right in the first place, 
with emphasis on determining the circumstances of the work’s initial making 
available. This is supported, inter alia, by the Court stipulating that the specific 
subject matter of IP is to exploit a work commercially, by marketing or making a 
work available, including through granting licenses.1175 
Therefore, the important consideration is whether the original act on which 
the subsequent communication relies on was authorised by the right holder. For 
instance, in the FAPL case, where control over importation of decoding devices 
was denied, the Court stressed the fact that the primary broadcast in question was 
authorised by the right holders.1176 On the other hand, in the Coditel I case, where 
subsequent control was upheld, the entity retransmitting a signal did not have 
authorisation in the MS of the origin of the broadcast.1177 
                                                                                             
1175  See CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, para. 107. 
1176  Ibid., para. 120. 
1177  Ibid., para. 119. 
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Whereas the exercise of the right is important for the material dissemination 
approach, the Court seems to accord it even more attention in cases on the right of 
communication to the public. This is particularly so in the cases concerning online 
dissemination, where the Court has repeatedly stressed the preventive nature of 
the rights and the right holder’s consent to particular communication.1178 In one 
of the latest cases, the CJEU holds at the outset that, subject to exceptions and 
limitations, any use of a work (communication to the public in the specific case) 
without the prior consent of the right holder infringes copyright.1179 
Significance of consent and what can be implied from it is particularly 
prominent in cases where the Court assesses the new public criterion. For instance, 
in the landmark Svensson case, the Court devotes very little attention to author-
isation itself. Rather, the CJEU relied on the fact that the right holder con-
templated access by the users in question through authorising the initial commu-
nication.1180 Hence, this points towards a conclusion that it could be inferred from 
the initial communication that it intended to make a work available to all the 
potential users. 
Further, this assumption is used to restrict the reach of the exclusive right if 
no new public is reached by such subsequent communication relying on the initial 
act. Likewise, the Court relies on the consenting to the initial communication 
targeting the same circle of persons in the AKM case.1181 Hence, these cases thus 
point towards the conclusion that one might have to accept some limits on the 
exercise of the right once communication is authorised. They are, of course, not 
absolute, but depend on a variety of indications, the most important of which 
seems to be the reach of a new public as a new target audience.  
The new public seems to be essentially an economic consideration, although 
it also has a moral rights aspect. If taken in the context of distribution of copies 
as the main example of material dissemination, partitioning of the market is rather 
straightforward and confined largely to the territory of states or a group of states 
(as, for example, the EU). Intangible dissemination, and in particular one taking 
place online, enables much more precise delineation of the markets and, hence, 
taking advantage of a monopolistic position. If the subsequent acts of dis-
semination represent the same way of exploitation, it is important to consider 
whether a new public is reached, meaning whether the authorisation of initial 
communication contemplated offering the work to this particular public.  
                                                                                             
1178  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, para. 44. Also CJEU, Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems. (2016) Case 
C-527/15, Judgment of 26 April 2017, para. 25. 
1179  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, para. 16. 
1180  CJEU, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, Judgment 
of 13 February 2014, paras 26–27. 
1181  CJEU, Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverleger 
registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs GmbH (2017) Case C-138/16, 
Judgment of 16 March 2017, paras 28–29. 
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On the other hand, if the subsequent dissemination represents a new form of 
exploitation, it targets the potentially not envisioned public for that particular 
mode of exploitation. The jurisprudence seems to imply that any change in the 
way of exploitation renders the secondary act of dissemination infringing, even 
if the public covered by such secondary act is already covered by the right holder 
through the same way of exploitation.1182 Whereas it could be questionable on the 
basis of solely economic considerations, it might be accepted on the grounds of 
the complexity of the assessment of a case would these circumstances have to be 
taken into account.  
Hence, it appears that the essential reasoning behind the new public criteria is 
very much related to the idea that every use of a work shall be remunerated. 
Therefore, if one offers a work through secondary dissemination to the public not 
contemplated by the initial communication, whether or not against any fee, they 
inevitably interfere with the exercise of the right to exploit and obtain remunera-
tion for each use of a work. 
 
 
5.3.2.2. Appropriate remuneration 
Just as for material dissemination, the cases on the right of communication to the 
public show that the important consideration, besides the authorisation of the 
right holder, is obtaining the remuneration. Principally, the specific subject matter 
of IP is its commercial exploitation.1183 In the Coditel I case the Court seems to 
suggest the exploitation and the relevant considerations depend on the type of a 
work in question.1184 The development of technology and the online environment 
has evened out the type of works when it comes to the initial and subsequent 
making them available on the Internet.1185 However, the differences may, to some 
extent, persist when it comes to such specific forms of exploitation as, for 
instance, broadcasting. 
Similarly to the cases on the right of distribution, the Court has held in the 
context of the right of communication to the public that, although the aim of 
exclusive rights is to enable obtaining remuneration, it does not guarantee the 
                                                                                             
1182  Essentially, the circumstances of the TVCatchup case. See section 5.2.3.2.1.2.1.  
1183  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, para. 107. 
1184  For films it would be every showing of a work, also with the view of broadcasting of a 
film. See CJEU, SA Compagnie générale pour la diffusion de la télévision, Coditel, and others 
v Ciné Vog Films and others. (1980) Case C-62/79, Judgment of 18 March 1980, para. 14.  
1185  Development of technology might have blurred the distinction between the types of a 
work, see section 5.2.1.1.  
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highest possible remuneration, but only an appropriate one.1186 Furthermore, the 
remuneration must be reasonable in relation to the service provided, i.e. to the 
expected public and the parameters of communication.1187 Interestingly, the 
position of the right holder in negotiating the remuneration upon first commu-
nication is emphasised. Namely, the right holder is free to negotiate the remunera-
tion corresponding to the potential audience at the time of negotiating authori-
sation.1188 
However, although it could be expected that through the first authorisation the 
right holder has obtained the appropriate remuneration, the assumption cannot be 
absolute. For instance, if the secondary communication relying on the initial act 
is deemed to be a new use of a work, it may require separate authorisation even 
though it is directed to the same circle of persons. New use would mean a new 
way of exploiting a work; hence, the interests of the right holder in taking 
advantage of new opportunities must be safeguarded.1189 
On the other hand, requesting additional remuneration for subsequent uses 
neither being a new use nor targeting a new audience could be denied. For 
instance, the Court found that paying a premium based on territoriality went 
beyond what was necessary to safeguard the subject matter. Hence, the Treaty 
could intervene with the exercise of the exclusive right on the basis of the freedom 
to provide services.1190 Similarly, in the AKM case, the request for additional 
remuneration for cable retransmission to the same audience was denied on the 
basis that the right holder authorised broadcasting in this territory.1191 
 
 
  
                                                                                             
1186  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, paras 107–108. 
1187  Ibid., paras 109–110. 
1188  Ibid., para. 112. 
1189  On new use as requiring authorisation, see CJEU, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v 
TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, Judgment of 7 March 2013, paras 23–24. 
1190  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, paras 115–116. 
1191  CJEU, Staatlich genehmigte Gesellschaft der Autoren, Komponisten und Musikverleger 
registrierte Genossenschaft mbH (AKM) v Zürs.net Betriebs GmbH (2017) Case C-138/16, 
Judgment of 16 March 2017, paras 28–29. 
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5.3.3. Secondary acts in relation to infringing communication 
What stands out in the analysis of the jurisprudence on the right of commu-
nication to the public right is its extension to acts in (in)direct connection to 
infringing communication of a work. This is not unknown in the context of 
exclusive dissemination rights. The right of distribution, for instance, has also 
been applied in the cases concerning the infringing copies of a work.1192 How-
ever, unlike the straightforward application of the right of distribution, the Court 
has been much more careful with the same results under the right of commu-
nication to the public. It is highly debatable whether it is desirable to cover such 
acts of (at most) contributory liability with the right of communication to the 
public, and even more so considering the distinction between the right of com-
munication and the right of making available is not maintained, whereas it other-
wise would call for a different assessment of the circumstances of a work’s 
exploitation. 
The main innovation of this body of case law are the subjective criteria devel-
oped to deal with the question of whether an act infringes the right of commu-
nication to the public. The basis for establishing whether or not a certain inter-
vention is liable to breach the right of communication to the public is, first, the 
profit-making nature of the activity and, second, the knowledge of the infringing 
nature of primary communication. Whereas the profit-making nature of a third-
party’s conduct is not an unknown element of constructing the scope of control 
accorded to the copyright holder under the exclusive right of communication to 
the public, the knowledge criterion is indeed an innovation.1193  
Finding an infringement of the right of communication of a work to the public 
on the basis of knowledge of the infringing nature of primary communication is 
rather ambiguous.1194 This approach must also be contrasted with the cases of 
primary infringing communication. For instance, compare the knowledge 
criterion with the Renckhoff case, where the issue concerned a primary infringing 
communication through an upload. The Court found it immaterial whether the 
uploader knew that such act is infringing. Hence, any new communication would 
be liable to infringe the right of communication to the public unless an exception 
applied.1195 On the other hand, left with no exceptions in the GS Media case the 
Court opted for this complicated system of conditions to avoid the conclusion 
that all secondary acts relying on infringing primary communication infringed 
the right.  
 
                                                                                             
1192  See section 3.2.4.2.  
1193  Quintais (2018), p. 18. 
1194  See Rognstad calling it a conceptual collapse when an action constitutes an act of com-
munication to the public but does not require an authorisation. Rognstad (2018), pp. 199–121. 
1195  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, paras 42–43. 
276 
This is supported by the fact that the Court resorted to the importance of 
hyperlinks for the freedom of expression and information, and exchange of infor-
mation, to justify individual assessment of the situation at stake.1196 To my mind, 
the situation is symptomatic of overbroad language of the right combined with 
the overbroad scope that encompasses uses which have been previously regulated 
separately. Hence, there is a danger of applying this line of reasoning to all the 
cases currently falling under the right of communication to the public rather than 
confining these criteria to the acts in connection to an infringing communication. 
 
 
5.4. Conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine the development of the right of communication 
to the public under the EU acquis in the light of the distinction drawn at the outset 
of the harmonisation between the material and immaterial dissemination rights. 
Whereas the right of communication to the public as known at present is the result 
of the layers of technological development and legislators’ legitimate intent to 
secure the right holder’s control over exploitation of a work, the recognition of a 
broad right covering a great variety of acts of both analogue and digital dis-
semination has clearly implicated the task of balancing the need of providing 
exclusive control with other rationales of copyright protection. 
The background to the harmonisation of the right of communication to the 
public under secondary EU law revealed that the objectives stretched beyond the 
mere implementation of the international obligations under the WIPO CT. An 
important, if not the main, rationale behind harmonising the right under the 
InfoSoc Directive was the recognition of the making available right encom-
passing acts of emerging digital transmissions. Through placing the right of 
making available under the broader right of communication harmonising nearly 
any form of a work’s communication not involving tangible copies, characteris-
tically different acts were subjected de facto to the same treatment. Given the full 
harmonisation of the right under the InfoSoc Directive and no mechanism for 
taking into consideration the circumstances at stake in individual cases, a less-
than-coherent framework emerged. 
A broad right can indeed be advantageous as it can be easily adapted to the 
need to secure an emerging exploitation of a work. Nonetheless, suitable mecha-
nisms for delimiting its scope according to specific circumstances must follow if 
it is to avoid a one-sided serving of the involved interests. The analysis of the 
adoption of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, seemingly precluding any 
general limit to the right of communication to the public on the basis of it being 
of an immaterial nature, reveals the vague foundation of the provision. Con-
sidered from today’s perspective, the issue has been settled prematurely, compli-
cating the adaptation of the copyright framework to the digital age. 
                                                                                             
1196  CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case  
C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, paras 45–47. 
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As the analysis of the growing CJEU jurisprudence interpreting the right of 
communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive shows, most juris-
prudence concerns secondary communication in some way relying on the initially 
authorised one. Furthermore, the reasoning of the Court is essentially based on 
economic considerations, ranging from the exercise of the right and appropriate 
remuneration to interference with a market and the relevance of the profit-making 
nature of secondary communication. Whilst the development has been endorsed 
for contemplating the interests at stake instead of subjecting any related act to the 
exclusive right, it has also attracted substantial critique for going against the 
legislative intent and, essentially, impairing legal certainty. 
The analysis under the chapter indicates a shift from denying any limits to 
subsequent control over dissemination falling under the right of communication 
to the public to allowing imposing restrictions in particular cases. Although the 
right was legislated on the assumption of immaterial dissemination and denying 
any limits to control over secondary dissemination, it has proven inadequate for 
explaining why certain uses ought to be subjected or exempted from exclusive 
control. For a right encompassing a wide variety of uses, both well-known and 
not at all anticipated, the enshrined inflexibility of approaching secondary com-
munication proved to be counterproductive. 
Three main findings shall be emphasised. First, despite the rigid (but also 
ambiguous) wording of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU allows exempting certain acts of secondary communication from the 
exclusive control. Remarkably, Article 3(3) has only been mentioned in cases 
involving either unauthorised primary communication or acts that, although 
relying on initial communication, constitute a distinct way of exploitation. 
Second, whereas no distinction between primary and secondary commu-
nication is drawn or can be implied from the wording of Article 3(1) of the 
Directive, jurisprudence appears to move into the direction of creating one. 
Almost all of the cases interpreting the right of communication to the public 
concern acts of secondary communication. Although the CJEU does not dis-
tinguish them from cases concerning primary unauthorised communication, the 
Court applies slightly different reasoning when examining them. Such a devel-
opment might well be welcomed considering the broad scope of the right and the 
need to systematise the approach. 
Third, the justifications of the Court for capturing the acts of secondary dis-
semination with the right of communication to the public are essentially eco-
nomic. Emphasis on a new public, new technological measures, and distinct 
exploitation can be interpreted through the objective of securing the market of a 
work and preventing interference with its exploitation. Leaving aside the contra-
diction between Article 3(3) and jurisprudence, the Court adopts a flexible 
approach to examining whether preventing particular interference is admissible 
on the basis of the right of communication to the public. Nevertheless, the way 
of approaching the cases lacks the transparency of the underlying objectives and 
normative guidance beyond the set of loosely formulated criteria that inevitably 
weight differently in diverse types of communication. 
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Accordingly, the analysis reveals that the underlying premises of the Court’s 
assessment in the cases concerning the right of communication to the public 
resemble the considerations employed in the cases on the material dissemination 
rights. Namely, these are the interference of the acts of secondary communication 
with the exploitation of a work by interfering with the primary market or a 
potential market. This raises the question of whether the EU copyright framework 
as a whole would benefit from reconciling the approaches to both types of rights 
given the developments. The findings of this chapter will be integrated with chap-
ters 3 and 4 in order to outline a framework for defining the extent of exclusive 
control beyond first communication, combining the approaches of material and 
immaterial dissemination rather than relying on Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc 
Directive. 
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6. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE EXCLUSIVE 
CONTROL OVER SECONDARY DISSEMINATION 
IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEVELOPMENTS UNDER 
THE EU COPYRIGHT ACQUIS 
Copyright, including under the EU acquis, generally does not distinguish between 
acts of primary and secondary dissemination. The exclusive rights ought to 
provide the right holder with control over exploitation of a work. Hence, they 
extend to any act falling within their scope, whether primary or secondary. None-
theless, the broad exploitation rights do have their boundaries, sometimes coin-
ciding with secondary dissemination. For instance, it has long been recognised 
that the scope of the right of distribution covering, first and foremost, distribution 
of tangible copies, ought to be limited to avoid interference with other interests 
such as circulation of goods. The exhaustion principle is an instrument of 
delineating the scope of the right of distribution de facto exempting secondary 
distribution from the right holder’s control. 
It is by no means excluded that similar circumstances, calling for limiting the 
reach of the exclusive right holder’s control in the light of other interests, arise in 
the context of dissemination falling within the scope of other rights. Nevertheless, 
historically, the idea of limiting the right holder’s exclusive control over commu-
nication of a work to the primary authorisation was largely opposed. One of the 
grounds has been the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
rights, where only the former category provided the right holder with an oppor-
tunity to obtain appropriate remuneration through the first authorisation. The dis-
tinction is based on the economic underpinning of the rights and, essentially, 
relies on the right holder’s ability to exercise the exclusive right in their best 
interest. 
Whereas the assumption has been enshrined under secondary EU law in the 
field of copyright, the subsequent developments, not least under the CJEU juris-
prudence, have challenged it. As has been explored in chapters 2 to 5 of this 
thesis, neither envisaged loss of control over secondary distribution nor the out-
lawed limits on the exclusive control over secondary communication under the 
InfoSoc Directive provide a reliable picture of what the scope of control is in 
practice. The preceding chapters examined in detail the development of the rights 
under the acquis and explored the justifications behind extending or restricting 
exclusive control over secondary dissemination. The present chapter sets to sum-
marise the conclusions and offer a framework for reconciling the material and 
immaterial dissemination rights under the acquis through defining a common set 
of criteria for assessing the justifiability of subjecting secondary dissemination to 
the exclusive right holder’s control.1197 
                                                                                             
1197  As was explained in Chapter 1, dissemination as a term was preferred to communication 
or distribution when referring to any way of communicating a work's content to the public in 
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This chapter, relying on the analysis in chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis, presents 
the answers to the two overall research questions. The first overall research ques-
tion is how does the development of the rights of distribution and communication 
to the public under the EU acquis reflect the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination rights? The second overall research question is how 
could the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination be reconciled to 
define the scope of exclusive rights beyond authorising every communication of 
a work? 
Whereas the main aim of the chapter is to outline the normative framework for 
answering the second overall question on the basis of reconciling the approaches 
to material and immaterial dissemination, it also sets to provide the background 
by summarising the findings of the analysis under chapters 3 to 5. Hence, before 
answering the first overall research question and turning to the normative 
framework itself, the indications of the convergence of the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination rights under the acquis are examined. 
Next, in order to outline the normative framework for assessing the justi-
fiability of subjecting secondary dissemination to the right holder’s control given 
the developments under the acquis, common criteria which can be used to 
systematise the approach to the extent of control over secondary communication 
are explored. The outlined criteria are contrasted with the incentive rationale of 
copyright and the objectives of the exclusive rights envisioned under secondary 
EU law to group them into primary and ancillary considerations. Last, the chapter 
puts the developed normative framework into the context of secondary EU law 
in force to examine the shortcomings of the present regulatory framework in 
accommodating the developed criteria. 
Hence, besides answering the two overall research questions of this thesis, this 
chapter addresses the following sub-questions to support the conclusions:  
 
What are the indications of the convergence of the approaches to material and 
immaterial dissemination rights under the EU acquis? 
What common criteria can be used to systematise the extent of control over 
secondary communication, relying on initially authorised communication, under 
the EU acquis? How do these criteria relate to the incentive rationale and the 
objectives of copyright under the acquis? 
What are the main shortcomings of the current EU copyright framework in 
accommodating the developed criteria? 
 
In order to answer these questions, first, the significance of the distinction bet-
ween material and immaterial dissemination in the context of the development 
under the EU copyright acquis is summarised. Relying on the findings of chapters 
                                                                                             
the chapters dealing with the analysis of rights, in order to avoid confusion with the scope of 
the respective exclusive right. Since this chapter is focusing on the outlook for reconciling the 
approaches rather than on placing the acts under a specific right, the term communication will 
be used throughout this chapter as a synonym to dissemination and as communicating a work’s 
content to exploit it economically. 
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2 to 5 of the thesis, it is explored what developments under the two main dis-
semination-related rights point towards the convergence of approaches and could 
form a basis for reconciling the approaches. Furthermore, the complications of 
relying on the distinction for determining the appropriate scope of control over 
secondary dissemination are emphasised. The analysis leads to the conclusions 
on the first overall research question, which also provide the background for the 
normative framework. 
Second, the normative framework building upon the identified developments 
is constructed. The framework aims to provide common criteria that could be 
used to systematise the extent of the right holder’s control over secondary dis-
semination. Given the underlying premises of the analysis of the development of 
the rights, the elements are contrasted with the economic rationale and the objec-
tives of exclusive rights under the acquis. On this basis, the elements of the frame-
work are divided into primary and ancillary ones. The former category constitutes 
the core of the assessment, capable of indicating whether exclusive control over 
subsequent secondary dissemination shall be upheld. The latter group comprises 
the elements that can assist the assessment but ought to be accompanied by clari-
fication of the rationales of protection under the acquis to avoid unduly priori-
tising the interests of the right holders at cost of other considerations. Finally, 
outlining the normative framework is complemented by exploring the main short-
comings of the present EU copyright framework in accommodating the devel-
oped criteria.  
The chapter is divided into two parts. Part 6.1. provides the background to the 
developed normative framework by summarising the developments under the 
acquis pointing towards the convergence of approaches and concluding on the 
first overall research question. Part 6.2. outlines the normative framework for 
assessing the justifiability of subjecting secondary communication to the exclu-
sive control of the right holder under the acquis. This part outlines a set of pri-
mary and ancillary criteria for the assessment and the shortcomings of the present 
copyright framework in accommodating them, before concluding on the second 
overall research question. 
 
 
6.1. The material and immaterial dissemination 
distinction in the context of the development of acquis 
In the context of technological progress in the 20th century, the emergence of the 
Internet as a new dissemination channel is, without a doubt, the key development. 
Not least because of the challenges it posed to the traditional way of regulating 
the exclusive rights on the basis of the material and immaterial dissemination 
distinction. The emergence of a new channel prompted legislators to confer on 
the right holder broad control over any act of communication taking place 
online.1198 
                                                                                             
1198  Both internationally and at the EU level. See sections 5.1.6. and 5.2.2. 
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Appropriate protection was necessary for the development of business 
models.1199 Nevertheless, nearly two decades after the harmonisation under 
secondary EU law, the adequacy of the framework is increasingly questioned.1200 
Whereas the extensive protection enabled the development of various business 
models, other objectives of copyright received less attention. Among other 
aspects, the position of users and the role of copyright in fostering innovation and 
competition are often discussed.1201 
This part summarises the findings of the analysis conducted in chapters 2 to 5 
of this thesis to contextualise the framework for reconciling the approaches to 
material and immaterial dissemination rights in the second part of this chapter. 
First, the developments indicating the convergence of approaches will be high-
lighted. Second, the complications of commencing the assessment of secondary 
dissemination relying on the distinction enshrined under the InfoSoc Directive 
will be discussed. Third, conclusions on the first overall research questions will 
be provided and will serve as a background for the second part of the chapter. 
 
 
6.1.1. Developments indicating a convergence of material and 
immaterial dissemination approaches 
At the very outset of the EU copyright harmonisation, a strict line between the 
rights of material and immaterial dissemination was drawn under secondary EU 
law.1202 The right of distribution would be systematically restricted by the appli-
cation of the exhaustion principle, whereas the right of communication to the 
public would not be subject to exhaustion. However, the subsequent development 
under CJEU jurisprudence illustrates that neither the general boundary of the 
right of distribution nor the outlawed limits on the right of communication to the 
public under secondary EU law tell us much anymore about the scope of exclu-
sive control in practice. 
Technological advancements and emerging markets have required a flexible 
assessment of the interests at stake that would consider the circumstances of 
exploitation of a work. The recent tendency to examine the relation between the 
copyright legislation and the fundamental rights harmonised under the CFR 
points towards dealing with the undesirable consequences of the broad exclusive 
                                                                                             
1199  Guibault and Quintais (2014), p. 7. 
1200  Sganga et al. (2017). See also Opinion of the European Copyright Society concerning the 
scope of the economic rights in light of case C-161/17, Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Dirk 
Renckhoff (‘Córdoba case’), 2018, emphasising the current copyright system’s inability to 
adapt to the digital environment and suggesting a de minimis rule, which would deal with the 
use of a work that has minimal impact on the interests of right holders. 
1201  On the position of a user, see Mazziotti (2008), Synodinou (2010). On competition, see 
Schovsbo (2011). 
1202  Under the InfoSoc Directive, see section 5.2.2.3. 
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control granted under copyright by the mechanisms outside copyright.1203 This 
thesis, leaving fundamental rights outside the scope, operates within the bounda-
ries of the copyright framework and from the perspective of economic justi-
fications for copyright. 
The absence of any designated material medium in online communication of 
a work implicates drawing definite conclusions based on the assumptions devel-
oped in the realm of analogue dissemination. The emergence of new markets and 
the potential for secondary exploitation of a work have prompted the CJEU to 
retreat from the predetermined positions enshrined under secondary law. Whereas 
the increasing flexibility in constructing the scope of the exclusive rights under 
the acquis is welcomed, the development comes at the cost of legal certainty.1204 
Whilst the underpinning arguments of the CJEU are of a predominantly economic 
nature, the underlying objectives are seldom explicitly revealed. 
The next sections integrate the findings of the analysis of the rights under the 
acquis and illustrate the convergence of the approaches to material and immate-
rial dissemination. By contextualising in part 6.2.3. of this chapter the answer to 
the first research question on how the development of the rights reflects the dis-
tinction, the present part also provides a background to the normative framework 
for assessing the scope of control accorded by the rights. First, the tendency to 
broaden the scope of subsequent control conferred by the right of distribution is 
assessed towards the traditionally material nature of the right. Second, the flexible 
approach to assessing secondary dissemination under the right of communication 
to the public is contrasted with the traditionally immaterial nature of the right. 
Third, the complications of commencing the assessment of the cases from the 
distinction under the secondary law are outlined. 
 
 
6.1.1.1. Scope of the right of distribution beyond the first marketing 
of a tangible copy 
The concept of material dissemination laid the ground to confining the right of 
distribution under secondary EU law solely to the copies fixed on a tangible 
medium. The preparatory works to the InfoSoc Directive indicate the legislator’s 
intent to harmonise the right of distribution under Article 4 of the Directive as 
covering solely distribution of tangible copies of a work.1205 However, the notion 
of material dissemination as related solely to tangible copies has been contested. 
First, the CJEU extended the application of the right of distribution and its 
boundaries to apparently functionally equivalent acts of online dissemination.1206 
                                                                                             
1203  On the topic, see Hugenholtz (2001), Geiger (2006), Geiger (2004), Jütte (2016), 
Hugenholtz (2016a), Griffiths (2018), Helfer (2018). 
1204  See also Rendas concluding that CJEU exercises great flexibility but at the cost of legal 
certainty, Rendas (2018), pp. 169–182. 
1205  See section 3.2.3.2. 
1206  The ruling in the UsedSoft case, see section 3.3.3. 
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Second, the economic arguments which are typically attributed to material dis-
semination have been used for delineating the scope of the rights of seemingly 
immaterial nature.1207 
This section draws attention to three main observations which point towards 
the convergence of approaches to material and immaterial dissemination and pro-
vide a ground for outlining the normative framework in the next part of the pre-
sent chapter. The first observation is an explicit delineation between the primary 
and secondary acts of distribution. The second aspect is the emphasis on the right 
holder’s chance to exercise the right. The third and final aspect is flexibility to 
extend the scope of control to secondary distribution despite the application of 
the exhaustion principle as a seeming boundary of the right. 
Despite the broad wording of the right of distribution under secondary EU 
law, at the time of harmonisation at the international and EU levels, there was 
little support for recognising a right that would extend to any subsequent distri-
bution of the same copies.1208 Recognising the right of first distribution was an 
alternative to a broad right. The latter, in turn, would necessarily have to be 
accompanied by the exhaustion principle. Opting for the brad right was a less 
obvious way of harmonising the right of first distribution. The right of distri-
bution under the InfoSoc Directive covers any primary or secondary act of distri-
bution with the exception of secondary acts following exhaustion of the right.1209 
Spelling out the exhaustion principle under secondary EU law meant that the 
acts of primary and secondary (subsequent) distribution must be distinguished. 
Every primary act of distribution is, in any case, subject to the right holder's 
authorisation, whereas secondary acts of distribution (in the meaning of distri-
bution under Article 4(1) of the InfoSoc Directive) are exempted from authori-
sation on the basis of the exhaustion principle under Article 4(2). This distinction 
is also significant in two other aspects. First, the wording of the principle rules 
out its application to acts not falling under the right of distribution under Article 
4(1).1210 Second, the distinction was also employed by the CJEU through the 
Community exhaustion principle to solve the conflict between the exclusive right 
and the free movement of goods within the internal market.1211 
The exhaustion principle, in theory, exempts acts of secondary distribution 
from the right holder’s authorisation. However, the wording of the principle is 
too finely tuned to the specific circumstances of distribution of “unalterable” 
tangible copies to effectively delineate control granted by the right in slightly 
different circumstances.1212 Although the wording of the principle suggests that 
                                                                                             
1207  For the criterion of appropriate remuneration, see section 5.3.2. 
1208  See section 3.1.2. 
1209  Also, spelling out the exhaustion principle allows to regulate its territoriality, see section 
3.2.3.2. 
1210  First and foremost, in respect of rental. See section 4.1.2. 
1211  See section 3.2.2.1. 
1212  In general, see section 4.3.1. Also, in the context of online distribution, see Oprysk et al. 
(2017). “Unalterable” is meant to signify that it could more or less be assumed at the time of 
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the first putting a copy on the market entails a complete loss of control over sub-
sequent distribution, it is far from providing a due account. The application of 
exhaustion neither prejudices other rights nor denies any control over subsequent 
dissemination.1213 The CJEU jurisprudence provides some examples where 
further control is justified even though the conditions of exhaustion are met.1214 
The key condition for the application of the exhaustion principle under the 
acquis is the exercise of the right by the right holder. In economic terms, by grant-
ing control over the placement of tangible copies of a work on the market, the 
Directives provide an opportunity to obtain appropriate remuneration for each 
copy.1215 Hence, the right of distribution under the acquis suggests that appro-
priate reward is ensured by providing the right to authorise any primary act of 
distribution, as secondary distribution is effectively exempted. Nevertheless, the 
CJEU on a few occasions considered it necessary to look beyond the remunera-
tion due for initial distribution.1216  
Hence, there has been a departure from the right of distribution securing con-
trol over the first marketing of copies to the right of distribution securing control 
over the distributed copies on any market. It is no longer the case that the right of 
distribution primarily covers first distribution. Rather, the right provides control 
over every distribution, exempting secondary distribution only if there is no 
separate market for the copies and if secondary distribution does not significantly 
interfere with the primary market. 
Whereas it could be argued that new markets for exploitation of distributed 
copies undermine the primary market for original copies or unduly deprive the 
right holder of additional profit, the overall development must be assessed 
towards the objectives of the right. It is highly debatable whether the copyright 
holder should be granted control extending beyond obtaining remuneration 
through the initial distribution of copies.1217 Furthermore, it can be seriously dis-
puted whether the incentive rationale of protection necessitates providing control 
over the placement of a work on any primary and secondary market, regardless 
the fact whether any (however slight) potential for obtaining additional remunera-
tion for already distributed copies exists. 
                                                                                             
elaborating the principle that a secondary market (if any) would be comprised of copies that 
were not substantially altered besides a regular “wear and tear.” However, as technology 
evolves, it becomes possible to modify copies in ways creating additional value, which raises 
the question of whether the right holder’s claim of further control shall be upheld. See also 
section 4.2.3.4. on the Art & Allposters ruling. 
1213  For instance, see on the different rights in relation to the same tangible copy section 
5.2.1.2. 
1214  See section 4.2.3.4. 
1215  In line with recital 10 of the InfoSoc Directive. See also section 3.3.1.2. 
1216  For instance, when a new market is emerging for copies already distributed, e.g. through 
rental or their substantial modification. 
1217  See, for instance, Poort on the irrelevancy of surplus created in the downstream market 
for the scope of copyright protection as long as market failure is not reintroduced. Poort 
(2018), p. 294. Also, Rognstad and Poort (2018), pp. 140–141. 
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Given the increasing demand for flexibility in constructing the boundaries of 
the control accorded by copyright, the role of the exhaustion principle under 
Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive in delineating the scope of the harmonised 
right of distribution is diminishing. Rightly so, the CJEU has considered the 
exhaustion principle as limiting the control to the first authorisation in its broader 
economic and practical sense and beyond the sale and resale of tangible 
copies.1218 Unlike the exhaustion principle in its narrow meaning under the 
Directives, such broader perspective can be replicated in the cases not necessarily 
encompassing dissemination of tangible copies. This is not to suggest that the 
exhaustion principle per se should be extended to digital copies. On the contrary, 
the principle in its narrow meaning under Article 4(2) shall rather be confined to 
its traditional tangible context.1219 
The implications of the development of the right of distribution and its 
inherent boundary in the form of the exhaustion principle are two-fold. First, the 
control accorded by the right under the EU acquis extends beyond the first distri-
bution of copies despite the exhaustion principle. The all-or-nothing approach of 
the principle does not fit well in the recently much more flexible approach to 
defining the boundaries of permissible control. Although the increasing flexi-
bility of the CJEU’s reasoning could be praised, jurisprudence fails to provide a 
clear rationale for extending control accorded by the right beyond the first distri-
bution.1220  
Second, the development does not provide any decisive grounds for extending 
the material dissemination approach to the assessment under other exclusive rights. 
Inevitably, extending the exhaustion principle in its broader sense to situations 
outside the realm of tangible copies is a matter of policy. However, it is of utmost 
importance that the question whether the material dissemination thinking 
accompanied by the exhaustion principle in its broader sense shall be extended to 
uses beyond the sale of tangible copies is not confined to the application of the 
exhaustion principle in its narrow sense under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
 
 
6.1.1.2. Search for flexibility under the right of 
communication to the public  
The right of distribution stands in contrast with the right of communication to the 
public under the acquis. The latter, in theory, knows no boundaries when it comes 
to primary versus secondary acts of communication falling under the right, 
pursuant to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive.1221 The justifications for such 
                                                                                             
1218  For instance, in the context of the UsedSoft case, where the Court held that limiting 
exhaustion would go beyond what is necessary to achieve objectives of copyright. See section 
4.2.3.3. 
1219  As will be elaborated in section 6.2.2.2. 
1220  See section 3.3.2. 
1221  See section 5.2.2.3. 
287 
unequivocal contrast rely, inter alia, on the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination rights. However, the development of the right of com-
munication to the public indicates that what secondary EU law seems to imply 
no longer reflects the state of the things. The tendency is to move beyond the 
assumption of no general limit to the right of communication to the public. Further-
more, the CJEU operates with considerations which are typically associated with 
material dissemination and the right of distribution. 
The present section outlines three main aspects of the development, which 
support reconciling the approaches to the exclusive rights on the basis of inte-
grating the material and immaterial dissemination approaches. The first aspect is 
an indication that the function of the right can be fulfilled through authorising 
each act of initial communication. The second aspect is the growing emphasis on 
the exercise of the right as the essential objective of protection. The third aspect 
is the diminishing significance of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive precluding 
exhaustion of the right of communication to the public. 
A significant departure from the traditional view of immaterial dissemination 
is acknowledging the possibility of limiting the exercise of the right of commu-
nication to the public once its function has been fulfilled. In turn, it relies on the 
assumption that the function of the right can be fulfilled through the first exercise 
of the right. The CJEU has held that, in particular circumstances, control over 
acts that would formally fall under the exclusive right of communication to the 
public could be limited, given the fact that initial communication has been 
authorised.1222 The Court reasoned, inter alia, that the rights guarantee only 
appropriate remuneration, which the right holder could have negotiated when 
giving the initial authorisation. 
Similarly, the absence of the public which has not already been taken into 
account by authorising the initial communication as an argument for restricting 
control over secondary communication through hyperlinking essentially points 
into the same direction.1223 What is emphasised is that the right holder is free to 
exploit a work in their best interest by virtue of the right to authorise any separate 
act of dissemination. However, they cannot expect to retain control over any 
secondary communication or any act in a remote connection to a work.  
If the possibility to confine the right holder’s control to authorising primary 
communication is admitted, then it prompts a discussion on the circumstances 
which sanction placing the limits on subsequent control. Perhaps the most 
prominent criterion developed by the Court in this respect is a new public, which 
is essentially of economic character. The assessment of the intended audience of 
the initial communication and the audience reached by a secondary act establishes 
                                                                                             
1222  See sections 5.2.1.1. and 5.2.3.1. In essence, the FAPL case has a lot to do with the fact 
that public receipt of a broadcast is considered to fall under the right of communication to the 
public. The reasoning of the CJEU on the relation between sale of decoding devices and the 
freedom to provide services relates to receipt of a signal rather than to a more active inter-
ference such as retransmission of a signal. 
1223  See sections 5.2.3.2.2. and 5.3.2.1. 
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whether the subsequent act interferes with primary communication by targeting 
an audience that was not foreseen. Hence, a new public potentially reached by 
secondary communication corresponds to the public from which potential remu-
neration was not obtained.1224  
The criterion further emphasises the importance of exercise of the right and 
the right holder’s prerogative to exploit a work in the form of targeting any indi-
vidual (or a group of individuals) with a communication of a work. It could there-
fore also be understood as assessing the presence of a foregone potentially paying 
public. Nevertheless, as will be argued, the criterion should only be examined in 
conjunction with the circumstances at stake. In some instances, the supposedly 
new public would not be interested in accessing a work at all; hence, no potential 
remuneration could be obtained.1225 In other circumstances, although no addi-
tional circle of persons would be reached, an act could still substantially interfere 
with a work’s communication or exploitation.1226 Therefore, it is vital that the 
new public criterion is considered when assessing other circumstances of an act 
in question.1227 
These considerations run contrary to what EU secondary law seems to imply 
under Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. Fundamentally, the paragraph 
attempts to distinguish the right of communication to the public from the right of 
distribution on the basis of the assumption that any primary or secondary act 
falling under the former right would have to be authorised in order to secure 
appropriate remuneration to the right holder.1228 Hence, whereas there are, of 
course, specific limitations such as exceptions for educational or scientific 
purposes, no general limits such as the exhaustion principle were deemed per-
missible. Whether or not one interprets Article 3(3) as precluding any general 
limit on the right of communication to the public, the wording unnecessarily 
encourages assuming a predetermined stance on the extent of accorded control.1229 
Prominently, the Court at times has adopted a flexible approach to the scope 
of the right of communication to the public beyond authorising primary commu-
                                                                                             
1224  On the new public as intended audience, see also Peukert (2017), p. 897. 
1225  Consider, for instance, installation of TV sets in public spaces such as hotel lobbies. It is 
questionable whether customers already having a terrestrial license and those who are not in 
possession of one would actually be interested in accessing a broadcast in a public space. Even 
if they were, another question that arises is whether it is justified to pass the extra costs on 
consumers already paying for a license and double compensate the right holder. See the CJEU 
applying the unconvincing criterion of the perceptiveness of the public, section 5.2.3.2.1.3.2. 
1226  For instance, framing could represent such a case. See Poort distinguishing embedding 
from linking and placing it closer to a work’s exploitation by downgrading the right holder’s 
exclusivity. Poort (2018), pp. 317–321. 
1227  On the importance of these considerations, see also Depreeuw (2014), p. 343. 
1228  The views on the exact meaning of the Article differ, see section 5.2.2.3. 
1229  As will be explored in the following section, any assessment of acts falling under the right 
of communication to the public starts from assuming the right holder’s control over any 
(in)direct act in connection with a work.  
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nication, much in line with the material dissemination thinking.1230 In the absence 
of any limit under the right of communication to the public, which is comparable 
to exhaustion under the right of distribution, the CJEU jurisprudence has con-
fused legal certainty. Namely, the Court’s understanding of Article 3(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive appears rather narrow, as opposed to the indications given by 
its wording. Rather than considering the provision in the circumstances of 
secondary communication, the CJEU examined its significance only in the cases 
which entail the existence of independent exploitation through unauthorised 
communication or correspond to secondary communication which is distinct to 
an extent it could be considered a separate one.1231  
Prominently, the Court has referred to the exhaustion principle to justify its 
conclusion that an upload of a work already freely available online constitutes an 
act of communication to the public.1232 Whereas the conclusion itself is sup-
ported, provided that the MS are then free to examine whether the act in question 
falls under any exception, the reference to exhaustion in this context is clearly 
erring. The Court has also referred to the provision in the case where secondary 
communication, although not altering most circumstances of the original one, 
was so distinct that it could be considered a separate exploitation.1233 It would be 
much more convincing if the Court would recall Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc in 
the cases concerning neither clearly primary communication nor secondary com-
munication potentially amounting to distinct exploitation. Instead, examining the 
meaning of Article 3(3) would be much more insightful in such cases as retrans-
mission through nearly the same means to the same public, public receipt of a 
broadcast or linking to freely available authorised content. 
Accordingly, the right of communication to the public as representing 
immaterial dissemination has undergone substantial adjustments. The distinction 
the legislator enshrined into secondary EU law proved to be a restrictive factor in 
shaping the appropriate scope of control accorded by the exclusive right. Never-
theless, even though the CJEU jurisprudence does not explicitly nullify the pro-
vision under Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, it demonstrates a flexible 
approach to subsequent control based on the circumstances of the case. In this 
context, the CJEU’s sporadic reference to Article 3(3) serves as additional 
argument for employing the distinction between primary and secondary dis-
semination as equally useful under the right of communication to the public. 
 
                                                                                             
1230  For instance, the same economic considerations of a work’s exploitation were used in the 
context of the right of communication to the public. Consider the exercise of the right through 
determining circumstances of initial dissemination and obtained remuneration, outlined 
above. 
1231  See section 5.2.3.1.2. Also, the Article was mentioned in the case of secondary act 
amounting to a new exploitation, see section 5.2.3.2.1.2.1. 
1232  See the Renckhoff case, section 5.2.3.1.2. 
1233  See the ITVCatchup case, section 5.2.3.2.1.2.1. On the economic significance of retrans-
mission, see also Poort (2018), pp. 324–328. 
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6.1.2. Complications of relying on the distinction for determining 
the appropriate scope of the rights  
Given the developments of the rights under the EU acquis, the main obstacle to 
constructing a framework that would be flexible and yet preserve the legal cer-
tainty is the strict division between the rights and the enumerated closed list of 
permitted limitations.1234 As the tendency has been, the CJEU jurisprudence 
gained increasing importance when it comes to providing any guidance on what 
the possible limits of control might be.1235 However, such development has also 
resulted in the shortcomings due to the selective nature of cases referred to the 
Court and the CJEU confining its reasoning to very specific circumstances. 
The structure of the InfoSoc Directive prevented a broader debate on the limits 
of the rights and complicated conceptualising the balancing factors and policy 
aims.1236 The first obstacle is seemingly precluding exhaustion of (i.e. exempting 
any acts of secondary communication from) the right of communication to the 
public. The second obstacle is harmonising the exhaustion principle under the 
full-harmonisation Directive. In the first case, the provision has been used to 
practically deny any general limit on the exercise of the right of communication 
to the public. In the second case, by spelling out the exhaustion principle in a 
narrow way, adapting it to the changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation 
was essentially discouraged. 
This is not to suggest that the distinction between the right of distribution and 
the communications right in its broad sense is deprived of any substance.1237 
Instead, the circumstances of exploitation change as technology evolves, and they 
call for a flexible assessment on a case-by-case basis. Every live performance of 
a work as a traditional form of immaterial exploitation requires a separate author-
isation from the right holder, just as every distribution of copies of a work does. 
In that sense, both acts are treated equally as they are subject to authorisation 
under the respective exclusive right. 
However, the considerations change when performance can be communicated 
beyond the reach of the present public, e.g. through broadcasting. Such further 
communication reaches an additional audience, for which the right holder might 
not be compensated if the right of performance does not extend to subsequent 
communication. Ultimately, circumstances of subsequent communication of a 
performance are different from resale of tangible copies, where the right holder 
has been compensated for each copy. Such secondary communication opens a 
                                                                                             
1234  Griffiths (2010), Dreier (2010a), Geiger and Schönherr (2014a), Guibault (2010), Hugen-
holtz (2016a). 
1235  Rosati (2019). 
1236  Westkamp (2017), p. 25. 
1237  On communications rights versus the right of communication, see section 5.1.1. Distri-
bution of tangible copies is still the way of dissemination where profit from each copy is ob-
tained mostly through the first sale. Broadcast is still different as its retransmission can result 
in substantial additional profit and interference with the right holder’s business model. 
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potentially much bigger market than a live performance, which can explain why 
exploitation through a performance does not entail the automatic application of 
the exhaustion principle. Once again, application of the exhaustion principle in 
this context could only mean exempting transmission (or broadcast) of a perfor-
mance to a (new) public but not the loss of the ability to authorise any new per-
formance.1238 
Consider, on the other hand, online dissemination, which opens a potentially 
world-wide market for communicating a work. Delivery of electronic copies to 
individual users through online transmission essentially resembles physical dis-
tribution. Should resale of these copies be prohibited on the sole ground that dis-
semination is seemingly immaterial? Likewise, would the first authorisation of 
communication of a work enable obtaining appropriate reward, if access to such 
communication is strictly controlled and offered worldwide? Whereas it might be 
the case, the peculiarities of online dissemination might as well call for refraining 
from drawing any conclusions on the sole basis of dissemination being “digital” 
or “immaterial”.  
The main message is that the variety of ways to exploit a work through com-
munication does not allow supporting an all-or-nothing approach to the extent of 
appropriate exclusive control. Whereas the strict distinction between the rights 
could be justified at the outset of digital environment in order to let the businesses 
grow on the basis of the broad exclusive right, the question is whether the solution 
is still justified today. In a sense, the distinction between material and immaterial 
dissemination rights indicates nothing more than the reluctance to apply the all-
or-nothing approach of the exhaustion principle as formulated under the Direc-
tives to the variety of acts falling under the right of communication to the public. 
However, it cannot justify placing no limits at all on the scope of the right of 
communication to the public. 
It could also be argued that the sharp distinction between the rights has 
encouraged the CJEU and the academic community to explore the possibility of 
extending the right of distribution to online dissemination.1239 Would more 
flexibility be entailed under the other rights, the limits of control could also have 
been addressed under the broad right of communication to the public. As has been 
explored in the previous chapters, denying the application of the right of distri-
bution to dissemination other than through circulation of tangible copies is often 
associated with precluding the application of the exhaustion principle. However, 
as was also illustrated in the previous chapters, the exhaustion principle might no 
longer entail a total loss of control over subsequent communication.1240 There-
fore, considering exhaustion in its broader meaning is certainly endorsed.  
                                                                                             
1238  To consider exhaustion as a loss of an ability to authorise next performance would amount 
to holding that exhaustion of the right of distribution implies that anybody is allowed to 
produce and distribute new copies of a work. 
1239  See section 4.3.3. Also, Sganga (2018b). 
1240  For instance, the Court has shown flexibility in assessing the circumstances of the cases 
even if they de facto prompted for application of exhaustion. See section 4.2.3.4. 
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It has already been emphasised that no conclusions on the appropriate scope 
of the rights can be drawn from the presence of a tangible medium alone. A copy 
fixed on a physical medium can be used both for distribution and for commu-
nication of a work through a performance or a broadcast. Hence, interference of 
secondary communication by a third party does not depend on a copy itself but 
rather on the use that is made of it.1241 The perception of dissemination as material 
or immaterial changes over time as technology evolves. Once a new distinct use 
for distributed copies or primary communication emerges, primary dissemination 
might call for treatment originally reserved to immaterial dissemination rather 
than material.1242  
The on-demand nature of online dissemination as a distinctive characteristic 
calling for an approach different from the rights of material dissemination must 
be contested.1243 Dissemination of works is generally evolving towards communi-
cating a work upon a request from a user. Actually, on-demand consumption of 
a work would essentially be closer to the consumption enabled by distribution of 
individual copies, compared with the consumption of a live performance or a 
broadcast. Whereas the latter presupposes that the circumstances of a work’s con-
sumption are outside of the control of a user, the former actually enables such 
control. 
The inflexibility of the current framework leads to the situation where the 
businesses can adapt their models to fit the necessary category of the exclusive 
rights and enforce excessive control to the likely detriment of the market and 
consumers.1244 One example is witnessed in the VOB case, where libraries were 
allowed to lend e-books on the condition that their e-lending closely resembled 
the analogue lending process.1245 Could it be the case that, be it not for the absence 
of a comparable exemption from the right of communication to the public, the  
e-lending system could be built in a different way not mirroring lending of 
tangible copies? For instance, libraries could potentially embrace the possibilities 
of technology and provide simultaneous access to more users at the same time 
and remunerate the right holders accordingly.  
Rather than trying to force the new ways of exploitation into the existing 
boxes, as was advised against at the outset of harmonisation,1246 it is appropriate 
                                                                                             
1241  For instance, providing tangible or digital copies of works for use in hotel rooms was 
considered to fall under the right of communication to the public despite the involvement of 
tangible copes. CJEU, Phonographic Performance (Ireland) Limited v Ireland and Attorney 
General. (2012) Case C-162/10, Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 62–69. See also section 
5.2.1.2. 
1242  Consider, for instance, rental of tangible copies, which was exempted from exhaustion 
following the rise of commercial rental, section 4.1.2. 
1243  See section 5.2.2.2. 
1244  For instance, this is evident in the aftermath of the UsedSoft case, where the vendors could 
easily adapt to the reasoning of the Court by providing time-limited access. 
1245  See section 3.2.4.3. 
1246  See section 2.2.2. 
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to account for the underlying practical-economic implications of exploitation and 
policy considerations.1247 Ultimately, the complexity of copyright grows when 
economic interests are balanced in individual cases. However, it would provide 
more flexibility to account for differences in specific circumstances.1248 From this 
perspective, and in particular in the context of online dissemination, relying on 
the notion of communication of a work under the right of communication to the 
public as of an inherently immaterial nature and not be subject to any general limit 
is somewhat archaic.1249 There is nothing to suggest that online dissemination at 
all times is incapable of generating appropriate remuneration through the first act 
of dissemination. Therefore, the justifications behind submitting any subsequent 
dissemination to the right holder's control must be considered carefully. 
Next, maintaining the strict distinction between the rights also does not allow 
the effect of the rights on the market to be appreciated. For instance, in the context 
of tangible copies, the primary market for a work is affected by the second-hand 
market for distributed copies. Denying the application of exhaustion to intangible 
copies thus ensures that no comparable interference takes place in regard to the 
market for digital copies. The situation could be viewed as conferring preferential 
treatment on the specific form of exploitation based on the technical circum-
stances of communication of a work. Whereas other objectives might justify such 
outcome, it is highly debatable whether creating a different status quo is sup-
ported by the mere absence of a tangible medium, if considered towards the 
rationale of providing incentives to create. 
Reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination under 
the exclusive rights would uphold the distinction between the primary and 
secondary acts of dissemination, which is traditionally associated with the 
material dissemination. The distinction would be helpful to avoid the confusion 
around the meaning of the exhaustion principle both in its narrow and broad 
senses. The exhaustion principle sanctions placing a limit on the secondary acts 
relying on the initially authorised communication and in no way interferes with 
the ability to authorise each new independent act. Only when it has been 
established that the right holder has exercised their right can the justifications for 
limiting further control over the particular act be considered. 
Taking these considerations into account, it should be concluded that recon-
ciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination would be a 
particularly appropriate development under the EU copyright acquis. First, it 
                                                                                             
1247  In the context of exhaustion, see Rognstad (2003), p. 463. In the broder context of the 
proposed alternative model for defining the exclusive rights through reasonable exploitation, 
see Rognstad and Poort (2018), p. 132. Also, see Ohly emphasising current formalistic 
approach to the exclusive rights and the need to consider economic consequences, Ohly 
(2018a), pp. 97–99. 
1248  Riis (2013), p. 151. 
1249  Jenner calls the discussion whether it is a download or a stream, under what section of the 
act does it fall and where and who owns it an arcane Medieval teleological discussion, Jenner 
(2011), pp. 60–61. 
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would systematise the developments under CJEU jurisprudence. Second, it would 
provide a framework for evaluating the cases on the basis of the practical impli-
cations rather than the dogmatic assumptions. Third, the reconciled framework 
ought to be better suited to deal with emerging technologies and any future need 
to adjust the right holder’s control over circumstances of dissemination. Finally, 
all these aspects would contribute to restoring legal certainty, which has recently 
been substantially weakened. 
 
 
6.1.3. Conclusions on the first overall research question 
The first overall research question of this thesis is how does the development of 
the rights of distribution and communication to the public under the EU acquis 
reflect the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination rights? 
The objective of the research was to determine the impact of the distinction 
between material and immaterial dissemination on the harmonisation of the rights 
and establish to what extent the acquis continues to reflect the assumptions made 
at the outset of harmonisation. 
As has been explored in Chapter 2, the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination is not a clear-cut notion but rather a way to systematise 
the rights. It has been employed to explain why the scope of certain rights could 
generally be limited to first exercise in relation to each separate act of dissemi-
nation (e.g. the right of distribution) and others (communication rights) ought not 
to. The distinction is in close relation to the economic rationale of protection and 
the idea that the function of the right can be fulfilled by the right holder exercising 
control over exploitation through authorisation of each separate dissemination. 
Traditionally, the right of distribution would be differentiated from the right 
of performance on the basis that the right holder would have a possibility to obtain 
appropriate remuneration though the first putting of copies into circulation, 
whereas authorising a performance may not provide appropriate remuneration 
with a view of the potential downstream market reached by communicating per-
formance to a wider public. Accordingly, national laws have limited the right of 
distribution to authorising every initial distribution of copies by spelling out the 
exhaustion principle as an inherent boundary of the right. Rights of commu-
nication to the public covering dissemination not connected to any tangible copies 
traditionally know no such (or comparable) limit. 
The approach to regulating dissemination-related rights on the basis of dis-
tinction has early on been enshrined under secondary EU law harmonising the 
exclusive rights under copyright. Whereas the right of distribution is accom-
panied by the exhaustion principle under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive, 
Article 3(3) explicitly precludes application of exhaustion, and hence, supposedly, 
any limits on control over secondary dissemination, to the right of communication 
to the public under  
 As explored in chapters 3 to 5, the legislative choices under the Directive 
depended on a variety of considerations besides the mere scope of control over 
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secondary dissemination conferred by each right. Harmonisation under the 
Directives relied, inter alia, on the preceding case law of the CJEU examining the 
conflict of national copyright with the free movement of goods, calling for 
harmonising certain aspects of exhaustion in order to prevent distortion of the 
internal market. Furthermore, given the broad scope of the right of distribution 
under certain national laws, it had to be ensured that the exhaustion principle as 
harmonised under secondary EU law would not interfere with the right holder’s 
control over such forms of distribution as rental. Given the fact that the wording 
of the provisions serves multiple objectives, it is crucial to unravel any assump-
tions on the envisioned scope of the exclusive right from the exact wording of the 
rights under the secondary EU law. 
Whereas it might not have seemed like such a big step to harmonise the two 
widely recognised rights in the 1990s on the basis of the commonly accepted 
distinction, it appears to be one from today’s perspective. As explored in Chapter 
2, copyright is closely linked to the development of technology and has been 
heavily challenged by the emergence of a great variety of dissemination channels, 
in particular the Internet. The developments have, without a doubt, impacted the 
distinction between material and immaterial dissemination. Whereas dissemi-
nation is increasingly moving online and ought to be of immaterial form, it can 
hardly be argued that none of the ways of dissemination is able to secure appro-
priate remuneration, given, inter alia, the availability of technological measures 
enabling wide control over access and consumption of a work. 
As has been discussed, the recently enabled new ways of exploiting already 
distributed tangible copies is another reason to question the justifiability of 
denying further control on the basis of the exhaustion principle. The overreaching 
scope of the communication to the public right seemingly covering any thinkable 
act of communication of a work online at times appears excessive in the absence 
of proper mechanisms of delineating control accorded by the right. This has had 
implications on matters outside copyright but closely related to the scope and the 
exercise of exclusive rights, such as consumer protection and competition.  
Whereas copyright law-making ought to be accustomed to the constant 
process of adaptation, it is nonetheless dependent on the flexibility of the frame-
work and the ability to account for the ever-changing circumstances of a work’s 
exploitation. As discussed in Chapter 2, the harmonisation of the rights under 
secondary EU law has negatively impacted the freedom of the MS to legislate. 
Whereas the aim of harmonisation has been, besides providing adequate protec-
tion to the right holders, to advance the internal market and competition within 
it, the objectives might not have been effectively achieved due to the diminutive 
margin for appreciation of the changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation.  
The impact of enumerating the rights under the EU copyright framework on 
the basis of the distinction has been discussed using the Scandinavian countries 
as an example. These countries share a common history of copyright law-making 
and are characterised by a less dogmatic approach to the legislation and the par-
ticular weight of public interest in copyright rationales. It was explored in Chapter 
2 how Scandinavian copyright has been influenced by Scandinavian legal realism 
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and how the important public interest rationale appears otherwise hardly 
accounted for under the EU acquis. The broad right of making available under 
Scandinavian copyright was designed to withstand the challenges of law-making 
in the course of technological development but the obligations under the acquis 
had led to further categorisation of the right. 
Despite the strict distinction between the right of distribution and the right of 
communication to the public under the InfoSoc Directive, the developments 
under the CJEU jurisprudence have substantially blurred the picture of the two 
rights. Whereas the harmonisation through the CJEU jurisprudence has touched 
many aspects of copyright, the right of communication to the public has received 
a fair share of attention. The significance of the development can be seen not least 
in Norwegian copyright, where, after nearly three decades of harmonisation, a 
separate category of communication to the public within the broad right of 
making available has been introduced to ease compliance with the acquis. 
The analysis of the development of the rights under the acquis under chapters 
3 to 5 from the perspective of the distinction drawn at the outset of harmonisation 
revealed that the distinction has not been strictly followed in practice. CJEU 
jurisprudence demonstrates a much more nuanced picture of the extent of control 
accorded by the rights than the mere wording of the provisions would suggest. 
The tendency has been to consider a wider picture rather than to rely on the 
respective Article of the InfoSoc Directive. Whereas it has upset legal certainty 
as to the scope of obligations under the acquis, it has also endorsed a flexible 
approach to the appropriate scope of control pursuant to the circumstances of a 
work’s exploitation. 
Besides resorting to the notion of appropriate remuneration in the context of 
the right of communication to the public, the Court has further advanced the idea 
that the exercise of the right might come with consequences for the right holder. 
This idea has traditionally been confined to distributed tangible copies, where 
control over such copies is limited after their first authorised distribution. 
Although, as suggested by the InfoSoc Directive, any act of communication, 
whether primary or secondary, requires the authorisation of the right holder, 
certain acts might be exempted. This appears to depend essentially on the degree 
to which secondary acts potentially interfere with the work’s exploitation and on 
the necessity to acknowledge other involved interests, such as fundamental rights. 
Despite the developments under jurisprudence, seemingly advancing flexi-
bility, the distinction spelled out under the InfoSoc Directive has caused incon-
sistencies. The Court still must commence the assessment from the wording of 
the Directive, which has made Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive rather 
ambiguous. It is even more so considering that the Article is hardly ever men-
tioned in jurisprudence. Given the complications of relying on the distinction for 
the assessment of the appropriate scope of control discussed in this chapter, it has 
been concluded that it is important for legal certainty that the distinction is recon-
sidered and the material and immaterial dissemination rights are reconciled under 
the acquis. Acknowledging the fact that the approaches in fact already merge, it 
would be appropriate to review the choices made three decades ago. 
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As the second part of the chapter attempts to consolidate the findings on the 
development of the rights and outline a possible normative framework for evalu-
ating the justifiability of extending or limiting control over secondary commu-
nication, the present part has also summarised the developments indicating the 
convergence of the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination under 
the acquis. Four main observations have been emphasised. First is the increasing 
emphasis on the exercise of the exclusive right as the essential function of the 
right. The second observation is the indication that the function of the right can 
be fulfilled through authorising each act of initial (primary) dissemination. 
The third observation is the (in)explicit delineation between the primary and 
secondary acts of dissemination. Whereas the delineation is explicit under the 
right of distribution, given that its scope in most cases is confined to the first 
distribution of a copy, it is much less clear under the communication rights. The 
distinction is observed, first and foremost, through the differences in the reasoning 
of the Court in cases concerning secondary dissemination and cases of either 
primary or secondary unauthorised communication. The fourth and the final obser-
vation is the flexibility exercised by the CJEU despite the envisaged application 
of the exhaustion principle or the absence of limits on the control over com-
munication pursuant to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive.  
On the basis of the findings on the first research question and the observations 
on the converging approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights, 
the next part of this chapter proceeds with outlining a possible normative frame-
work for evaluating the justifiability of extending exclusive right holders’ control 
over secondary communication. As has been explored in Chapter 2, the analysis 
in this thesis relied on assumptions which also must be taken into account when 
outlining a framework. Whereas the economic underpinning of the exclusive 
rights and their boundaries is not the only aspect to consider in copyright law-
making, it is an appropriate point of departure if the objectives of protection are 
to acknowledge the wider public interest. 
 
 
6.2. Framework for reconciling the approaches 
to material and immaterial dissemination 
As has been elaborated in the first part of this chapter, the development of the 
rights of distribution and communication to the public points towards the conver-
gence of material and immaterial dissemination rights contrasted under secondary 
EU law at the outset of harmonisation. It has been concluded in answering the 
first overall research question that, in the light of the technology development 
and the increasing demand for legal certainty under the acquis, reconciling the 
approaches to material and immaterial dissemination would be a logical and 
necessary development. Consequently, the present part outlines a normative frame-
work as the means to that end. 
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Understandably, it would be too far-reaching to attempt to construct the 
appropriate scope of the exclusive economic rights on the sole basis of recon-
ciling these approaches. Nevertheless, integrating approaches can serve as a basis 
for assessing the necessity to extend or restrict the reach of the rights over each 
secondary dissemination (communication), in the light of the potential fulfilment 
of the economic function of the right through the authorisation of each initial act 
of communication. Accordingly, the normative framework outlined below builds 
on the analysis in the preceding chapters and the underlying premises of the 
distinction between material and immaterial dissemination rights.  
More precisely, the framework is meant for assessing secondary communi-
cation by third parties, i.e. acts which rely on the initially authorised communi-
cation. As elaborated in Chapter 2, the distinction which is reconciled here con-
cerns essentially the scope of the exclusive rights in relation to secondary dis-
semination. This is to say that it only comes into play when the right holder has 
exploited a work through authorising its dissemination in one way or another and 
where the question is to what extent they might control any secondary use of such 
dissemination. Whereas, pursuant to the distinction enshrined under secondary 
EU law, further control is either permitted or denied, reconciling the approaches 
shall offer a considerably more nuanced approach. 
The framework outlined below is only designed to examine the acts of 
secondary dissemination relying on the initially authorised communication. This 
is its most important limitation because the framework is not intended to offer 
all-encompassing guidance on what the appropriate scope of copyright protection 
as a whole ought to be and what acts of a work’s dissemination shall be reserved 
for the right holder. The tendency has been to reserve for the right holder any 
making of a work available which entails some degree of control over the cir-
cumstances of dissemination. Whereas the studies have been conducted on the 
appropriate scope of the economic rights as a whole, the focus of the present 
enquiry is narrower.1250 
Focusing on control over secondary communication relying on the initially 
authorised communication, the framework proceeds from the assumption that the 
right holder has authorised the initial act of communication of a work. Further-
more, it must be assumed that this initial dissemination falls under exclusive 
rights, which would mean that the right holder has exercised their right. The 
framework then aims to assess the justifiability of submitting an act of secondary 
dissemination by a third party to the right holder’s exclusive control, with a view 
of the circumstances of the act and its possible interference with a work’s 
exploitation. 
The convergence of the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination 
under the acquis has amplified the importance of distinguishing between primary 
and secondary acts of dissemination. This is so because the relevant considera-
tions are not identical. An upload of a work and making it accessible on the 
Internet is clearly an independent act of communication, entailing control over 
                                                                                             
1250 For instance, the suggestions in Hugenholtz et. al. (2018). 
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the availability and access to a work, and, generally, ought to be reserved for the 
right holder’s authorisation, unless there is strong public interest in the opposite. 
A mere link to an already legally available work leads to less straightforward 
conclusions. Assessing both cases using the same standards leads to inconsistent 
conclusions and upsets legal certainty.1251 
Distinguishing between the primary and secondary acts of dissemination may 
not be easy at all times. Furthermore, whereas in the past secondary dissemination 
would be confined to redistribution of tangible copies or retransmission of a 
broadcast, technological development has enabled secondary communication 
capable of altering the envisioned circumstances of primary communication to a 
far greater extent. Indeed, in certain cases, secondary dissemination is of such a 
distinct and interfering nature that it ought to be considered as a primary exploi-
tation. The outlined framework ought to enable capturing these aspects, as the 
developed criteria allow appreciating the broader circumstances of a work’s 
exploitation.  
For the purpose of the framework, secondary dissemination shall mean any 
act which relies or is dependent on the initial dissemination authorised by the 
right holder. Whereas every initial act presupposes exercise of control over par-
ticular circumstances of dissemination such as place, duration, availability, acts 
of secondary dissemination generally do not entail the same degree of control. A 
few examples of secondary acts which rely on initially authorised dissemination 
are: 
• linking to a work that has been uploaded on the Internet with the authorisation 
of the right holder; 
• retransmission of (a performance of) a work; 
• passing on a (digital) copy of a work, where the copy was obtained on an 
individual basis against the payment of a one-time fee; 
• transfer of access to a copy of a work associated with one user account to a 
different user account. 
 
These examples are rather broad; they are broad on purpose. Linking to a work 
that has been made freely available on the Internet is different from linking that 
circumvents protection measures confining the initial availability of a work to a 
particular circle of recipients. Furthermore, it could make a difference whether 
linking is taking place through a simple hyperlink pointing to another webpage 
or, for instance, through framing the content from a different webpage. The 
criteria under the outlined framework are designed to capture the circumstances 
of such secondary communication rather than to decide on the admissibility of 
the acts on the all-or-nothing basis suggested under the current secondary EU law 
in the field of copyright.  
Drawing normative conclusions on the permissibility of such acts in the 
absence of the right holder’s authorisation shall not be a matter of qualifying an 
act under one of the rights and the type of dissemination it ought to represent 
                                                                                             
1251  As, for instance, in the Recnkhoff case. See section 5.2.3.1.2. 
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(either material or immaterial). Rather, it shall be a matter of assessing the broader 
context of such acts and their impact on a work’s exploitation. Any insignificant 
use of a work which does not unduly prejudice the interests of right holders shall 
not be made subject to the right holder’s exclusive control at the cost of 
competing objectives, such as public access to a work or competition. 
Copyright does not operate in a vacuum but in the context of complex legal 
relationships. Not least, in the digital environment the access to a work is usually 
accompanied by lengthy terms of use. Even though the framework below might 
point towards admissibility of a certain secondary act, it may run contrary to the 
contractual obligations under such terms. Likewise, even if such secondary acts 
were to breach the contractual obligations, the consumer protection law may step 
in and preclude enforcement of particular terms. Accordingly, it is by no means 
the objective of the framework to provide a definite answer to the admissibility 
of each act in every specific case. Rather, the objective is to outline the criteria 
indicating that the function of the exclusive right in relation to specific act of 
dissemination might be considered fulfilled, opening the floor for taking other 
involved interests into consideration. 
The framework outlined in this part is based on the analysis conducted in 
chapters 2 to 5 and, essentially, the economic approach to the exclusive rights. 
Given that the criteria have been derived by analysing the justifications for 
extending or limiting control over secondary communication against the back-
ground of the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination, they 
build largely on the economic considerations. Although they might not neces-
sarily be the decisive ones in the light of the diverse rationales of copyright, they 
play the key role in the harmonisation under the acquis and in the CJEU’s inter-
pretation of it. 
Whereas the purpose of the framework is to primarily reconcile the approaches 
to examining two main dissemination-related rights (distribution and commu-
nication to the public), the considerations outlined below are equally useful for 
other economic rights related to a work’s dissemination, such as, for example, 
rental. Nonetheless, further discussion on the other rights would require a through-
out assessment of their development and is outside the scope of this thesis. Here, 
the suggestion is made only insofar it concerns rebutting the presumption 
enshrined under the InfoSoc Directive and reconciling the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination using the example of the two rights. 
The framework is by no means limited to the premises of present technological 
development and currently known (primary or secondary) ways of exploiting a 
work. Circumstances of a work’s exploitation constantly change. What is static 
is the need to define and constantly adapt the scope of control accorded by 
copyright considering different (and changing) rationales for protection and the 
competing interests involved. The objective of the thesis is not to balance these 
interests but to contribute with a framework offering guidance on when the 
function of the exclusive right might be considered fulfilled. 
Some matters identified under the analysis of the development of the rights 
are not directly envisaged by the economic underpinning of the rights or by the 
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rationales of the acquis. Hence, the criteria under the normative framework have 
been divided into two groups on the basis of the primary assumption made for 
the purpose of the analysis in this thesis, that control over every primary act of 
dissemination potentially offers sufficient incentives to create and exploit a 
work.1252 Therefore, the primary elements of the framework examine the exercise 
of the exclusive right by the right holder and the potential interference of 
secondary dissemination with a work’s exploitation. Primary elements are com-
plemented by ancillary ones. The ancillary elements could potentially influence 
the assessment, but considering them requires a clarification of the underlying 
rationales to avoid unjustifiably prioritising the interests of the right holders. 
Part 6.2.1. of this chapter outlines the primary elements for evaluating the jus-
tifiability of subjecting acts of secondary dissemination to the exclusive control 
of the right holder. These criteria are of primary importance for securing the right 
holder’s control over every act of communication. Therefore, where the right 
holder exercises their right in the circumstances where such control has been war-
ranted, it would point towards the conclusion that the function of the right has 
been fulfilled and further control over this specific instance of dissemination 
could be limited, unless circumstances call for additional assessment. The 
primary elements of the framework are exercise of the right through authorising 
initial communication of a work, relevance of obtained remuneration, and inter-
ference with a work’s exploitation. 
The second group of criteria, elaborated in part 6.2.2., consists of ancillary 
considerations that potentially form a basis for such additional assessment. In the 
light of the assumption that the function of the right might be fulfilled through 
authorising initial communication, the criteria embody considerations extending 
beyond providing control over initial communication and must be examined care-
fully. These considerations might unduly prioritise the interests of the right 
holders where there are indications that the function of the right has been fulfilled. 
As the rationales for introducing these ancillary elements into the assessment are 
not explicitly articulated under the EU acquis, it is equally desirable that the 
objectives are elaborated by the legislator. The ancillary considerations are reach-
ing a potentially new public within the originally authorised area, competition, in 
particular on the primary market, and revenue generated by a third party. 
 
 
6.2.1. Primary and ancillary elements of the framework 
As elaborated above, the following sections will outline the primary and ancillary 
elements of the normative framework for reconciling the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination rights under the acquis on the basis of the analysis 
undertaken in chapters 2 to 5 of the thesis and the conclusions on the first overall 
research question. Whereas, in reality, the identified criteria are intricately linked 
to each other, this part will attempt to address each one in isolation, demonstrating 
                                                                                             
1252  For more background, see section 2.4. 
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how they are, to a different extent, influenced by the various objectives of the 
EU acquis. 
 
 
6.2.1.1. Primary elements for assessing the justifiability of control 
beyond every initial authorisation 
This section outlines three primary elements for evaluating the justifiability of 
subjecting acts of secondary dissemination to the exclusive control of the right 
holder. The criteria build upon the research on the development of the exclusive 
rights in chapters 2 to 5 and the indications of the convergence of the approaches 
to material and immaterial dissemination, summarised in part 6.1. of this chapter. 
The primary criteria consist of three elements. The first criterion is the exercise 
of the right through authorising the circumstances of primary communication as 
a basis for any limit to exclusive control over secondary communication. The 
second consideration is the relevance of remuneration obtained through author-
ising the primary act of dissemination. The third element is the substantial inter-
ference of a secondary act of communication with exploitation of a work. Whereas 
the normative framework as a whole aims to reconcile the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination, at first sight the primary elements mirror several 
aspects of the material dissemination approach. However, as shall be explained, 
the criteria shall not be examined in a yes-or-no fashion but rather entail a broader 
assessment.  
The first two criteria examine whether the exercise of the right through the 
first communication of a work points towards the conclusion that the function of 
the right has been fulfilled, focusing on the circumstances of the initial commu-
nication. However, these criteria do not take into account the circumstances of 
the particular situation and ought to be complemented by a third criterion. The 
latter brings flexibility into the assessment by considering the role of the secondary 
act relying on the initially authorised communication. In particular, it must be 
assessed to what degree such secondary act interferes with a work’s exploitation. 
The latter inevitably depends also on the characteristics of communication 
envisioned by the initial authorisation. Hence, it is not only the fact of author-
isation that shall be established under the first two criteria but also the envisaged 
audience, means, duration, which are relevant for examining the third criterion. 
 
 
6.2.1.1.1. Exercise of the right through authorising  
primary communication 
The rights granted under copyright are essentially preventive in nature; warranting 
authorisation of the right holder is their primary function.1253 Safeguarding the 
                                                                                             
1253  See on the preventive nature of the economic rights under the EU acquis, Rosati (2019), 
pp. 60–61. 
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right holders’ authorisation of each exploitation of a work is the crucial objective 
of the exclusive rights. Through authorising every dissemination of a work to the 
public the right holder is given an opportunity to exploit a work commercially 
and to obtain remuneration. The distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination, which is at the centre of this thesis, has been drawn on the basis of 
the assumption that the right holder may obtain appropriate remuneration through 
the first authorisation of particular dissemination.1254 Hence, the fact of the right 
holder’s authorisation plays a role in determining the scope of exclusive control 
over secondary dissemination.  
Explicit exemption of secondary acts of communication from the right holder’s 
exclusive control has traditionally been associated with the rights of material dis-
semination, such as the right of distribution. For instance, the exhaustion principle 
as a boundary of the right of distribution exempts further resale of distributed 
copies from authorisation. The exhaustion principle in its narrow sense is a rather 
one-sided solution to the need to limit the extent of control over secondary 
market. Whereas such a clear-cut rule has been accepted at the time of the intense 
international and the EU harmonisation, the development of technology chal-
lenges the established solution.1255 
It must be kept in mind that authorising distribution has no bearing on the right 
holder’s prerogative to exercise the right again through authorising distribution 
of additional copies. Hence, authorisation of initial distribution might only 
influence the ability to further control already distributed copies, but in no way 
influences the right holder’ entitlement to exclusive control over any new ones. 
Accordingly, exercise of the right as a primary element of the outlined normative 
framework shall be assessed insofar it relates to an act of secondary commu-
nication relying on such initial authorised act. Authorisation of a particular dis-
semination act shall be of no relevance to the right holder’s control over each and 
every separate communication, as emphasised in the section above. 
As has been illustrated in the background to the harmonisation of the right of 
distribution, the authorisation of the right holder has not always been a precon-
dition to limiting control over subsequent distribution.1256 However, it has gained 
importance under the EU acquis, both under secondary EU law and under CJEU 
jurisprudence. For instance, authorisation has been used for establishing the 
Community exhaustion principle, where the intervention with the exercise of 
exclusive rights under national copyright laws was justified on the basis of the 
Treaties once the right holder has authorised distribution of copies in question.1257 
The analysis of CJEU jurisprudence suggests that very little if anything could 
be inferred from the fact of authorisation. At the very least, authorisation indi-
cates that the right holder agreed to communicating a work to the public and such 
                                                                                             
1254  Section 2.4. 
1255  Section 4.3.3. 
1256  For instance, limiting further control could be triggered by other circumstances such as 
publication of a work, see section 4.1.3. 
1257  See section 3.2.1. 
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communication is normally confined to a specific area. It is, hence, irrelevant 
whether such authorised communication takes a form of distributing physical 
copies within a particular MS, broadcasting a work within the particular geo-
graphical area, or uploading a work on a publicly accessible webpage. Any of 
those acts essentially intend to make a work available to the public, whether or 
not the public takes a chance. 
Whereas the EU acquis and the jurisprudence of the CJEU deal with the 
authorisation predominantly through the economic prism of exploiting a work, 
there is also an inherent moral element to it. By exercising the rights through 
authorising dissemination, the authors not only exploit a work economically but 
also exercise their moral right to determine the circumstances of presentation of 
a work.1258 Interference with the circumstances of the authorised communication 
and, essentially, presentation of a work, can, in turn, also impede exploitation in 
the economic sense.1259 
It is precisely the economic aspect of authorisation which is important to the 
outlook presented in this chapter. Authorisation of any dissemination effectively 
safeguards the right holder’s opportunity to exploit a work by prohibiting others 
from doing so. Hence, in the absence of authorisation, any act of dissemination 
will be infringing, essentially interfering with exploitation opportunities. The 
economic aspect of authorisation has been stressed by the CJEU holding that 
through exercising the right to authorise primary distribution the right holder can 
freely choose where and how to exploit a work on a market.1260 In different terms, 
the Court has also held that the right of exploitation would be worthless if it was 
not possible to authorise or prohibit the acts falling under it, or if the right holder 
could not put an end to unauthorised communication of a work.1261 
Hence, the exercise of the right through authorisation of dissemination is an 
important indication of the right holder's intent to make a work public and to 
exploit it commercially. If a third party could communicate a work without 
obtaining authorisation, it would interfere with the right holder’s opportunities to 
exploit a work. Therefore, if the objective of the exploitation right is to secure the 
non-interference of third parties with the market for a work, any limitation to the 
right holder’s control over subsequent dissemination ought to be based on the fact 
that the right holder has entered the market. 
                                                                                             
1258  On the observation that the CJEU’s assessment of the communication to the public right 
overlaps with the right of divulgation as a moral right, see Marušić (2019). 
1259  See section 6.2.1.1.3. 
1260  CJEU, Musik-Vertrieb membran GmbH and K-tel International v GEMA. (1981) Joined 
cases 55/80 and 57/80, Judgment of 20 January 1981, para. 25. 
1261  In the context of the right of rental, see CJEU, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome 
Video ApS v Erik Viuff Christiansen. (1988) Case C-158/86, Judgment of 17 May 1988, para. 
18. Also, in the context of the right of communication to the public, see CJEU, Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 7 August 2018, 
paras 29–31. 
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As is evident from the analysis of the rights, accepting the limits on further 
control arising from the mere fact that a work was lawfully communicated would 
undermine the objective of securing the primary market of a work. This would be 
the case, for instance, if the primary communication took place pursuant to a 
compulsory license or a remuneration right. It cannot be ruled out at the outset 
that such lawful dissemination of a work could trigger comparable consequences 
for the extent of further control. However, under the EU acquis, the conditions 
for limiting further control have been narrowed down to the initial acts authorised 
by the right holder. 
On the other hand, subjecting every act of primary dissemination to the right 
holder’s control could serve the economic rationale of copyright, for instance, by 
resolving market failure. If the right holder is able to obtain appropriate 
remuneration through the authorisation of each dissemination, the question that 
arises is to which extent shall secondary dissemination not constituting a separate 
exploitation be subject to exclusive control. With the welfare economics perspec-
tive and market failure in mind, the question is how justifiable it is to confer 
exclusive control once the underlying market failure has been mitigated. It is 
obvious that no universal answer can be provided as considerations will depend 
on the type of a work and the circumstances of the case. 
Therefore, rather than taking the form of a mere yes-or-no fact (as with the 
exhaustion principle in its narrow sense), the criterion of exercise of the right 
through authorisation shall necessarily be a broader one, accommodating the 
assessment of the envisioned circumstances of communication. Here, a parallel 
could be drawn with the idea of implied consent, holding that the right holder’s 
consent to certain secondary use of a work can be implied from authorising the 
original communication.1262 Whereas the implied consent theory could be of help 
in the context of the assessment, the purpose of the authorisation criterion is 
clearly broader. 
Rather than establishing what could be implied from initial authorisation, the 
assessment of this element is indispensably linked with examining the other two 
primary elements. The purpose is to look at a broader picture of whether and how 
secondary communication potentially interferes with primary dissemination. This 
would move the assessment closer to the one CJEU performed in the Coditel I 
case, where the peculiarities of a particular exploitation model were taken into 
account.1263 However, such assessment cannot and should not be generalised, as 
it is to be performed on a case-by-case basis. 
Inevitably, the significance of authorisation of primary communication for the 
outcome of the assessment would differ, depending on the nature of the secondary 
act. For instance, when technological development enables a new distinctive use 
of already authorised communication, amounting to new exploitation, the rele-
vance of authorisation decreases. The very purpose of requiring consent for a 
                                                                                             
1262  See the analysis of the exhaustion principle in the context of implied consent theory, 
Mysoor (2018). On a new public as an implied license, see Rosati (2019), p. 101. 
1263  See section 5.2.1.1. 
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particular act is to inform the right holder about the future exploitation of a work 
and the means of prohibiting it. Hence, without contemplating a possible distinct 
use, the right holder cannot adopt a position in advance.1264 Conversely, where 
secondary dissemination closely resembles the primary dissemination, the 
criterion shall carry more weight. 
Certain concepts developed under the CJEU jurisprudence relate, in essence, 
to the consequences of authorisation. The new public criterion, for instance, 
assesses permissibility of further control over communication on the basis of the 
right holder’s intent and the legitimate expectations.1265 The criterion is closely 
connected to authorisation as a primary element of assessing the justifiability of 
the exclusive control reaching beyond each initial communication. However, it 
bears the danger of being too blunt if examined in isolation and not confined to 
the assessment of secondary communication. Whereas it is by all means impor-
tant to acknowledge the intended audience and any new audience reached by 
secondary communication, it must be done in the overall context of the exercise 
of the right and the work’s exploitation. 
Accordingly, the exercise of the right through authorising the underlying pri-
mary dissemination shall form a key element of the assessment of justifiability of 
subjecting secondary communication to exclusive control of the right holder. 
Whereas there might be public policy arguments for exempting certain secondary 
uses even in the absence of authorisation of primary communication,1266 the 
framework proceeds with outlining other criteria on the assumption that the 
underlying initial dissemination has been authorised. Furthermore, the circum-
stances of initial communication and the scope of authorisation shall be assessed 
in conjunction with the other developed criteria, taking into account the charac-
teristics of the secondary act. 
 
 
6.2.1.1.2. Relevance of obtained remuneration 
The criterion outlined in this section is closely related to the exercise of the right 
to exploit a work through authorisation of dissemination. Obviously, not every 
exploitation of a work entails obtaining direct remuneration. However, obtained 
remuneration proved to be a compelling argument in the context of limiting the 
reach of both material and immaterial dissemination rights. The very fact that 
through first authorisation the right holder has obtained or has had a chance to 
                                                                                             
1264  CJEU, Marc Soulier and Sara Doke v Premier ministre and Ministre de la Culture et de 
la Communication (2016) Case C-301/15, Judgment of 16 November 2016, paras 37–40. Also 
see Rosati (2019), p. 77. 
1265  Westkamp (2017), p. 34. Also, section 5.3.2.1. 
1266  See, for instance, the opinion of the ECS in the Renckhoff case. In particular, the proposal 
of introducing a de minimis rule to deal with uses that have minimal impact on the interests of 
right holders. See Opinion of the European Copyright Society concerning the scope of the 
economic rights in light of case C-161/17, Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Dirk Renckhoff 
(‘Córdoba case’), p. 4. 
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obtain remuneration can point towards a possibility to restrict exclusive control 
beyond primary dissemination. 
According to the CJEU, the specific subject matter of copyright is to ensure 
“protection of the right to exploit commercially the marketing or the making 
available of the protected subject-matter, by the grant of licences in return for 
payment of remuneration”.1267 Hence, warranting an opportunity to obtain remu-
neration is an important objective of the EU copyright framework.1268 However, 
the highest possible remuneration is not guaranteed. Recital 10 of the InfoSoc 
Directive provides that the protection seeks to guarantee an opportunity to obtain 
an appropriate reward, which is reasonable in relation to economic value and also 
takes into account the actual or potential number of persons who enjoy or wish 
to enjoy the service.1269 
The fact that protection does not aim to guarantee appropriate remuneration 
but only to provide an opportunity to obtain it through exploitation of a work 
shall be emphasised. For instance, the CJEU has stressed that there is nothing that 
prevents the right holder from claiming a reasonable amount for the initial 
authorisation in relation to the potential audience of the communication in ques-
tion.1270 Asking for a fee which is intended to obtain remuneration corresponding 
to the economic value of a copy points towards the conclusion that the function 
of the right has been fulfilled.1271 The very pragmatic approach of the CJEU is 
further supported by Court’s reasoning outside the realm of secondary dissemi-
nation, where the CJEU has held that the royalties paid by CMO must be analysed 
“with respect to the value of that use in trade”.1272 
The relevance of remuneration and what could be considered appropriate 
remuneration, naturally, differ. Even though the criterion is relevant for the 
assessment, it ought not be decisive for the outcome. Even if appropriate remu-
neration is obtained, further dissemination could be legitimately opposed, for 
instance, as would be the case where secondary communication is likely to create 
a new distinct market for already authorised dissemination and interfere with 
primary or subsequent markets of a work. For example, it has been held that resale 
                                                                                             
1267  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, para. 107. 
1268  See also section 2.1.2. 
1269  CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others 
(C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment 
of 4 October 2011, paras 108–109. 
1270  Ibid., para. 112. 
1271  CJEU, UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. (2012) Case C-128/11, Judgment 
of 3 July 2012, para. 45. 
1272  CJEU, Kanal 5 Ltd and TV 4 AB v Föreningen Svenska Tonsättares Internationella 
Musikbyrå (STIM) upa (2008) C-52/07, Judgment of 11 December 2008. para. 36  
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of substantially altered lawfully distributed tangible copies shall not escape the 
right holder’s authorisation if such copies form a distinct market.1273 
Remuneration as an argument is most prominent in the cases where the right 
holder has authorised communication to a specific public by offering access to a 
work against the payment of an individual fee. A subsequent act of dissemination, 
relying on such initial act, if operating within the boundaries of the same targeted 
public and the same way of the work's exploitation, could be exempted from the 
right holder’ authorisation. Resale of copies distributed with the right holder's 
authorisation or simultaneous retransmission of a broadcasting signal would be 
core examples.1274 
Generally, a claim for additional remuneration beyond that which is due for 
initial dissemination would be denied if no interfering circumstances are present. 
Consider, for instance, the CJEU rejecting the claim for payment of additional 
remuneration upon the importation of copies lawfully distributed in a different 
MS.1275 Similarly, consider the CJEU invalidating the national law which pro-
hibits the import of decoding devices providing access to a broadcast solely on 
the basis of territoriality.1276 Additional payment based on the territorial exclu-
sivity was considered to go beyond what is necessary to safeguard the specific 
subject matter of protection.1277 
However, remuneration obtained through the primary act of dissemination is 
not automatically appropriate. In theory, the right holder can always ask for an 
appropriate amount of remuneration in the absence of competition from third par-
ties. Hence, the right holder could be assumed to have acted in their best interest 
when authorising initial dissemination. Nevertheless, certain circumstances 
might interfere with such a conclusion. For instance, the relevance of obtained 
remuneration diminishes if the particular secondary use could not have been 
anticipated at the time of authorising primary communication, such as commu-
nication resulting in a new good or service. 
On the other hand, the absence of remuneration which is explicitly due for 
primary communication cannot alone indicate that no limits on further control 
over communication would be justified. It would, for instance, be the case of 
hyperlinking to the content freely available on the Internet. In the absence of 
additional circumstances, prohibiting hyperlinking by virtue of the exclusive 
                                                                                             
1273  CJEU, Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright. (2015) Case C-419/13, 
Judgment of 22 January 2015, also, section 3.3.2.2. 
1274  See sections 3.3.1.2. and 5.2.3.2.1.2.2. 
1275  In line with the Musik-Vertrieb case, CJEU, Musik-Vertrieb membran GmbH and K-tel 
International v GEMA. (1981) Joined cases 55/80 and 57/80, Judgment of 20 January 1981. 
1276  In line with the FAPL case, CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others 
v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd  
(C-429/08) (2011), Judgment of 4 October 2011. 
1277  Ibid., para. 116. Also, Opinion of Advocate General in Football Association Premier 
League Ltd and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media 
Protection Services Ltd (C-429/08). 3 February 2011, para. 192. 
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right has been denied, even though the right holder might not have received any 
specific remuneration through authorising the initial upload. By making a work 
freely available online, the right holder has exercised the right in their best interest 
and would have to accept certain consequences of their action.1278 
In this respect, the notion of a “payment corresponding to an economic value 
of a copy” used by the CJEU in the UsedSoft case is noteworthy. It seems to 
support the idea that remuneration asked for the initial act of dissemination would 
often amount to appropriate reward. It could perhaps even be assumed, given the 
present technological circumstances and control over access to a work, that the 
price set by the right holder corresponds to the actual value of the access to com-
munication. Unless, of course, the subsequent use changes the envisaged para-
meters of such communication.1279 
This argument is particularly appealing in the context of online dissemination. 
Digital technologies have made access to a work much more excludable.1280 
DRM protection, supported by secondary EU law, inevitably subjects any copy 
to the right holder’s extensive exclusive control.1281 Furthermore, where a work 
is offered on the basis of conditional access or can only be downloaded from the 
Internet, it is much easier for the right holder to achieve market delimitation.1282 
In combination, these circumstances enable perfect price discrimination through 
access control, hence making a market failure, which is supposed to be mitigated 
by the grant of the exclusive rights, less of a concern.1283 The circumstances 
empower the right holders to ask for a price they deem appropriate. 
Coming back to the incentive rationale of copyright protection and the eco-
nomic underpinning of the rights, obtaining appropriate remuneration could be 
an indication that the objective of providing incentives has been achieved. 
Clearly, defining appropriate remuneration is not a straightforward task. Never-
theless, it could be argued that, in a situation where the right holder is granted an 
exclusive right to enter the market and is familiar with the boundaries of the 
granted protection, the remuneration they ask for the initial act should be con-
sidered appropriate, as they have been given an opportunity to act accordingly.  
On the other hand, this conclusion would be undermined by the absence of 
legal certainty on the scope of exclusive control or interference of secondary 
                                                                                             
1278  CJEU, Nils Svensson and Others v Retriever Sverige AB. (2014) Case C-466/12, 
Judgment of 13 February 2014, paras 27–28. 
1279  Consider alteration of a medium in the Art & Allposters case. CJEU, Art & Allposters 
International BV v Stichting Pictoright. (2015) Case C-419/13, Judgment of 22 January 2015. 
Or subsequent communication using different technological means, CJEU, ITV Broadcasting 
Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, Judgment of 7 March 2013. 
1280  Kreiken and Koepsell (2013), p. 8. 
1281  Elkin-Koren and Salzberger (2012), p. 79. 
1282  Opinion of Advocate General in Football Association Premier League Ltd and Others v 
QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd  
(C-429/08). 3 February 2011, para. 187. 
1283  Ginsburg (2002), p. 125. Also, Poort (2018), pp. 290–292.  
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dissemination which could not have been contemplated. Hence, sorting out the 
scope of the exclusive rights in relation to secondary dissemination, as suggested 
here, would advance the argument that the function of the right can be fulfilled 
through its exercise in relation to each separate act of dissemination. Never-
theless, the results of the assessment of this criterion shall be complemented also 
by the ancillary elements of the framework upon clarifying the objectives of the 
exclusive rights. 
 
 
6.2.1.1.3. Interference with exploitation of a work 
Whereas the first two primary criteria of the framework focus on the right 
holder’s prerogative in exploiting a work and the significance of authorisation for 
determining the extent of control over any potential secondary communication, 
the last primary criterion shifts the focus to the act of secondary dissemination in 
question. Whilst authorisation and remuneration are often discussed by the CJEU 
in cases on the scope of exclusive rights, interference with a work’s exploitation 
has not explicitly been a part of the assessment.  
Nevertheless, the analysis of the development of the rights under the acquis 
illustrates that many considerations taken into account by the Court essentially 
boil down to the presence of substantial interference. Assessing the act of 
secondary dissemination in question ought to complement the more formal 
criteria of prior authorisation and obtained remuneration and serve to avoid pre-
determined results, such as on the basis of the exhaustion principle. If a secondary 
act relying on initially authorised dissemination does not clearly interfere with a 
work’s exploitation, the chances are that such act could be exempted from 
authorisation. Conversely, if an act would substantially interfere with a work’s 
exploitation, such activity would most probably be subjected to further control. 
Interference with a work’s exploitation can be divided into three main cate-
gories. The first is the interference of secondary communication with a work’s 
exploitation through altering the circumstances of initial communication (presen-
tation) of a work. The second category is the interference of the secondary act 
with the different market for a work, e.g. when the subsequent dissemination 
constitutes a distinct form of exploitation. The third category is when the subse-
quent act directly interferes with the primary market for a work. 
For the purpose of the assessment of this criterion, the market is considered in 
a broad sense as an opportunity to obtain compensation in exchange for providing 
access to a work. A distinct market for a work can be facilitated by the change in 
technology communicating the content of a work, change in the intended 
audience of dissemination or change in territorial coverage. The distinction 
between the primary market and a different market is drawn for illustrative pur-
pose only to signify the various (in)direct forms in which an act can potentially 
interfere with a work’s exploitation. Obviously, the types of interference in no 
way exclude each other. On the contrary, they often arise simultaneously. For 
instance, the interference with the primary market for a work would typically not 
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take place unless the subsequent act in some way alters the circumstances of 
initial communication. Further, in such a case, the secondary act might trigger 
not only interference with communication in general but also an interference with 
a different market for a work. 
Not every insignificant interference with a work’s communication should 
trigger the application of the exclusive right and subject secondary commu-
nication to authorisation.1284 However, a change of the circumstances, even in no 
way altering the presentation of a work, might, in particular cases, be considered 
as interfering with a work’s exploitation. Linking to content which is already 
lawfully and freely available on the Internet in the form of framing could be one 
example.1285 Whereas, on the one hand, such linking would not interfere with the 
intended audience or in any way alter the original content, such secondary com-
munication could nevertheless interfere with the right holder’s intentions. Not-
withstanding the moral aspect of the presentation of a work, framing could 
obstruct obtaining remuneration in connection to consumption of a work on the 
webpage that was initially intended.1286 
Continuing with hyperlinking, placing a link to a work which through the 
primary authorised act has been made accessible only to certain target audience 
will constitute an interference if it were to reach the public which was not 
intended. Not only will such secondary act interfere with the intended circum-
stances of original communication, but it will also interfere with the (new) market 
formed by the recipients of the link not envisioned under the primary commu-
nication. The same holds true for any secondary act, which, by its virtue, offers 
access to a work to the audience, which was not contemplated by the first com-
munication.1287 
A prominent example of a case where secondary dissemination is likely to fall 
under the exclusive control of the right holder is where it directly exploits a new 
market. For instance, this would be the case of rental of the copies distributed 
with the authorisation of the right holder. Although the right holder has obtained 
remuneration through the first distribution of each copy, further rental of such 
copies would deprive them of remuneration that could have been extracted from 
each copy if it were rented instead of being offered for sale. Moreover, such 
                                                                                             
1284  See also Opinion of the European Copyright Society concerning the scope of the economic 
rights in light of case C-161/17, Land Nordrhein Westfalen v. Dirk Renckhoff (‘Córdoba case’), 
2018, suggesting a de minimis rule to deal with uses of a work that have minimal impact on 
the interests of right holders. 
1285  On the types of links, see Guibault and Quintais (2014), p. 15. Also, Poort (2018), pp. 
314–324. 
1286  For example, where the exploitation of a work is taking place through monetising on 
website’s visits or advertisements placed on a webpage. See also Rognstad and Poort (2018), 
pp. 142–144. On framing as being possibly captured under the unfair competition laws of 
some countries, see Guibault and Quintais (2014), p. 19. 
1287  On constructing the limits of the rights through the notion of consuming control as 
illustrated by the new public criterion, see Westkamp (2017), p. 46. 
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secondary dissemination could possibly also undermine demand for copies dis-
tributed by the right holder on the primary market.1288 
Another way a secondary act could interfere with the primary market is through 
substantial alteration of the initial communication.1289 A prominent example is 
the resale of significantly modified copies. First, such an act would affect the 
right holder’s intent to disseminate a work in a particular form. Second, it could 
interfere with a new market enabled by the alteration of copies. Likewise, such 
modified copies might as well decrease the demand for the original copies, 
resulting in an interference with the primary market. 
Sometimes the interference with the exploitation of a work also depends on 
the specific characteristics of the business model. For instance, one example is 
the situation at stake in the Coditel I case. Leaving aside the fact that the secondary 
act communicated a work to the public which was not intended by the initial 
authorisation, such secondary communication also interfered with the specific 
circumstances of a film’s exploitation through a windowing system.1290 The 
question of whether copyright should de facto protect business models in such 
cases is highly debatable. Nonetheless, taking into account the circumstances of 
a work’s exploitation might be necessary for striking an appropriate balance.  
Occasionally, a change of technology used for secondary communication can 
also constitute interference with the new market for a work. For instance, simul-
taneous retransmission of a broadcast of a work through a different channel such 
as the Internet might amount to an interference with a new market, even though 
the secondary act may not be reaching any new audience.1291 No definite conclu-
sion should be drawn in such case. Retransmission on the Internet may not pro-
vide an alternative access to broadcast but merely deliver an additional con-
venience for users paying the right holder to watch the broadcast. Hence, it may 
well be the case that the retransmission does not deprive the right holder of any 
paying customers. Furthermore, if the right holder does not provide any com-
parable service for accessing a broadcast online, the consequences of prohibiting 
such secondary act by virtue of exclusive rights appear even more disadvan-
tageous to the users. 
Hence, it is of utmost importance that the criterion of interference is not used 
in an absolute manner. Whereas, as outlined above, secondary dissemination 
often appears to interfere with one or another aspect of a work’s exploitation, it 
                                                                                             
1288  See the WarnerBrothers case, CJEU, Warner Brothers Inc. and Metronome Video ApS v 
Erik Viuff Christiansen. (1988) Case C-158/86, Judgment of 17 May 1988. Also, section 3.3.2. 
1289  As examined by the CJEU in the Art & Allposters case, see section 4.2.3.4. Also, see 
Lund in that it is only natural that you cannot sell further a copy that was changed or where 
the author’s name was removed. Lund (1954), p. 142. 
1290  The windowing system is used by the film industry to increase the revenue from a film’s 
exploitation through first making it public at cinemas and later through broadcasting.  
1291  Section 5.2.3.2.1.2.1. Also, see Westkamp holding that actively interfering with an act of 
communication employing different technology could further be seen to fulfil the new public 
criterion and constitute an entirely separate act of communication. Westkamp (2017), p. 34. 
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does not necessarily mean that any such interference justifies subjecting secondary 
dissemination to exclusive rights. Rather, including interference with a work’s 
exploitation into a normative framework ought to emphasise the need for flex-
ibility in assessing the justifiability of the right holder’s control over secondary 
dissemination. 
It would go beyond the objective of this thesis to define any threshold of 
interference which would point towards extending or restricting the reach of 
exclusive rights. What should be emphasised though is the fact that establishing 
any level of interference shall necessarily be accompanied by the clarification of 
rationales of the acquis and the ancillary elements of the framework, outlined in 
the part below. The significance of the interference might depend on the fact 
whether it occurs on a market where the right holder is not active or, on the 
contrary, whether it results in competition. Furthermore, it could also be influ-
enced by the fact whether the right holder is deprived of any potential income.  
Examining these circumstances, however, requires further guidance on the 
rationales of protection. Considering the possible interference of secondary dis-
semination clearly goes beyond a traditional distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination and the incentive rationale of copyright. Although 
interference with a work’s exploitation calls for clarifying the objectives of pro-
tection as do the ancillary elements outlined below, it shall nevertheless form a 
basis for the primary assessment. Examining the impact of the secondary dis-
semination in question shall be indispensable for the assessment of the justi-
fiability of subjecting it to exclusive control if a flexible yet predictable approach 
to the appropriate scope of the exclusive rights is to be taken. 
 
 
6.2.1.2. Ancillary considerations 
In the part above, the primary elements of the normative framework for recon-
ciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination have been out-
lined. These elements shall form a basis for an assessment of the justifiability of 
extending right holder’s exclusive control to an act of secondary dissemination. 
They relate directly to the assumption that appropriate remuneration can be 
received through authorising initial communication. The primary criteria focus 
on the exercise of control by the right holder and the potential interference of 
secondary dissemination with an ability to obtain appropriate remuneration 
through a work’ exploitation.  
Ancillary considerations outlined in the present part relate to the act of 
secondary dissemination itself and form a basis for additional assessment, pro-
vided that the rationales of the copyright acquis are clarified to avoid unjustified 
prioritisation of the right holder’s interests. In most cases, these aspects are 
closely connected with the assessment of the primary elements. Nonetheless, 
separating these elements into a different group ought to highlight the arguable 
premises for introducing these aspects into the assessment. It is argued that the 
criteria outlined below go beyond merely safeguarding the right holder’s first-
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mover advantage on a market and point into the direction of eliminating any 
competition with the right holder. 
Similar to the interference with a work’s exploitation as the primary criterion, 
these criteria have not been explicitly employed by the CJEU in the cases con-
cerning secondary dissemination. However, the analysis of the development of 
the rights has shown that they might better explain subjecting certain acts to 
exclusive control than the Court’s mechanical approach to what constitutes an act 
of communication. Three such ancillary elements have been identified. The first 
element is the assessment of whether a secondary act reaches a potentially new 
public within the audience originally envisioned by the right holder. The second 
consideration is whether the secondary act of communication leads to compe-
tition with the right holder. The third element is the relevance of revenue poten-
tially generated by the third party through secondary communication. In combi-
nation, these conditions might point towards extending the right holder’s control 
to the specific act of secondary communication. 
 
 
6.2.1.2.1. Reaching a potentially new public within 
the originally authorised area 
The analysis of the development of the EU copyright acquis points towards an 
important observation. Secondary acts, which essentially targeted the same 
intended public, have been subjected to the exclusive right and, hence, required 
the right holder’s authorisation or compensation. The new public criterion justi-
fying submitting secondary communication to the exclusive control was typically 
used in cases where dissemination was directed at a distinct geographical area or 
where the dissemination itself constituted a distinct form of exploitation. How-
ever, the CJEU has also submitted situations where neither condition was met to 
the exclusive right and, hence, for a claim for additional compensation. 
The most prominent example is the public receipt of a broadcast at a commer-
cial establishment such as a hotel. Notwithstanding the question of whether such 
public receipt constitutes an act of secondary communication, the Court has 
repeatedly held that such actions required authorisation under the exclusive right 
of communication to the public.1292 For instance, in Rafael Hoteles the Court 
reasoned on the basis of the new public criterion, holding that a new public was 
reached as there was a communication by an organisation other than the right 
holder.1293 Intervention of the hotel provided access to works to customers which 
would not otherwise access the works even though they were physically within 
the intended coverage area of a broadcast.1294 
                                                                                             
1292  The Court has nicely summarised the issue at stake under one of the headings of the FAPL 
judgment as “B – Rules relating to the use of the broadcasts once they are received”. 
1293  CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA. 
(2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, para. 40. 
1294  Ibid., para. 42. 
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The CJEU appears to narrow down the notion of the intended audience beyond 
the one within the catchment area of a broadcast and confine it to the circle of 
recipients of a broadcast in possession of a license. A hotel making a broadcast 
accessible to the customers within the catchment area was considered to interfere 
with the initial broadcast through communicating it to the new public potentially 
not captured by a TV license. Whether such a narrow understanding of the 
intended audience and such a broad understanding of the new public could be 
endorsed in the cases beyond the public receipt of a broadcast is highly disput-
able. 
In this respect, the Court’s reasoning in the Renckhoff case is worrying as the 
CJEU relied on the same notion of the new public in the context of a work freely 
available on the Internet with the authorisation of the right holder. The Court 
reasoned that the public taken into account by the right holder comprised solely 
the users of a particular website and not users of the other websites or even all 
the Internet users.1295 Whereas this would be a reasonable argument were access 
to the original webpage in any way protected, the statement is odd when a freely 
publicly accessible webpage is in question.  
As was explored, any separate act of making a work available entailing full 
control over dissemination (such as upload of a work) would generally fall under 
the exclusive right without the need to examine the public that has been reached. 
Whereas exceptions may exempt such secondary use from obtaining authori-
sation, the exhaustion principle as a limit to control over subsequent dissemi-
nation would in no way influence the findings. The fact that the Court did not 
stress in Renckhoff that the issue concerned a new upload and, thus, a separate 
exploitation, is problematic.1296 It would be rather unfortunate and highly mis-
leading to draw a conclusion that the authorised posting of a work on a freely 
accessible webpage implies solely consent to communicate a work to the visitors 
of that specific webpage. Following such reasoning, any linking could be held as 
an act of communication and require authorisation. 
Consider, for instance, the cases where the initial making a work available is 
not authorised by the right holder. A secondary act such as hyperlinking to un-
authorised content might well target the same public as the original unauthorised 
communication.1297 However, the primary act and any secondary act would 
inevitably be directed to the new public as this public was not contemplated by 
the right holder. Accordingly, what is essential is the authorisation of the right 
holder in respect of offering a work to a particular public. In the absence of 
                                                                                             
1295  CJEU, Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018) Case C-161/17, Judgment of 
7 August 2018, para. 35. 
1296  See also Ohly (2018b). 
1297  CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case  
C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, paras 42–43; CJEU, Stichting Brein v Jack 
Frederik Wullems. (2016) Case C-527/15, Judgment of 26 April 2017, paras 48–50; CJEU, 
Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All Internet BV. (2017) Case C-610/15, Judgment of 26 
April 2017, para. 45. 
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authorisation, any act, whether primary or secondary, is infringing as it is, in fact, 
directed to a new public.1298  
However, not every case of public receipt of a broadcast has been subjected 
to the exclusive right. For instance, in the DelCorso case, public receipt of a 
broadcast did not require a payment of a fee on the basis of a neighbouring right 
of communication to the public because the circle of persons having access to it 
was limited. Furthermore, the visitors were not particularly receptive to the 
broadcast at a dentist’s office.1299 Such a receipt at a commercial establishment 
also did not generate a value on its own, as will be examined in the following 
sections. 
The CJEU jurisprudence is rather inconsistent on submitting the public receipt 
of a broadcast to the exclusive right; the rationales of extending the exclusive 
control to such acts are blurry. There are grounds to confine the assessment of the 
potential new public within an originally authorised area to the cases of public 
receipt of a broadcast. What is also important to take into account in these cases 
is the intent and the outcome of claiming the acts to fall under the broad right of 
communication to the public, which is essentially obtaining additional compen-
sation. Whereas it might be argued that it is difficult to calculate the number of 
persons that would be willing to pay for a broadcast at the time of authorisation, 
it is highly disputable whether similar claims should be endorsed in the context 
of dissemination other than through a broadcast, and, especially, in the online 
setting.  
It could be equally argued that, just as it does not matter whether the public to 
which communication is directed has actually enjoyed a work, it also should not 
matter whether a part of this originally authorised public is reached by secondary 
communication provided that all the other parameters of communication remain 
the same. What is important is the exercise of the exclusive right by the right 
holder which enables them to exploit a work in their best interest. If seen from 
this perspective, it is highly disputable whether the right holder should be addi-
tionally compensated on the mere ground that the intended public is confined to 
a more specific group. 
Hence, it is argued that reaching a potentially new public within the initially 
intended area is an ancillary consideration which should be examined very care-
fully in each case. First, it can easily amount to a double payment to the right 
holder, where the consumers are passed on the cost of a separate license for public 
receipt of a signal. Second, if considered in the cases outside the realm of public 
receipt of a broadcast, the reasoning by analogy could lead to situations where 
any secondary act would require authorisation even though it cannot possibly 
deprive the right holder of any (potential) customers. The latter would, in turn, 
further advance a dominant position of the right holder. 
 
                                                                                             
1298  Also, Rosati (2019), pp. 102–103. 
1299  CJEU, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, 
Judgment of 15 March 2012, paras 96–98. 
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6.2.1.2.2. Competition, in particular on a primary market 
Whereas the CJEU denied the relevance of competition when examining secondary 
communication, it can be genuinely disputed whether that is actually the case. 
Different outcomes in rather similar cases could be explained in the light of 
competition, which is closely linked with the interference with a work’s exploit-
ation as a primary element of the framework. Nonetheless, competition has been 
placed under the heading of ancillary considerations because of two main reasons. 
First, copyright protection generally does not engage with regulating competition. 
Second, the aspect is not explicitly addressed under the CJEU jurisprudence and 
lacks a clear stand within the objectives of copyright acquis. 
For instance, in the case of retransmission of an analogue broadcast on the 
Internet, the Court held that whether a third party acts in competition with the 
right holder is not a relevant consideration.1300 Instead, the Court found there to 
be an act falling under the exclusive right of communication to the public relying 
on the argument that retransmission of a broadcast was carried out using new 
technical means. The latter is a somewhat inflexible indicator because there could 
be cases where the same technical means are used in a very innovative way.1301 
Essentially, the case could have been seen in the light of the interference with the 
communication or precisely in the context of competition with the right holder. 
If considered in conjunction with the outcome in the AKM case, where a 
retransmission through cable network installations was not considered to fall 
under the right of communication to the public, competition seems indeed a very 
relevant criterion. Whereas in the AKM case the third party did not interfere with 
the intended public and did not in any way alter the way of accessing a broadcast, 
the third party in the TVCatchup case arguably did, providing access to a broad-
cast via Internet. Nonetheless, the practical or economic significance of such 
alternative way of accessing a broadcast was still limited. Using TVCatchup ser-
vice still required a possession of a terrestrial license. Hence, in theory, the right 
holder was already remunerated for the access to a broadcast by the persons using 
the third-party service to access a broadcast.  
In these circumstances, it seems that the primary concern of the right holder 
in the TVCatchup case, who also happened to be the broadcaster, was the com-
petition from a third party. It is also suggested by one of the questions that the 
referring court was asking the CJEU, namely, whether it was of any importance 
to the assessment of the scope of the right whether or not a third party acted in 
competition.1302 In this case, the third party could probably not be considered in 
direct competition with the right holder, as the possession of an original broad-
caster’s license was required to access the service. However, would the 
                                                                                             
1300  CJEU, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, Judg-
ment of 7 March 2013, para. 46. Also, section 5.2.3.2.1.2.1. 
1301  Guibault and Quintais (2014), p. 14. 
1302  CJEU, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, 
Judgment of 7 March 2013, para. 18. 
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broadcaster offer the same extra service, namely access to their broadcast online, 
the third party de facto would be in direct competition. The fact that the 
broadcaster was also the right holder of the broadcasted works is an essential 
factor here. 
Whereas the CJEU might have attempted to avoid the criterion such as com-
petition, favouring a seemingly more objective one such as different technical 
means, it is greatly disputable whether such approach conveys any advantages. 
The use of the new technical means argument is somewhat inconsistent in the 
light of the subsequent case law, in particular, the AKM case.1303 On the other 
hand, competition is intricately linked with the exclusivity of the rights under 
copyright and safeguarding right holder’s prerogative in exploiting a work. Con-
sider, for instance, the Art & Allposters case, where the fact of a new exploitation 
opportunity through alteration of the lawfully acquired copies was emphasised.1304 
Essentially, what was important, was the interference of the third party’s conduct 
with a new market for a work, possibly in competition with the right holder, 
similar to the circumstances in TVCatchup. 
Competition as a criterion could potentially become more prominent and even 
supplement the primary elements of constructing the scope of exclusive control. 
Indeed, it could also become a part of the assessment of possible interference with 
a work’s exploitation, which is the primary element of the framework.1305 Not 
least, competition would help to differentiate between the subsequent acts of dis-
semination of a private and commercial nature. For instance, it cannot be disputed 
that the alteration of an acquired copy for private use is generally permissible, 
whereas the subsequent commercial resale of such copies might not be.1306 
On the other hand, considering competition as a relevant criterion requires a 
more than careful assessment. The analysis of the development of the rights has 
shown that there appears to be a considerable emphasis on protecting the right 
holder from competition under the CJEU jurisprudence. Not only is it question-
able from the perspective of the incentive rationale of protection, competition 
also falls outside the equation of the distinction between material and immaterial 
dissemination rights, which this thesis attempts to reconcile. If the rationales of 
copyright under the acquis are predominantly incentive based and competition in 
                                                                                             
1303  See section 5.2.3.2.1.2.2. 
1304  CJEU, Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright. (2015) Case C-419/13, 
Judgment of 22 January 2015, paras 19, 48. 
1305  Section 6.2.1.1.3. 
1306  See also Senftleben in that time-shifting for private use can hardly be said to damage 
interests of the right holders. Similarly, it would have to be demonstrated that rebroadcasts 
typically constitute a significant source of revenue. See Senftleben (2004), p. 203. Interestingly, 
the recently adopted DSM Directive explicitly exempts private or non-commercial uses of 
press publications by individual users from protection under the neighbouring right of making 
available to the public which it grants to press publishers. See Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on copyright and related rights in 
the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC. 17.5.2019. OJ 
L 130/92, Art. 15. 
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the internal market is to be promoted,1307 then considering competition in con-
junction with the possible interference of secondary communication with a 
work’s exploitation ought to be based on the clear objective of the exclusive 
rights. Should the rights secure an opportunity to exploit a work or, in addition, 
eliminate (any) competition? 
Subjecting any subsequent dissemination to exclusive control appears detri-
mental to consumers and innovation. Whereas copyright may not be the appro-
priate field of law to regulate competition, persistently subjecting all the acts of 
secondary dissemination to authorisation of the right holder would be an unfor-
tunate development when the situations at stake are rather diverse. Thus, it would 
be more appropriate for copyright to encourage the right holders to optimise their 
business models rather than to maximise control. Whereas downright free-riding 
on the investment in direct competition with the right holder ought to weight con-
siderably in the assessment of extending the reach of exclusive control (already 
at the level of primary criteria), an additional service which does not unduly 
impair the right holder’s interests might be exempted from authorisation where 
appropriate remuneration has been obtained through initial authorisation. 
 
 
6.2.1.2.3. Foregone profit and revenue generated by a third party  
The foregone profit of the right holder is occasionally inexplicitly taken into 
account by the CJEU in the context of secondary communication resulting in a 
new market or targeting a new public which was not envisaged by primary com-
munication of a work. On the other hand, revenue generated by a third party in 
connection with secondary dissemination has explicitly made it into juris-
prudence on a few occasions. Although the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination itself does not entail that the third-party revenue is of 
any relevance to the assessment, it appears to have become a part of the equation 
under CJEU jurisprudence. Essentially, under the material dissemination approach 
(as well as the justification for copyright on the basis of mitigating market 
failure), any revenue generated by a third party is irrelevant as long as the right 
holder has exercised their right and obtained remuneration.1308 
Turning back to the TVCatchup case, the Court held that the revenue generated 
by the third party is not conclusive for finding there to be an infringement of the 
right of communication to the public. Hence, the presence of the revenue was not 
a determining factor in the case of a broadcast retransmitted on the Internet.1309 
On the other hand, in the Rafael Hoteles case concerning the public receipt of a 
broadcast, the profit-making nature of the activity was a relevant but not a 
necessary condition for finding there to be an act of communication to the 
                                                                                             
1307  On the rationales under the acquis, see section 2.1.2. 
1308  See sections 2.1. .2. and 2.2.2. Also, Poort (2018), pp. 298–232. 2
1309  CJEU, ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TVCatchUp Ltd. (2013) Case C-607/11, Judg-
ment of 7 March 2013, paras 43–44. 
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public.1310 Conversely, in the context of the receipt of a broadcast at a dental 
practice, the Court considered the absence of the revenue generated by a public 
receipt as one of the main arguments for holding that such act did not fall under 
the neighbouring right of communication to the public.1311 Accordingly, it is not 
clear why in some instances this aspect plays a more significant role than in 
others. Furthermore, it is not evident how third-party revenue relates to the 
economic underpinning of the rights and appropriate remuneration which ought 
to be secured under the acquis. 
One way to interpret the cases would be to consider the revenue generated by 
the third party as evidence of foregone profit for the right holder. For instance, if 
the dentist did not receive any economic benefit from a public receipt of a broad-
cast, then the right holder was not deprived of any either.1312 However, it goes 
without saying that one should be careful assuming that the right holder has fore-
gone any profit where a third party made a profit. This is especially so in the 
circumstances where the party relies on the initial authorised act and does not 
interfere significantly with the primary market.1313 
Lately, the Court has also employed the profit criterion for dealing with the 
cases of secondary communication relying on primary infringing commu-
nication. In these cases, the Court has used the profit-making nature of the activity 
of the third party as a basis for a rebuttable presumption of knowledge of the 
infringing nature of the primary communication.1314 Whereas it is outside of the 
scope of this thesis to deal with the secondary acts relying on the initially unlaw-
ful communication, such approach must not be extended to the cases where the 
third party is relying on authorised communication, examined here. First, 
knowledge presumption becomes void when the initial communication is lawful. 
Second, the interference with the right holder’s interest shall not be presumed on 
the sole ground that a profit is made in (in)direct connection to a work. 
It could also be asked whether the profit-making criterion ought to be slightly 
relaxed in the online environment. On the one hand, the Internet as a dissemi-
nation channel is characterised by a higher degree of control over circumstances 
of initial communication of a work. On the other hand, it also often provides more 
opportunities to make a profit through secondary communication in a way which 
may not necessarily substantially harm the position of the right holder.1315 Hence, 
                                                                                             
1310  CJEU, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v Rafael Hoteles SA. 
(2006) Case C-306/05, Judgment of 7 December 2006, para. 44. 
1311  CJEU, Società Consortile Fonografici (SCF) v Marco Del Corso. (2012) Case C-135/10, 
Judgment of 15 March 2012, para. 99. 
1312  Riis (2013), p. 150. 
1313  See also section 6.2.1.1.3. on the interference with work’s exploitation and section above 
on competition. 
1314  CJEU, GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and Others. (2016) Case  
C-160/15, Judgment of 8 September 2016, paras 47–48. 
1315  Consider, for instance, Tom Kabinet webpage offering a platform for reselling e-books 
from particular vendors against the payment of a commission to CMOs upon each transfer of 
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the question that arises is whether the development of additional services, relying 
on the initially authorised communication, should be precluded on the sole basis 
that they might generate some income. Also, the question is whether the devel-
opments under the acquis point towards supplementing the incentive rationale of 
the acquis with the objective of attributing any possible value generated in 
(in)direct connection to a work to the right holder. Considering the recently 
adopted DSM Directive targeting the value gap in the context of online inter-
mediaries, the development seems to point precisely in this direction.1316 
Whereas the foregone profit of the right holder might play a role in the assess-
ment of the primary criteria of the framework, namely, the interference of 
secondary communication with the work’s exploitation, it shall be examined 
separately from any profit made by a third party. By no means should it be con-
cluded at the outset that the revenue generated by a third party is always irrelevant 
for the assessment unless foregone profit can be proven. In a sense, there might 
always be foregone profit if we accept that subjecting secondary dissemination 
to exclusive control would effectively enable obtaining additional remuneration. 
Equally to the competition aspect outlined above, the relevance of profit made by 
the third party shall be examined with great care and towards the clarified 
objectives of protection. 
 
 
6.2.1.3. Consequences of reconciling the approaches 
under the acquis 
The set of primary and ancillary criteria outlined above highlights the essentially 
economic underpinnings of the exclusive rights and the developments under the 
acquis. Whereas each element in one way or another contributes to securing a 
market for a work as envisaged by the economic rationale of copyright protection, 
some elements, if taken to the extreme, also support retaining control over the 
market beyond the initial authorisation of a work’s communication. Therefore, 
the rationales behind the scope and the reach of the exclusive rights under the 
acquis require elaboration if they are not to unduly advance the interests of the 
right holders at the expense of other involved interests. 
The present section briefly outlines the consequences of employing the iden-
tified criteria as a common approach to examining the justifiability of submitting 
                                                                                             
an e-book. Tom Kabinet is the party in the proceedings before the CJEU, Request for a 
preliminary ruling in Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom 
Kabinet Internet and others (2018) Case C-263/18. The platform voluntary pays a fee to the 
authors for each transfer of an e-book between users of the platform, which goes beyond the 
obligations under copyright acquis and enables obtaining additional remuneration from a 
single copy, which would not be possible in the analogue scenario. 
1316  Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 
on copyright and related rights in the Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC 
and 2001/29/EC. 17.5.2019. OJ L 130/92, Art. 17. For an overview, see also Rosati (2019), 
pp. 200–202. On the value gap generally, see Quintais and Poort (2018). 
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secondary dissemination to the exclusive control of the right holder. First of all, 
a common set of criteria would avoid the confusion caused by Article 3(3) of the 
InfoSoc Directive, which so far has rarely been invoked by the CJEU. At the 
moment, the Article clarifies little beyond the fact that every separate act of 
secondary dissemination has to be authorised by the right holder. Whereas the 
criteria developed by the Court under the right of communication to the public 
might seem to introduce some flexibility into the assessment if compared with 
the wording of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, it is still limited to the 
economic aspects of exploitation of a work from the perspective of the right 
holder. Very rarely does the Court reach the conclusion that the secondary act 
does not prejudice the interests of the right holder. In turn, the right holder is 
seldom a creating author themselves.  
Second, the common approach might help to avoid creating concepts detached 
from the real world. In very few cases, notably in the context of digital dis-
semination, the Court discusses the justifiability of excluding acts closely resem-
bling the analogue communication from the respective rights and exceptions to 
them. In most of the cases, the Court proceeds from the assumption of the high 
level of protection as necessarily translating into the right holder’s interest in the 
highest possible degree of control over any dissemination. In essence, the juris-
prudence ignores such aspects as who the parties to the proceedings are, who 
relies on the exclusive right and whether they seek to prohibit an act or merely to 
obtain additional remuneration. 
The reference in the Tom Kabinet case appears symptomatic of the develop-
ment under the jurisprudence and of the lack of flexibility sanctioned under the 
EU acquis.1317 The CJEU will have to decide whether the all-or-nothing approach 
of the exhaustion principle should be extended to digital dissemination of  
e-books, similarly to the situation in the UsedSoft case. One might wonder if the 
situation would have been different in the absence of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc. 
Could more flexible criteria have been developed, diminishing the need to rely 
on the outdated all-or-nothing approach of the exhaustion principle? Anyhow, the 
questions referred for a preliminary ruling do not allow the broader picture to be 
examined.1318 
Reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights 
would help to systematise the developments under the acquis on the basis of 
                                                                                             
1317  The case concerns the application of the exhaustion principle to online distribution of  
e-books. Namely, the referring court asks, inter alia, whether the right of distribution is 
exhausted once the right holder provides a copy of an e-book for download. See Request for 
a preliminary ruling in Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene Uitgevers v Tom 
Kabinet Internet and others (2018) Case C-263/18. 
1318  For instance, other rights under the acquis, such as the right of communication to the 
public, are not subject to interpretation, as well as the possible DRM protection of e-books. 
Tom Kabinet only facilitates resale of DRM-free books. On the reference in the context of the 
DSM, see Oprysk (2019a). 
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whether a primary or a secondary act of communication is concerned.1319 As this 
chapter outlines the elements for assessing secondary dissemination relying on 
the initially authorised communication, it is self-explanatory that no automatic 
replication of the elements ought to take place in the cases of primary or 
secondary unauthorised communication. Nevertheless, the criteria developed 
here can also inform the discussion on the scope of the exclusive rights more 
generally. 
As has been demonstrated, no definite conclusion should be drawn from the 
mere fact that an act of secondary dissemination relies on initially authorised 
communication. Nevertheless, the distinction between secondary dissemination 
and unauthorised primary communication is useful to maintain. Not least, it ought 
to avoid the confusion caused by the inconsistent application of criteria developed 
in the context of secondary dissemination in the cases of primary dissemination. 
The right holder's control over any separate acts of dissemination shall be safe-
guarded unless very specific objectives justify otherwise, which is not the focus 
of this thesis. Secondary dissemination relying on such authorised commu-
nication might, on the other hand, be exempted from control if it does not unduly 
influence the incentives to create and work’s exploitation. The criteria outlined 
above precisely aim to support the assessment of whether any substantial inter-
ference takes place. 
Clarifying the objectives of copyright harmonisation combined with provided 
flexibility to take into account the changing circumstances of a work’s exploi-
tation would be the most appropriate development of the EU copyright acquis. 
As it has been explored on the example of Scandinavian copyright, national laws 
might be better equipped to the agile circumstances surrounding copyright 
policy.1320 There are two ways to achieve a more or less coherent approach to the 
exclusive rights across the MS given these dynamic conditions. The first is to 
complete a full-scale harmonisation taking all the aspects into account, e.g. by 
introducing European copyright title.1321 The second is to provide sufficient 
guidance on the objectives of the acquis and the relevant considerations while 
leaving enough room for the MS to develop national laws capable of adapting 
accordingly. 
Last but not least, reconciling the approaches would contribute to restoring 
legal certainty. Removing the distinction between material and immaterial dis-
semination, which is largely arbitral at this point, would provide right holders 
with more a intuitive understanding of the scope of control envisaged under the 
                                                                                             
1319  Consider, for instance, the FAPL case, which was differentiated from the earlier Coditel 
I case because in the latter a rebroadcast took place without authorisation and appropriate 
remuneration being paid to the right holder. CJEU, Football Association Premier League Ltd 
and Others v QC Leisure and Others (C-403/08) and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd (C-429/08) (2011), Judgment of 4 October 2011, para. 119. 
1320  See section 2.3. 
1321  See Ricolfi (2016), Strowel (2014), van Eechoud et al. (2009), pp. 316–325. Recently, on 
creeping unification of the EU copyright and the time for unification, see Hugenholtz (2019). 
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copyright framework. A better understanding of the scope of protection than the 
misleading all-or-nothing rule suggested under secondary EU law could also 
mean a more thoughtful exercise of the exclusive rights. This, in turn, would 
advance the argument for exempting certain acts of secondary dissemination 
from exclusive control following the exercise of the right by the right holder who 
is fully aware of the eventual boundaries of protection. 
 
 
6.2.2. Shortcomings of implementing the framework under 
the current system of secondary EU law  
in the field of copyright 
The sections above have outlined the normative framework that could be used for 
assessing the justifiability of submitting secondary dissemination to the exclusive 
control of the right holder under the EU copyright acquis. Given that the elements 
of the framework rely, inter alia, on the developments under CJEU jurisprudence, 
the question that arises is to what extent the EU copyright framework already 
accommodates the assessment pursuant to the criteria. The present part aims to 
highlight the shortcomings of the current system of secondary law for employing 
the framework in concrete cases. 
Copyright rules do not operate in a vacuum but within a system of other fields 
of law, such as consumer protection, contract law, unfair commercial practices, 
competition law, etc. However, it is often the objectives of copyright protection 
that take precedence over all other considerations. A discourse on the limits of 
control accorded by the exclusive right under copyright would perhaps be of less 
importance if there were other effective mechanisms to ensure that control does 
not stretch beyond what is necessary.1322  
Without a clear rationale behind the extent of control accorded by copyright, 
balancing copyright objectives with those of other fields of law is a tall order. 
The scope of the undertaken analysis does not allow a conclusion to be drawn on 
how reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination could 
or ought to best be implemented in practice. However, this part will highlight the 
two most significant deficiencies of the current regulatory framework under the 
EU copyright acquis, which complicate accommodating a flexible approach to 
determining admissible control over dissemination beyond first authorisation. 
The first aspect is the broad scope of the right of communication to the public in 
the light of legal certainty. The second aspect is the potential role of the exhaus-
tion principle in reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemi-
nation in the context of distribution of digital copies, especially in the light of the 
upcoming ruling in the Tom Kabinet case. 
 
 
                                                                                             
1322  Hilty (2018), p. 880. 
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6.2.2.1. Borderless right of communication to the public and 
legal certainty  
As evident from the analysis in this thesis and, in particular, Chapter 5, the right 
of communication to the public under the EU acquis has a broad scope and covers 
a fair share of the ways to disseminate a work today. The right covers any 
secondary communication of a live performance extending its reach beyond the 
physically present public, such as through broadcasting. The right also encom-
passes any primary or secondary act of communicating a work, regardless the fact 
whether any audience actually enjoys a work or whether any new audience is 
reached.1323 
A broadly formulated right is not detrimental to the copyright framework per 
se. The broad language of the right might better capture the emerging ways of 
exploiting a work than the already recognised technology-specific rights. This 
aspect has been explored, for instance, on the example of a broad right of making 
available under Scandinavian copyright.1324 However, such broad right is some-
what at odds with the traditional structure of copyright as a collection of rights 
with distinctive scope, boundaries, and exceptions. A broad right of commu-
nication to the public, encompassing all the different types of uses, also requires 
in-built flexibility to deal with cases where restraints on the accorded control are 
necessary. 
The right of communication to the public de facto provides a general right to 
control access to a work.1325 As control of access to a work is generally not a right 
protected by copyright, complications arise.1326 Whereas the technological devel-
opment raises the need for a flexible framework, the exhaustive list of permitted 
limitations under Article 5 of the InfoSoc Directive runs contrary to that 
objective.1327 Given the overall focus of this thesis on the distinction between 
immaterial and material dissemination, it is Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive 
which deserves special attention as it seemingly precludes a more general 
delineation of the boundaries of the communication to the public right.  
Combining any known and unanticipated future ways of exploitation under a 
single right also calls for a flexible approach to defining its boundaries, which 
extends beyond the specific cases known at present. The lack of such mechanism 
under the EU acquis might have prompted the businesses and public institutions 
alike to act in a particular manner. Namely, it encouraged their activity to be 
organised in ways which are not optimal from the perspective of technological 
                                                                                             
1323  On the broad scope, see section 5.2.2. 
1324  Consider the right of making a work available as an umbrella right under the Scandinavian 
copyright law, section 2.3.2.1. 
1325  Westkamp (2006), p. 268.  
1326  On access to a work being outside the scope of copyright regulation, see Guibault and 
Helberger (2005), p. 19. 
1327  van Eechoud et al. (2009), pp. 102–104. 
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possibilities or the public interest but which support fitting their activity into a 
necessary box for the particular right and the associated exception to apply. 
It is worth recalling one such prominent example. In the VOB case, the issue 
at stake was whether lending of e-books fell under the regulatory framework of 
the lending right and, further, under the library exception to the right.1328 The 
question concerned a process organised in a way closely resembling tangible 
lending in order to fall under the exception to the lending right. One electronic 
copy was accessible to one user at any particular time and only for a limited 
amount of time. The CJEU ruled that such e-lending would fall under the excep-
tion and, hence, not be subject to authorisation but to compensation, pursuant to 
that exception. 
What if lending of e-books could be organised in a way that a few users could 
access an item at the very same time and the right holder would be compensated 
accordingly? Whereas it does not present a challenge for technology, it would 
result in an uncertain situation under copyright. Could such lending still come 
under the scope of the lending right and the exception to it, or would it auto-
matically fall under the right of communication to the public? Whereas the ruling 
in VOB is helpful for libraries if their system is built reflecting the legacy of 
tangible lending, it fails to provide any guidance on how such services could be 
developed and offered in the future.  
A comparable situation was also at stake in UsedSoft, where the circumstances 
of a work’s dissemination without tangible support were similar to the ones 
usually falling under the right of distribution. The ruling, although a landmark 
one, proved to be of limited impact, both when it comes to the application to the 
different subject matters of copyright and to slightly different circumstances of 
online dissemination. A similar outcome is likely to take place in the Tom Kabinet 
case as the circumstances are comparable to the ones in UsedSoft. However, 
another layer of uncertainty, which is unlikely to be resolved, is added to the 
equation. It is the DRM protection of e-books, which is not an issue in the Tom 
Kabinet case but is protected under the copyright acquis and is capable of creating 
obstacles to practical implementation of the ruling if it were to extend the 
principle of exhaustion to all the subject matters.1329 
Submitting new uses to the rules designed to balance the objectives of pro-
tection in particular analogue circumstances might not be the perfect fit for online 
dissemination. Whilst the CJEU should be endorsed for devoting attention to the 
justifications behind extending the scope of the limitation in the VOB case, the 
Court only briefly mentioned them in the UsedSoft case, applying the exhaustion 
principle to the digital distribution of computer programmes.1330 On the other 
hand, if the Court were to refuse to treat these cases on the basis of traditionally 
                                                                                             
1328  See section 3.2.4.3. 
1329  On the different roles TPMs play, see Rognstad and Poort (2018), pp. 146–147. Under 
their model right of reasonable exploitation, TPMs are not treated as a separate layer of 
protection but within the exclusive right.  
1330  Section 3.2.4.3. 
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copy-related rights, any comparable boundaries on exclusive control may not be 
recognised at the EU level until a new case makes it to the CJEU on the basis of 
a different right, in particular the right of communication to the public. The broad 
scope of the right of communication to the public and its interpretation, combined 
with Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive, give an impression that the control 
does not have any visible boundaries. This, in turn, might discourage national 
courts from submitting questions for interpreting the appropriate scope of control 
accorded to the right holder. 
However, as has been illustrated through the development of the exclusive 
rights, this assumption is no longer unchallenged in the light of CJEU juris-
prudence. The fact that the CJEU assumed the role of the legislator has, under-
standably, been criticised.1331 At the same time, the developments under juris-
prudence also offered more flexibility for dealing with the divergent objectives 
of copyright protection. Legal certainty is of tremendous importance when the 
need to clear the rights, especially in the online setting, is constantly rising.1332 It 
is vital to services relying on the copyright-protected content and to users as both 
may be reluctant to engage in activities that are not so clearly legal.1333 
In the light of the analysis in this thesis, it shall be concluded that the assump-
tion of no admissible boundary to the scope of control under the right of commu-
nication to the public based on its inherently immaterial nature ought to be 
abolished in the light of the benefits that reconciling the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination rights offers. Whereas abolishing the distinction 
would not itself ensure legal certainty, it would be a step towards a broader dis-
cussion on the rationales behind the extent of the exclusive rights. The outlined 
primary and ancillary criteria could, in turn, provide guidance on the relevant 
considerations in the light of the practical situations the CJEU had to deal with 
and the constantly evolving circumstances of a work’s exploitation. 
The ability of the right holder to exercise the exclusive rights granted under 
copyright in their best interests is one of the major considerations under the CJEU 
jurisprudence. The exercise of the right, in turn, in certain cases can justify 
limiting further control over communication on the assumption that an oppor-
tunity to obtain appropriate remuneration was provided. However, at present, 
secondary EU law appears to imply borderless control over dissemination under 
the right of communication to the public, whereas CJEU jurisprudence does not 
fully support it. 
In order to avoid a vicious circle of legal uncertainty, where extending exclu-
sive control is being justified on the basis of right holders not contemplating the 
secondary use of communication, it is desirable to at least acknowledge the pos-
sibility to limit the reach of the right of communication to the public. The under-
                                                                                             
1331  Determining the scope of protection at the judiciary level, even if the regulation is 
confusing, is liable to harm legal certainty, see Batchelor and Montani (2015), p. 600. 
1332  Jenner (2011), p. 58. 
1333  van Gompel (2011), p. 7. Further on the importance of the legal certainty to internet 
platforms, see Belleflamme (2016), p. 10. 
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standing of at least the lower threshold of the accorded exclusive control should 
allow the right holder to exercise the right in their best interest. In these circum-
stances, the differentiation between the primary acts always falling under the 
scope of the exclusive right and the secondary acts not necessarily subject to 
authorisation would be advantageous. Similarly, clear rationales behind extending 
or limiting control over secondary communication would further enhance the 
understanding of protection which can be relied on. 
 
 
6.2.2.2. Potential of the exhaustion principle under Article 4(2) 
of the InfoSoc Directive 
The reference in Tom Kabinet calls for considering the extension of the exhaus-
tion principle in its narrow sense to digital copies of all the subject matters pro-
tected by copyright.1334 Whereas much of the debate on the matter focuses on the 
wording of exhaustion under Article 4(2) as being able to accommodate digital 
uses, it is essential that the question is approached from the two ways of looking 
at the principle. Throughout this thesis, the exhaustion principle was addressed 
in two main senses. First, exhaustion has been considered in its broad under-
standing as limiting the reach of the exclusive right to authorisation of initial dis-
semination. Second, the principle has also been addressed in its narrow meaning 
as a label for a specific solution to the need of delimiting the right of distribution, 
as harmonised under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive.  
Ultimately, the exhaustion principle in its narrow meaning under Article 4(2) 
is not the only conceivable way to implement the rationale of exhaustion in its 
broader understanding but only a particular instrument to deal with the balancing 
it entails.1335 Towards the background of the undertaken analysis, the principle as 
enshrined under the InfoSoc Directive could be seen as too rigid for today’s 
realities, as it entails the all-or-nothing approach to such a delicate task of 
balancing interests.1336 This is not to suggest that what the principle achieves in 
the realm of physical distribution should not be also endorsed in the context of 
other rights or circumstances. Instead, the undesired effects of copyright, which 
were tackled to some extent by the exhaustion principle in its narrow sense, might 
need to be considered in a broader context.1337 
In the age of expanding rights and the overall reach of copyright protection, it 
is no wonder that the exhaustion principle is under attack.1338 Whereas the 
                                                                                             
1334  Request for a preliminary ruling in Nederlands Uitgeversverbond, Groep Algemene 
Uitgevers v Tom Kabinet Internet and others (2018) Case C-263/18. 
1335  Batchelor and Montani (2015), p. 600. See also section 4.3. 
1336  Framed as stemming from the need to eliminate the interference of exclusive rights with 
the internal market, the principle under Article 4(2) perhaps overachieves in term of envisaged 
harmonisation. See analysis under section 4.2. 
1337  Hilty (2018), p. 880. 
1338  Hugenholtz (1997), p. 7. 
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principle in its narrow sense could be seen as a phase-out model in the digital 
world, nothing precludes the discussion on the need to formulate a comparable 
technology-neutral rule that would better reflect the rationale of exhaustion in its 
broad sense.1339 The application of Article 4(2) outside the realm of physical 
copies is opposed mainly on the grounds that the principle is only associated with 
the material dissemination and distribution of tangible copies. As it has also been 
explored, such claims are rather unfounded considering both the development of 
technology and the development of dissemination-related rights under the EU 
acquis.1340 Not only do some ways of online dissemination closely resemble the 
tangible distribution in every major aspect, but the CJEU also found it necessary 
to interpret the provisions of the EU secondary law in a flexible manner. Specific 
technical circumstances of the work’s dissemination should play an increasingly 
minor role.1341 Instead, the right holder’s authorisation of dissemination shall be 
taken as a point of departure for establishing the reasonable limits to the exclusive 
rights once a work is exploited. 
On the other hand, the exhaustion principle under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc 
is a rather specific solution, to the point of being of limited use. Especially so in 
the context of online dissemination which is characterised by the extensive pos-
sibilities to control access and consumption of a work. The application of the 
exhaustion principle online is vulnerable to the changes in business models and 
can actually have the opposite effect.1342 Hence, there might be a need to find 
other ways to achieve the desired result of not allocating the right holder more 
control than what is reasonable.1343 
Regardless of the outcome in the Tom Kabinet case, nothing precludes a 
broader discussion on the need to reconsider the approaches to dissemination-
related rights. Torremans, for example, asks whether it is time to reconsider the 
outcome of the Coditel I case and the justifications behind exempting commu-
nication rights from exhaustion with reference to the FAPL judgment.1344 
Rognstad, on the other hand, submits that the situation at stake in UsedSoft should 
have been addressed from the perspective of the Treaties rather than forcing the 
analogue right of distribution.1345 Addressing the need to delineate the rights 
                                                                                             
1339  See Wiebe on exhaustion as a phase-out model, Wiebe (2010), p. 327. On the other hand, 
see Hilty holding that the fact that exhaustion is worded as related to some physical objects 
does not mean that limitations intended by it may not be equally appropriate in the absence of 
a physical object. Hilty (2018), p. 865. 
1340  See section 4.3.3. 
1341  The fact that copies are not transferred but created on the recipient end is immaterial to 
the assessment of the extent of exclusive control that should be accorded. On the contrary, see 
Lindberg and Westman (2001), p. 258; Olsson (2015), p. 115. 
1342  Riis et al. (2013), p. 479. 
1343  Ibid., p. 479. 
1344  Torremans (2010), pp. 302–303. 
1345  Rognstad (2014), p. 15. 
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should not necessarily entail the use of the exhaustion metaphor.1346 It is also 
conceivable to create a balancing mechanism through applying the economic 
arguments similar to that in the UsedSoft case in the context of other rights, as 
the CJEU has done examining the cases on the communication to the public 
right.1347 Essentially, the discussion is not about the type of arrangement but about 
explaining why certain uses do not constitute an infringement of copyright.1348 
Finally, the function of the exhaustion in its broad sense could also be divided 
into two main categories. First and foremost, it draws the boundaries of exclusive 
control, ensuring that the rights do not unduly interfere with secondary use relying 
on initial authorised communication.1349 The second function is to delimit control 
of the right holder over circumstances of a work’s consumption by individual users. 
Whereas the exhaustion principle in its narrow sense under Article 4(2) served 
both functions, it is unlikely that they can be easily addressed under a single 
instrument in the context of online dissemination.1350 
Ultimately, the question of the optimal way of reconciling the approaches to 
material and immaterial dissemination requires further research. However, what 
can be submitted is that the all-or-nothing approach of exhaustion in its narrow 
sense might be too rigid in the present development and especially in the context 
of online dissemination. Furthermore, the distinction between the necessity to 
provide boundaries of control in general and the need to enable users to dispose 
of their copies in particular should be explored further. It does not seem viable to 
address both aspects with a single rule by extending the exhaustion principle 
under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc. Whereas the first aspect could potentially be 
tackled under the copyright framework, the second might need an intervention of 
other fields of law such as consumer protection.1351 
The above considerations bring us to a final point. Either outcome in the Tom 
Kabinet case could be seen in a positive light as long as the CJEU bases the 
decision on elaborating the underlying rationales of the acquis rather than relying 
on the dogmatic assumptions. Neither precluding the extension of the principle 
nor endorsing it would result in a final stance on the matter of delineating the 
                                                                                             
1346  Rognstad (2003), p. 464. 
1347  Riis et al. (2013), p. 479. 
1348  Hilty (2018), p. 867. 
1349  Consider exhaustion in its narrow sense as enabling trade in copies but only the original 
ones. On the limited market effect of exhaustion, see Heide (2004), p. 98. 
1350  Given that a user is often in a weaker position, some scholars submit that, given that the 
InfoSoc Directive in general favours the right holders at the expense of users, the absence of 
digital exhaustion strengthens position of the former even more. See Cohen Jehoram (2001), 
p. 542; Targosz (2010), pp. 337–353. 
1351  In particular with a view of the recent adoption of the Digital Content Directive, which 
provides consumers with a claim for remedies when use of digital content is prevented or 
limited as a result of restrictions imposed by a third party, including on the basis of IP rights. 
See Article 10 of the Directive (EU) 2019/770 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content and digital services. 22 May 2019. OJ L 136/1. 
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control accorded by the exclusive rights.1352 Making the exhaustion “digital” 
through the extension of the principle to digital copies might not bring the envi-
sioned result, but it would certainty become sort of manifestation of the impact 
of digitisation on exclusive rights.1353 
 
 
6.2.3. Conclusions on the second overall research question 
The second overall question of this thesis is how could the approaches to material 
and immaterial dissemination be reconciled to define the scope of exclusive rights 
beyond authorising every communication of a work? The question has been 
answered in the second part of this chapter by outlining a normative framework 
for reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights. 
The objective is to offer a list of criteria for assessing the justifiability of 
extending the right holder’s exclusive control over secondary communication 
relying on the initially authorised dissemination, pursuant to the developments 
under the acquis analysed in chapters 2 to 5. 
This part proceeded with sketching the normative framework on the basis of 
the observation that the development of the rights of distribution and commu-
nication to the public reveals a much more nuanced relationship between the 
rights than the traditional distinction between the material and immaterial dis-
semination rights under secondary EU law would suggest. Whereas secondary 
law appears to subject any secondary act of communication to exclusive control 
and exempt any secondary distribution from control, CJEU jurisprudence is less 
than coherent on the matter. As it has been concluded in the answer to the first 
overall research question, given the changing circumstances of a work’s exploi-
tation and the importance of legal certainty on the extent of control conferred by 
the exclusive rights, reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial 
dissemination rights would be a logical and welcomed development. 
The normative framework described here shares the underlying premises with 
the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination rights. Namely, it 
proceeds from differentiating secondary acts of dissemination from primary acts. 
Whereas the latter always fall under the exclusive right and require the author-
isation of the right holder, exempting the former from the exclusive control may 
be justified if the right holder has exercised the exclusive right in their best 
interest. The distinction under secondary EU law exempts secondary distribution 
from authorisation on the sole ground of authorisation of initial dissemination in 
some cases and blankly denies any limit in other cases. The outlined framework 
offers a more nuanced approach.  
The elements of the framework are intended to capture the circumstances of 
secondary communication and its potential interference with a work’s exploi-
                                                                                             
1352  See also Oprysk (2019a). 
1353  Targosz (2010), p. 351. Also, for the exhaustion principle not leading to the equitable 
result in an online environment, Oprysk et al. (2017), pp. 132–134. 
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tation, unlike the all-or-nothing approach to the scope of the exclusive rights 
pursuant to the exhaustion principle. Acts of secondary communication, the 
justifiability of subjecting which to the exclusive control of the right holder ought 
to be examined under the framework, encompass acts which rely or depend on 
the initial dissemination authorised by the right holder. 
The framework consists of six elements derived on the basis of the analysis of 
the developments under the acquis and grouped into primary and ancillary 
criteria. Primary elements are essential to secure the right holder’s control over 
each exploitation of a work. They rely on the assumption that through the first 
authorisation of dissemination the right holder has been given an opportunity to 
obtain appropriate remuneration. Ancillary considerations, on the other hand, 
appear to go beyond the incentive rationale of protection. They should be taken 
into account provided that the objectives of the exclusive rights under the acquis 
are clarified.  
Three primary elements for the assessment of secondary dissemination have 
been identified. These criteria are of primary importance to the assessment of the 
justifiability of subjecting acts of secondary dissemination to the exclusive control 
of the right holder as they ought to ensure the right holder’s control over every 
initial communication. These three elements are exercise of the right through 
authorising initial communication of a work, relevance of obtained remuneration 
thereof, and interference of secondary act with a work’s exploitation. 
Exercise of the right through the right holder authorising initial dissemination 
is the key requirement of the framework and the basis for examining all the other 
criteria. Whereas exercise of the right has traditionally been employed to exempt 
any secondary distribution from the right holder’s authorisation pursuant to the 
exhaustion principle and the material nature of such dissemination, the scope of 
the criterion is broader under the framework. Besides establishing the fact of 
authorisation of a work’s exploitation, the assessment of the element ought to take 
into account the envisaged circumstances of initial dissemination. They, in turn, 
ought to also be examined in the light of possible interference of secondary 
communication with work’s exploitation under the third element of the framework. 
The second of the primary elements is the relevance of obtained remuneration 
through the initial authorisation of dissemination. Whereas not every exploitation 
entails direct remuneration that can be easily examined, the fact of obtaining 
remuneration ought to play a role in the assessment relying on the incentive 
rationale of copyright and the economic underpinning of the rights. In the light of 
the envisioned objective of the acquis to provide an opportunity to obtain 
appropriate remuneration, it has been discussed under what circumstances it could 
be assumed that the chance to obtain remuneration has been provided through 
control over each primary communication. 
The third primary criterion is the broadest and ought to examine the possible 
interference of the secondary communication with exploitation of a work. It shifts 
the focus from considering the circumstances of primary communication and the 
interests of the right holder to examining the characteristics of the act of secondary 
communication and the extent to which it interferes with a work’s exploitation. 
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The criterion allows the practical implications of subjecting or exempting 
secondary communication from the exclusive control to be appreciated. However, 
it is obvious that not every insignificant interference calls for reserving the act 
for the right holder. The fine line of permissible interference ought to be explored 
in conjunction with clarifying the rationales of the EU acquis, similarly to the 
ancillary criteria. 
The ancillary group of criteria also consists of three elements, which ought to 
complement the primary ones. Considering that these criteria do not stem from 
the assumption that the function of the right can be fulfilled though its first 
exercise, employing them for the assessment of justifiability of submitting 
secondary dissemination to the exclusive control of the right holder shall be 
accompanied by the clarified objectives of the exclusive rights under the acquis. 
These three ancillary considerations are reaching a potentially new public within 
the originally authorised area; competition, in particular on the primary market; 
foregone profit; and the revenue generated by a third party. 
The first ancillary element is a potentially new public within the originally 
authorised area, which has been derived from the CJEU’s tendency to give the 
new public a broad meaning while interpreting the intended public narrowly. 
Whereas secondary communication can substantially interfere with exploitation 
of a work even though it, in essence, targets the same public, it is argued that the 
public shall not be employed as a separate argument without considering other 
circumstances of exploitation as well as the objective behind exercising the right 
in respect of secondary communication. It is arguable whether communication 
directed at the part of the intended public which, de facto, does not deprive the 
right holder of paying customers shall necessarily require authorisation. Hence, 
the relevance of reaching some public within the authorised area shall be con-
sidered in the light of the clarified objectives of the exclusive rights. 
The second ancillary element is the relevance of competition, especially on 
the primary market. It has been argued that, despite the CJEU denying it as a 
relevant criterion, competition could provide a ground for further fine-tuning the 
assessment of the justifiability of submitting secondary dissemination to the 
exclusive control of the right holder. The tendency seems to be to eliminate any 
competition through submitting secondary communication to the exclusive right. 
Whereas submitting any act that is in (in)direct competition with the right holder 
to the exclusive control of the latter would be clearly excessive, competition 
could be taken into account to a certain degree, provided that the assessment is 
based on the clarified objectives of the exclusive rights. 
The third and the last ancillary element is the relation between the foregone 
profit of the right holder and the revenue generated by a third party. Whereas 
neither the foregone profit nor the revenue generated by a third party is of 
relevance for the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
rights, both considerations are prominent under the CJEU jurisprudence. This 
criterion is closely connected to competition and presents one extra element for 
examining the possible interference with a work’s exploitation. However, it has 
been warned that the foregone profit shall not be assumed where there is any 
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profit generated by a third party, it would also be excessive to submit any 
additional service not unduly interfering with the right holder’s interests to the 
exclusive right on the sole basis that it generates some value. Therefore, equally 
to other ancillary criteria, this element should be examined in conjunction with 
clarifying the objectives of the exclusive rights under the acquis. 
Whereas outlining a normative framework for reconciling the approaches to 
material and immaterial dissemination rights under the acquis did not address the 
question of how the framework ought to be applied in practice, the two main 
shortcoming of the present system of secondary EU law in accommodating the 
outlined criteria have been emphasised. The first shortcoming is the broad scope 
of the right of communication to the public absent mechanisms for restricting its 
scope where necessary or enough leeway for the MS to do so. The broad right in 
conjunction with the ambiguous statement of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc 
Directive only upsets legal certainty suggesting the scope of the right that is not 
followed in practice under the jurisprudence. The second shortcoming of the 
current framework is the exhaustion principle harmonised in its narrow meaning 
under Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. Whereas it appears to be an outdated 
provision, as it also is rather inflexible for accounting for new uses of already 
distributed copies, it needlessly suggests that it is the only admissible case of 
limiting the reach of the exclusive rights over secondary communication. 
Accordingly, the second overall question has been answered by outlining the 
criteria for examining justifiability of subjecting secondary communication to the 
exclusive control of the right holder. The criteria are based on the indications 
pointing towards the conclusion that the function of the exclusive right can be 
fulfilled through authorising every exploitation, which opens the floor for taking 
into account other involved interests. For this reason, it is crucial that such 
assessment considers not only the mere authorisation of initial communication 
but also the possible interference of secondary communication with a work’s 
exploitation. Overall, the developed criteria aim to offer an alternative approach 
to examining the appropriate scope of exclusive control conferred by the rights 
through reconciling the material and immaterial dissemination rights in the light 
of the developments under the EU acquis. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
Copyright is so intricately linked to the development of technology that it could 
not possibly withstand the enormous advances taking place in the last three 
decades and the numerous exploitation opportunities facilitated by the emergence 
of the Internet. Early on after the rise of online environment, the right holder’s 
control over digital dissemination was safeguarded at the international, national, 
and EU levels.  
From today’s perspective, introducing the broad right of communication to 
the public encompassing the acts of the on-demand making available of a work 
marks one of the most significant developments in copyright history. Sending 
digital copies of music over the Internet or streaming movies was not yet a reality 
in the early 1990s. Still, relatively little attention was paid to the probable future 
need to restrict the reach of the broad right. Essentially, the right of commu-
nication to the public encompasses a wide variety of uses previously subject to 
different exclusive rights of distinct scope and the limitations thereof. 
As the analysis of the development of the main dissemination-related rights 
under the EU copyright acquis has shown, the combination of the broad right of 
communication to the public and the exhaustive list of exceptions under 
secondary EU law led to little flexibility for appreciating the circumstances of 
dissemination at hand. In the light of the increasingly all-encompassing harmo-
nisation under the EU acquis, the development has impaired the freedom of the 
MS to devise their own solutions and serve copyright rationales besides incen-
tivising creative labour. 
This thesis focused on the significance of the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination rights drawn at the outset of the online environment in 
justifying placing no general limits on the scope of the right of communication to 
the public under the EU acquis. The thesis set out to examine how the assumption 
on the basis of the distinction influenced the harmonisation of the main dissemi-
nation-related rights under secondary EU law and whether the developments 
under the acquis still support the distinction. 
Two overall research questions were asked. The first question is how does the 
development of the rights of distribution and communication to the public under 
the EU acquis reflect the distinction between material and immaterial dissemi-
nation rights? The second overall research question is how could the approaches 
to material and immaterial dissemination be reconciled to define the scope of 
exclusive rights beyond authorising every communication of a work? To answer 
these questions, the development of the exclusive rights under the acquis was 
examined from the perspective of the distinction. The analysis relied on the 
incentive rationale of copyright and the economic underpinning of the exclusive 
rights which underly the distinction between material and immaterial dissemi-
nation rights. 
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Chapter 2 has provided the background to the analysis of the rights under the 
EU copyright acquis by placing the distinction between material and immaterial 
dissemination into the wider context of copyright rationales and their significance 
for determining the scope of exclusive control conferred by the rights. Further-
more, the chapter explored how technological development influences the circum-
stances of work’s exploitation and the appropriate scope of protection, resulting 
in a danger of drawing inadequate conclusions on the assumptions made in the past. 
As the overall focus of this thesis has been the EU acquis, Chapter 2 also 
addressed the impact of the EU copyright harmonisation on the national laws of 
the MS. The significance of enshrining the distinction between material and 
immaterial dissemination through harmonising the exclusive rights under the 
acquis has been illustrated using the Scandinavian countries as an example. Not 
only does Scandinavian copyright place great emphasis on serving public interest 
in copyright law-making, which is largely unacknowledged under the EU copy-
right acquis, the broadly construed right of making available covering any pro-
tected act of dissemination falls short of its in-built flexibility due to harmoni-
sation under the acquis. 
Chapter 2 equipped the research undertaken in chapters 3 to 6 with the under-
standing of how the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination 
relates to the copyright rationales and, in particular, to the economic underpinning 
of the rights, and how the analysis is influenced by the assumed rationales of 
protection. Two main assumptions for the analysis of the exclusive rights were 
defined. First, given the economic underpinning of the exclusive rights, it was 
presumed that control over every primary act of dissemination potentially offers 
sufficient incentives to create and exploit a work, which warrants placing limits 
on exclusive control over secondary dissemination. The second assumption was 
that the distinction between the primary and secondary acts of dissemination 
could be a benchmark for evaluating the appropriate scope of control accorded 
by copyright. 
For the purpose of the analysis, secondary acts comprised any act that relies or 
is dependent on the initial dissemination authorised by the right holder. Whereas 
every initial (primary) act of communication presupposes the exercise of control 
over particular circumstances of dissemination such as place, duration, avail-
ability, acts of secondary dissemination generally (but not always) would not 
entail the same degree of control over the circumstances. Such examples of 
secondary acts would be linking to a work that has been uploaded on the Internet 
with the authorisation of the right holder, retransmission of (a performance of) a 
work, and passing on a (digital) copy of a work obtained on an individual basis 
against the payment of a one-time fee. 
It has been emphasised that the distinction between primary and secondary 
communication (dissemination) is not a straightforward task. Furthermore, the 
distinction is liable to become even more blurred when technology enables 
secondary communication that, in fact, amounts to distinct exploitation. Hence, 
reconsidering the rules developed on the basis of the distinction between material 
and immaterial dissemination is important because they rely solely on the fact of 
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authorised primary dissemination (the case of the exhaustion principle), without 
leaving room for appreciating the circumstances and the practical impact of such 
secondary act on a work’s exploitation. 
Taking as a basis the economic approach to copyright and the outlined 
assumptions, in chapters 3 to 5 the development of the two main dissemination-
related rights under the EU copyright framework has been analysed against the 
background of the distinction between material and immaterial dissemination. 
Chapter 3 devoted attention to the development of the right of distribution, and 
Chapter 4 concentrated on the development of the exhaustion principle as an 
instrument to limit control over secondary distribution. Chapter 5 focused on the 
development of the right of communication to the public. Whereas the focus of 
the analysis of the rights has been on the InfoSoc Directive and CJEU juris-
prudence, other instruments of secondary EU law were addressed where neces-
sary for providing a background, as were the developments under international 
and national laws. 
Chapter 3 examined the development of the right of distribution under the 
acquis as providing control over material dissemination. The main matters the 
chapter addressed were the circumstances influencing the need and the form of 
harmonising the right under the acquis, the driving forces behind confining its 
scope to material dissemination, and the discussion of whether and how the sub-
sequent development of the right reflects the premises of material dissemination. 
The analysis under this chapter has revealed that the need to harmonise the right 
under international law and the acquis was heavily influenced by the needs of 
international trade, especially given the disparities in the scope of control under 
national laws pursuant to the exhaustion principle. Subsequent developments of 
technology, in turn, have challenged the clear-cut rule under Article 4(2) of the 
InfoSoc Directive exempting secondary distribution from the scope of the right 
of distribution. 
As the analysis has revealed, the assessment of the acts potentially falling 
under the right of distribution no longer relies solely on the notion of primary or 
secondary distribution but on the overall assessment of the circumstances of a 
work’s exploitation. Furthermore, this development concerns not only the dis-
semination of digital copies, which the right of distribution was not designed to 
cover, but also the traditional distribution of tangible copies. The findings of 
Chapter 3 suggest that the changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation call 
for a more nuanced analysis than the fact of the right holder’s authorisation of 
initial distribution. This, in turn, enables reconciliation of the approaches to 
material and immaterial dissemination rights by developing a common normative 
framework for assessing the justifiability of subjecting secondary dissemination 
to the exclusive right holder’s control. 
Chapter 4 examined the development of the exhaustion principle as an instru-
ment of limiting control over subsequent distribution under the acquis. The 
exhaustion principle was analysed through the prism of it constituting an inherent 
boundary to the right of distribution fulfilling the function of the material dis-
semination approach. The chapter addressed the circumstances influencing the 
338 
need and the form of harmonising the principle under the acquis and the role it 
played in limiting the scope of the right of distribution pursuant to material dis-
semination, and discussed whether the principle continues to perform its function 
given the development of the right of distribution. The analysis revealed the 
objectives of harmonising the principle under secondary EU law that reach well 
beyond establishing the mere boundary of the right of distribution. 
Chapter 4 concluded that enshrining the principle under EU secondary law in 
its narrow sense of limiting the exclusive control over distributed tangible copies 
has implicated the development of a more flexible and systematic approach to the 
scope of admissible control over secondary dissemination. Whereas, as explored 
in Chapter 3, the circumstances of exercising the right of distribution and 
determining its appropriate scope changed, these developments could not be 
easily accommodated under the exhaustion principle. This has also resulted in the 
uncertainty as to the exact meaning of Article 4(2) of the InfoSoc Directive. 
Given the increasingly all-encompassing harmonisation under the acquis and the 
full harmonisation character of the InfoSoc Directive, it is important to refrain 
from interpreting the provision as the only possible general limit on the reach of 
exclusive rights. Confining the exhaustion principle in its narrow meaning to 
tangible copies shall not prejudice considering the broader notion of exhaustion 
outside the realm of tangible mediums. 
Chapter 5 examined how the right of communication to the public under the 
EU acquis developed from being of an inherently immaterial nature envisaged 
under secondary EU law to accommodating certain premises of the material dis-
semination approach. Unlike the right of distribution with the more or less 
identical scope under national, international, and EU law, scope of the right of 
communication to the public differs between the instruments of international 
harmonisation, national laws, and the EU acquis. For this reason, a general back-
ground to the wider concept of communication rights was provided, whereas the 
focus of the analysis has been on the right of communication to the public as 
harmonised under the InfoSoc Directive.  
The main matters addressed in Chapter 5 were the circumstances influencing 
the need and the form of harmonising the right under the acquis, the driving 
forces behind confining its scope to immaterial dissemination, and the discussion 
of whether and how the subsequent development continues to reflect the premises 
of immaterial dissemination. As the analysis of the development of the right of 
communication to the public revealed, the right’s harmonisation under the acquis 
was driven by then ongoing developments under international law, namely, the 
adoption of the WIPO CT. Whereas the introduction of a broad right of commu-
nication potentially made it future-proof by incorporating nearly any conceivable 
way of communicating a work to the public, the subsequent developments under 
the acquis indicate that another aspect of the exclusive right, namely, the limits 
of its scope, received disproportionately little attention. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 revealed a shift from denying any general limit to 
the right holder’s control over secondary communication pursuant to Article 3(3) 
of the InfoSoc Directive to adopting a more nuanced approach to examining 
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secondary communication under the CJEU jurisprudence. It was concluded that 
the rule developed under Article 3(3) was ambiguous from the outset and cannot 
adequately explain why certain secondary communication ought to be subjected 
to exclusive control whereas other secondary communication shall not. Further-
more, although no delineation between primary and secondary communication 
was envisaged under the Directives, the line appears to intuitively yet not explicitly 
be drawn under CJEU jurisprudence. 
The justifications behind extending or restricting the reach of the exclusive 
right of communication to the public to secondary communication are essentially 
of economic nature and resemble considerations typically associated with 
material dissemination. Although CJEU jurisprudence demonstrates great flexi-
bility in assessing the scope of the right in the light of Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the reasoning lacks the clear underlying objectives and the guidance 
beyond a set of loosely formulated criteria that weigh differently for diverse types 
of communication. Given the overall development of the right pointing towards 
differentiating between primary and secondary communication, the chapter con-
cluded that reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination 
rights would be an appropriate development under the acquis. 
On the basis of the analysis in chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis, Chapter 6 sum-
marised the findings and offered a normative framework for reconciling the 
approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights under the acquis 
pursuant to the developments. First, it has been explored what are the indications 
of the convergence of the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination 
rights under the acquis. Second, the common criteria that could systematise the 
extent of control over secondary dissemination were defined and contrasted with 
the incentive rationale of copyright and the objectives of protection under the 
acquis. Third, the main shortcomings of implementing the outlined normative 
framework under the current system of EU copyright were addressed. 
Pursuant to the analysis addressing the first overall research question, Chapter 
6 concluded that the development of the rights under the acquis reveals a much 
more nuanced picture of the scope of permissible exclusive control in relation to 
secondary dissemination than suggested by secondary EU law. Such develop-
ment was attributed to the changing circumstances of a work’s exploitation and 
the need for a flexible assessment of the situation at stake rather than relying on 
all-or-nothing rules. Four main observations pointing towards the convergence of 
the approaches under the CJEU jurisprudence and laying the ground for devel-
oping a common normative framework for the assessment of secondary dis-
semination were emphasised. 
These observations were the increasing emphasis on the exercise of the exclu-
sive right as the essential function of the right, the indication that the function of 
the right can be fulfilled through authorising each act of initial (primary) dis-
semination, the (in)explicit delineation between the primary and secondary acts 
of dissemination, and the flexibility exercised by the CJEU despite the envisaged 
application of the exhaustion principle or the absence of limits on the control over 
communication pursuant to Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive. These obser-
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vations also led to the conclusion that commencing the assessment from the dis-
tinction enshrined under secondary EU law in these circumstances results in an 
inconsistent approach to the scope of exclusive rights, which is to the detriment 
to legal certainty. Against this background, reconciling the approaches would be 
a timely development aiding the task of defining the appropriate scope of control 
over secondary dissemination accorded by exclusive rights. 
 
 
Proposed normative framework 
Chapter 6 addressed the second overall research question, namely a way to 
reconcile the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights pursuant 
to the developments under the acquis, by outlining a normative framework for 
assessing the justifiability of subjecting secondary dissemination to the right 
holder’s exclusive control. The normative framework builds upon the analysis of 
the development of the rights and has as an objective to provide an instrument for 
assessing whether extending the reach of the right is justified in a particular case 
of secondary dissemination. It is meant as an alternative to the all-or-nothing 
approach envisaged by the exhaustion principle enshrined under the Directives, 
which has been challenged, not least under CJEU jurisprudence. 
The framework relies on the assumption inherent to the distinction between 
material and immaterial dissemination rights, which is the notion that the function 
of the exclusive right can be fulfilled by the right holder authorising every 
primary communication of a work. Hence, submitting or exempting secondary 
communication from the reach of the exclusive right must be justified. Con-
trasting the criteria of the outlined framework with the predominantly incentive-
based rationale of copyright under the acquis led to dividing them into primary 
and ancillary elements. The primary criteria of the framework relate directly to 
the economic underpinning of the exclusive rights and the possibility of limiting 
their scope once their function has been fulfilled through the first authorisation 
of dissemination. Ancillary criteria reach beyond securing the right holder’s first-
mover advantage on a market and shall be carefully examined towards the clari-
fied objectives of the exclusive rights under the acquis. 
Primary criteria under the normative framework consist of three elements that 
are of primary importance to the assessment of the justifiability of subjecting acts 
of secondary dissemination to the exclusive control of the right holder as they 
ought to ensure the right holder’s control over every primary communication of 
a work. Exercise of the right through authorising initial dissemination is the first 
element and the basis for examining all the other criteria. Besides establishing the 
fact of authorisation of a work’s exploitation, the assessment of the element ought 
to take a notice of the envisaged circumstances of initial dissemination. It, in turn, 
shall also be taken into account when examining a possible interference of 
secondary dissemination with a work’s exploitation pursuant to the third primary 
criteria. 
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Second primary element is the relevance of remuneration obtained through 
the initial authorisation of dissemination, supported by the incentive rationale and 
the economic underpinning of the rights. It should neither be assumed that the 
absence of direct remuneration obtained through authorising initial commu-
nication justifies subjecting any secondary communication to exclusive rights, 
nor should it be accepted that obtaining remuneration for the initial authorisation 
justifies exempting any secondary communication from the reach of the exclusive 
rights. 
The last primary element is introduced to accommodate the assessment of the 
act of secondary communication itself. The third criterion is the interference of 
secondary communication with a work’s exploitation. It is obvious that subjecting 
any act that remotely interferes with exploitation of a work would shift the balance 
to serving a right holder’s interests, possibly at the expense of the broad public 
interest. Hence, the fine line of tolerable interference ought to be explored in 
conjunction with clarifying the rationales of the EU copyright acquis. 
Ancillary elements also consist of three criteria and could complement the 
primary ones, provided that the objectives of the exclusive rights under the acquis 
are clarified. The first ancillary element is reaching a potentially new public 
within the originally authorised area, arising from the CJEU’s tendency to give a 
new public a broad meaning while interpreting the intended public rather 
narrowly. Examining the relevance of reaching such a “new” public shall take 
into account the objectives behind exercising the right and the presence of other 
circumstances pointing towards the interference of secondary communication 
with exploitation of a work. The second ancillary element is the relevance of the 
fact that secondary communication might result in competition, especially on a 
primary market. The criterion could provide a ground for further fine-tuning of 
the assessment. However, the boundaries of permitted competition should be 
further explored, as the tendency has been to extend exclusive control to an extent 
eliminating any competition, which may be excessive. 
The third and last ancillary element is the relation between the foregone profit 
of the right holder and the revenue generated by a third party, which is closely 
connected to competition as an ancillary criterion. Whereas this element could 
play a role in assessing the possible interference with a work’s exploitation, it has 
been warned against assuming foregone profit where any revenue is made by a 
third party. Otherwise, it would advance the idea that any potential profit in 
(in)direct connection to a work ought to be attributed to the right holder. Equally 
to other ancillary elements, the relevance of foregone profit and generated value 
shall be examined in conjunction with clarifying the objectives of the exclusive 
rights under the acquis. 
Finally, Chapter 6 also discussed the main shortcomings of employing the 
criteria defined under the framework under the current system of EU secondary 
law. It has been concluded that the main obstacle is the broad scope of the right 
of communication to the public absent the mechanisms for restricting its reach 
where it might be necessary. Article 3(3) of the InfoSoc Directive upsets legal 
certainty in the light of CJEU jurisprudence and limits the leeway for the MS to 
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employ a more flexible and consistent approach to exclusive rights. The second 
shortcoming is the seemingly outdated exhaustion principle under Article 4(2) of 
the InfoSoc Directive, which is not flexible enough to account for the new reali-
ties of a work’s exploitation. Article 4(2) in conjunction with Article 3(3) unwar-
rantedly suggest that exempting secondary distribution of tangible copies is the 
only permissible limitation to exclusive control over secondary dissemination 
under the acquis. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis in this thesis has led to three main conclusions. First, given the 
variety of acts falling under the broad right of communication to the public, it is 
crucial to distinguish between primary and secondary acts of communication. 
Whereas the primary acts ought to fall under the exclusive right and require an 
authorisation (unless intentionally exempted pursuant to an exception or a limi-
tation), the scope of control accorded over secondary communication ought to 
vary depending on the circumstances of the case and the interests involved. In 
order to take into account interests other than the right holder’s, it is important to 
separate cases where there could be more room for examining the broad public 
interest, such as where the right holder has been given an opportunity to exercise 
the exclusive right in their best interest. 
The second conclusion is that the approaches to material and immaterial dis-
semination rights ought to be reconciled under the acquis, preferably on the 
legislative level as well as under CJEU jurisprudence. The distinction drawn at 
the outset of harmonisation appears to no longer serve any practical aim and 
obscures reality by suggesting the predetermined stance on the extent of appro-
priate exclusive control on the basis of once handy distinction. The importance 
of reconciling the approaches to material and immaterial dissemination rights is 
further supported by the intricate role of EU harmonisation in the MS’s ability to 
construct a flexible yet predicable framework under national law. 
The third conclusion takes the form of a list of proposed primary and ancillary 
criteria for examining the justifiability of subjecting secondary communication 
to the exclusive control of the right holder, pursuant to the developments and the 
conclusions above. Whereas these criteria stem, inter alia, from the observations 
under CJEU jurisprudence, application of the ancillary criteria should be accom-
panied by clarification of the objectives of the EU copyright acquis. Ancillary 
criteria might unduly favour the interests of the right holders at the cost of the 
public interest where the right holder exercised control over primary commu-
nication in their best interest. 
The findings of this thesis should be of interest to law and policy makers in 
the field of copyright. In particular, the results of the analysis provide arguments 
for considering introduction of limits to the reach of the exclusive rights in respect 
of secondary dissemination and aligning their scope to what is necessary to 
incentivise creation and exploitation of works. The normative framework outlined 
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in this thesis lists the circumstances which indicate that the incentive function of 
the right has been fulfilled. Hence, it could be useful for accommodating the 
conflicting interests involved in secondary dissemination of a work, such as 
consumer protection or competition. On the basis of the outlined primary criteria, 
the incentive function of exclusive rights could be deemed fulfilled, making room 
for pursuit of other objectives. 
As the conclusions in thesis are drawn with a view of reconciling the approaches 
to different rights through a common set of economically underpinned criteria, 
they ought to remain equally relevant in the constantly changing circumstances 
of a work’s exploitation. The need for a flexible approach to the exclusive control 
conferred by the rights, especially in respect of secondary communication, will 
only increase with new technologies offering more sophisticated control over the 
circumstances of a work’s communication and consumption. Also, the possible 
negative consequences of the broad exclusive rights will accentuate the need to 
strike a balance between the need for copyright protection and serving public 
interest. 
Further research is encouraged, in particular with respect to the ancillary 
elements of the outlined normative framework. These elements call for further 
analysis, as they lie outside the core incentive rationale of the acquis, on which 
the analysis in this thesis relied. In particular, the consequences of allocating 
exclusive control over secondary dissemination require an assessment towards 
the background of competition and consumer protection. Furthermore, the 
analysis of the appropriate scope of dissemination rights would also benefit from 
being complemented by studies on the appropriate limits of other rights such as 
the right of reproduction. 
In an attempt to systematise the developments under the acquis, this thesis 
demonstrated that there is little new about the considerations the CJEU operates 
with besides the very fact that contemplating them is not explicitly envisaged 
under secondary EU law. Given the vast developments which could hardly have 
been anticipated at the time of drafting the Directives, it is understandable that 
the Court strives for flexibility. However, now that the developments are evident, 
the time is ripe to reconsider the choices made at the outset of harmonisation and 
restore legal certainty, serving the rationales of protection without unduly 
favouring any of the involved interests.  
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Ühtne lähenemisviis materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õigustele 
Euroopa Liidu autoriõiguse arengu valguses 
Autoriõiguste kaitse peaks teenima avalikku huvi loometöö soodustamise ja 
teoste levitamise võimaldamise teel. Ainuõiguste kui autoriõiguste kaitse saavuta-
mise vahendi puuduseks on piiratum avalik juurdepääs kaitstud teostele ja kon-
kurentsi moonutamine. Seepärast ei ole ainuõigustega antav kontroll absoluutne, 
vaid peab piirduma sellega, mis on vajalik selleks, et teenida autoriõiguse ees-
märke. 
Tehnoloogia areng on seadnud kahtluse alla väljakujunenud lähenemisviisid, 
mida kasutatakse ainuõiguse kaitseulatuse määratlemiseks. Digitaalse keskkonna 
kui uue levitamiskanali esile kerkimine on seadnud kahtluse alla Euroopa Liidu 
teiseses õiguses loetletud materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste erista-
mise autoriõiguste vallas. Kuigi teisene õigus esmapilgul ei võimalda kehtestada 
üldpiirangut õiguste omaja kontrollile immateriaalse levitamise esmaste või tei-
seste toimingute üle, viitab Euroopa Liidu Kohtu värske praktika sellele, et eri-
nevate teoste kasutamise eripära nõuab paindlikumat lähenemisviisi. 
Väitekirjas uuritakse võtmetähtsusega varaliste õiguste arengut Euroopa Liidu 
autoriõiguses tehnoloogia arengu taustal ning materiaalse ja immateriaalse levi-
tamise õiguste eristamist Euroopa Liidu teiseses õiguses. Väitekirjas leitakse, et 
Euroopa Liidu autoriõiguse põhimõtted, millest lähtuvalt autoriõigusi ühtlustama 
asuti, on praeguseks aegunud ja tehakse ettepanek ühtlustada levitamisega seotud 
õiguste reguleerimise lähenemisviisid, võttes arvesse õigustiku arengut ja 
muutusi teoste kasutamisel. 
 
 
Sissejuhatus 
Digitaalne keskkond võimaldab pakkuda palju erinevaid teenuseid ja nõudmisel 
juurdepääsu (on-demand access) autoriõigusega kaitstud teostele on tegelikkuses 
kujunenud uueks standardiks.1354 Lisaks uuele levitamiskanalile võimaldab 
tehnoloogia teoste üle seninägematut kontrolli, sh nii veebipõhise juurdepääsu 
kui ka digitaalsete koopiate edastamise kontekstis.1355 Uue levitamiskanali paku-
tavad võimalused tõid kaasa autoriõiguse kaitseulatuse laienemise.1356 Rahvus-
vahelise autoriõiguse raamistiku olulised täiendused räägiti läbi 1990. aastatel, 
                                                                                             
1354  Õiguste omajate ja tarbijate saadava kasu kohta vt Waldfogel (2017), lk 208–210; 
Longhini (2016), lk 106. 
1355  Näiteks kohaldatavad tehnoloogilised kaitsemeetmed mitte üksnes ei jõusta litsentsi-
lepingute sätteid, vaid faktiliselt ka laiendavad kontrolli teose ja koopiate üle. Vt Poort (2018), 
lk 291.  
1356  Selle kohta, kuidas autoriõigused lähevad vastuollu uue tehnoloogiaga ja kuidas järk-
järgult laiendatakse õiguste ulatust vt Synodinou (2014), lk 81. Autoriõiguste kui laienevate 
ainuõiguste kohta vt Ohly (2009), lk 238. 
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kui veebikeskkond hakkas kujunema teoste kasutamise kanaliks.1357 Ühest küljest 
võimaldas selline õiguslik režiim koostoimes tehniliste lahendustega erinevaid 
ärimudeleid, mis pakkusid juurdepääsu seadusega kooskõlas olevale autori-
õigusega kaitstud sisule. Teisalt on see sisuliselt välistanud teoste teisese kasuta-
mise kolmandate isikute või lõppkasutaja poolt või seda pärssinud, minnes see-
juures vastuollu lõppkasutajate ootustega, mis on kujunenud välja analoogmaa-
ilma oludes.1358 
Ainuõigustega antava kontrolli laienemine ilmneb ka Euroopa Liidu (EL) 
tasandil, kus autorõiguse ühtlustamine lähtub kõrgetasemelise kaitse ees-
märgist.1359 Ainuõiguse piirangute ulatust mõjutanud kõrgetasemelise kaitse ees-
märki, teadlased laialdaselt kritiseerinud.1360 Laiad, kõikehõlmavad õigused koos-
toimes kitsalt määratletud ammendavalt loetelud piirangutega toovad kaasa eba-
kõla autoriõiguse kaitse tasakaalustamisel ja riivavad liikmesriikide vabadust 
oma lahenduste väljatöötamisel.1361 
Üks põhjuseid, miks digitaalset kasutust, mis näib olevat funktsionaalselt 
samaväärne tavalise füüsilise levitamisega, koheldakse erinevalt, seisneb selles, 
et ELi autoriõiguse ei tõmba sõnaselgelt piiri õiguste omaja ainukontrollile levi-
tamise üle, kui tegu ei ole füüsiliste koopiaga. Kuigi levitamisõiguse raames 
tunnustatud õiguste ammendumise põhimõte1362 viitab sellele, et ainuõigusest 
tulenev kontroll füüsiliste koopiate üle lõpeb pärast seda kui õiguse omaja on 
eksemplari võõrandanud, ei ole sellist õigust digitaalsete eksemplaride ega muude 
veebipõhiste levitamisvormide puhul. Sellist erinevat kohtlemist on selgitatud 
muu hulgas teose materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise erinevusega, mille 
puhul vaid esimene liik õigustab üldpiirangu seadmist ainuõiguse ulatusele. 
                                                                                             
1357  Eelkõige Maailma Intellektuaalse Omandi Organisatsiooni (WIPO) autoriõiguse lepingu 
sõlmimine Genfis 1996. aasta 20. detsembril (WIPO autoriõiguse leping) and 1994. aasta 
15. aprillil sõlmitud intellektuaalomandi õiguste kaubandusaspektide leping (TRIPS-leping). 
1358  Vt Guibault (2008). 
1359  Euroopa Liidu autoriõiguse õigustik tähendab Euroopa Liidu liikmesriikide ühiste kohus-
tuste kogumit autoriõiguse valdkonnas. Euroopa Liidu teisene õigus viitab õigustiku osale, 
mis koosneb direktiividest ja määrustest autoriõiguse valdkonnas. Kohtupraktika viitab Euroopa 
Liidu Kohtu praktikale õigustiku tõlgendamisel. 
1360  Vajaduse kohta võtta autorikeskse lähenemisviisi asemel omaks võrdsed mängureeglid vt 
Ohly (2009), lk 239–240. Kõrgetasemelise kaitse eesmärgi kahtluse alla seadmise kohta 
põhjusel, et see ilmtingimata ei soodusta loomingulisest ega innovatsiooni vt ka van Gompel 
(2017), lk 307.  
1361  Vt Ohly (2009), lk 236; van Eechoud jt. (2009), lk 94–118; Hugenholtz (2019), Rosen-
meier jt. (2019), lk 17–24. 
1362  Eesti intellektuaalse omandi teoorias kasutatakse levitamisõiguse lõppemise tähista-
miseks õiguste ammendumise (exhaustion of rights) mõistet. Eesti autoriõiguse seadus räägib 
õiguse teost levitada lõppemisest õiguse ammendumise põhimõtet otseselt nimetamata (§ 13). 
Eesti patendiseadus kasutab aga otsesõnu õiguste ammendumise mõistet (§ 171). Õiguste 
ammendumise mõiste on kasutuses ka teaduskirjanduses. Seetõttu lähtutakse sellest mõistest 
ka käesolevas töös. – Autoriõiguse seadus. – RT I 1992, 49, 615 … RT I, 19.03.2019, 55; 
Patendiseadus. – RT I 1994, 25, 406 … RT I, 19.03.2019, 59. 
346 
See erinevus on mõjutanud 1990. aastatel tehtud seadusandlikke valikuid. 
Materiaalset levitamist seostatakse füüsiliste eksemplaride levitamisega, mis 
võimaldab õiguste omajal saada hüvitist algse levitamistoimingu kaudu. 
Immateriaalne levitamine hõlmab aga teose edastamist ilma füüsilist eksemplari 
andmata, seega esituse, ülekande jms teel. Eristamise loogika peitub sisuliselt 
ainuõiguste majanduslikus õigustuses. Koopiate müümise teel saab õiguste 
omaja tasu iga koopia eest. Seevastu ei pruugi teose väärtus realiseeruda esita-
mise vormis esmakasutuse teel. 
Erinevust on kasutatud selleks, et eristada autoriõigustest tulenevaid ainu-
õigusi ja õigustada nende vastavaid piire. Euroopa Liidus on ühtlustatud pea-
mised levitamisega seotud õigused, s.o levitamisõigus ja õigus teost üldsusele 
edastada. Levitamisõigust on piiratud tuginedes õiguste ammendumisele esmase 
levitamisega, ent üldsusele edastamise õigus, mida seostatakse immateriaalse 
levitamisega, hõlmab nii teose üldsusele edastamise esmast toimingut kui ka 
hilisemaid toiminguid. 
Seega ehkki veebikeskkond võimaldab erinevaid teose edastamise viise, mis 
sarnanevad nii füüsilisele levitamisele kui ka esitamisele, käsitletakse veebi-
põhist levitamist ELi õiguse raames eelkõige mittefüüsilise levitamisena. See on 
toonud kaasa muu hulgas olukorra, kus teose üldsusele edastamisele puuduvad 
levitamisõiguse ammendumise (lõppemise) põhimõttega võrreldavad üldpiiran-
gud. Laialt määratletud teose üldsusele edastamise õigus, millega kaasneb ELi 
õigustikus lubatavate erandite kitsalt tõlgendatud ulatus, on toonud kaasa õiguste 
omajale antud kontrolli drastilise laienemise.1363 
Autoriõiguse valdkonnas Euroopa Liidu teisest õigust tõlgendav Euroopa 
Liidu Kohtu hiljutine praktika on seadnud kahtluse alla väljakujunenud arusaama 
veebipõhise levitamise homogeensest olemusest. Muu hulgas on kohus lubanud 
veebipõhiselt levitatud tarkvara edasimüüki, laiendades füüsilistele koopiatele 
kohaldatavat õiguste ammendumise põhimõtet ka veebipõhisele levitamisele.1364 
Lisaks on kohus mõningatel juhtudel leidnud, et üldsusele edastamise õigus ei 
ulatu esmaedastuse lubamisest kaugemale, kasutades seejuures lõppemisele 
sarnaseid argumente.1365 
Üldise arengu tähtsus on kolmetine. Esiteks õõnestas see õiguskindlust seoses 
õigustikust tulenevate ainuõiguste pakutava kaitse ulatusega. Funktsionaalselt 
sarnaseid toiminguid võidakse kohelda erinevalt, sõltuvalt sellest, kas levitamine 
toimub veebikeskkonnas ja levitatava teose liigist. Tehnoloogiapõhine lähene-
mine õiguste määratlemisele Euroopa Liidu teiseses õiguses ja pidevalt täienev 
Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika teevad õiguste piiramise võimalikkuse hindamise 
eripärade mõistmise keeruliseks. Üldsusele edastamise õiguse lai sõnastus aval-
                                                                                             
1363  Digitaalsete kasutusviiside lühikese loetelu kohta vt Hilty (2004), lk 766. 
1364  Palju kõlapinda tekitanud kohtuasi UsedSoft. Vt Euroopa Liidu Kohus, UsedSoft GmbH 
vs Oracle International Corp. (2012) Kohtuasi C-128/11, 2012. aasta 3. juuli otsus. Otsuse 
mõju piirdub senini vaid tarkvaraga, sest autoriõiguse muid esemeid reguleerib teine instru-
ment. 
1365  Sganga (2018b), lk 213, 227–228. 
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dab pärssivat mõju teose võimalikele teisestele kasutusviisidele, sest ei näi 
pakkuvat kasutajale lisaväärtust, kuigi õiguste omaja on saanud tasu esmase 
levitamise teel. Lõpetuseks teeb õiguskindluse puudumine keerukaks loa saamise 
teose kasutamiseks ja selliste lubade haldamise kollektiivse esindamise orga-
nisatsioonide poolt. Viimatinimetatud on püüdnud saada lisahüvitist üldsusele 
edastamise õiguse suurele ulatusele tuginedes.1366 
Hiljutised sündmused on põhjustanud arvukaid üleskutseid kaaluda ainu-
õiguste reguleerimise lähenemisviisi ja ulatuse muutmist ELi autoriõiguse õigus-
tiku raames, eriti seoses nende ulatuse piiritlemisega veebikeskkonnas.1367 Pea-
mine mure seisneb selles, et ELi autoriõiguse raamistik ei ole kuigi paindlik 
nende erinevate viiside mõistmisel, mil teost veebis levitada saab. See on ise-
äranis probleemne, arvestades ELi teisesest õigusest tulenevate varaliste õiguste 
ulatuslikku ühtlustatust.1368 Lisaks peab Euroopa Liidu Kohus navigeerima veebi-
keskkonnas tekkivate probleemide vahel tuginedes põhimõtetele, mis on sätes-
tatud direktiivides juba ammu enne selliste kasutusviiside esilekerkimist. 
Teose kasutamise olude areng võib nõuda uusi lähenemisviise kaitsemeetmete 
ulatuse reguleerimisel.1369 Traditsiooniliste paradigmade külge klammerdumine 
uute tehniliste võimaluste ajastul ei pruugi olla põhjendatud.1370 Ulatuses, milles 
teose tarbimist ja teisest kasutamist on võimalik veebikeskkonnas kontrollida, 
ületab selle, mis on võimalik või lubatud analoogmaailmas, ent ei ole autori-
õiguste kaitse aluseid silmas pidades ilmtingimata põhjendatud.1371 Euroopa 
Liidu õigustiku arengut silmas pidades analüüsitakse väitekirjas eeldusi, millest 
lähtuti ELi õiguse ühtlustamisel, samuti näidata, kuidas need eeldused on seatud 
kahtluse alla vajaduse poolt olla ainuõiguste piiride suhtes paindlik, ning selgi-
tada, kuidas lähenemisviise materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õigustele 
saaks paremini ühildada. 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
1366  Näiteks ülekande avaliku vastuvõtu eest. 
1367  Põhiargumentide kokkuvõttega tutvumiseks vt Rendas (2018), lk 155–160. Veebikesk-
konna kontekstist vt Hugenholtz jt. (2018), Ginsburg (2002), Rognstad (2015), Geiger (2017), 
Westkamp (2017), Depreeuw (2014). 
1368  Rognstad (2009), lk 532, 536. Vt ka Hiltyt, kes leiab, et liikmesriikidelt manööverdamis-
ruumi äravõtmisega sekkuvad Euroopa Liidu õigusaktid ka võimesse reageerida uutele 
vajadustele huvisid tasakaalustada. Hilty (2004), lk 766. 
1369  Vt Jennerit, kes nimetab arutelu sellest, kas tegu on allalaadimise või voogedastusega, 
mis paragrahvi alla see kuulub ning kus ja kes on omanik „mõistatuslikuks keskaegseks 
teleoloogiliseks aruteluks“. Jenner (2011), lk 59. 
1370  Autoriõiguse kui seadusandja leiutise kohta, mille piirjooni saab kujundada selliseks nagu 
meil vaja, vt Heide (2004), lk 102. 
1371  Näiteks turutõrke leevendamisele tuginevad autoriõiguste kaitse majanduslikud alused ei 
toeta ainuõiguste laiendamist toimingutele, millega turutõrget ei kaasne, nt individuaalsete 
koopiate käsutamine nende levitamisel ja järelturg. Vt Poort (2018), lk 331. 
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Väitekirja ulatus 
Väitekirjas uuritakse materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise erinevust levita-
misega seotud õiguste kujundamisel ELi autoriõiguses. Analüüs keskendub 
nende õiguste pakutava ainukontrolli ulatusele, mis ulatuvad kaugemale iga algse 
levitamistoimingu lubamisest. Selleks uuritakse ELi õigustiku raames kahe pea-
mise teose levitamisega seotud õiguse – levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse – arengut. 
Kontrolli ulatus ja piirid sõltuvad eeskätt autoriõiguste kaitse alustest ja ees-
märkidest.1372 Analüüsi aluseks on eeldus, et mitte ükski autoriõiguse aluseks 
olev teooria ei nõua kõikehõlmava kontrolli andmist teose üle. Euroopa Liidu 
õiguse arengu tulemusi hinnatakse materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eris-
tamisel valguses autoriõiguse kaitse soodustavatest alustest, rõhutades õiguste 
majanduslikku alust ja õiguste piire. 
Väitekirjal on kaks peamist eesmärki. Esiteks näidata, kuidas teose kasuta-
mise olude muutus on suunanud materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste 
ulatuse määratlemise lähenemisviiside koondumist ELi õigustikus. Teiseks 
pakkuda viisi, kuidas õigustiku arengut silmas pidades lähenemisviise ühtlustada, 
töötades välja normatiivse raamistiku, millest lähtuvalt hinnata, kas teose teisese 
levitamise allutamine õiguste omaja kontrollile on õigustatud. 
 
 
Uuringu ülesehitus 
Väitekirjas analüüsitakse kriitiliselt praeguses ELi teiseses õiguses sätestatud 
autoriõigusliku kaitse eeldusi, pidades silmas õiguse arengut ja muutusi teoste 
kasutamise. Lisaks teiseses õiguses sätestatud õiguste ja nende ulatuse ühtlusta-
mise uurimisele analüüsitakse väitekirjas seda, kas materiaalseid ja immateriaal-
seid õigusi eristatakse ka Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikas. Seejärel selgitatakse, 
kuidas materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste lähenemisviise saaks üht-
lustada hindamaks, kas teose teisese levitamise allutamine õiguste omaja kont-
rollile on põhjendatud. 
 
Väitekirjas esitatakse kaks üldist uurimisküsimust: 
1. Kuidas kajastab levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise õiguse areng Euroopa 
Liidu õigustikus materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste erinevust? 
2. Kuidas saaks lähenemisviise teose materiaalsele ja immateriaalsele levita-
misele ühtlustades määratleda õiguste omaja ainuõiguse ulatus selliselt, et 
puudub vajadus saada luba teose igakordseks edastamiseks? 
 
  
                                                                                             
1372  Ainuõiguste kui poliitilistest valikutest sõltuva nähtuse piiritlemise kohta vt Rognstad 
(2018), lk 123. 
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Kahele üldküsimusele vastamist toetavad täpsustavad küsimused. Esimesele üld-
küsimusele vastamisel tuginetakse alltoodud lisaküsimustele: 
o Kuidas ja millisel eesmärgil eristatakse materiaalset ja immateriaalset levita-
mist autoriõiguste kontekstis? Kuidas on eristamine seotud autoriõiguste alus-
tega ja kuivõrd tehnoloogia areng on selle kahtluse alla seadnud? 
o Mida tähendab materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eristamine ELi õigus-
tiku raames liikmesriikide õigusele ja õigusloomevabadusele? 
o Milline oli materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eristamine ELi teiseses 
õiguses ja mis olid seda suunavad jõud? 
o Mis asjaolud on mõjutanud levitamisõiguse, üldsusele edastamise õiguse ja 
õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte ühtlustamise vajadust ja vormi ELi õigus-
tiku raames? 
o Millist rolli on õiguste ammendumise põhimõte mänginud levitamise ainu-
õiguse ulatuse piiramisel materiaalse levitamise raames ELi teiseses õiguses? 
o Kas ja kuidas kajastab levitamisõiguse areng ELi autoriõiguse raamistikus 
materiaalset levitamist? Kas ja kuidas kajastab üldsusele edastamise õiguse 
areng immateriaalset levitamist? 
o Kuidas täidab õiguste ammendumise põhimõte materiaalse levitamise õiguse 
piiramise funktsiooni, arvestades tehnoloogia ja õigustiku edasist arengut? 
 
Teisele üldküsimusele vastamist toetavad esimese üldküsimuse analüüsi järel-
dused ja vastused alltoodud lisaküsimustele:  
o Mis viitab materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste lähenemisviiside 
ühtlustamisele ELi õigustiku raames? 
o Milliseid üldkriteeriume saab ELi õigustiku alusel kasutada selleks, et süste-
matiseerida kontrolli teisese edastamise üle, tuginedes algsele edastamisloale? 
Kuidas on need kriteeriumid seotud soodustavate alustega ja kaitse-eesmärki-
dega õigustiku raames? 
o Millised on peamised puudujäägid ELi kehtivas autoriõiguste raamistikus 
väljatöötatud kriteeriumite omaksvõtul? 
 
Väitekiri viitab teose levitamisele üldiselt, s.o kui mis tahes viisile edastada teose 
sisu üldsusele näiteks koopiate levitamise, esituse, peast esitamise, ülekande, 
voogedastuse vms teel. Teose „edastamine” võib keelelisest perspektiivist olla 
pisut sobivam termin ja seda kasutatakse vaheldumisi „levitamisega,” iseäranis 
väitekirja viimases, s.o 6. peatükis. Segaduse vältimiseks edastamise kui laias 
mõttes teose levitamise vahel ja üldsusele edastamise mõttes edastamise vahel 
eelistatakse väitekirjas ainuõiguste ulatuse analüüsi kontekstis terminit „levita-
mine”. 
Esimese üldküsimusega püütakse teha kindlaks, mis rolli on materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise õiguste eristamine mänginud ELi autoriõiguse ühtlus-
tamisel? Arvestades ELi õigusraamistikku, on vajalik kontrollida kaht aspekti, et 
esimesele küsimusele vastata. Esimene aspekt on see, kuidas materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise eristamine on mõjutanud ühtlustamist ELi teisese 
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õiguse alusel? Teine aspekt on see, kas edasine Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika 
areng toetab ELi teiseses õiguses tehtud eristust? 
Teine üldküsimus püüab pakkuda lahendust, kuidas ühtlustada lähenemis-
viisid materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õigustele ELi õigustiku arengu 
põhjal. Teisele küsimusele vastamiseks tuleb kontrollida kaht aspekti. Esimene 
aspekt on see, milliseid ühiseid kriteeriume saab iga algse edastuse lubamisele 
järgnevate õiguste ulatuse kohta tuletada õiguste arengust õigustiku raames. 
Teine aspekt on, kuidas neid kriteeriume võiks ühtlustada ühtse hindamis-
raamistiku piires ja kooskõlas ELi autoriõiguse õigustiku alustega. 
Analüüsis kasutatakse uurimisküsimustele vastamiseks nii kirjeldavaid kui ka 
normatiivseid meetodeid. Esimene küsimus, mis on olemuselt normatiivne, 
nõuab ka kehtiva õigusraamistiku kirjeldavat analüüsi. Selleks, et õigustiku 
raames õiguste arengut analüüsida, uuritakse materiaalse ja immateriaalse levita-
mise erinevust autoriõiguste kaitse aluseid silmas pidades. Euroopa Liidu autori-
õigusest tuleneva erisuse kasutamise tähtsust liikmesriikide õigusele vaadeldakse 
Skandinaavia riikide näitel.1373 Lisaks analüütilisele meetodile kasutatakse ka 
võrdlevat meetodit, et hinnata liikmesriikide õiguses kasutatud erinevaid lähe-
nemisviise õigustikust tulenevate kohustuste täitmise suhtes. 
Järgmiseks pöördub analüüs ELi autoriõiguste õigustikus sätestatud ainu-
õiguste poole, mis kajastavad erinevust materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise 
õiguse vahel. Uurimine algab edastamise ja levitamise ainuõiguste rahvus-
vahelisel ja ELi tasandil ühtlustamise tausta ajaloolise analüüsiga. Sel foonil 
käsitletakse ELi teisesest õigusest tulenevate õiguste ulatust grammatilise, 
kontekstilise ja teleoloogilise tõlgendamise meetodi abil. Seejärel analüüsitakse 
ainuõiguste arengut Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikas läbi materiaalse ja immate-
riaalse levitamise õiguste erisuse, mis kätkeb endas õiguse piiramist või laienda-
mist pärast iga levitamise esmast lubamist. 
Esimese üldküsimuse analüüsi ja järelduste pinnalt tuletatakse normatiivse 
raamistiku üldkriteeriumid hindamaks seda, kas teisese levitamise toimingute 
allutamine ainuõiguse omaja kontrollile on põhjendatud. Neid kriteeriume hinna-
takse autoriõiguse edendamist ja ELi õigustikust tulenevate õiguste majandus-
likke aluseid silmas pidades. Põhielemendid on hindamise aluseks, samas kui 
kõrvalelemendid täiendavad neid eeldusel, et õigustikust tulenevate ainuõiguste 
eesmärke täpsustatakse. Lõpetuseks rõhutatakse ELi teiseses õiguses loodud 
autoriõiguse raamistiku peamisi puudujääke pakutud kriteeriumite lisamisel 
hindamiskriteeriumitesse. 
Analüüsi toetavad erinevad allikad, sh õigusaktid, õigusakte ettevalmistavad 
aktid, kohtupraktika ja õigusteadlaste arvamused. Euroopa Liidu autoriõiguse 
õigustiku puhul, millele väitekirjas keskendustakse, analüüsitakse ELi esmase ja 
                                                                                             
1373  Nagu 2. peatükis selgitatud, iseloomustab Skandinaavia autoriõigust avaliku huvi kaal 
autoriõiguse kujundamisel ja ulatuslik teose kättesaadavaks tegemise õigus, mis on mõeldud 
tulema toime tehnoloogia arengust tingitud seadusloomeliste raskustega. Euroopa Liidu 
õigustikust tulenev ühtlustamine on piiranud võimalust teenida avalikku huvi ja kohandada 
raamistikku tehnoloogia arengule vastavalt. 
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teisese õiguse allikaid ja Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikat.1374 Kuigi levitamis-
õiguse ja edastamisõiguse arengu ajalooline analüüs käsitleb erinevaid autori-
õiguse valdkonna direktiive, keskendutakse analüüsis eeskätt infoühiskonna 
direktiivile, mis on varaliste õiguste ühtlustamise põhiinstrument.1375 Euroopa 
Liidu Kohtu praktika on õigustikust tulenevate õiguste arengu hindamisel samuti 
olulisel kohal, sest kohus mängib üha suuremat rolli ELi autoriõiguse ühtlusta-
misel hoolimata siduvate pretsedentide süsteemi puudumisest.1376 Lisaks õigus-
allikatele ja kohtupraktikale analüüsitakse õigusakte ettevalmistavaid akte. 
Kuigi rahvusvaheliste instrumentide analüüsi eesmärk ei ole anda kõike-
hõlmav ülevaade rahvusvahelisest õigusest tulenevatest kohustustest, vaid paigu-
tada muudatused autoriõiguse kujunemise laiemasse konteksti, võetakse arvesse 
mitmeid allikaid. Peamist huvi pakuvad Berni konventsiooni, WIPO autoriõiguse 
leping ja TRIPS-leping.1377 Lisaks nendele instrumentidele ja neid ettevalmista-
vatele aktidele hõlmab analüüs ka ülemaailmse autoriõiguse konventsiooni 
sätteid ja 1990. aastatel aset leidnud läbirääkimisi autoriõiguse valdkonna õigus-
aktide mudelsätete ja võimaliku Berni konventsiooni lisaprotokolli kohta. Ehkki 
mudelseaduse ja võimaliku lisaprotokolli üle peetud läbirääkimised ei päädinud 
siduvate instrumentide vastuvõtmisega, olid need aluseks hilisemale WIPO 
autoriõiguse lepingule ja aitasid mõista õiguste ühtlustamisele viinud asjaolusid. 
Analüüs Euroopa Liidu ühtlustatud õiguse mõjust liikmesriikide õigusele 
tugineb Skandinaavia, eeskätt Rootsi ja Norra autoriõiguse analüüsile. Uuritakse 
Rootsi ja Norra 1960. aastate autoriõiguse seaduste vastuvõtmisele eelnenud aru-
telu ja seaduse vastuvõtmise järel toimunud muutusi (sh Norra 2018. aasta autori-
õiguse seadust). Lisaks autoriõiguse seadustele analüüsitakse ka nende ette-
valmistusakte ja muudatusi, sest tegu on Skandinaavia autoriõiguse seisukohast 
oluliste tõlgendusallikatega. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
1374  Euroopa Liidu esmane õigus koosneb ELi aluslepingutest, samas kui teisene õigus selle 
väitekirja kontekstis koosneb autoriõiguse valdkonna direktiividest ja määrustest. Euroopa 
Liidu autoriõiguse õigustiku all peetakse väitekirjas läbivalt silmas ELi esmast ja teisest 
õigust, mida täiendab Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika, mis nii otseselt kui ka kaudselt 
määratlevad autoriõiguse ühtlustamise ulatuse ja sisu.  
1375  Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiiv 2001/29/EÜ, 22. mail 2001, autoriõiguse ja 
sellega kaasnevate õiguste teatavate aspektide ühtlustamise kohta infoühiskonnas. 22.6.2001. 
ELT L 167/10. 
1376  Selle kohta, et puudub formaalne pretsedentide süsteem ja et Euroopa Liidu Kohtu 
eelotsustel on oluline roll vt Rosati (2019), lk 73–85. Kohtupraktika rolli kohta ELi õigus-
loomes vt Hartley (2014), lk 71–72; eelotsuse taotluse menetluse ja õigusteadlaste osaluse 
kohta vt van Eechoud (2012). 
1377  Berni kirjandus- ja kunstiteoste kaitse konventsioon (muudetud 28.9.1979), WIPO autori-
õiguse leping (sõlmitud Genfis 20.12.1996); 1994. intellektuaalomandi õiguste kaubandus-
aspektide leping (allkirjastatud 15.4.1994). 
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Väitekirja ülesehitus 
Väitekiri jaguneb kolmeks põhiosaks. Esimeses osas paigutatakse analüüs 
konteksti, tuues esile raamistiku, millest lähtuvalt hinnatakse õiguste arengut ELi 
õigustiku alusel hilisemates peatükkides. Teises osas keskendutakse levitamisega 
seotud õiguste arengule õigustiku raames, tuginedes esimeses osas esile toodud 
raamistikule. Kolmas ja ühtlasi ka viimane osa väitekirjast käsitleb analüüsi tule-
musel tehtud tähelepanekuid ja vastatakse kahele üldisele uurimisküsimusele. 
Teises peatükis esitatakse analüüsi alused, paigutades materiaalse ja immate-
riaalse levitamise erinevuse autoriõiguse aluste laiemasse konteksti, iseäranis 
autoriõiguste kaitse majanduslike aluste konteksti. Arvestades, et väitekirja põhi-
rõhk on ELi autoriõiguse raamistikul, juhib peatükk tähelepanu ka tähtsusele, mis 
erisuse ELi teiseses õiguses sätestamisel on liikmesriikide õiguse seisukohast. 
Seejärel käsitletakse materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste vahelist 
erinevust selle taustal, et tehnoloogia areng muudab pidevalt teose kasutamise 
olusid ja sobiva kaitse ulatust ja rõhutatakse, et mineviku eeldustele tuginevate 
normatiivsete järelduste tegemine on ohtlik. 
Peatükkides 3–5 esitatakse levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise õiguse 
arengu analüüs, lähtudes tehtud tähelepanekutest ja 2. peatükis välja toodud 
raamistikust. Õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte kui levitamisõiguse olemuslik 
piir eraldatakse nimetatud õiguse analüüsist ja seda käsitletakse pikemalt 4. pea-
tükis. Peatükid 3–5 algavad õiguste ELi tasandil ühtlustamise tausta, sh rahvus-
vahelisest õigusest tulenevate asjaomast kohustuste tuvastamisega. Seejärel 
suundub analüüs õiguste arengu hindamise juurde materiaalse ja immateriaalse 
levitamise erisust silmas pidades. Viimases osas võrreldakse analüüsi käigus 
tehtud tähelepanekuid materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise omadustega, et 
illustreerida lähenemisviiside lähenemist. 
Kuuendas peatükis käsitletakse analüüsi tulemusel tehtud tähelepanekuid ja 
vastuseid kahele üldisele uurimisküsimusele. Peatüki esimeses osas tehakse 
kokkuvõte tuvastatud muudatustest, mis viitavad materiaalse ja immateriaalse 
levitamise õiguse lähenemisviiside lähenemisele õigustiku raames ja moodus-
tavad aluse lähenemisviiside ühtlustamiseks ühtse raamistiku kaudu. Selles osas 
esitatakse esimese üldise uurimisküsimuse kohta tehtud järeldused koos välja-
vaadetega teises osas esitatud normatiivse raamistiku kohta. 
Kuuenda peatüki teises osas esitatakse normatiivne raamistik, mis pakub kri-
teeriume teisese levitamise õiguste omaja kontrollile allutamise põhjendatuse 
hindamiseks tuginedes materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise lähenemisviiside 
ühtlustamisele vastavalt õigustiku arengule. Selles osas tuuakse esile normatiivse 
raamistiku põhi- ja kõrvalelemendid ja rõhutatakse ELi kehtiva teisese õiguse 
süsteemile tugineva raamistiku peamisi puuduseid. Kuues peatükk lõppeb teise 
üldküsimuse vastuse kokku võtmisega. 
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2. Materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise erinevus autoriõiguse aluste 
ja autoriõigusloome kontekstis 
Teises peatükis esitatakse taustateave Euroopa Liidu õigustikust tulenevate õiguste 
analüüsiks, mis järgnevates peatükkides ette võetakse. Esiteks paigutatakse selles 
materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise erinevus autoriõiguse aluste laiemasse 
konteksti ja foonile, milles autoriõiguse alused suunavad nende õigustega antud 
ainukontrolli ulatuse määramist. Teiseks käsitletakse selles seda, kuidas tehno-
loogia areng mõjutab teose kasutamise olusid ja sobiva kaitse ulatust, rõhutades 
mineviku eeldustele tuginevate järelduste – näiteks materiaalse või immateriaalse 
levitamise kontsepti – tegemise ohtlikkust. Kolmandaks rõhutatakse peatükis ELi 
õiguse ühtlustamise mõju liikmesriikide õigustele Skandinaavia riikide näitel. 
Neis õiguskordades tunnustatakse teistsuguseid autoriõiguse aluseid, mis ei ole 
ELi õiguses valdavalt tunnustamist leidnud. Üldiselt formuleeritud õigus teha 
teos kättesaadavaks, mis hõlmab kõiki kaitstud levitamistoiminguid, ei ole 
sisemise paindlikkuse jaoks piisav õigustikust tulenevast ühtlustamisest lähtuva 
toimingute liigituse tõttu. 
Enne kui vastata väitekirjas püsitatud kahele üldküsimusele, on vaja tuletada 
meelde autoriõiguse alused ja nende mõju ainuõiguste ulatusele. Sõltuvalt vaate-
nurgast annab arengu analüüs erinevaid tulemusi. Tutvustamata materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise erisust sellisena nagu seda mõisteti 1990. aastatel 
toimunud ühtlustamise ajal ja seda, kuidas see on seotud kaitse alustega, poleks 
taust täielik. Teises peatükis aidatakse vastata esimesele uurimisküsimusele, 
käsitledes alltoodud lisaküsimusi:  
 
Kuidas ja milleks eristatakse materiaalset ja immateriaalset levitamist autori-
õiguste kontekstis? Kuidas on erinevus seotud autoriõiguse alustega ja kuidas on 
tehnoloogia areng selle kahtluse alla seadnud? 
Mida tähendab materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eristamine ELi õigustiku 
raames liikmesriikide õigusele ja õigusloomevabadusele? 
 
Peatükk on jagatud neljaks osaks. Osas 2.1 esitatakse taust, käsitledes autori-
õiguse aluseid, eelkõige autori ainuõiguste majanduslikke põhjendusi. Seejärel 
liigutakse edasi autoriõiguse aluste juurde ELi õigustikus, pannes suuremat rõhku 
infoühiskonna direktiivile. Osa 2.2 on pühendatud mõjule, mida uute levitamis-
kanalite teke avaldab autoriõigusloomele ning erinevusele materiaalse ja immate-
riaalse levitamise vahel kui ainuõiguste eristamise alusele. Osas 2.3 uuritakse, 
kuidas õigustiku raames toimunud ühtlustamine on mõjutanud liikmesriikide 
paindlikkust kaitse sobivate piiride seadmisel ainuõiguste ulatuse määramise 
kaudu. Keskenduses Rootsile ja Norrale, uuritakse selles osas õigusrealistlikku 
mõtlemist, mis mõjutab Skandinaavia autoriõiguse aluseid, varaliste õiguste 
struktuuri ja muudatusi, mis järgnesid ELi autoriõiguse õigustiku ühtlustamisele. 
Osas 2.4 võetakse kokku peatükis tehtud tähelepanekud ja kirjeldatakse pea-
tükkides 3–5 kasutatud analüüsiprismat. 
Lühike peatus autoriõiguse teooriatel ja kaitse alustel näitab, et mitte ükski 
teooria ei nõua kõikehõlmavat kontrolli teose üle, sest autorite ja õiguste omajate 
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huve ei saa seada alati kõrgemale kõigi teiste omadest. Nagu ilmnes, on erinevus 
materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise vahel tihedalt seotud autoriõiguse majan-
duslike põhjendustega ja õigustab kaitset, mille aluseks on turutõrke kõrvalda-
mine või kultuuriväärtuste tootmise väliste aspektide muutmise sisemisteks 
aspektideks. Seetõttu on ainukontrolli andmine õigustatud ulatuses, milles see on 
vajalik konkreetse mure leevendamiseks. Kui tulemus on saavutatud, ei ole 
sekkumiseks rohkem õigustusi – see võib omakorda võimaldada keskenduda 
konkurentsiaspektile või muudele seotud huvidele üldiselt. 
Sobiv kaitsetase ja autoriõiguste õigustused on staatilised nähtused. Arves-
tades keerulist seost autoriõiguste kaitse ulatuse ja tehnoloogia arengu vahel, ei 
pruugi olla soovitav tugineda konkreetsel ajahetkel määratletud normidele, sest 
kasutusolud muutuvad väga kiiresti. Võttes arvesse ELi õiguse ühtlustamise üha 
kasvavat mõju, tuleks liikmesriikidele anda raamistik, mis on piisavalt paindlik 
selleks, et kohaneda vajadustega ja arvestada avaliku huviga. Arvestades ELi 
õigustiku hiljutist arengut, seisneb küsimus selles, kas laialt määratletud õigus 
oleks Skandinaavia autoriõiguses kasulik eeldusel, et seda täiendatakse vastava 
piiritlemismehhanismiga, mis arvestab oludega. 
Algselt kasulik eristus võib osutuda vastunäidustatuks, kui olud muutuvad. 
Kui kaitsevajaduse ja piiride tõmbamise vajaduse vahel tasakaalu leidmine on 
kõike muud kui lihtne ülesanne, siis ka kaasaegsete asjaolude põhjal konst-
rueeritud raamistikud võivad kiiresti ajale jalgu jääda. Ka veebipõhist levitamist, 
mis ei hõlma koopiaid, ei saa automaatselt samamoodi kohelda. Veebipõhist 
levitamist, mis hõlmab digitaalseid koopiaid, ei saa ilmtingimata kohelda viisil, 
mis on mõeldud selliste toimingute füüsilisele väljendusele. 
Teises peatükis esitatud analüüsile tuginedes analüüsitakse järgnevates pea-
tükkides levitamis- ja üldsusele edastamise õiguse arengut õigustiku raames 
materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise vaatenurgast, mis määratleti ühtlustamise 
alustamisel. Iga õiguse harmoniseerimise tausta analüüs keskendub nende koos-
kõlla viimisele materiaalse või immateriaalse levitamise põhjendustega. Õigus-
tiku edasist arengut eelkõige Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika valguses analüüsi-
takse lähtuvalt eeldusest, et ELi õigus eristab neid õigusi vastavalt materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise eristamisele. Analüüs algab majanduslike aluste vaate-
nurgast, s.o keskendudes Euroopa Liidu Kohtu põhjendustele, mis puudutavad 
õiguste omaja kontrolli teose kasutamise, teose turu, tasu ja konkurentsi üle. 
Oluline on, et analüüs keskendub teisese levitamise toimingutele, mis tugi-
nevad algselt lubatud toimingule, sest seal ilmnebki erinevus materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise vahel. See tähendab, et kuigi analüüsitakse õiguse 
tõlgendamise kohtupraktikat, on rõhk Euroopa Liidu Kohtu mõttekäigul kohtu-
asjades, kus õiguse omaja on lubanud esmase levitamise (nt koopiate levitamine, 
ülekandesignaali edastamine, teoste internetti postitamine) ja kus küsimus 
seisneb selles, kas konkreetne toiming, mis tugineb sellisele algsele toimingule 
(nt koopia edasimüük, signaali ümbersuunamine, üleslaaditud teosele hüper-
linkimine jne) nõuab samuti autori luba.  
Õiguse eristamise suunas arenemise hindamise aluseks on kaks põhieeldust. 
Esiteks, arvestades ainuõiguste majanduslikke aluseid eeldatakse, et kontroll iga 
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esmase levitamistoimingu üle pakub piisavat motivatsiooni teose loomiseks ja 
kasutamiseks. Samuti aktsepteeritakse, et ainuõigused – arvestades nende 
soodustavaid aluseid – annavad kontrolli iga uue kasutustoimingu üle. Ent küsi-
must sellest, kas iga teisene toiming, mis tugineb edastamise lubamisele, tuleks 
allutada ainukontrollile, ei saa lahendada pelgalt soodustuse loogikale tuginedes. 
Teine eeldus on, et esmaste ja teiseste levitamistoimingute erinevus võib olla 
etaloniks, mille põhjal hinnata ainuõigustega antava kontrolli ulatust. Seega 
selleks, et tuletada Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikast põhjendused õiguste ulatuse 
laiendamiseks kaugemale igast uuest levitamistoimingust, tugineb analüüs 
esmaste lubatud toiminute ja teiseste toimingute eristamisele. Sobiv kontroll 
teiseste toimingute üle võib sõltuda sellest, mil määral need riivavad teose kasuta-
mise motivatsiooni, mida tuleks kaitsta esmase toimingu üle teostatava kontrolli 
vormis või soodustuste alustest või koguni autoriõigusest väljapoole jäävatest 
kaalutlustest. 
 
 
3. Levitamisõigus, mis annab kontrolli materiaalse levitamise üle 
Kolmas peatükk uurib esmalevitamisele järgneva levitamise õiguse arengut ja 
levitamisõiguse ulatuse piiramise põhjendusi ning illustreerib seda, kuidas 
tehnoloogia areng on kujundanud seda ulatust ELi õigustiku raames. Arvestades, 
et väitekirjas keskendutakse üldjoontes materiaalse ja immateriaalne levitamise 
erinevusele kui alusele, millele tuginedes keelduda üldpiirangu seadmisest üld-
susele edastamise õigusega antava kontrolli ulatusele, keskendutakse selles pea-
tükis levitamisõigusele selle kitsas tähenduses, mis hõlmab eksemplaride ja 
omandi püsivama võõrandamise vorme, näiteks müüki. Kitsas tähenduses on see 
õigus ühtlustatud infoühiskonna direktiivi raames, mis on peamine instrument 
ELi autoriõiguse õigustiku raames. Vaatluse all on levitamisõiguse ja materiaalse 
levitamise kontsepti vaheline suhe. 
Koos 2., 4. ja 5. peatükiga püütakse selles peatükis vastata esimesele üldisele 
uurimisküsimusele, s.o kuidas kajastab levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse areng Euroopa Liidu õiguses materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eri-
nevust. Täpsemalt esitatakse selles peatükis alused õiguste ammendumise põhi-
mõtte kui levitamisõiguse piiri ühtlustamiseks, käsitledes alltoodud lisaküsimusi: 
 
Mis asjaolud on mõjutanud levitamisõiguse ühtlustamise vajadust ja vormi ELi 
õigustiku raames? 
Milline oli materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eristamine ELi teiseses õiguses 
ja mis olid seda suunavad jõud? 
Kas ja kuidas kajastab levitamisõiguse areng ELi autoriõiguse raamistikus mate-
riaalset levitamist? 
 
Peatükk on jagatud kolmeks osaks. Osas 3.1 esitatakse levitamisõiguse ühtlusta-
mise taust ELi õigustiku raames nii läbi autoriõiguse üldise arengu prisma kui ka 
autoriõiguse rahvusvahelise arengu prisma. Selles osas käsitletakse nelja olulist 
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aspekti: eraldi levitamisõiguse tunnustamise olulisus reprodutseerimisõigust 
silmas pidades; teisesele levitamisele ulatuva laia õiguse aktsepteerimine; erine-
vus omandi ja valduse vahel laenutusõiguse eristamise kontekstis; õiguse ühtlus-
tamine rahvusvahelisel tasandil. Osa 3.2 on pühendatud õiguse ühtlustamisele ja 
arendamisele ELi õigustiku raames. See algab levitamisõiguse ühtlustamise 
vajaduse uurimisega Euroopa Komisjoni poolt ja enne direktiivide vastuvõtmist 
Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikas ühtlustatud aspektidega. Seejärel liigutakse tark-
varadirektiivi ja infoühiskonna direktiivi ajaloo juurde, kaardistades õiguste 
sätestamise ajal õigustikus tehtud valikud. Lõpetuseks uuritakse Euroopa Liidu 
Kohtu praktikat direktiivide tõlgendamisel ja õiguse ulatuse kujundamisel vasta-
valt teose kasutamise olude muutumisele. Osas 3.3 hinnatakse seda, kas ja kuidas 
õigustikus sisalduv levitamisõigus kajastab direktiivide ühtlustamise ajal sõnas-
tatud materiaalse levitamise eeldusi. Selles osas keskendutakse õiguse kolmele 
aspektile: esmasele levitamisele järgneva ainukontrolli piiramist õigustavatele 
asjaoludele, esmasele levitamisele järgneva ainukontrolli laiendamisele viita-
vatele asjaoludele ja eseme kehalisusele kui materiaalse levitamise vältimatule/ 
välditavale omadusele. 
Õiguse ühtlustamise tausta analüüs õigustiku raames illustreerib ühist aru-
saama, et levitamisõigus peaks piirduma esmase levitamisega. Euroopa Liidu 
seadusandja on levitamisõiguse ühtlustamisel õigustiku raames tuginenud mate-
riaalse levitamise kontseptile, tunnustades laia õigust, mis hõlmab esmaseid ja 
teiseseid toiminguid, ent allutanud selle lõppemisprintsiibile, mis faktiliselt 
vabastab teisesed aktid loa andmisest. Õiguste omajatele kontrolli andmine teose 
koopiate iga esmase ringlusse laskmise üle ei olnud ühtlustamise ainus eesmärk. 
Kaks kriitilise tähtsusega asjaolu olid ühtlustamise ajal koopiate laenutusturu 
esile kerkimine ning turgu lõhestanud konflikt levitamise ainuõiguse ja kaupade 
vaba liikumise vahel Euroopa Majandusühenduses (EMÜ). 
Laia levitamisõiguse kehtestamine koostoimes levitamisõiguse lõppemisega 
läks infoühiskonna direktiivi raames aga kaugemale pelgalt riigisisese õiguse ja 
autoriõiguste territoriaalsuse konflikti lahendamisest kaupade vaba liikumise 
kontekstis ELis – see sisuliselt ühtlustas levitamisõiguse ulatuse riigisiseses 
õiguses. Ühtlustamise vorm laia õiguse kaudu, millega kaasneb õiguste ammen-
dumise põhimõte, kajastab materiaalse levitamise õiguste kontsepti, mille puhul 
kontroll teose iga esmase levitamise üle (s.o uute koopiate ringlusse laskmine) 
nõuab õiguste omaja luba ja järgnev levitamine luba ei nõua. Kui õiguste omaja 
kasutab teost nii, et annab igaks levitamiseks eraldi loa ja saab tasu iga koopia 
eest, piirdub tema kontroll muude eesmärkide saavutamisega, s.o kaupade vaba 
liikumisega EMÜs. 
Levitamisõiguse lõppemise reegli selgepiiriline sätestamine täielikku ühtlus-
tamist nõudva infoühiskonna direktiivi alusel näib olevat üsna staatiline, arves-
tades ELi õigustiku arengut, mis õiguse normatiivse ulatuse ümber kujundab. 
Euroopa Liidu Kohtu järgnev praktika viitab materiaalse levitamise paind-
likumale tõlgendamisele levitamisõiguse kontekstis võrreldes sellega, mida üht-
lustamise alustamisel ette kujutati. Esiteks laiendas kohus levitamisõiguse kohal-
damist juhtudele, mida seadusandja ette ei näinud, näiteks digitaalse levitamise 
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juhtudele. Teiseks, hoolimata sellest, et õiguste ammendumise põhimõte e nägi 
ette levitamisõiguse piiri, ei saa pelgalt lubatud levitamisele tuginedes teha 
rutakaid järeldusi järgneva kontrolli ulatuse kohta. 
Analüüsitud arengu kontekstis tundub õiguste ammendumise põhimõte kõik-
või-mitte-midagi lähenemisviis olevat ajale jalgu jäänud. Õiguste omajale levita-
misõiguse raames antud kontrolli ulatuse hindamine ei tugine enam pelgalt 
esmase või teisese levitamise kontseptile, millest räägitakse infoühiskonna direk-
tiivi artiklis 4, vaid üldisele hinnangule teose kasutamise olude kohta. Seega isegi 
näiliselt lihtsad juhtumid, mis hõlmavad füüsiliste koopiate levitamist, nõuavad 
üha individuaalsemalt hindamist. Seetõttu saab esile tõsta Euroopa Liidu Kohtu 
otsust kohtuasjas UsedSoft, kus kohus laiendas levitamisõigust või vähemasti 
õiguste ammendumise põhimõtet digitaalselt levitatud tarkvara koopiatele. Kui 
majanduslikus plaanis võib digitaalne levitamine olla väga sarnane füüsilise 
levitamisega nii nagu seda mõisteti õiguse ühtlustamise ajal, on ilmne, et vaja on 
arvestada enamate aspektidega. Arvestades kaitstud teoste ja digitaalse levita-
mise vormide mitmekesisust, nõuab peamisele turule või mis tahes uuele turule 
võimaliku sisulise sekkumise hindamine märksa nüansirikkamat analüüsi kui 
pelgalt algse loa andmise fakti tuvastamist. 
 
 
4. Õiguste ammendumise põhimõte kui vahend, mille abil 
piirata kontrolli edasise levitamise üle 
Neljandas peatükis uuritakse õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte positsiooni 
levitamisõiguse ulatuse piiramisel lähtudes füüsilise koopia levitamisest. Selles 
käsitletakse põhimõtte rolli ja potentsiaali kõnealuse õiguse piiramisel teose 
kasutamise olude muutuse kontekstis ja üha paindlikumat lähenemist õiguste 
omaja kontrolli ulatuse lubatavuse määratlemisele ELi õigustiku raames. Ana-
lüüsimisel lähtutakse lõppemise tasuteooriat ja varasemates peatükkides tehtud 
tähelepanekuid silmas pidades lõppemise kitsast tähendusest, mis on levitamis-
õiguse ulatust piirav erikonstruktsioon, mis tugineb tasu saamise võimaluse 
olemasolule. 
Koos 2., 3. ja 5. peatükiga püütakse selles peatükis vastata esimesele üldisele 
uurimisküsimusele, s.o kuidas kajastab levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse areng Euroopa Liidu õigusess materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise 
erinevust. Täpsemalt hindab see õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte tugevusi ja 
nõrkusi ainuõiguse ulatuse piiritlemisel tehnoloogia ja õigustiku arengut silmas 
pidades. Uuritakse alltoodud lisaküsimusi: 
 
Mis asjaolud on mõjutanud õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte ühtlustamise vaja-
dust ja vormi ELi õiguses? 
Millist rolli on õiguste ammendumise põhimõte mänginud levitamise ainuõiguse 
ulatuse piiramisel materiaalse levitamise raames ELi teiseses õiguses? 
Kuidas täidab õiguste ammendumise põhimõte materiaalse levitamise õiguse 
piiramise funktsiooni, arvestades tehnoloogia ja õiguse edasist arengut? 
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Peatükk on jagatud kolmeks osaks. Osas 4.1 kirjeldatakse põhimõtte ühtlustamise 
tausta. Lisaks rahvusvahelisel tasandil tehtud muudatustele käsitletakse kolme 
olulist aspekti, mis mõjutavad ühtlustamise vajadust ja ka vormi: teose koopiate 
laenutusturu teke, lõppemise kui poliitikavahendi territoriaalsus ning levitamis-
õiguse lõppemiseni viivate tingimuste tähtsus. Osas 4.2 käsitletakse põhimõtte 
ühtlustamist ELi õigustiku raames, alustades direktiivide abil ühtlustamisele eel-
nevast Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikast, eelkõige ühenduse õiguste ammendu-
mise põhimõtte kehtestamisest. Sellele järgneb õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte 
kujunemisloo analüüs tarkvaradirektiivi, laenutusdirektiivi ja infoühiskonna-
direktiivi põhjal. Osas 4.3 käsitletakse õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte rolli 
levitamisõiguse ulatuse piiramisel ja küsimust, kas põhimõte täidab oma üles-
annet, arvestades koopiate levitamisele keskenduvate turgude esile kerkimisega 
ja teiste kasutamise olude muutumisega. 
Põhimõtte rahvusvahelisel ja ELi tasandil ühtlustamise tausta analüüs näitab, 
et ühtlustamine teenis eesmärke, mis ulatusid märksa kaugemale pelgast kontrolli 
piiramisest teisese levitamise üle. Esiteks aitas põhimõtte sõnastuse piiritlemine 
koopia omandi üleandmisega kindlustada õiguse omaja ainukontrolli juba levi-
tatud koopiate edasise laenutamise üle. Teiseks oli põhimõtte territoriaalne 
määratlemine oluline rahvusvahelise kaubanduse jaoks autoriõiguse territoriaalse 
iseloomu tõttu. Kuigi katsed ühtlustada põhimõtet rahvusvahelisel tasandil on 
läbi kukkunud peamiselt lõppemise territoriaalset ulatust puudutavate eri-
meelsuste tõttu, toimus ELi õigustiku raames siiski ulatuslik ühtlustamine. 
Õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte e ühtlustamine ELi õigustikus teenis kaht eri-
nevat ent siiski omavahel seotud eesmärki: kõrvaldada autoriõiguste territoriaalse 
olemuse negatiivne mõju kaupade vabale liikumisele siseturul ja piirata (täiesti) 
ühtlustatud levitamisõiguse ulatust ELi teiseses õiguses.  
Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika edasisel arengul oli kaks olulist tagajärge 
õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte funktsioonile, milleks oli piirata kontrolli levi-
tamise üle materiaalse levitamise kontsepti raames. Esiteks on kitsas tähenduses 
lõppemise (sätestatud infoühiskonna direktiivis) kõik-või-mitte-midagi lähe-
nemisviis ilmselgelt kahtluse alla seatud. See tõstatab küsimuse õiguste ammen-
dumise põhimõttele tuginevalt loa olemasolu nõudest vabastatud toimingute ula-
tusest, ent annab ka mõista, et põhimõte ei anna enam selget pilti õiguste omaja 
õigustatud ootustest. Teiseks näitavad levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse areng, et kitsas tähenduses õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte sätestamine 
infoühiskonna direktiivis tingis järjepidevama ja süsteemsema lähenemisviisi tei-
seste levitamistoimingute üle lubatava kontrolli suhtes. Infoühiskonna direktiivi 
artikli 4 lõike 2 kõik-või-mitte-midagi lähenemisviis muutis põhimõtte laienda-
mise levitamisõigusest kaugemale ebasoovitavaks teose kasutamise olude 
muutumise valguses. 
Mõned kaasaja raskused, millega õiguste ammendumise põhimõte silmitsi 
seisab, saaks ületada kuulutades, et norm puudutab vaid füüsiliste koopiate edasi-
müüki tingimusel, et koopiaid pole oluliselt muudetud. Ent ELi tasandil, arves-
tades infoühiskonna direktiiviga ette nähtud täielikku ühtlustamist ja Euroopa 
Liidu Kohtu soovimatust asju liikmesriikide otsustada jätta, võib see veelgi 
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kahjustada õiguskindlust. Kuigi õiguste ammendumise põhimõte tekkis tõe-
poolest selleks, et vabastada koopiate teisene levitamine õiguste omaja kontrolli 
alt, on see ELi õigustikus muudetud levitamisõiguse ainsaks võimalikuks piiran-
guks ja lisaks on see teravas vastuolus muude levitamisega seotud õigustega, 
eeskätt üldsusele edastamise õigusega.  
Lõppemise tähenduse taandamist selle algsele kõrvaltähendusele toetatakse 
tingimusel, et lõppemist käsitletakse seejärel ka selle laiemas tähenduses, mille 
kohaselt see (osaliselt) piirab ainukontrolli levitamise üle pärast esmase loa and-
mist, mis võimaldab õiguse omajal saada sobivat tasu. Nagu üldsusele edastamise 
õigust käsitlevas 5. peatükis öeldud, viitab õigustiku areng sellele, et suur erine-
vus õiguste vahel, mis lähtub kitsas tähenduses õiguste ammendumise põhimõtte 
kohaldamise ebaselgest keelamisest, on mõjutanud järjepideva lähenemisviisi 
kujunemist vajaduse suhtes piirata või laiendada ainukontrolli teisese levitamise 
üle teose kasutamise olude muutumise tingimustes. 
Kuigi Euroopa Liidu Kohus on uuesti määratlenud lähenemisviisi materiaal-
sele levitamisele, võttes lisaks loa olemasolule arvesse ka kasutamise asjaolusid 
nagu 3. peatükist nähtub, ei anna direktiivides ühtlustatud l õiguste ammendu-
mise põhimõte enam selgelt pilti asjaomastest kaalutlustest. Ehkki see mängis 
otsustavat rolli levitamisõigusega antava kontrolli ulatuse kujundamisel direk-
tiivide raames ühtlustamise ajal, on hilisem asjade käik selle rolli pisendanud. 
Ehkki Euroopa Liidu Kohus on laiendanud põhimõtet mõnedele näiliselt funkt-
sionaalselt samaväärsetele digitaalse levitamise toimingutele, on vaieldav, kas 
tegu on arenguga õiges suunas või hoopis tegelikkuse moonutamisega ja õigus-
kindluse vähendamisega. Kuigi tulemus, milleks on teisese levitamise vabas-
tamine õiguste omaja loast, võib olla mõistlik, siis selle saavutamise meetmed 
kaugeltki nii mõistlikud pole. Arvestades ELi õigusest tuleneva õiguste ammen-
dumise põhimõtte tähenduse hägustumist, siis kõik-või-mitte-midagi lähenemis-
viisi kasutamine ei aita just kuigipalju kaasa autoriõiguse raamistiku kohenda-
misele nii, et see vastaks tänapäevastele vajadustele. 
 
 
5. Üldsusele edastamise õigus teose materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise vahel 
Viiendas peatükis uuritakse üldsusele edastamise õiguse arengut ELi õigustikus 
materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste ühtlustamise alustamisel lähtutud 
erisuste valguses. Kui üldsusele edastamise õigus, nii nagu seda praegusel ajal 
tuntakse, on mõjutatud nii tehnoloogia arengust kui ka seadusandja legitiimsest 
soovist tagada õiguste omaja kontroll teose kasutamise üle, siis laiapõhjalise ja 
tervet rida erinevaid analoog- ja digitaalse levitamise toiminguid hõlmava õiguse 
tunnustamine on ilmselgelt muutnud ainukontrolli andmise vajaduse tasakaalus-
tamise autoriõiguste kaitse muude alustega liiga raskeks. 
Koos 2., 3. ja 4. peatükiga püütakse selles peatükis vastata esimesele üldisele 
uurimisküsimusele selle kohta, kuidas kajastab levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele 
edastamise õiguse areng Euroopa Liidu õigustikus materiaalse ja immateriaalse 
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levitamise erinevust. Täpsemalt antakse peatüks edasi arusaam üldsusele edas-
tamise õiguse ühtlustamise alustest, sh selle teravast vastandamisest levitamis-
õigusega. Järgmiseks illustreeritakse, kuidas on nende õiguste vahelist jäika eris-
tust seatud kahtluse alla hilisema arengu käigus, käsitledes alltoodud lisa-
küsimusi: 
 
Mis asjaolud on mõjutanud üldsusele edastamise õiguse ühtlustamise vajadust ja 
vormi ELi õigustiku raames? 
Milline oli materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise eristamine ELi teiseses õiguses 
ja mis olid seda suunavad jõud? 
Kas ja kuidas kajastab üldsusele edastamise õiguse areng ELi autoriõiguse raamis-
tikus immateriaalset levitamist? 
 
Peatükk on jagatud kolmeks osaks. Osas 5.1 kirjeldatakse üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse ühtlustamise tausta ELi autoriõiguse õigustiku raames. Selles käsitletakse 
edastusõiguste arengut esitamisõigusest kuni WIPO autoriõiguse lepingu raames 
ühtlustatud edastamisõiguse laia kontseptini. Osas 5.2 keskendutakse üldsusele 
edastamise õiguse ühtlustamisele ELi teiseses õiguses ja sellele, kuidas Euroopa 
Liidu Kohus on õiguse piire kujundanud. Kuigi rõhk on infoühiskonna direktiivis 
ühtlustatud õigusel, käsitletakse selles osas ka teatud muid muutusi, mis on 
teisese suhtluse seisukohast olulised, nt satelliit- ja kaabellevi direktiiviga regu-
leeritud taasedastamist. Osas 5.3 hinnatakse üldsusele edastamise õiguse ulatuse 
arengut õigustiku raames ja seda, kuidas selle koht on muutunud materiaalse-
immateriaalse levitamise võrrandis. Selles osas keskendutakse kolmele pea-
misele aspektile: vaikimisi kontrolli andmine igasuguse hilisema edastamise üle; 
asjaolud, mis viitavad kontrolli ulatuse piiramisele pärast esmaedastamist; õigus-
vastasele edastamisele tuginevate teiseste toimingute positsioon.  
Üldsusele edastamise õiguse ühtlustamise taustast nähtub ELi teiseses õiguses, 
et ühtlustamise eesmärgid ulatusid kaugemale pelgalt WIPO autoriõiguse 
lepingust tulenevate kohustuste rakendamisest. Oluline, et mitte öelda peamine 
põhjus, miks kõnealune õigus sätestati infoühiskonna direktiivis, seisnes aru-
saamas, et kättesaadavaks tegemise õigus peaks sisaldama kujunemisjärgus digi-
taalsete ülekandelahenduste abil tehtavaid toiminguid. Asetades kättesaadavaks 
tegemise õiguse laima edastamise õiguse kohaldamisalasse, milles ühtlustatakse 
peaaegu kõik teose edastamise vormid, mis ei hõlma füüsilisi koopiaid, allutati 
faktiliselt samale kohtlemisele olemuslikult sootuks erinevad toimingud. Arves-
tades üldsusele edastamise õiguse täielikku ühtlustamist infoühiskonna direktiivi 
raames ja seda, et puudub mehhanism üksikjuhtumitel kaalul olevate asjaolude 
arvesse võtmiseks, kujunes välja kõike muud kui järjekindel raamistik. 
Laia õiguse eelis võib seisneda selles, et seda on lihtne kohandada vajadusele 
kaitsta teoste uusi kasutusviise. Siiski peavad sellega kaasnema mehhanismid, 
mis sobivad selle ulatuse piiritlemiseks vastavalt konkreetsetele asjaoludele, et 
vältida asjaomaste huvide ühekülgset teenimist. Infoühiskonna direktiivi artikli 3 
lõige 3 näiliselt välistab üldpiiri seadmise üldsusele edastamise õigusele, sest see 
õigus on olemuslikult immateriaalne. Kõnealuse sätte analüüs näitab, et selle alu-
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sed on väga ebamäärased. Kaasaegsest vaatenurgast on küsimus lahendatud 
ennatlikult ja see on teinud autoriõiguse raamistiku kohendamise digiajastule 
keeruliseks. Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika üldsusele edastamise õiguse tõlgen-
damise vallas infoühiskonna direktiivi raames üha kasvab ja lõviosa sellest puu-
dutab teisest edastamist, mis mingil viisil tugineb algselt lubatud edastamisele. 
Lisaks tugineb kohtu mõttekäik peamiselt majanduslikele kaalutlustele, ulatudes 
õiguse teostamisest ja sobivast tasust kuni turule sekkumiseni ja teisese edastuse 
tulundusliku olemuse asjakohasusele. Kuigi vaekausil olevate huvide kaalumist 
on eelistatud iga asjaomase toimingu allutamisele ainuõigusele, on seda ka palju 
kritiseeritud seadusandja tahtega vastuollu mineku ja sisuliselt õiguskindluse 
pärssimise tõttu. 
Peatükis sisalduv analüüs näitab, et on toimunud nihe üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse alla paigutuva levitamise edasisele kontrollile piiride seadmiselt piiran-
gute lubamisele teatud juhtudel. Ehkki õigus sätestati tuginedes immateriaalsuse 
eeldusele, mis ei võimaldanud piirata kontrolli teisese levitamise üle, on see 
osutunud ebasobivaks selgitamisel, miks teatud kasutusviisid tuleks ainu-
kontrollile allutada või sellest vabastada. Paljusid erinevaid, sh nii tuntud kui ka 
sootuks ootamatuid kasutusviise sisaldava õiguse puhul osutus kehtestatud jäikus 
teisese levitamise käsitlemisel vastunäidustatuks. 
Rõhutatakse kolme peamist tähelepanekut. Esiteks – hoolimata infoühiskonna 
direktiivi artikli 3 lõike 3 jäigast ent samas ka mitmetimõistetavast sõnastusest – 
võimaldab Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika vabastada ainukontrollist individuaal-
seid teisese levitamise toiminguid. On märkimisväärne, et artikli 3 lõiget 3 on 
mainitud vaid kohtuasjades, mis puudutavad loata esmast edastamist või toimin-
guid, mis küll tuginesid lubatud edastamisele, ent kujutasid endast erilist kasutus-
viisi. Teiseks, kuna direktiivi artikli 3 lõike 1 sõnastusest ei saa tuletada esmase 
ja teisese edastamise erinevust, näib kohtupraktika liikuvat selle tekitamise 
suunas. Kolmandaks on kohtu põhjendused teisese levitamise toimingute 
paigutamisele üldsusele edastamise õiguse alla eelkõige majanduslikud. Jättes 
kõrvale vastuolu artikli 3 lõike 3 ja kohtupraktika vahel, läheneb kohus paind-
likult sellele, kas konkreetse sekkumise ennetamine on üldsusele edastamise 
õiguse alusel lubatav. Sellest hoolimata on aluseesmärgid jäänud juhtumite käsit-
lemisel läbipaistmatuks ja normatiivsed suunised piirduvad ebamääraselt sõnas-
tatud kriteeriumitega – sellel on paratamatult erinev mõju eri liiki edastamisele. 
Seetõttu näitab analüüs, et kohtu hinnangu alused kohtuasjades, mis puudu-
tasid üldsusele edastamise õigust sarnanevad kaalutlustega, mida kasutati mate-
riaalse levitamise õigusi puudutavates kohtuasjades. Nendeks on teose kasuta-
misse sekkumine teisese levitamise toimingute puhul põhiturule või potentsiaal-
sele turule sekkumise teel. See tõstatab küsimuse, kas ELi autoriõiguse raamistik 
tervikuna saaks mingit kasu nende õiguste suhtes võetud lähenemisviiside üht-
lustamisest kõnealust asjade käiku silmas pidades. Peatüki järeldused haakuvad 
3. ja 4. peatükiga, et tuua välja esmasele edastamisele järgneva ainukontrolli ula-
tuse määratlemise raamistik, mis ühendab lähenemisviisid materiaalsele ja 
immateriaalsele levitamisele, selle asemel, et tugineda infoühiskonna direktiivi 
artikli 3 lõikele 3. 
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6. Ainukontrolli ulatuse määratlemine teisese levitamise 
üle Euroopa Liidu autoriõiguse õigustiku arengu valguses 
Kuuendas peatükis, mis tugineb 2.–5. peatükis tehtud tähelepanekutele, antakse 
vastus kahele üldisele uurimisküsimusele. Kuigi peatüki põhieesmärk on tuua 
välja normatiivne raamistik teisele üldküsimusele vastamiseks materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise suhtes võetud lähenemisviiside ühtlustamise alusel, esi-
tatakse selles ka taustateavet, tehes kokkuvõtteid 3.–5. peatükis sisalduva ana-
lüüsi käigus tehtud tähelepanekutest. Seega enne esimesele üldküsimusele vasta-
mist ja normatiivse raamistiku poole pöördumist uuritakse, mis on materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise õiguste lähenemisviiside ühtlustamise näidustused 
õigustiku raames?  
Seejärel – selleks, et tuua välja normatiivne raamistik hindamaks, kas teisese 
levitamise allutamine õiguste omaja kontrollile on õigustiku arengut silmas pida-
des põhjendatud – uuritakse, mis üldtingimusi saab kasutada süstematiseerimaks 
lähenemisviisi teisese edastamise üle teostatava kontrolli ulatusele. Loetletud 
kriteeriume vastandatakse autoriõiguse soodustavatele alustele ja ELi õiguses 
sisalduvatele ainuõiguste eesmärkidele, et rühmitada need põhi- ja kõrvalkaalut-
lusteks. Lõpetuseks asetab peatükk väljatöötatud normatiivse raamistiku ELi 
teisese õiguse konteksti, et uurida praeguse regulatiivse raamistiku puudujääke 
teisese levitamise hindamiseks väljatöötatud kriteeriumite kohaldamisel. 
Lisaks väitekirja kahele üldküsimusele vastamisel käsitletakse 6. peatükis 
lõppjäreldusi toetavaid lisaküsimusi:  
 
Mis on materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste lähenemisviiside ühtlusta-
mise näidustused ELi õigustiku raames? 
Milliseid üldkriteeriume saab ELi õigustiku alusel kasutada selleks, et süste-
matiseerida kontrolli teisese edastamise üle, tuginedes algsele edastamisloale? 
Kuidas on need kriteeriumid seotud soodustavate alustega ja kaitse-eesmärkidega 
õigustiku raames? 
Millised on peamised puudujäägid ELi kehtivas autoriõiguste raamistikus välja-
töötatud kriteeriumite omaksvõtul? 
 
Peatükk jaguneb kaheks osaks. Osas 6.1 esitatakse väljatöötatud normatiivse raa-
mistiku taust. Selleks tehakse kokkuvõte õigustiku arengust, mis viitab lähenemis-
viiside ühtlustumisele ja esitatakse järeldused seoses esimese üldise üürimis-
küsimusega. Osas 6.2 antakse ülevaade õigustiku raames teisese edastamise 
õiguste omaja ainukontrollile allutamise põhjenduste hindamise normatiivsest 
raamistikust. Selles osas tuuakse välja peamised ja täiendavad hindamis-
kriteeriumid ja autoriõiguse olemasoleva raamistiku puudus nende kohaldamisel 
ning esitatakse lõppjäreldused teise üldise uurimisküsimuse kohta. 
Väitekirja esimene üldine uurimisküsimus on järgmine: kuidas kajastab levi-
tamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise õiguse areng Euroopa Liidu õigustikus 
materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste erinevust? Nagu 2. peatükis leiti, 
ei ole materiaalne ja immateriaalne levitamise selgepiiriliselt erinevad mõisted, 
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vaid pigem õiguste süstematiseerimise viis, mida on kasutatud selgitamaks, miks 
saab teatud laadi levitamise (nt levitamisõigus) puhul üldiselt piirata õiguste ula-
tust esimese kasutamisega, samas kui teist laadi levitamise (nt edastusõigused) 
seda teha ei saa. Peatükkidest 3–5 ilmneb, et direktiivides tehtud seadusandlikud 
valikud sõltuvad paljudest erinevatest kaalutlustest, mitte pelgalt sellest, kui ula-
tusliku kontrolli iga erinev õigus teisese levitamise üle annab. Ühtlustamine 
tugines direktiivides muu hulgas Euroopa Liidu Kohtu eelnevale praktikale, 
milles uuriti riigisisese autoriõiguse vastuolu kaupade vaba liikumisega, mis nõu-
dis lõppemise teatud aspektide ühtlustamist, et vältida siseturu moonutamist. 
Arvestades levitamisõiguste suurt ulatust teatud liikmesriikide õiguses, tuli 
hoolitseda selle eest, et ELi teiseses õiguses ühtlustatud õiguste ammendumise 
põhimõte ei läheks vastuollu õiguste omaja kontrolliga selliste levitamisvormide 
üle nagu laenutamine. Arvestades asjaolu, et sätete sõnastus teenib korraga mitut 
eesmärki, on tähtis sõeluda teiseses õiguse sätestatud õiguste täpsest sõnastusest 
välja eeldused, millest lähtuti ainuõiguse ulatuse kavandamisel.  
Kui 1990. aastatel ei pruukinud kahe laialdaselt tunnustatud õiguse ühtlusta-
mine ühiselt aktsepteeritud eristusele tuginedes tunduda suure sammuna, siis 
tänases vaatepunktis näib see küll selline. Nagu 2. peatükis märgitud, on autori-
õigus tihedalt seotud tehnoloogia arenguga ja hulga erinevate levitamiskanalite 
teke iseäranis seoses interneti kasutuselevõtuga on autoriõigusele probleeme 
valmistanud. See on mõjutanud materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise erista-
mist. Olukorras, kus levitamine kolib üha enam veebikeskkonda ja peaks toi-
muma immateriaalses vormis, ei saa väita, et mitte ükski levitamismudel ei suuda 
tagada piisavat tasu, arvestades muu hulgas tehnoloogilisi meetmeid, mis anna-
vad laialdase kontrolli juurdepääsu ja teose tarbimise üle.  
Hoolimata levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise õiguse rangest eristamisest 
infoühiskonna direktiivis, on Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika nende kahe õiguse 
piirjooni tublisti hägustanud. Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikas on ühtlustatud palju 
autoriõiguse aspekte ja üldsusele edastamise õigus on pälvinud üsna suurt tähele-
panu. Selle olulisest annab tunnistust näiteks Norra autoriõigus, kus pärast ligi-
kaudu kolmekümne aasta pikkust ühtlustamist võeti laia kättesaadavaks tegemise 
õiguse raames kasutusele eraldi üldsusele edastamise kategooria, et tagada suju-
vam kooskõla ELi õigustikuga. 
Õiguste arengut ELi õigustiku raames analüüsiti peatükkides 3–5 selle erista-
mise vaatenurgast, mis tehti ühtlustamise alustamisel ning analüüsi tulemusel 
selgus, et praktikas seda eristust rangelt ei järgitud. Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika 
näitab palju nüansirohkemat pilti õigustest tuleneva kontrolli ulatusest, kui sätete 
sõnastuse põhjal võiks eeldada. Euroopa Liidu Kohus on kaldunud kaaluma 
laiemat pilti, mitte pelgalt keskendunud infoühiskonna direktiivi konkreetsele 
artiklile. Kuigi kohus on vähendanud õiguskindlust õigustikus sisalduvate 
kohustuste ulatust silmas pidades, on kohus toetanud paindlikku lähenemist sobiva 
kontrolli ulatusele lähtuvalt teose kasutamise asjaoludest. 
Hoolimata kohtupraktikast, mis näiliselt suurendas paindlikkust, põhjustas 
infoühiskonna direktiivis sätestatud eristus ebakõlasid. Kohus peab ikkagi alus-
tama hindamist tuginedes direktiivi sõnastusele, kus artikli 3 lõige 3 on iseäranis 
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mitmetähenduslik. Lisaks seda artiklit kohtupraktikas peaaegu ei mainitagi. 
Arvestades raskusi, mis tekivad kontrolli sobiva ulatuse hindamise erisusele, 
mida selles peatükis käsitletakse, jõutakse järeldusele, et õiguskindluse seisu-
kohast on väga tähtis erisus ümber mõtestada ja lähenemisviisid direktiivi raames 
ühtlustada. Arvestades, et lähenemisviise juba ühendatakse, oleks kohane käsit-
leda kolmkümmend aastat tagasi tehtud valikuid. 
Väitekirja teine üldküsimus on järgmine: kuidas saaks lähenemisviise mate-
riaalsele ja immateriaalsele levitamisele ühtlustada nii, et määratleda ainu-
õiguse ulatus selliselt, et puudub vajadus saada luba igaks teose üldsusele edas-
tamiseks? 
Küsimusele vastatakse 6. peatüki teises osas, kus tuuakse välja materiaalse ja 
immateriaalse levitamise lähenemisviiside ühtlustamise raamistik. Eesmärk on 
pakkuda välja kriteeriumite loetelu, mille põhjal hinnata, kas ainuõiguse omaja 
kontrolli laiendamine teisesele edastamisele on algselt lubatud levitamisele tugi-
nedes põhjendatud, arvestades õigustiku arengut, mida analüüsitakse peatükkides 
2–5. 
Seejärel visandatakse 6. peatükis raamistik, mis tugineb tähelepanekule, et 
levitamisõiguse ja üldsusele edastamise õiguse areng kajastab palju nüansi-
rohkemat suhet kui väljakujunenud eristus materiaalse ja immateriaalse levita-
mise õiguste vahel, kui seda võiks ELi teisese õiguse põhjal eeldada. Kui teisene 
õigus näib allutavat teisesed edastustoimingud ainukontrollile ja vabastab 
teisesed levitamistoimingud kontrollist, siis Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktika ei ole 
selles küsimuses kaugeltki mitte järjekindel. Nagu järeldati vastuses esimesele 
üldisele uurimisküsimusele, siis – võttes arvesse teose kasutamise olude muut-
mist ja õiguskindluse tähtsust ainuõigustega antava kontrolli ulatusele – oleks 
materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise suhtes võetud lähenemisviiside ühtlusta-
mine loogiline ja tervitatav samm.  
Pakutud normatiivne raamistik tugineb materiaalse ja immateriaalse levita-
mise õiguste erisusele. Teisisõnu on selle lähtepunktiks teiseste levitamistoimin-
gute eristamine esmastest toimingutest. Kui viimased paigutuvad alati ainuõiguse 
alla ja nõuavad õiguste omaja luba, siis esimesed vabastamine ainukontrollist 
võib olla põhjendatud olukorras, kus õiguste omaja on kasutanud ainuõigust oma 
parimates huvides. Erinevalt teisesest ELi õigusest, mis mõningatel juhtudel 
vabastab teisesed toimingud loa olemasolu nõudest pelgalt selle põhjal, et esma-
seks levitamiseks oli luba olemas ja teistel juhtudel lihtsalt ei võimalda piirangut, 
kätkeb välja pakutud raamistik endas nüansirohkemat lähenemisviisi. 
Raamistik koosneb kuuest elemendist, mis on tuletatud õigustiku arengu 
analüüsist ja jagatud põhi- ja lisakriteeriumiteks. Põhielemendid on vajalikud 
selleks, et tagada õiguste omaja kontroll teose iga kasutamise üle ja rajanevad 
eeldusel, et levitamise esimese lubamise kaudu on õiguste omajale antud või-
malus tasu saada. Lisakaalutlused aga näivad minevat kaugemale kaitse soodus-
tavatest alustest ja neid tuleks võtta arvesse tingimusel, et ainuõiguste eesmärgid 
õigustiku alusel on selged.  
Teisese levitamise hindamiseks on tuvastatud kolm põhielementi. Need kri-
teeriumid on esmatähtsad selleks, et hinnata, kas teisese levitamise toimingute 
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allutamine õiguste omaja ainukontrollile on põhjendatud, sest need peaksid 
tagama õiguste omaja kontrolli iga esmase edastamise üle. Need kolm elementi 
on õiguse kasutamine teose esmase edastamise teel, selle eest saadud tasu asja-
kohasus ja teisese toimingu mõju teose kasutamisele. 
Lisakriteeriumid koosnevad samuti kolmest elemendist, mis täiendavad esma-
seid kriteeriume. Kuna need kriteeriumid ei lähtu eeldusest, et õiguse funktsiooni 
on võimalik täita selle esimese kasutamise teel, tuleb kriteeriumite kasutamisel 
selleks, et hinnata, kas teisese levitamise toimingute allutamine õiguste omaja 
ainukontrollile on põhjendatud, esitada ka ainuõiguste täpsustatud eesmärgid 
õigustiku raames. Need kolm lisakaalutlust on: uue võimaliku auditooriumini 
jõudmine algselt lubatud piirkonnas; konkurents, iseäranis esmaturul; saamata 
jäänud tulu ja kolmanda isiku tekitatud tulu. 
Kuigi normatiivse raamistiku esile toomine selleks, et ühtlustada lähenemis-
viisid materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õigustele õigustiku raames, ei käsitle 
küsimust, kuidas peaks raamistikku praktikas rakendama, rõhutatakse ELi teisese 
õiguse olemasoleva süsteemi puuduseid esile toodud kriteeriumite määratlemisel. 
Esimene puudus seisneb üldsusele edastamise õiguse suures ulatuses, milles 
puuduvad mehhanismid vajadusel ulatuse piiramiseks või liikmesriikidele selleks 
piisava manööverdamisruumi jätmiseks. Lai õigus koostoimes infoühiskonna 
direktiivi artikli 3 lõikega 3 mitmetimõistetava sõnastusega pärsib õiguskindlust, 
viidates õiguse ulatusele, mida Euroopa Liidu Kohtu praktikas ei järgita. 
Kehtiva raamistiku teine puudus väljendub õiguste ammendumise põhimõttes, 
mis on kitsas tähenduses sätestatud infoühiskonna direktiivi artikli 4 lõikes 2. 
Tegu näib olevat aegunud sättega, sest see on üsna jäik juba levitatud koopiate 
uute kasutusviiside suhtes. See annab tarbetult mõista, et tegu on ainsa juhtumiga, 
mille puhul ainuõiguste ulatuse piiramine teisese edastuse üle on lubatud. Füüsi-
liste koopiate maailmas suutis säte tulla toime nii õiguse ulatuse piiramise funkt-
siooniga kui ka teose lõppkasutaja-poolse tarbimise üle teostatava kontrolli 
piiramise funktsiooniga, kuid digitaalses maailmas on need kaks eraldi ülesannet. 
Seega teisele üldküsimusele vastamiseks loetletakse kriteeriumid, millest 
lähtuvalt kontrollitakse seda, kas teisese edastamise toimingute allutamine 
õiguste omaja ainukontrollile on põhjendatud. Nende kriteeriumite aluseks on 
näidustused, mis viitavad järeldusele, et ainuõiguse funktsiooni saab täita iga 
kasutuse lubamise teel, mis teeb võimalikuks muude asjaomaste huvide arvesse 
võtmise. Sel põhjusel on tähtis, et hindamisel arvestatakse mitte üksnes algse 
edastamise lubamist, vaid ka teisese edastamise võimalikku mõju teose kasuta-
misele. Kokkuvõttes on väljatöötatud kriteeriumite eesmärgiks pakkuda alter-
natiivset lähenemisviisi kontrollimaks, kas õigustega antava ainukontrolli ulatus 
on sobiv, kui ühtlustada materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õigused ELi 
õigustiku arengut silmas pidades. 
 
 
Kokkuvõte 
Autoriõigus ei suuda kuidagi pidada sammu viimase kolme kümnendi jooksul 
toimunud tehnoloogia arenguga, eelkõige arvukate kasutusvõimalustega, mida 
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pakub internet. Alguses, pärast veebikeskkonna esiletõusu, kaitsti õiguste omaja 
kontrolli digitaalse levitamise üle rahvusvahelisel, riiklikul ja ELi tasandil. Täna 
kujutab üldsusele edastamise lai õigus, mis hõlmab teose tellimuspõhiseid kätte-
saadavaks tegemise toiminguid, üht kõige olulisemat muutust autoriõiguse aja-
loos. Muusika digitaalsete koopiate edastamine interneti teel või filmide voog-
edastus ei olnud 1990. aastate alguses veel võimalik. Sellest hoolimata pöörati 
vähe tähelepanu võimalikele vajadustele tulevikus kärpida laia õiguse ulatust. 
Sisuliselt hõlmab üldsusele edastamise õigus arvukalt erinevaid (samaväärseid) 
kasutusviise, millele varem kohaldati erinevaid ainuõigusi, millel oli erinev 
ulatus ja millele kehtisid erinevad piirangud.  
Nagu ELi autoriõiguse õigustikus sisalduvate peamiste levitamisega seotud 
õiguste arengu analüüs on näidanud, põhjustas edastamise lai õigus koostoimes 
ELi teises õiguses sisalduva erandite loeteluga olukorra, kus kaasaegsete 
levitamisolude hindamiseks pole kuigipalju paindlikkust. Arvestades üha kõike-
hõlmavamat ühtlustamist ELi õigustiku raames, on asjade käik piiranud liikmes-
riikide vabadust oma lahendused ise välja töötada ja loometöö soodustamise 
kõrval ise autoriõiguse eesmärkide saavutamisele kaasa aidata.  
Väitekiri keskendus sellele, kui oluline oli materiaalse ja immateriaalse levi-
tamise eristamine veebikeskkonna algusajal, et õigustada üldiste piiride seadmata 
jätmist üldsusele edastamise õiguse ulatusele ELi õigustikus. Väitekirjas uuriti, 
kuidas eristamise aluse eeldus mõjutas peamiste levitamisega seotud õiguste üht-
lustamist ELi teisese õiguse raames ja kas õigustiku areng ikka veel toetab seda 
eristamist. 
Analüüsi põhjal saab teha kolm põhijäreldust. Esiteks, arvestades erinevaid 
toiminguid, mis kuuluvad üldsusele edastamise laia õiguse alla, on tähtis eristada 
esmaseid ja teiseseid edastamistoiminguid. Kui esmased toimingud on hõlmatud 
ainuõigusega ja nõuavad luba (v.a juhul, kui need on vabastatud erandi või 
piirangu alusel), peaks teisese edastamise suhtes kohaldatava kontrolli ulatus 
sõltuma juhtumi asjaoludes ja asjaomastest huvidest. Selleks, et võtta arvesse 
muude isikute huve kui õiguse omaja huvid, on oluline eristada juhtumeid, kus 
ülekaaluka avaliku huvi kontrollimiseks on rohkem ruumi, arvestades asjaolu, et 
õiguse omajale anti võimalus kasutada ainuõigust oma parimates huvides. 
Teine järeldus on, et lähenemisviisid materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise 
õigustele tuleks õigustikus ühtlustada, soovitavalt nii õigusloome kui ka kohtu-
praktika tasandil. Ühtlustamise alguses aluseks võetud eristus ei teeni enam ühtki 
praktilist eesmärki ja hägustab tegelikkust seeläbi, et pakub välja ettemääratud 
positsiooni sobiva kontrolli ulatuse suhtes varasemalt käepärase eristuse põhjal. 
Materiaalse ja immateriaalse levitamise õiguste suhtes võetud lähenemisviiside 
ühtlustamise tähtsust kinnitab ka ELi ühtlustamise keeruline roll, arvestades 
liikmesriikide võimet luua paindlik ja samas etteaimatav raamistik riigisiseses 
õiguses.  
Kolmas järeldus väljendub pakutud põhi- ja lisakriteeriumite nimekirja näol, 
mis on mõeldud kontrollimaks, kas teisese edastamise toimingute allutamine 
õiguste omaja ainukontrollile on põhjendatud, pidades silmas toimunud arengut 
ja ülaltoodud järeldusi. Kriteeriumid tulenevad muu hulgas Euroopa Liidu Kohtu 
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praktikas tehtud tähelepanekutest, ent lisakriteeriumite kohaldamisega peab kaas-
nema ELi autoriõiguse õigustiku eesmärkide täpsustamine, sest need võivad 
põhjendamatult eelistada õiguste omajate huve avaliku huvi arvel, olgugi, et 
õiguste omaja teostas kontrolli esmase suhtluse üle enda parimates huvides. 
Väitekirjas tehtud tähelepanekud võiksid pakkuda huvi autoriõiguse vald-
konna seadusandjatele ja poliitikakujundajatele. Analüüsi tulemused esitavad 
argumente kaalumaks piiride kehtestamist ainuõiguste ulatusele ja nende joonda-
mist vastavalt sellele, mis on vajalik loovuse ja tööde kasutamise soodustamiseks. 
Väitekirjas välja toodud normatiivne raamistik loetleb asjaolud, mis näitavad, et 
õiguse soodustav funktsioon on täidetud. Seega võib raamistik olla kasulik 
selleks, et mahutada ära vastandlikud huvid, mida teose teisene levitamine hõl-
mab (nt tarbijakaitse või konkurents). Esile toodud põhikriteeriumite puhul võib 
ainuõiguste soodustava funktsiooni lugeda täidetuks, mistõttu muude eesmärkide 
poole püüdlemiseks on rohkem ruumi. 
Väitekirjas tehakse järeldusi sooviga ühtlustada erinevate õiguste suhtes 
võetud lähenemisviisid ühtse majanduslikult põhjendatud kriteeriumite abil, mis 
peaksid jääma sama asjakohaseks ka teose kasutamise olude muutumise korral. 
Vajadus ainuõiguste ulatuse suhtes paindliku lähenemisviisi järele, iseäranis 
seoses teisese edastamisega, üha suureneb, sest uued tehnoloogiad pakuvad 
detailsemat kontrolli teose edastamise olude ja tarbimise üle. Lisaks rõhutavad 
laia ainuõiguse võimalikud negatiivsed tagajärjed vajadust leida tasakaal autori-
õiguste kaitse vajaduse ja avalike huvide teenimise vahel.  
Täiendavad uuringud on soovitavad, eelkõige seoses välja toodud normatiivse 
raamistiku kõrvalelementidega. Need elemendid nõuavad täiendavat analüüsi, 
sest need paiknevad väljaspool autoriõiguse edendamise motivaatoreid, millele 
väitekirja analüüs tugineb. Eelkõige teisese levitamise üle ainukontrolli andmise 
tagajärg nõuab hinnangut, mis peab silmas konkurentsi ja tarbijakaitset. Lisaks 
oleks levitamisõiguste sobiva ulatuse analüüsil abi toest, mida saavad pakkuda 
teiste õiguste (nt reprodutseerimise õiguse) kohaste piiride kohta tehtud uurimused. 
Püüdes süstematiseerida õigustiku arengut, näitas väitekiri, et Euroopa Liidu 
Kohtu kasutatavates kaalutlustes on vähe uut peale asjaolu, et nende kasutamine 
ei ole ELi teiseses õiguses sõnaselgelt ette nähtud. Kohtu püüd paindlikkuse poole 
on mõistetav, arvestades tohutuid muutusi, mida direktiivide väljatöötamise ajal 
oli võimatu ette näha. Ent nüüd, kus need on ilmsed, on aeg küps ühtlustamise 
algusajal tehtud valikute revideerimiseks ja õiguskindluse taastamiseks nii, et see 
teeniks õiguste kaitse huve, seejuures asjaomaseid huve põhjendamatult soosimata. 
 
 
Kokkuvõtte tõlge eesti keelde: Taivo Liivak 
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